Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi v. Jyotsna Bedi

Delhi High Court · 25 Sep 2025 · 2025:DHC:8566-DB
Anil Ksheterpal; Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar
EFA(OS) 13/2025
2025:DHC:8566-DB
civil appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld the execution of a consent decree granting lifetime residential possession, rejecting attempts to defeat it via prior agreements and property alterations.

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EFA(OS) 13/2025
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
reserved on: 16.09.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 25.09.2025
EFA(OS) 13/2025, CM APPL. 56103/2025 and CM APPL.
56104/2025 TIKKA BRIJINDER SINGH BEDI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Krishna Datta Multani, Mr. Zeeshan Diwan, Mr. Joel James, Mr. Harsha & Ms. Ankita Yadav, Advocates.
versus
JYOTSNA BEDI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Giriraj Subramanium, Mr. Prayuj Sharma, Ms. Bijaharini G., Mr. Jaisal Baath & Mr. Simarpal Singh Sawhney, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

1. Through the present Appeal filed under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, read with Order XXI Rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as “CPC”] the Appellant assails the correctness of judgment and final order dated 03.09.2025 [hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Order”] passed by the learned Single Judge.

BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX:

2. The present matter arises out of a civil suit bearing CS(OS) NO. 52/2024 filed by the Respondent/Ms. Jyotsna Bedi, before the learned Single Judge seeking partition and declaration in respect of property bearing No.132, Golf Links, New Delhi [hereinafter referred to as “Suit Property”].

3. The aforesaid suit arises out against the validity of the Will dated 19.01.1991 [hereinafter referred to as “Will of 1991”] and the Joint Family Agreement dated 07.08.1992 [hereinafter referred to as “JFA”], under which the Suit Property stood in the name of the Appellant/Mr. Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi. The said Civil Suit culminated in a Consent Decree dated 30.01.2024, whereby the parties agreed to abide by the JFA. The Appellant/Judgment Debtor has assailed this order on the grounds that it results in unjust enrichment of the Respondent, ignores the effect of pre-decreetal agreements and fails to consider the practical impossibility of execution in the circumstances. The terms of the JFA as recorded in the decree sought to be executed herein, are reproduced below, for reference: “The parties 1 will act is good faith and will not act against the spirit of this agreement. The relevant portion of MOU are extracted herein below:

5. That the 2nd Floor Flat shall be given to Ms. Jyotsna Bedi for her residential use for her life time. Thereafter the possession shall revert back to Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi or to Tikka Angad Singh Bedi in the event of death of Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi.

6. That party No. 7 shall have no right to part with or handover possession of the same i.e.2nd Floor Flat to anybody else other than party No. 3 or his son. However party No. 3 cannot sell the Building 132, Golf Links without explicit written permission of Party No. 7.

7. That it is specifically agreed that Party No. 7 shall keep the Flat only for her personal use and only for her life till time. The title of the same shall remain in the name of Tikka B.S. Bedi (Party No. 3) or Tikka Angad Singh Bedi as the case may be.

8. That Party No. 7 shall have no right to will the flat to anybody.”

4. In order to understand the inter-se relationship between the parties, it is appropriate to draw a small pedigree table on the basis of the suit filed by the Respondents herein:

5. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as under: i. The disputes pertain to the ownership and succession of the Suit Property after the death of the Late Sh. J. S. Bedi, the validity and effect of the Will of 1991 and JFA, the scope of the Respondent’s limited residential rights under the JFA, the impact of the Agreement dated 27.05.2019 [hereinafter referred to as “Agreement of 2019”], whereby the Respondent had agreed to monetize her rights for a sum of Rs. 4 Crores out of which Rs. 77 Lakhs were paid, and the Consent Decree executed on 30.01.2024 seeking possession of the second floor of the suit property. The father of the parties, Late Sh. J. S. Bedi, Swarn K. Bedi-Wife of J.S. Bedi (Granted lifetime right under Will & JFA) Late Sh. J.S. Bedi (Original owner of 132, Golf Links, New Delhi) Other Siblings  Signatories to Joint Family Agreement dated 07.08.1992 Ms. Neelmani Singh [Special Power of Attorney Holder] Ms. Jyotsna Bedi [Respondent- Decree Holder] Mr. Tikka Brijender Singh Bedi [Appellant- Judgment Debtor] executed a total of four Wills during his lifetime: registered Wills dated 23.12.1977, 03.06.1985, and 01.09.1989, and the last and final Will dated 19.01.1991, which was unregistered. The relevant portions of aforesaid Agreement of 2019 are reproduced below: “This agreement is agreed on this 27th day of May 2019 between Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi and Ms. Jyotsna Bedi, that,

1. Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi will pay a sum of Rs. 4,00,00,000=00(Rupees Four Crores Only) to Ms. Jyotsna Bedi for Settlement and, after the payment is made in full, for relinquishment of any and all her rights arising now or in the future in relation to property 132Golf Links, or otherwise. This full and final settlement amount will be paid as under a) Rs. 10,00,000=00 (Rupees Ten Lakh Only) as earnest money a tthe time of signing of this Agreement by transfer to her account in the USA. b) Rs. 1,90,00,000=00 (Rupees One Crore Ninety Lakh Only) on or before 1 7/10/2019 c) Rs. 2,00,00,000=00 (Rupees Two Crore Only) on or before17/12/2019, December 17th 2019.

