Full Text
W.P.(C) 2200/2017
DHARAM SINGH «fe ORS Petitioners Tlirough: Mr. Chatanya Siddhartha, Advocate.
Through: Mr. Yeeshu Jain and Ms. Jyoti Tyagi.
Advocates for LAC/L&B.
Mr. Pawan Mathur, Advocate for DDA.
Through: Mr. Chatanj^'a Siddhartha, Advocate.
Advocates for LAG/L&B.
SANJEEV KUMAR & ORS Petitioners , Through: Mr. Cl^vatanya Siddhartha, Advocate.
WP(C) No.2200/17& Connectedmatters Page I of12
2019:DHC:7933-DB JAI DEVI Petitioner fhiough: Mr. Chatanya Siddhartha, Advocate.
Through: Mr. Yeeshu Jain and Ms. Jyoti Tyagi, I Advocates for LAC/L&B.
RAJENDER SINGH & ORS Petitioners Tlu-ough: Mr. ChatanyaSiddhartha, Advocate.
INDER SmGH Petitioner
Through: Mr. Chatanya Siddliartha, Advocate.
I^M DUTT Petitioner Tluoiigh: Mr. Chatanya Siddhartha, Advocate.
Mr. Pawan Mathui", Advocate for DDA.
25.01.2019 SANJEEV NARULA. J.;
ORDER
1. These seven writ petitions, that were heard separately, arise out of a similar set of facts and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The Petitioners are seeking a declaration that the acquisition proceedings in respect of land situated in Revenue Estate of village Mohamadpur Majri, New Delhi (hereinafter "the subject land") stand lapsed in view of Section V 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter "the 2013 Act"). The area of the land and its relevant khasra number corresponding for each Petition has been consolidated as under: S.No. Writ Petition
(Civil) No.
1. 2200/2017 22//11 min (4-06), 19 min (4-08), 20 (4-04), 21 (4-12), 23//16 (4-04), 25 (4-16), 43//6 (4-09), 14 (4-16), 15 (4- 12), 16 (4-12), 17 (4-16), 24 (4-16), 25 (4-12), 46//4/1 (2-16), 5 (5-00), 35//2min (2-16), 3 (4-16), 9min (3- WP(C) NO.2200/J7& Connected matters Page 3 of12 12),4•6//4/3 (1-00), 7(3-14), 8(4-16)
2. 2224/2017 23//6 (3-18), 13/2(2-12), 14(4-16), 15(4-14), 17(4-4), 2.2/1(4-9), 26(0-2), 18//19 (3-3) 27/18,27 bighas 18 biswas
3. 2203/2017 39/76/2 (2-08), 14 (4-16), 15 (4-16), 16 (4-16), 17 (4-16), 24 (4.16), 25 (4- 16) and 40//10/2 (2-08), 11 (4-16), 12 (5-06), 19 (3-00), 20 (4-16), 21 (4- 16), 22 (0-16) 57 bigha 2 biswa
4. 2204/2017 26//i (4-'12),,40//2 (4-16) •. 09 bigha 08 biswa
5. 2228/2017 I 35//4 (4-12), 35//7 (4-12). 35//8 (4- 16), 357/12(3-18), 35//14 (4-08) and 39//11 (4-16), 39//12 (4-16), 39//13 (4^16) 36 bighas 14 biswas
6. 2202/2017 22//18 (0.16), 23 (3-14) 4 biglia 10 biswas
7. 2226/2017 40//3 (4-8), 40//8 (2-10) and 40//9 (4-
12) 16 bighas 04 biswas 3, The conunon case of all the Petitioners is that they are in physical possession of their respective portions in the subject land in question. It is not in dispute that a notification dated 21®^ March 2003 was issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (hereinafter "LAA") for public purpose namely Rohini Residential Scheme, followed by a declaration dated 19^'' March 2004 under Section 6 of the LAA. An Award No. 20/2005- 2006/DC(NW) was passed on November 2005.
4. The Petitioners admit the receipt of compensation in respect of the acquisition, however, it is alleged that the Petitioners are still in physical possession of the subject land. It is noted that some of the landowners of WP(C) No.2200/17 & Connected matters Page 4 of12 village Mohamadpiir Majri had filed W.P. No. 1,545 of 2014 (.Dhamm Singh V. Union ofIndia), challenging the aforementioned land acquisition proceeding. This Hon'ble Court vide order dated 10'^' March 2014, dismissed the petition on the groimd of delay and laches which reads as mid'er; "W.P.(C) NO.-154.5/2014 and CM No.3231/'20.14: Tliis writ petition is concerned with the same Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and subsequent Notilication under Section 6 in respect of Village? Moharnmadpur Majri, Delhi, which was the subject matter of W.P.(G). No.2501/20i[3]. entitled Narctih. Kumar and Ors. Vs. Union of India aiid. Qrs. as also W.P.(C) No.958/2014 entitled Rajendra Singh and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.. Those writ petitions were dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on the ground of delay and laches by separate orders dated 17.04.2013 and 10.02.2014. For the same reason, this writ petition is also dismissed. It is ordered accordingly. The pending applications, are disposed off.". '.
