Technology Information, Forecasting & Assessment Council (TIFAC) v. DRPK Anilkumar & Ors.

0 TlPA 409/2019and C.M.29130/2019 LPA 410/2019 and C.M.28134/2019 TiPA 412/2019 and r.M.28142/2019 T.PA 413/2019 and C.M.28152/2019 T.PA 414/2019 and r.M.28160/2019 The present appeals have arisen out ofan order dated 29.03.2019 passed bythelearned Single Judgeofthis Courtraising acommon question oflaw. Mr.Maninder Acharya,learned Additional Solicitor General,submits that while granting interim protection,learned Single Judge has failed to take into consideration the settled position oflaw in terms ofthejudgment passed by the Supreme Court ofIndia in the case ofthe Secretary,State ofKarnataka and „,hers vs. Vmadeviandothersreported in(2006)4SCCI,more particularly, paragraphs43&44,whichwereproducebelow: "43 Thus it is clear that adherence to the rule ofequality in en?;iZenUsabasicfeatureofourConstitutionandsm^ethe.™leof kw isthecore ofourConstitution,acourtwould certainly bedisabled from passinganorderupholdingaviolationofArticle 14or mordering ["lookingoftheneedtocomplywiththerequirementsof^ice Hread"reticle 16oftheConstitution.Therefore,consistentvtmh Ihes"fo1^ublicemployment,this Courtwhile layingdown the law has necessarily to hold that unlessthe appointmentis m terms of Ite'rerarr^L'and after a proper competifton among quahfied oersons thesamewould notconferany rightontheappointee^IfIt[1] O Lntracmalappointment,theappointmentcomestoa"ondat endo thecontract ifitwereanengagementorappointmenton daly wagesor casualbaS the same would cometo an end when itisdiscontinued Similarly,atemporaryemployeecould notclaimtobemadePam^ant ontheexpiry ofhisterm ofappointment.Ithasalsoto be clarified that meS beSLse a temporary employee or a casual wage woto. continuedfor atime beyondtheterm ofhisappointment,he would not Teemftledtobeabsorbedinregularserviceormadepennanent,merely onthestrength ofsuchcontinuance,ifthe originalappomtmen wasn Zde by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the TelevantZles.ItisZtopentothecourttoprevent-g"latthe Instance oftemporary employees whose period ofemployment 1cometo an end orofad hocemployeeswho their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts act g ^ under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordmariy issue dheZons for absorption, regularisafion, or permanent contmuan unless the recruitment itself was made constitutional scheme. Merely because an emp"k described as under cover of an order of the court, which we have as "litigious employment"in the earlier part ofthejudgment,he w not be entitled to any rightto be absorbed or made permanent in the LZtiet"such cases,theHigh Courtmay notbejustified in LsTng irnerim directions,since,after all,ifultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible f mouldthereliefin suchamannerthatultimately noPteJ^dmeJ'l caused to him, whereas an mterirn direction to continue employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection o im^^oseontheStatetheburdenofpayinganemployeewhoisleallyno ieZred The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not s interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the ste or mentalities or lend themselves the mstruments to facilitatethebypassingoftheconstitutionalandstatutory mandates.

44 The concept of"equal pay for equal work"is different from the conceptofconferring permanency onthose who have been appom^^^^ onad hocbasis,temporarybasis,orbasedonno processofselection as envisaged bytherules.ThisCourthasin variousdecisions appliedthe rSeofequalpayforequalworkandhaslaiddowntheparameters rSe application ofthat principle. The decisions are rested on he concept ofequality enshrined in our Constitution in ^ directive principles in thatbehalf.Butthe acceptance ofthatpncipe Q cannotleadtoapositionwherethecourtcould ^ made without following the due procedure established by law, deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doingso,would benegationoftheprincipleofequalityofopportuniy. Thepowerto makeanorderasis necessaryfor doingcompletejustice inJy causeor matter pending beforethis Court,wouU notnorm^ly beusedforgivingthe go-bytothe procedure established bylaw inAe matter of public employment. Take the situation arising m the cases Sre us'from the State of Kamataka. Therein, decision[(1990)2SCC396:1990 SCC(L&S)274:(1990)12ATC 902 • (1990) 1 SCR 544] the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities an departmentshadignoredthose directionsordefied"?o^'=directionsan^ had continued to give employment, specifically mter y ^ orders issued by the executive. Some ofthe appointing officers ha:venbeenpunishedfortheirdefiance.Itwouldnotbeju^orproperto pass an orderin exerciseofjurisdiction under Article226or32o Constitution or in exercise of power under Article Constitution permittingthose personsengaged,to be absorbed otto be made permanent, based on their appointments Completejusticewouldbejusticeaccordingtolawandthoughitwould be opento this Courtto mouldthe relief,this Courtwould notgran reliefwhich would amountto perpetuatinganillegality. Ms.Acharyafurthersubmitsthatnoprotectioncouldhavebeengrantedto therespondents,being contractualemployees.Itisfiirther pointed outthatthe respondents were appointed purely for a project by the appellants herein and \ once the project stands completed, there is no provision to regularize their services or continuethem any further. Wehaveheardthelearned Additional Solicitor General. The interim order impugned before us has been passed in the month of March2019andthe matter wasadjournedfor 17'^ May2019.Weareinformed thatthe matter is now listed inthe month ofSeptember2019 butthe pleadings areyettobecompletedbeforethelearned SingleJudge mthreematters. In our view,no purpose will be served in issuing notices m these matters, asbythetimethe service would becompletedthe matter would in any case be listed beforethe learned Single Judge. We find no reason to interfere with the order dated 29"' March 2019 passed bythelearnedSingleJudge,atthisstage,asthematterisyetto beheard on merits after the pleadings are complete, except to say that m case an application is filed by the appellantfor early hearing,after completion ofthe pleadings, the learned Single Judge would endeavour to hear the stay applications on merits. We accordingly dispose ofthe presentappeals and stay applications with the above mentioned directions. G.S.SISTANI,J JYOTISINGH,J MAY 31,2019 ^b page5of[5]