2. The Above arrangement is being secured by Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi by two post dated cheques to be kept in custody of Mr. M. S. Sawhney and scanned copies of which are attached to this Agreement. Mr. M.S. Sawhney will deliver the checks to Jyotsna Bedi on the due date.

3. Tikka B S Bedi also agrees to pay a sum of Rs. 10,50,000=00 (TenLakh Fitly Thousand Only) over and above the amount of Rs.4,00,00,000=00 (Rupees Four Crores Only) in consideration for Ms. Jyotsna Bedi agreeing to the payment milestones specified above, (of which Ms. Jyotsna Bedi acknowledges receipt of Rs. 8,00,000/= and balance, Rs. 2,50,000/= will be immediately transferred to her account in the USA.

4. Simultaneously with the receipt of the last installment of Rs.2,00,00,000=00 (Rupees Two Crore Only) under 1 (c) above, Ms. Jyotsna Bedi will sign and register the Relinquishment Deed, for relinquishment of any and all her rights arising now or in the future in relation to prope1iy 132 Golf Links, or otherwise.

5. M.s Jyotsna Bedi will as and when required, sign any and all documents required to secure and clear the title of Tikka BrijinderSingh Bedi for the property 132 Golf Links, New Delhi-

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110003.

6. Ms. Jyotsna Bedi will immediately withdraw all complaints that may have been made by her/on her behalf to the L&DO against Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi in regards to property 132 Golf Links, New Delhi- 110003 and shall not do anything which is detrimental to him and may act contrary to this Clause 6 only in case of failure of fulfilment of this agreement by December 21st 2019.” ii. The Impugned Judgment passed in Execution Petition NO. 28/2024 is challenged in the present Execution First Appeal. It is claimed by the Appellant that the learned Single Judge disregarded the objections raised by him under Section 47 of the CPC, and overlooked the Agreement of 2019 that had monetized the Respondent’s rights, and directed appointment of a Bailiff with liberty to seek police assistance for delivery of possession of the second floor to the Respondent.

6. The relevant portion of the Impugned Order is extracted below: “15.In the present case, it is pertinent to note that the 2019 agreement was entered into by the parties, prior to the institution of the original civil suit, therefore, neither can the same be deemed to be an agreement intending to end litigation between the parties, nor can it be interpreted as to fore close the right to execute the present decree or affect the execution of the same.

16. If judgment and decree sought to be executed is looked into in the aforesaid context, it would appear that the parties have agreed to act upon the MoU.

17. It is thus seen that there is no illegality, irregularity or any inconsistency in the impugned judgment and decree which is sought to be executed. ………………….

21. The aforesaid position is reemphasized to conclude that the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree sought to be executed and has to take the decree according to its tenor.

22. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that the judgment debtor herein could have sought incorporation of the terms of the 2019 agreement in the consent judgment/decree at the time the judgment was passed or sought necessary modification subsequently.

23. The impugned judgment and decree sought to be executed, was passed on 30.01.2024, and the present proceedings came to be filed on20.04.2024. Since then, the matter has been taken up on various dates for consideration. However, the defendant/ judgment-debtor has completely failed to take any steps to get his grievance mitigated if he had any, under law............................

25. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the Court finds that there is no substance in the objections raised by the judgmentdebtor. The consent decree sought to be executed records only that the terms of the MoU should be given effect to by the parties. Although, the 2019 agreement may have been entered into by the parties, however, the same does not form part of the consent decree sought to be executed in the instant execution proceedings.

26. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the Court is bound to execute the judgment and decree which has been passed by this Court on 30.01.2024.The said order, in clause no. 5 of the terms of compromise, clearly records that the possession of the property in question is to be given to the decree holder herein.”

