Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 11448/2025, CM APPL. 47023/2025 & CM APPL.
56142/2025 MANOJ KUMAR M. THROUGH A.R ASHISH DUBEY .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. T. Singhdev, Mr Rohit Bhagat, Ms. Anum Hussain, Ms. Yamini Singh, Mr. Pragyesh Pratap Singh, Ms. Aprajita, Mr. Abhijit Chakravarty, Ms. Ramanpreet Kaur, Advs.
Through: Mr. Syed Abdul Haseeb, CGSC
Mr. Naveen Bhardwaj, JD (Admn), Sub.
Ram Niwas and UDC Rameshwar Lal
56181/2025 ARUN KUMAR SEMWAL THROUGH A.R ASHISH DUBEY .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. T. Singhdev, Mr Rohit Bhagat, Ms. Anum Hussain, Ms. Yamini Singh, Mr. Pragyesh Pratap Singh, Ms. Aprajita, Mr. Abhijit Chakravarty, Ms. Ramanpreet Kaur, Advs.
Through: Mr. Ranjeev Khatana, SPC
Mr. Rajat Rajoria Singh, GP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
09.09.2025 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, we are disposing of these writ petitions on a very limited ground. The facts are identical. For the sake of convenience, we refer to the facts in WP (C) 11448/2025.
2. By order dated 28 February 2025, the petitioner was placed under suspension under Rule 10(1)(a) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965[1] on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against him.
3. Rule 10(6) of the CCS (CCA) Rules requires every order of suspension to be reviewed every 90 days, upto the maximum period of 270 days.
4. It is also trite in law that an extension which is on grounds which are legally unsustainable would have to be set aside and would result in extinguishing of the order of suspension on that day.
5. The very first extension of the petitioners order of suspension “CCS(CCA) Rules” hereinafter which was on 27 May 2025, read thus:
6. This was followed by a further order of suspension on 22 August 2025 which was identical in terms.
7. Thus, the orders of 27 May 2025 and 22 August 2025 extended the petitioner’s suspension for the second period of 90 days and the third period of 90 days on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were pending against him. It is also an admitted position that, till date, no charge-sheet has been issued to the petitioner.
8. Mr. Haseeb, learned CGSC submits that the issuance of chargesheet is imminent and is presently seeking approval of the CVC.
9. Be that as it may, it is settled in law that disciplinary proceedings commence only with issuance of charge-sheet. The following passage from Union of India v Anil Kumar Sarkar[2] makes this clear:
sheet is issued.”
20. In Coal India Ltd. v Ananta Saha[4] this Court held as under: “27. There can be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that the disciplinary proceedings commence only when a charge-sheet is issued to the delinquent employee.[5] ”
21. We also reiterate that the disciplinary proceedings commence only when a charge-sheet is issued. Departmental proceeding is normally said to be initiated only when a charge-
Union of India v K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109 and UCO Bank v Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2007) 6 SCC 694 sheet is issued.”
10. It is also apparent from Rule 14(3) and 14(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules.
11. As such, the ground on which the suspension was extended on the second period of 90 days and the third period of 90 days was erroneous, as there were no disciplinary proceedings pending against the petitioner at that point of time.
12. Though Mr. Haseeb submits that the original ground on which the petitioner had been placed under suspension, which was that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against petitioner continues to apply, the extension of suspension was not on the ground that disciplinary proceedings continued to remain contemplated, but that they were pending, which is incorrect.
13. Even if this was an inadvertent error, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit thereof. The legality of any executive action is to be tested on the reasons adduced therefor. This has been the law since Commissioner of Police v Gordhandas Bhanji[6], as cited in the following famous passage from Mohinder Singh Gill v Chief Election Commissioner[7]:
AIR 1952 SC 16 time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji: “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.”
14. As such, solely on the ground that first and second extensions of suspension were on an a plainly factually erroneous ground, we are constrained to set aside the orders dated 27 May 2025 and 22 August 2025 whereby the petitioner’s suspension was extended beyond 90 days. Consequences in law would follow. The petitioner would be entitled, therefore, to be reinstated in service.
15. This would, however, not preclude the respondent from taking action against the petitioner in accordance with law, including by way of suspension if deemed appropriate.
16. Needless to say, should the petitioner being aggrieved by any such action which may be taken, the petitioner’s right in law shall remain reserved.
17. Mr. Singhdev points out that the petitioner’s application for leave is pending with the respondents. We say nothing thereon. It would be for the respondents to take a decision on the application.
18. The petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J. SEPTEMBER 9, 2025