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Date of Decision: 6th February, 2019.
JINDAL STAINLESS (HISAR) LIMITED ..... Petitioner
JINDAL STAINLESS LIMITED ..... Petitioner
Mr.Vinod Diwakar, CGSC with Mr.Sayandeep Pahari and
Ms.Radhika Roy, Adv. for R-1 in W.P.(C) 5920/2018
Mr.Amit Narayan, CGSC with Mr.Apoorv Singhal and
Mr.Randeep Sachdeva, Adv. for R-1 in W.P.(C) 6246/2018
Mr. Sanjay Notani, Mr.Vivek Sharma, Mr.Abhishek Anand and Mr.Udit Jain, Advs. for R-3
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. (OPEN COURT)
JUDGMENT
1. In these two petitions, the grievance urged is that the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal [hereafter “CESTAT”] by a common impugned order rejected the appeals preferred before it under Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. 2019:DHC:802-DB
2. These two appeals had questioned the notification and the final finding rendered by the Designated Authority (DA) pursuant to the investigations conducted with respect to the information received by the Designated Authority vis-a-vis dumping of Cold Rolled Coils by Chinese and other manufacturers in India, the marginal injury determined and the anti-dumping duty ultimately imposed by the Department of Revenue‟s notification dated 24.10.2017.
3. The CESTAT by its impugned order took note of the rejection of a similar appeal in the case of M/s Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. The CESTAT had rejected that appeal under Section 9C [Final Order No.58242/2017] on the ground that the initiation and the final findings had been challenged initially through writ petitions by importer/consumer in India before this Court, and later before the Supreme Court by foreign manufactures/exporters. The CESTAT, therefore, rejected the present petitioner‟s appeals stating as follows:
4. The CESTAT‟s approach, we regret to note, is wholly inconsistent with this Court‟s order and directions in Manali Petrochemicals Limited vs. Union of India & Ors. [W.P.(C) 11548/2016, dated 06.12.2016]. The Court had on that occasion, in similar circumstances, noted the nature of Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and inter alia held as under: “8. It is axiomatic that every order of a judicial or quasi judicial authority who is responsible for deciding disputes concerning citizens as well as myriad body of litigants before it, should indicate the reasons which impelled the decision maker (judicial authority, judge, etc) to hold what it did. Courts rigorously enforce – as an attendant value to the rule of law minimum standards of fairness of procedure (adequate notice, fair opportunity of hearing, a decision on the merits, by an unbiased tribunal or authority, based on reasons). These values are in fact the bedrock of judicial functioning. Bereft of reasons, an order, which might have momentous consequences to those affected by it, is incapable of redress; its sphinx like inscrutability would likely mask untenable reasons and considerations that lay buried forever in the mind of the maker. Unlike the executive and legislative branches whose functioning does not always mandate open scrutiny, courts are always obliged to dispense justice in the public gaze. Rather than ply this order with a surfeit of judgments and past wisdom, this court prefers to quote one decision, apt under the circumstances, of the Supreme Court, M/S Kranti Asso. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors (2010) 9 SCC 496, which observed as follows, after considering a welter of previous authorities:
10. Parliamentary intent in the creation of an appellate forum in respect of findings by the designated authority was to provide meaningful redress by a competent appellate body. The order impugned is not only cryptic but mistaken in its assumption that the pending writ petitions (of others) can provide adequate redress to the petitioner- an entirely erroneous assumption, because those writ petitions are merely pending and depend upon exercise of discretion. The availability of an appellate remedy in this case, is conferment of a right to approach the higher forum for correction, on facts and law, whereas exercise of judicial review is within a restricted canvas. The CESTAT has in essence, treated an appellate remedy (otherwise a compulsive jurisdiction) to be alternative and discretionary, robbing it of substantial content.
11. For the foregoing reasons, a direction is issued to the CESTAT whose President shall constitute a Bench as expediently as possible and issue notice of hearing to the parties- within six weeks. The CESTAT shall endeavor to complete the hearing as early as possible, and within three months of conclusion of hearing, issue final orders. Orders dasti, to the parties; orders shall also be communicated directly to the President, CESTAT by the Registry. The writ petition and accompanying applications are allowed in the above terms.”
5. The failure of the CESTAT to adjudicate the petitioners‟ appeal, in the opinion of this Court, is inexplicable. Its impugned order, is completely at variance with the directions in Manali Petrochemicals (supra). The Court is also cognizant of the fact that the proceedings before the Supreme Court have not in any manner restrained CESTAT from performing its statutory duty of adjudicating on the appeals pending before it. The CESTAT‟s approach of „washing its hands‟ of the duty cast upon is, therefore, deprecated in the strongest terms.
6. The impugned order is, for the above reasons, set aside and the appeals preferred by the petitioners before it are restored to the file of CESTAT. Consequently, the CESTAT shall proceed to hear and decide the pending appeals before it in accordance with law after issuing notice to all the concerned parties.
7. The writ petition is disposed of in the above terms.
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
PRATEEK JALAN, J. FEBRUARY 06, 2019 „hkaur‟