Manoj Jain v. Varsha Jain

Delhi High Court · 25 Sep 2025 · 2025:DHC:8524-DB
Anil Ksheterpal; Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar
MAT. APP. (F.C.) 84/2014
2025:DHC:8524-DB
family appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court dismissed the husband's appeal seeking divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion, upholding the Family Court's finding that he failed to prove the allegations and was himself guilty of desertion.

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MAT. APP. (F.C.) 84/2014
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
reserved on: 18.09.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 25.09.2025
MAT. APP. (F.C.) 84/2014, CM APPL. 42598/2024
MANOJ JAIN ....Appellant
Through: Ms. Geeta Luthra, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Rishabh Dahiya and
Mr. Akhil Ranganathan, Advs.
versus
VARSHA JAIN .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Mishika Singh, (DHCLSC) and Ms. Akshya Singh, Advs. with Respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

1. The present Appeal has been filed assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 31.05.2014 [hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’] whereby the petition filed by the Appellant/Husband under Section 13 (1) (i-a) and (i-b) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [hereinafter referred to as ‘HMA’] seeking dissolution of marriage from the Respondent/Wife, has been dismissed and the Appellant was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,63,500/- as travelling and defraying charges to the Respondent.

FACTUAL MATRIX

2. At the outset, it is appropriate to set out the relevant facts leading upto the present round of litigation between the parties. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 29.04.1997 according to Hindu Rites and Ceremonies at Vidisha, Madhya Pradesh. Out of the said wedlock, a male child was born on 19.06.1998. As per the case set out by the Appellant, the conflict between the parties ensued shortly after the wedding took place and the parties have been living separately since 21.01.2000 itself.

3. Thereafter, in the year 2004, the Appellant preferred a divorce petition under Section 13 (1) (i-a) and (i-b) of the HMA, before the learned Family Court, Tis Hazari, Delhi seeking dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The grounds for seeking divorce were that the Respondent used to behave erratically and subjected the Appellant to mental torture on various pretexts, amounting to cruelty. It was further alleged that the Respondent deliberately picked a fight with the Appellant on 21.01.2000 and thereafter left the matrimonial home while the Appellant was at work, thereby deserting him.

4. However, vide the Impugned Judgment, the Family Court concluded that the Appellant has failed to prove the grounds of cruelty and desertion on behalf of the Respondent and therefore the petition was dismissed. Being aggrieved, the Appellant has filed the present Appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

5. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant has contended that the Respondent has subjected the Appellant to mental cruelty both prior to and after the institution of the divorce petition. Prior to filing of the petition, the Respondent allegedly behaved disrespectfully, compelled the Appellant to relocate, left the matrimonial home on various occasions, refused physical intimacy with the Appellant and threatened self-harm during her second pregnancy. These allegations were contended to be supported by the testimonies of four witnesses including the Appellant. It is further contended that after the institution of the divorce petition by the Appellant, the Respondent filed multiple false complaints against the Appellant, all of which resulted in acquittal, discharge or closure. It is the case of the Appellant that the Respondent has made baseless accusations of adultery, without providing any supporting evidence.

6. On the issue of desertion, it has been contended by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that the Respondent left the matrimonial home on 21.01.2000, after voluntarily picking a fight with the Appellant before he left for his office. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant has highlighted contradictions in the Respondent’s written statement, evidence by way of affidavit and cross examination regarding the circumstances that led to her departure, to challenge the credibility of the facts and circumstances stated by her. It is also contended that despite genuine efforts made by the Appellant to bring her back, the Family Court erroneously relying upon his crossexamination on 05.02.2007, denied the relief on the ground that he was not presently willing to reside with the Respondent.

7. Per contra, on grounds of alleged cruelty, the learned counsel for the Respondent has contended that the allegations made by the Appellant are unsubstantiated, with no independent evidence led by the Appellant to support his case. Controverting the case made out by the Appellant regarding consistent interference of Respondent’s mother, attention of this Court has been drawn to the cross examination of PW-3, wherein a contrary admission was made by the said witness stating that the Respondent’s mother advised her to perform household chores in a better manner.

8. With regard to relocation, it is contended that the change in accommodation was due to the landlord’s objection to the Appellant’s behaviour towards the Respondent. The Appellant, however, failed to examine the landlord or produce any corroborative evidence. The allegations of misbehaviour have been stated to be of no relevance since no evidence in this regard has been produced by the Appellant before the Family Court. Moreover, it is the case of the Respondent that she was forced to terminate her second pregnancy by the Appellant and his family. Further, the Appellant’s contention that the Respondent denied him a physical relationship is stated to be contradicted by the record, which demonstrates that it was the Appellant who treated the Respondent with cruelty and ultimately deserted her.

