Union of India v. Pt Munshi Ram & Associates Pvt Ltd

8. That the counsel sent the first draft of the present appeal to the department for approval subsequent to which a meeting was held in 16.09.2013 to discuss corrections and changes to the same.

9. That the final appeal and affidavits including changes were forwarded to the department for signature on 14.11.2013 for vetting and signatures.

10. That there is a delay of 303 days in filing the appeal that has occurred due to the reasons mentioned hereinabove. It is neither deliberate nor intentional. It is submitted that the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned in view of the reasons explained above.” ANALYSIS:

6. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both parties and upon a careful perusal of the record, this Court now proceeds to address the questions arising for determination. The foremost issue that falls for consideration is whether the present appeal has been instituted within the period prescribed by law, and if not, whether the Appellant has demonstrated “sufficient cause” to warrant condonation of the inordinate delay.

7. In relation to an appeal preferred under Section 37 of the A&C Act, no specific period of limitation is provided therein. Consequently, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963[5] stand attracted, a position which now stands conclusively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Limitation Act. Represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. 6. The relevant observations from the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-

25. When the Commercial Courts Act is applied to the aforesaid appeals, given the definition of “specified value” and the provisions contained in Sections 10 and 13 thereof, it is clear that it is only when the specified value is for a sum less than three lakh rupees that the appellate provision contained in Section 37 of the Arbitration Act will be governed, for the purposes of limitation, by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act. Shri Deshmukh's argument that depending upon which court decides a matter, a limitation period of either 30 or 90 days is provided, which leads to arbitrary results, and that, therefore, the uniform period provided by Article 137 of the Limitation Act should govern appeals as well, is rejected………… *****

27. Even in the rare situation in which an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act would be of a specified value less than three lakh rupees, resulting in Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act applying, the main object of the Arbitration Act requiring speedy resolution of disputes would be the most important principle to be applied when applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are filed to condone delay beyond 90 days and/or 30 days depending upon whether Article 116(a) or 116(b) or 117 applies. As a matter of fact, given the timelines contained in Sections 8, 9(2), 11(4), 11(13), 13(2)-(5), 29-A, 29-B, 33(3)-(5) and 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, and the observations made in some of this Court's judgments, the object of speedy resolution of disputes would govern appeals covered by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act. *****

32. Thus, from the scheme of the Arbitration Act as well as the aforesaid judgments, condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be seen in the context of the object of speedy resolution of disputes.

33. The bulk of appeals, however, to the appellate court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, are governed by Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act provides the forum for appeals as well as the limitation period to be followed, Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act being a special law as compared with the Limitation Act which is a general law, which follows from a reading of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act lays down a period of limitation of 60 days uniformly for all appeals that are preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. [As held in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234, whereas Section 37 of the Arbitration Act provides the substantive right to appeal, Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act provides the forum and procedure governing the appeal (see para 13).]

34. The vexed question which faces us is whether, first and foremost, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, as has been argued by Dr George. The first important thing to note is that Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not contain any provision akin to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. Section 13(1- A) of the Commercial Courts Act only provides for a limitation period of 60 days from the date of the judgment or order appealed against, without further going into whether delay beyond this period can or cannot be condoned. *****

43. The next important argument that needs to be addressed is as to whether the hard-and-fast rule applied by this Court in N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 is correct in law. Firstly, as has correctly been argued by Shri Shroti, N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109, does not notice the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act at all and can be said to be per incuriam on this count. Secondly, it is also correct to note that the period of 90 days plus 30 days and not thereafter mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act cannot now apply, the limitation period for filing of appeals under the Commercial Courts Act being 60 days and not 90 days. Thirdly, the argument that absent a provision curtailing the condonation of delay beyond the period provided in Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act would also make it clear that any such bodily lifting of the last part of Section 34(3) into Section 37 of the Arbitration Act would also be unwarranted. We cannot accept Shri Navare's argument that this is a mere casus omissus which can be filled in by the Court. *****

52. For all these reasons, given the illuminating arguments made in these appeals, we are of the view that N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 has been wrongly decided and is therefore overruled.

53. However, the matter does not end here. The question still arises as to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of limitation. At one extreme, we have the judgment in N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 which does not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other extreme, we have an openended provision in which any amount of delay can be condoned, provided sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two extremes that we have to steer a middle course. *****

55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, the object and context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover as to what the expression “sufficient cause” means in the context of condoning delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. *****

63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.” (emphasis supplied)

8. It must further be noted that the present appeal was instituted prior to the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015[7], and therefore, the threshold of limitation envisaged under the CC Act does not govern the present matter.

9. We are guided by the dictum laid down in Borse Brothers Engineers (supra), which leads us to Article 117 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, for determining limitation in the present case. Article 117 provides as follows:- Description Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run

117. From a decree or order of any High Court to the same Court. Thirty days. The date of the decree or order.

10. The present appeal, being an intra-court appeal against an order of the learned Single Judge of this Court, squarely falls within the ambit of Article 117 of the Limitation Act, and was therefore required to be instituted within thirty days from the date of the Impugned Judgment.

