Ranjit Bajaj v. All India Football Federation & Ors.

Delhi High Court · 25 Sep 2025 · 2025:DHC:8612
Sachin Datta
W.P.(C) 1552/2025
2025:DHC:8612
administrative appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld an interim stay on the appointment of a former elected office bearer as Secretary General of AIFF, holding that such appointment violates the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports circular and principles of good governance to prevent conflict of interest.

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CM APPL.29517/2025 in W.P.(C) 1552/2025
HIGH COURT OF DELHI pronounced on: 25.09.2025
RANJIT BAJAJ ..... Petitioner
W.P.(C) 1552/2025 and CM APPLs.7595/2025, 20922/2025
Through: Mr. Rahul Mehra, Sr. Advocate along
WITH
Mr. Shivam Singh, Mr. Shubham Janghu, Mr. Yoshit Jain, Mr. Hanif Chimthanwala, Mr. Akash Chatterjee, and
Mr. Chaitanya Gosain, Advocates.
VERSUS
ALL INDIA FOOTBALL FEDERATION & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Shlok Chandra, Mr. Vidushpat Singhania, Ms. Aashita Khanna, Ms. Saiee Godbole and Mr. Neil Goswami, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Praveen K. Joy, Ms. Renuka Sahu and Mr. Shivam Singh, Advocates for R-2.
Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG along
WITH
Mr. Shashank Bajpai, CGSC, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Sourabh Tripathi, Mr. Shubham Sharma and
Ms. Vrja Pandey, Advocates for UOI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
JUDGMENT
/ORDER

1. The present application has been filed by the applicant / respondent no.2 being aggrieved by an order dated 02.04.2025 passed in the present CM APPL.29517/2025 (on behalf of the respondent no.2 seeking vacation of interim stay order dated 02.04.2025) proceedings, whereby, an interim stay has been granted with respect to the appointment of the applicant / respondent no.2 as the Secretary General of the respondent no.1/All India Football Federation (‘AIFF’).

2. The petitioner has assailed the appointment of applicant/respondent no.2 as Secretary General of respondent no.1, pursuant to his resignation from the position of an elected member of the Executive Committee of respondent no.1, on account of the said appointment being allegedly in contravention of the circular/communication dated 28.02.2022 issued by the respondent no.3/Department of Sports, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Government of India. It is alleged that the said circular/communication bars an elected member of the Indian Olympic Association (IOA) and/or National Sports Federation (NSF), from being appointed to an administrative/ salaried position in the concerned association and/or federation.

3. Vide order dated 02.04.2025 this Court passed an interim order staying appointment of the applicant / respondent no.2 as the Secretary General of the respondent no.1. The said order reads as under:

“1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assails the appointment of the respondent no.2 as Secretary General of the All India Football Federation (AIFF), a National Sports Federation (NSF). 2. The petitioner is a Director of the Delhi FC which is part of I-league which is administered by AIFF/respondent no.1. 3. The short point raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been illegally appointed as the Secretary General of the respondent no.1 inasmuch as the said appointment is in contravention of circular/ letter dated 28.02.2022 issued by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (respondent no.3). 4. The said circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022 issued by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports reads as under:- “ F.No. 92-1/2020-SP-III Government of India Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports Department of Sports

****** Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi Dated: 28th To February, 2022

1. President/ Secretary General, Indian Olympic Association

2. President/ Secretary General National Sports Federations (as per list enclosed) Subject: Appointment of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in National Sports Federations-reg Sir/Madam, With a view to ensure good governance practices in the management of National Sports Federations (NSFs), this Ministry has brought out National Sports Development Code of India, 2011 (Sports Code) and also issued various other instructions/ advisories from time to time.

2 It has been observed that upon being ineligible for re-election, the outgoing office beares come back as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Federation, which is against the spirit of the guidelines limiting age and tenure of office bearers of IOA and NSFs of the Sports Code 2011. This issue has been considered in the Ministry and it has been decided that any person who has held an elected post in IOA and an NSF in the past, should not be appointed as CEO. The post of CEO is an administrative position for which the person selected is paid by the IOA and NSF as per the terms and conditions of engagement. The above inston shall be adhered to scrupulously by IOA and all recognized NSFs. Yours faithfully, (SPS Tomar) Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India Tel: 011-24361819”

5. Indisputably, the aforesaid circular/ communication has to be read in conjunction with the NSDCI (Sports Code). The purport thereof is to ensure that elected office bearers of an NSF are barred from taking up paid/salaried administrative positions in the NSF. The same is necessary, not only to prevent circumvention of age and tenure restrictions, but also to obviate any conflict of interest which is inherent in an administrative/ salaried post being given to a person who has held an elected post in the same NSF.