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:

7. Learned senior counsel representing the Appellant/Judgment Debtor has made the following submissions: i. There is no decree for delivery of possession, hence, the Impugned Order is not in accordance with the decree. ii. Moreover, originally the property was constructed over a plot of 335 sq. yds. and with the efforts of the Appellant/Judgment Debtor, there was a further allotment of 80 sq. yds. Now, the total area of the plot is 415 sq. yds. and the Appellant/Judgment Debtor has made substantial changes, as initially the second floor comprised of only a single room, and the Appellant/Judgment Debtor undertook to construct another room. Whereas now, it is a complete three-bedroom apartment with a living room and lobby (dining lounge). Hence, the decree is not executable. iii. In the end, it was contended that the Appellant/Judgment Debtor is prepared to deliver possession of two bedrooms and a living room to the Respondent/Decree Holder. It is also contended that, for enforcement of dishonoured cheques handed over to the Respondent/Decree Holder, the Appellant/Judgment Debtor has initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [hereinafter referred to as “NI Act”], and that the property is now in the possession of a tenant, namely, the World Bank.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:

8. Per contra, learned counsel representing the Respondent/Decree Holder has defended the Impugned Judgment. Reliance was placed upon the judgment passed on 30.01.2024 by this Court. The relevant extract reads as under: “11.Considering the fact that the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 are willing to be bound by the said MoU, which is in the nature of a family settlement, the suit shall stand decreed against the Defendant No. 1 in terms of the said MoU. The Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 and anyone else acting on their behalf shall be bound by the terms and conditions of the MoU.”

9. Learned counsel representing the parties have not made any other submissions.

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:

10. A perusal of Clause 5 of the Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 07.08.1992 [hereinafter referred to as “MoU dated 07.08.1992”] forms part of the decree wherein it is specifically stipulated that the Second Floor shall be given to Respondent/Decree Holder for her residential use for her lifetime.

11. Since the decree has been passed in terms of the settlement which forms part of the decree, a direction to deliver possession exists.

12. The decree is required to be read in a meaningful manner to ensure its implementation and in this regard, reliance is placed upon the Bhavan Vaja and Ors. vs Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang and Anr.[1] The relevant extract of the said Judgment reads as under: “It is true that an executing court cannot go behind the decree under execution. But that does not mean that it has no duty to find out the true effect of that decree. For construing a decree it can and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading up to the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree the court, often has to ascertain the circumstances under which those words came to be used. That is the plain duty of the execution court and if that court fails to discharge that duty it has plainly failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it.” (Emphasis Supplied)

13. Hence, the submission of the learned senior counsel lacks substance.

14. Furthermore, with regard to the second submission of substantial changes, it is noticed that, as per the MoU dated 07.08.1992, the Appellant/Judgment Debtor acknowledged that the Respondent/Decree Holder would be entitled to use the Second Floor for her residence during her lifetime. The changes, if any, made by the

Appellant/Judgment Debtor would ensure to the benefit of his sister, particularly when the Appellant/Judgment Debtor had already undertaken to construct another room.

15. There is already a restriction under Clause 6 of the MoU dated 07.08.1992 to the effect that she will not part with or hand over possession to anybody other than the Appellant/Judgment Debtor or his son.

16. In such circumstances, the changes if any made would not result in defeating the decree.

17. As far as the steps taken by the Respondent/Decree Holder to encash the cheques, which were dishonoured, vide proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act are concerned, in 2019 there was an agreement between the parties whereby her rights were monetized. It is the Appellant/Judgment Debtor who, after making a payment of Rs.

77 Lakhs out of a total of Rs. 4 Crores, failed to pay the balance amount. The cheques handed over to the Respondent/Decree Holder were dishonoured, forcing her to initiate proceedings.

18. In such circumstances, the Appellant/Judgment Debtor cannot take benefit of the same because he cannot be allowed to capitalize on his own defaults.

19. The last submission of the learned senior counsel representing the Appellant/Judgment Debtor lacks substance, because it is the Appellant/Judgment Debtor who has rented out the premises to the World Bank. The tenants are not before this Court. It is only the contention of the Appellant/Judgment Debtor. Moreover, it is for the Appellant/Judgment Debtor to ensure implementation of the decree.

20. Moreover, the premises have been let out by the Appellant/Judgment Debtor after the decree was passed. Hence, he cannot be permitted to defeat the same by letting out the same.

21. Learned counsel representing the Appellant/Judgment Debtor further submitted that the Respondent/Decree Holder should be directed to refund Rs. 77 Lakhs, which has been received pursuant to the Agreement of 2019.

22. In this regard, it is noted that neither this aspect was pressed before the Executing Court, nor it would be appropriate to pass an order directing a refund, particularly when there is a delay in delivering possession and the Respondent/Decree Holder has been forced to litigate in various courts.

23. Hence, the Appellant/Judgment Holder, if so advised, may avail of available remedies in accordance with the law for recovery of the amount.

24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Appeal lacks substance and, hence, the present Appeal, along with pending applications, is dismissed. ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. SEPTEMBER 25, 2025 s.godara/sp/rgk