5. The iilbresaid order was challenged before the Supreine Ccurt in SLP (C) No. 13358/2014 which was dismissed as withdrawn: Th{?reafter the present Petitioners filed another writ petition being W.P. (-C) No. 4712 of 2015 {Dharam Singh v. U6J) which was also dismissed as withdrav/n, vide order dated 22"^^ November 2016, v/liic;h.reads asunder; '•'The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that he may be permitted to withdraw this wit petition with liberty that the petitioners may file individual petitions. The writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty." WF(C) No.2200/17& Connectedmatters ' Page HnfJ[2]
6. In view of the leave granted the Petitioners have now approached this Court by way ofthe present petitions.
7. The Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) in its counter affidavit filed in all the petitions, has disputed the Petitioners' claim of having possession of the subject land. According to the LAC, the possession of the acquired lands was duly taken on 2"^ August 2006 (in W.P. Nos. 2200/17, 2204/17, 2203/17, 2202/17, 2228/17 and 2226/17). In respect of W.P. 2224 of 2017 part possession was acquired on 2"'^ August 2006 and remaining possession was acquired on 21"' December 2012. Thereafter, the subject land was handed over to the beneficiary department- DDA on the spot on the above stated dates. A preliminary objection has further beenraisedbythe LAC that the petitions are liable to be dismissed on account of delay and laches. As regards payment of compensation, it is their stand that compensation stands paid. Thedetails ofthe payment inrespect of allthepetitions is asunder: S.No. W.P.(C) Date of payment of Amount compensation
1. 2200/2017 15.12.06 Rs. 1,11,29,283/- 16.1.2007 Rs. 1,11,29,283/- 22.1.2007 Rs. 34,57,576/- 22.1.2007 Rs. 34,57,576/- 26.9.2007 Rs. 4,12,195/- 27.2.2007 Rs. 37,09,760/-
2. 2224/2017 23.11.06 Rs. 53,88,777/- 30.11.06 Rs. 26,94,388/- 18.6.09 Rs. 10,61,8281- WP(C) NO.2200/17& Connectedmatters Page 6 of12 18.6.09 12.7.2013 12.7.2013 Rs. 5,30,914/- Rs. 8,36,189/- Rs. 4,18,0941-
3. 2204/2017 20.12.06 Rs. 24,95,295/-
4. 2203/2017 16.11.06 Rs. 60,63,037/-
5. 2202/2017 1.2.2007 Rs. 11,94,556/-
6. 2228/2017 27.4.2007 Rs. 1,94,84,543/-
7. 2226/2017 18/01/2006 Rs. 83,36,364/-
8. It is confirmed by DDA in its reply thatpossession of the subject land has been handed over to iton 2"'^ August 2006 (in W.P. Nos. 2200/17, 2204/17, 2203/17, 2202/17, 2228/17 and 2226/17). In W.P.(C) 2224 of 2017, possession was partially handed over on 2"'^ August 2006 and remaining possession was acquired on 21®' December 2012. A copy ofthe possession proceedings has been annexed to the counter affidavits.
9. The Petitioners have filed rejoinder affidavits asserting that they continue to be in possession of the landand thattheproceedings conducted in respect of the same are a farce and mere exercise on papers. Though the Petitioners have not disputed receiving compensation for the subject land, it is urged that as long as possession of the subject lands remained with the Petitioners, it would not matter if they had received compensation since one of the conditions specified under Section 24 (2) ofthe 2013 Act stood fulfilled and this was sufficient for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings were deemed to have lapsed. Reliance was placed on the decision of Pune Municipal Corporation y. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki reported at (2014) 3 see 183, Prahlad Singh v. Union ofIndia reported at (2011) 5 WP(C) No.2200/17 & Connected matters Page 7 of12 OS. see 386.
10. The Supreme Couit in Executive Engineer Jal Nigam Central Stores Division U.P. v. Suresh Nand Juyal (1997) 9 SCC 224 considered what could be termed as "symbolic possession" and held as under: "Suffice it so say that after symbolic possession is taken, if the petitioner is enjo>dng the^ possession, he is enjoying the possession as a tmstee on behalf of the public at large and that by itself cannot be considered to be a around to contend that possession is not taken. It is the duty of the person who is occup>'ing the property to look after the property and to see that the property is not defaced or devalued by himselfor by others. He cannot subsequently come to the Court to say that actual possession is not taken aiid therefore he should be protected and land be denotified."
11. The Court would also like to obseiTe that in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), there was no observ^ation to the effect that'the retention of possession notwithstanding the acceptance of full compensation would per se attract provisions of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. Further, the Court finds thatinDDA v. SukhbirSinghAIR2016 SC 4275, the Supreme Court referred to an earlier decision in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792, where the legal position was explained as under: "(i) No hard and fast mle can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking ofpossession ofthe acquired land.
(ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned to go to.the spot and prepare a panchnama will • ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession.