6. The circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022 which is addressed to all the National Sports Federations unambiguously states that “any person who has held an elected post in IOA and an NSF in the past, should not be appointed as CEO. The post of CEO is an administrative position for which the person selected is paid by the IOA and NSF, as per the terms and conditions of engagement.”

7. In the present case, there is no dispute that prior to his appointment as Secretary General of the All India Football Federation, the respondent no.2 was an elected member of AIFF’s Executive Committee. In fact, it is the case of the respondent no.2 itself that it resigned from the post of elected member of AIFF’s Executive Committee, to assume the assignment/ job of “Secretary General”. Such conduct is clearly in the teeth of the circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022.

8. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 has contended that the proscription contained in the circular/communication date 28.02.2022 must be confined to cases where any elected office bearer is seeking to circumvent the age and tenure restrictions and not to any other situation.

9. As noted, the same is belied by the plain language of the proscription contained in the said circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022. Also, as noticed, the purport of the circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022 is also evidently to act as a safeguard against any “conflict of interest”. Learned counsel for the Union of India also affirms the same, and fairly submits that in terms of the aforesaid letter/ circular, it is impermissible for the respondent no.2, to take up the position of “General Secretary” of the respondent no.1. The stand of the UOI is consistent with the language and spirit of the circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022 as well as the NSDCI.

10. In the circumstances, till the next date of hearing, the appointment of the respondent no.2 as Secretary General of the AIFF (respondent no.1) is stayed.

11. At this stage, learned senior counsel for the respondent no.1 requests for expeditious disposal of the present writ petition. At his request, list for final hearing on 08.04.2025.”

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4. For the purpose of the present application, the primary contention of the applicant/respondent no.2 is that the aforesaid interim order dated 02.04.2025 is based on a misconstruction of the circular / communication dated 28.02.2022 issued by the respondent no.3. In this regard, it has been averred in the present application as under:

“6. Pertinently, this Hon'ble Court issued a stay on the appointment of the Applicant primarily on the submissions made by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.3/Union of India. It was contended on behalf of the Union of India that, in terms of the circular/communication dated 28.02.2022 issued by the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, any person who had previously held an elected position in a National Sports Federation is ineligible for appointment to a position such as the Secretary General. That the basis the stand taken by the Union of India, this Hon’ble Court stayed the appointment of the Applicant/respondent No.2 till the next date of hearing, i.e., 8.04.2025. 7. That pursuant to the same, an application seeking clarification of the MYAS Letter dated 28.02.2022 bearing C.M. No. 20922/2025 was filed by the Respondent No.1. It is further submitted that during the hearing held on 08.04.2025, the Union of India clarified its earlier submissions with respect to the scope, interpretation and purport of the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports’ communication dated 28.02.2022.

8. It is imperative to note that the Union of India clarified and submitted that the bar envisaged under the said communication is intended to apply to those office bearers who have become ineligible for re-election by virtue of age or tenure limitations under the Sports Code and thereafter seek to assume salaried administrative positions as a means of circumventing the prescribed restrictions. It was further submitted that in the absence of such ineligibility on account of age or tenure, the prohibition contained in the circular would not be attracted. This clarification had a material bearing on the continuation of the Interim Order passed by this Hon’ble Court on 02.04.2025.

9. It is imperative to note that this Hon’ble Court ought to have noted that the petitioner had admitted the Applicant as Secretary General of Respondent No.1 and has even communicated in official capacity seeking approval and transfer of the holding company and sporting right of Delhi Football Club and in official capacity as General Secretary response was also issued via email response dated 17.12.2024 addressed to petitioner, which is concealed in the writ petition. The doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance.

10. However, it is germane to note that the Respondent No. 2 was neither an outgoing member rendered ineligible for re-election nor an individual who completed a full tenure as a member of the Executive Committee of Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 was appointed as a member on 02.09.2022 and tendered his resignation on 20.07.2024, having served for a total period of only one year and ten months.