9. As to the contention that the Respondent deserted the Appellant, it is submitted that Appellant physically assaulted the Respondent, causing her to fear for her life and safety. Resultantly, she was compelled to take shelter at her matrimonial uncle’s residence in Delhi. Further, reliance is placed on paragraph no.130 of the Impugned Judgment to state that it was the Appellant who deserted the Respondent.

10. Learned counsel for the Respondent has further contended that the Appellant was in an illicit relationship with Ms. S, in support of the said contention, reliance has been placed on the contradictory stands taken by the Appellant prior to and after one Mr. Alaudin, a travel agent, deposed that two tickets were booked by the Appellant on 21.03.2007 from Delhi to Kathmandu.

ANALYSIS

11. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and with their able assistance, perused the material on record.

12. At the outset, it must be noted that this Court had referred the parties to the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. However, the attempts at mediation failed and the parties are back to the courtroom.

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13. The Appellant has invoked Section 13 (1) (i-a) of the HMA and has made several contentions supporting his case, however, a perusal of the record available, shows that the Appellant has failed to substantiate the same by leading cogent evidence to support his case. Additionally, the testimonies of the witnesses relied upon by him include his own and those of interested witnesses, none of whom could be construed as neutral or independent in the light of the fact that either they are the relatives and/or friends of the Appellant. Moreover, the allegations of cruelty arising out of criminal complaints filed by the Respondent lack any proof of malice or falsity. It is settled law that merely filing of criminal complaints leading to either acquittal or dismissal of complaints is not sufficient to prove cruelty unless it is shown that the complaints were totally baseless, maliciously instituted and filed with an intent to harass the person against whom such complaints have been instituted.

14. The Supreme Court in K. Srinivas Rao v D.A. Deepa[1] has held that the burden to prove malicious prosecution lies squarely on the party alleging it. This principle aligns with the evidentiary burden prescribed under Sections 101 and 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as per which the burden to prove an asserted fact rests on the person asserting it. Consequently, the Appellant cannot shift a negative onus onto the Respondent to prove that her complaints were genuine and true, unless he first establishes that they were prima facie false and/or motivated. A perusal of the record shows that the Appellant has failed to discharge this burden.

15. With respect to the Appellant’s allegation of desertion under Section 13 (1) (i-b) of the HMA, this Court finds no merit in the contentions raised by the Appellant. The Family Court after considering the pleadings, documentary evidence and witness testimonies has rightly rendered a categorical finding that it was the Appellant who deserted the Respondent. Such finding falls against the allegations made by the Appellant in view of his conduct during crossexamination, wherein he categorically stated that he is not willing to reside with the Respondent, thereby lacking an intent to continue the matrimonial relationship. This particular admission by the Appellant defeats any plea taken that he made efforts to bring the Respondent back or that she had left without justification.

16. In addition, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the Respondent drew the attention of this Court to the statements made and evidence adduced before the Family Court regarding the Appellant’s illicit relationship with Ms. S. It is trite law that in matrimonial cases, the standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as also reaffirmed in Dr. N.G. Dastane v Mrs. S. Dastane[2]. In the case at hand, documentary evidence such as call records and Air Tickets to Kathmandu, Nepal on 21.03.2007 coupled with the testimony of Mr. Alaudin and the Appellant’s initial denial followed by his contradictory statement immediately after the deposition of Mr. Alaudin is sufficient to raise a doubt on the credibility of the Appellant, supporting the Respondent’s allegation.

17. In light of the above facts and circumstances, Section 23(1)(a) of the HMA becomes operative. This provision explicitly puts a bar on any person from seeking a relief under the Act if he or she is taking advantage of his or her own wrong. The Appellant, having failed to prove his case on the grounds of cruelty and desertion, cannot be permitted to take benefit of his own wrong. Moreover, the Appellant’s AIR 1975 SC 1534 categorical unwillingness to live with the Respondent coupled with a suspicion of an extramarital affair, disentitles him from seeking a decree of divorce under the equitable jurisdiction of this Court.

CONCLUSION

18. Accordingly, in light of the above findings, it is concluded that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate any illegality, perversity or procedural impropriety in the Impugned Judgement warranting interference by this Court. The findings of the Family Court are based on record, including the testimonies of witnesses and documents placed on record before it by both the parties.

19. In view of the aforesaid discussion on facts and law, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the Impugned Judgment passed by the Family Court.

20. Having found no merit, the present Appeal, along with the pending application, is accordingly dismissed. ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. SEPTEMBER 25, 2025 jai/hr