(iii) If crop is standing on the acquired landor buiiding/structure
WP(C) No,2200/17 & Connected matters I - •• exists, mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures,on the panchnama. Of course, refusal' of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken.
(iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring /designated authority to take physical possession of each and eveiy parcel of the land and it will be sufficient, that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document.
(v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terras of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utiljzed in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken".
12. Once the compensation has been admittedly received in full the only inference could be that the Petitioners have again trespassed into the land after surrendering it, as is nqticed m Suresb Naiid Juyal (supra). Consequently, none of the conditionalities attached to Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act is fulfilled in the present ease.
13. A further factor is that although the Award was passed way back on 1 November 2005, no effort was made ^thereafter by the Petitioners to assert that they continue to remain in actual physical possession of the land in question. They appear to have rnovedithe Court only in 2015., The delay in approaching the Court for reUef is^inordinate and has no convincing WP(C) No.2200/17 & Connected matters, Page 9 of12 explanation.
14. In Mahavir v. Union of India (2018) 3 SCC 588, the Supreme Court observed as under: "23. In the instant case, the claim has been made not only belatedly, but neither the petitioners nor their previous three generations had ever approached any of the authorities in writing for claiming compensation. No representation had ever been filed with any authority, none has been annexed and there is no averment made in the petition that any such representation had ever been filed. The claim appears not only stale and dead but extremely clouded. This we are mentioning as additional reasons, as such claims not only suffer from delay and laches but courts are not supposed to entertain such claims. Besides such claims become doubtful, cannot be received for consideration being barred due to delay and laches. 24. The High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot be permitted to be raised in the court, and cannot be adjudicated as they are barred. The High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot be. a subject matter of inquiry after the lapse of a reasonable period of time and beneficial provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act are not available to such incumbents. In our opinion. Section 24 cannot revive those claims that are dead and stale."
15. The aforesaid Judgment has been considered by the Supreme Court in the decision of Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra reported at (2018) 3 SCC 412, relevant portion ofwhich is reproduced hereunder:- "128. In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be used to revive the dead or stale claims and the matters, which have been contested up to this Court or even in the High Court having lost the cases or where reference has been sought for enhancement of the compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urged that physical possession has not been taken from them, such claims cannot be entertained under the guise of section 24(2). IVP(C) No.2200/17 & Connected matters Page 10 of12 We have W.P.(C) Nos. 946/2017 & 948/2017 come across the cases in v/hich findings have been recorded that by which of drawing a Panchnama, possession has been taken, now again under Section 24(2) it is asserted again that physical possession is still with them. Such claims cannot be entertained in view of the previous decisions in which such plea ought to have been raised and such decisions would operate as res judicata or constructive res judicata. As either the plea raised is negatived or such plea ought to have been raised or was not raised in the previous round of litigation. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not supersede or annul the court"s decision and the provisions cannot be misused to reassert such claims once over again. Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawing the Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the case W cannot be reopened under the guise of section 24 ofAct of 2013.
129. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those who first deliberately reflise to accept the compensation, and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-motivated dilatory • tactics, for decades together. On the contrary, the section is intended to help those who have not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being the legal obligation of the acquiring body so to do, and/or who have been illegally deprived. of their possession for fiye years or more; in both the scenarios, fault/cause not being attributable to the landowners/claimants.
130. We are of the view that stale or dead claims camiot be the subject-matter of judicial probing under section 24 of the Act of
2013. The provisions of section 24 do not invalidate those judgment/orders of the courts where under rights/claims have been lost/negatived, neither do they revive those rights which W have come barred, either due to inaction or otherwise by operation of law. Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all to be raised under the guise of section 24. Misuse of provisions of section 24(2) camiot be permitted. Protection by the courts in cases of such blatant mii^use of the provisions of law could never have been the intention behind enacting the provisions of section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act; and, _by the decision laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), and this Court never, even for a moment, intended [that such cases W.P.(C) Nos. 946/2017 & WP(C) No.2200/17 & Connected matters Page 11 of12 948/2017 would be received or entertained by the courts."
16. Another difficulty for the Petitioners isthat the land inquestion has been acquired for Rohini Residential Scheme. Although theyseekto contend that the orders passed by the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.16385-88/2012 {Rahul Gupta v. DDA) do not pertain to Village Mohamadpur Majri, Rohini where the land in question is located, this Court has rejected a similar plea earlier in its order dated 22nd November 2018 in W. P. (C) 5111 of 2016 {Jawahar Singh v. Lt. Governor). This Court finds that in the order dated 18'^ October 2016 in Rahul Gupta v. DDA, the Supreme Court was categorical that "in case the applicants have re-entered possession or otherwise, they shall vacate the said land and hand over its possession forthwith to the DDA,.failing which it shall be assumed to be inpossession of the DDA, after the expiry of ten days from the passing of the instant order."
17. Following the aforementioned decisions and in the light of the facts and circumstances listed out hereinbefore, the present petition is dismissed both on the ground oflaches as well as merits. The interim stay stands vacated.