11. This duration falls significantly short of a complete four-year tenure. Moreover, Respondent No. 2 has not completed even a single full term in the Executive Committee of Respondent No.1. In light of the clarification issued by Respondent No.3, as set out above, the position of Respondent No.2/Applicant clearly falls outside the scope and application of the Circular dated 28.02.2022.

12. It is respectfully submitted that the interim stay granted by this Hon'ble Court, restraining Respondent No.2 from discharging his duties as Secretary General of Respondent No.1, infringes upon his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business, is an essential facet of personal liberty and livelihood, and forms an integral part of the freedoms guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.

13. In the present case, the appointment of Respondent no.2/Applicant as Secretary General is not merely a titular position but constitutes his primary source of livelihood and means of sustenance. The continuance of the interim stay effectively deprives the Respondent no.2/Applicant the opportunity to lawfully engage in his profession, thereby causing unwarranted and disproportionate prejudice to his fundamental rights.

14. It is further submitted that, in view of the clarification provided by the Union of India during the proceedings on 08.04.2025 before this Hon’ble Court, concerning the interpretation and scope of the MYAS communication dated 28.02.2022 — which has materially altered the premise on which the Interim Order was granted — the continuance of the stay is no longer justified. Although the matter was directed to be listed for final hearing on 08.04.2025, it has remained pending, and the Interim Order continues to operate. It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the Interim Order be vacated.”

5. Further, it is the case of the applicant/respondent no.2 that the aforesaid interim order dated 02.04.2025 is causing grave prejudice to the applicant/respondent no.2, as it not only affects his source of livelihood but also imposes a restraint upon the applicant in discharging his official duties. It is submitted that the same resultantly also impacts the administration and day to day functioning of AIFF inasmuch as AIFF continues to operate in the absence of a Secretary General, a post which is integral to the day to day functioning, management and operation of a NSF.

6. It is also contended that although the applicant took charge of the post of the Secretary General of AIFF on 19.08.2024, the present petition was filed only in February, 2025 i.e., after a lapse of six months from the date of appointment.

7. Furthermore, the reply filed on behalf of the applicant/respondent no.2 also avers as under: “g)…………………………….. The process of appointing a new Secretary General was not a hasty decision, it was the result of careful deliberation within the AIFF's Executive Committee. With a long period of vacancy in this key role, the committee made it a priority to find someone with the necessary experience to step-in and ensure smooth functioning of the organisation. The answering Respondent, with his extensive 13 years background in the field, was considered by the Committee as a qualified candidate to take on the responsibilities of this important position and accordingly his appointment was confirmed by the President of AIFF on 19.08.2024. However, despite the procedural nature of this decision, the Petitioner herein has raised objections, questioning the legitimacy of the appointment. This challenge is part of a broader pattern of legal action against the AIFF, which has now turned its attention to a crucial governance decision. This reveals is an ongoing effort to disrupt the governance reforms that the AIFF has been working hard to implement.”

8. It is noted that for the purpose of the present application, learned ASG appearing for the UOI/MYAS, has supported the stand of the applicant.

9. Having considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds no merit in the present application seeking vacation of interim order dated 02.04.2025.

10. It is undisputed that prior to being appointed as the Secretary General of the AIFF, the applicant was elected as a member of the Executive Committee of the AIFF on 22.08.2022. The applicant resigned as the Member of the Executive Committee on 20.07.2024. Copy of the said resignation letter (filed as Annexure R-5 to the reply filed on behalf of the respondent no.2), reads as under: From Anil Kumar. P Executive Committee Member AIFF To The President AIFF Dear Sir, I would like to inform you that due to personal reasons I am unable to continue as a member of Executive Committee of AIFF. So kindly accept my resignation from the post of Executive Committee Member of AIFF. I am also resigning from Competition Committee of AIFF. Kindly accept my resignation. Thanks & Regards -sd- Anil Kumar P.”

11. The aforesaid resignation letter was accepted on 01.08.2024 and thereafter, the applicant on 19.08.2024 was appointed as the Secretary General of AIFF.

12. It is noted that a sweeping statement has been made in the reply filed on behalf of applicant/respondent no.2 that the applicant “with his extensive 13 years background in the field was considered by the Committee as a qualified candidate to take on the responsibilities of this important position and accordingly his appointment was confirmed by the President of AIFF on 19.08.2024”. However, it has not been disclosed in the reply of the respondent no.2 whether any advertisement was issued or any qualification criteria was prescribed for the purpose of appointment of a Secretary General, which admittedly is a paid administrative post.