11. The Impugned Judgment by the learned Single Judge was delivered on 21.12.2012. Accordingly, the last date for filing the appeal was 20.01.2013. However, the present appeal came to be filed only on 20.11.2013, well beyond the statutory period, amounting to a delay of 303 days. The computation is set out hereinbelow for ready reference:- Event Date Remarks Impugned Judgement passed by the learned Single Judge 22.12.2012 Starting point for limitation. CC Act Expiry of the 30-day limitation 20.01.2013 Last date for filing appeal, without seeking condonation of delay. Actual date of filing 20.11.2013 303 days beyond expiry of limitation (i.e., from 21.01.2013).

12. The sole question that arises, therefore, is whether the Appellant has established “sufficient cause” so as to justify condonation of this extraordinary delay. It is trite law that such discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be exercised with circumspection, sparingly, and only where exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. The burden lies squarely upon the Appellant to furnish a cogent, credible, and convincing explanation for the delay.

13. Although the present appeal does not fall within the ambit of the CC Act, the legislative intent underlying the A&C Act is to ensure speedy and efficient resolution of disputes. Consequently, condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right nor granted as a matter of routine, lest the object of expeditious arbitral resolution be defeated. In this context, reference may be made to Dilshad Khan v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi[8], where this Court emphasized that condonation of delay under Section 37 of the A&C Act can be granted only upon showing of proper and sufficient cause. The Court categorically held that adherence to prescribed timelines is integral to the legislative intent of arbitral law, and the phrase “sufficient cause” cannot be employed to condone negligence or stale claims.

14. The averments in the application for condonation of delay, as already extracted hereinabove, reveal that the Appellant’s explanation rests essentially on two grounds: first, the necessity of obtaining FAO (COMM) 206/2025 administrative approvals and internal procedural clearances; and second, a lapse on the part of the clerk of the counsel, who allegedly misfiled the relevant papers by tagging them with another connected matter.

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that the law of limitation binds Government authorities no less than private litigants. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.9, the Apex Court unequivocally held that explanations predicated merely on impersonal machinery or procedural red tape are no longer acceptable in the modern era. The Apex Court stressed that condonation of delay is an exception, not a rule, and cannot be mechanically extended merely because the Government is a litigant. The following observations of the said judgement are particularly instructive:-

bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

31. In view of our conclusion on issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of the issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.

32. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs.”

16. Similarly, in Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Admn.10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again deprecated the casual and lethargic approach of Government Departments, observing that they cannot walk into courts at their convenience, ignoring statutory timelines. The Hon’ble Court went on further to caution that unless officers responsible for such lapses are held accountable, the tendency of delay will persist unchecked. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as under:-

that the present matter should have been brought up, really takes the cake!

6. The aforesaid itself shows the casual manner in which the petitioner has approached this Court without any cogent or plausible ground for condonation of delay. In fact, other than the lethargy and incompetence of the petitioner, there is nothing which has been put on record. We have repeatedly discouraged State Governments and public authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk in to the Supreme Court as and when they please ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the statutes, as if the Limitation statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgment in State of M.P. v. Bherulal. The leeway which was given to the Government/public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. Despite this, there seems to be a little change in the approach of the Government and public authorities.”

17. The explanation offered by the Appellant, premised on factors such as inter-departmental approvals, procedural red tape, and an alleged clerical lapse in the counsel’s office, does not inspire our confidence and leaves a substantial part of the inordinate 303-day delay wholly unexplained. It is a settled principle that in proceedings under the A&C Act, strict compliance with statutory timelines is central to the legislative scheme. The A&C Act was enacted with the avowed objective of securing expeditious adjudication of disputes through arbitration, and any laxity in adhering to limitation periods would undermine this very purpose.

18. While courts may, in exceptional cases, condone delays upon a showing of “sufficient cause”, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate any such compelling justification. Vague references to bureaucratic procedures or internal administrative hurdles cannot constitute a valid excuse for non-compliance with mandatory statutory timelines. Likewise, attributing part of the delay to a clerical lapse in the counsel’s office only points to negligence, and even if such lapse is assumed, the department’s failure to exercise timely oversight and follow-up cannot be condoned. Such explanations neither establish sufficient cause nor entitle a litigant to the indulgence of condonation.

19. Accordingly, the reasons advanced in the present case are inadequate and run contrary to the spirit and purpose of the A&C Act. They cannot be accepted as credible grounds to overcome the statutory bar of limitation. CONCLUSION:

20. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the application for condonation of delay filed with the present appeal is devoid of any cogent or persuasive grounds. The explanation tendered does not constitute “sufficient cause” in law.

21. Consequently, without examining the merits of the case, the appeal stands dismissed solely on the ground of delay and limitation.

22. The present appeal, along with the pending application, is disposed of in the above terms.

23. No order as to costs. ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. SEPTEMBER 03, 2025/sm/rn