13. Further, it is evident that the applicant’s appointment as Secretary General on 19.08.2024 was deliberated upon by the very same Executive Committee of which he remained a member until 01.08.2024. Consequently, the appointment of the applicant to a paid post by the very same Executive Committee, immediately following his resignation as an elected member, raises a legitimate apprehension of bias. It also gives rise to an apprehension that the process was orchestrated to place one of its own members in a paid administrative position by circumventing an open selection procedure.

14. The ‘conflict of interest’ in such a situation is inherent and structural. The mere act of resignation of the applicant does not obliterate the fact that the applicant previously was an elected office-bearer. The appointment to a “salaried” role almost immediately after the resignation from an “elected” role gives rise to a genuine apprehension/inference regarding ‘conflict of interest’.

15. The aforesaid also undermines the principles of good governance and mandates prescribed under the National Sports Development Code of India, 2011 (‘NSDCI’). The said principles enshrined in the NSDCI are not to be applied pedantically. The underlying objectives of the NSDCI viz. fairness, democratic governance, absence of influence, prevention of ‘conflict of interest’, must govern its application. The “resignation to appointment” route is an anathema to the principles of good governance which permeate the NSDCI and must guide its interpretation and application.

16. The circular / communication dated 28.02.2022 of the respondent no.3 / MYAS recognises the inherent ‘conflict of interest’ in a situation where any outgoing office bearer is appointed as the CEO of the concerned NSF. The mischief which the circular / communication dated 28.02.2022 seeks to address is akin to the mischief in the present case viz. resignation of an elected office bearer, followed immediately by the appointment of the same office bearer to a paid / salaried administrative post in the same Federation/NSF.

17. The ‘conflict of interest’ that is inherent in such a situation is not obviated on account of the fact that the concerned erstwhile office bearer / elected member does not fall foul of age / tenure restrictions.

18. The proscription contained in the circular / communication dated 28.02.2022 is not only to prevent circumvention of age and tenure restrictions in NSFs but also to obviate the possibility of any ‘conflict of interest’ that is inherent in an ex-office bearer being appointed as a paid employee soon-after demitting office or resigning as an elected office bearer. The contention/s on behalf of the applicant and the UOI/MYAS, seek to undermine the latter aspect of the circular / communication dated 28.02.2022. The fact that the applicant was only 22 months (approximately) into his term as an elected member of the Executive Committee, does not condone the ‘conflict of interest’ inherent in the “resignation to appointment” route taken by the applicant.

19. Further, the order dated 02.04.2025 rightly notes as under: “8. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 has contended that the proscription contained in the circular/communication date 28.02.2022 must be confined to cases where any elected office bearer is seeking to circumvent the age and tenure restrictions and not to any other situation.

9. As noted, the same is belied by the plain language of the proscription contained in the said circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022. Also, as noticed, the purport of the circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022 is also evidently to act as a safeguard against any “conflict of interest”. Learned counsel for the Union of India also affirms the same, and fairly submits that in terms of the aforesaid letter/ circular, it is impermissible for the respondent no.2, to take up the position of “General Secretary” of the respondent no.1. The stand of the UOI is consistent with the language and spirit of the circular/ communication dated 28.02.2022 as well as the NSDCI.” The attempt of the Union of India, in the aftermath of the interim order dated 02.04.2025, to seek so as to narrowly construe its own circular / communication dated 28.02.2022 undermines the basic tenets of good governance, which permeates the NSDCI and which is also the rationale for issuing the circular / communication dated 28.02.2022. The same cannot be countenanced.

20. In the circumstances, at this stage, this Court finds no basis to vacate the interim order dated 02.04.2025 passed in the present proceedings. However, the same shall necessarily be subject to the outcome of the main writ petition. While deciding the main writ petition, the purport, scope and the applicability of the circular / communication dated 28.02.2022 shall be considered in greater detail, and appropriate directions shall be issued with regard thereto.

21. The application stands dismissed in the above terms.

22. List on 29.10.2025 i.e., the date already fixed. W.P.(C) 1552/2025 SACHIN DATTA, J SEPTEMBER 25, 2025/r, sl