Dr. Thelma J. Talloo v. Jesus and Mary College & Another

14. On 28.06.2008, the Governing Body decided to initiate an inquiry. Even before the Inquiry Committee was properly constituted on 02.07.2008, the petitioner was subjected to prolonged questioning on 01.07.2008, reflecting a predetermined bias. The Chairman of the Governing Body, while constituting the Inquiry Committee, even remarked that her denial “lacked substance”, prejudging the case.

15. Thereafter, the inquiry proceeded in a manifestly unfair and biased manner. The Committee refused to share fair minutes of proceedings, recorded biased comments and disallowed the petitioner from presenting her O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 6 of 29 witnesses, including her entire class and Mr. Singh, who had personally overheard the incriminating conversation.

16. Matters escalated on 30.10.2008, when the petitioner was suddenly suspended from her position as Head of Department and reduced to subsistence allowance, revealing the vindictive intent of the authorities.

17. Despite intervention by this Court in W.P. (C) 7906/2008 directing supply of documents and fair opportunity to defend, the Inquiry Committee continued to obstruct her rights.

18. The Committee denied her legal representation, forcing her to cross-examine complainants herself and even humiliated her counsel. They refused to allow her witnesses and rejected representations signed by her students. Even after she suffered a heart attack in 2009, her requests for adjournment or representation by counsel were denied.

19. The inquiry was rushed and conducted with procedural improprieties. On 20.05.2010, the petitioner received the Inquiry Report holding four out of the five charges proved. She submitted a detailed representation, leading the Governing Body to reopen the inquiry. Yet, even after reopening, the Committee hurriedly concluded proceedings without allowing full crossexamination or defence witnesses and in its Report dated 19.08.2010, held three charges proved.

20. Despite her detailed representation, the Governing Body dismissed her from service on 06.07.2011.

21. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Clause 9(1) of the Annexure to Ordinance XII of Delhi University before the Appeals Committee. On 23.05.2012, the Appeals Committee, despite testimony from Mr. Singh, confirming that it was he who had suggested the trap, failed to give due weight to his statement. O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 7 of 29

22. On 23.10.2012, the Appeals Committee dismissed the appeal, merely reducing the penalty from dismissal to termination, so that the retiral dues of the petitioner would not be affected.

23. The Appeals Committee failed to properly evaluate the evidence, overlooked the challenge of the petitioner to the tainted inquiry and simply reiterated the findings of the Inquiry Committee.

24. Aggrieved by the award of the Appeals Committee, the petitioner is constrained to file the present petition under Section 34 of the Act.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER

25. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has made the following submissions:

26. Violation of Statutory Safeguards under Ordinance XII: Clause 6 of the Annexure to Ordinance XII mandates that before terminating services of a teacher, the Governing Body must (i) furnish written grounds, (ii) provide an opportunity to reply, (iii) grant personal hearing if requested, and (iv) duly consider the case of the teacher before arriving at a final decision. In the present case, the Governing Body failed to issue a further show cause notice on the inquiry report, did not record independent findings and directly imposed dismissal, in contravention of Clause 6 and judicial pronouncements in Dr. M.S. Frank v. Delhi University & Ors., 2015:DHC:5697 and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, 1999 (7) SCC 739.

27. Improper Constitution of the Inquiry Committee: The Governing Body appointed its own members as the Inquiry Committee and thereafter accepted the report with the same members participating in the Governing Body meeting. This offends the principle that “no person can be a judge in O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 8 of 29 his own cause”, as laid down in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 262 and creates a clear case of bias.

28. Fabricated and Unreliable Evidence: The principal allegation rested on a manipulated phone recording between the petitioner and a student. The call was made from the phone of a student but recorded on the device of another student, raising grave doubts of tampering. No forensic verification was conducted. Nevertheless, both the Inquiry Committee and the Appeals Committee accepted the transcript as “natural and reliable”, ignoring basic evidentiary safeguards.

29. Failure to Consider Material Evidence: The Appeals Committee disregarded crucial defense evidence, including the deposition of Senior Advocate Mr. Singh, who corroborated the version of the petitioner and had advised involving the police. Similarly, representations from students supporting the integrity of the petitioner and contradictions in the testimonies of the complainants were ignored, namely, Saraswati Chhabra admitting attendance was not an issue and Meghna Khanna denying shortage of attendance.

30. Denial of Legal Assistance and Fair Opportunity: The petitioner, being an academic and not trained in law, was compelled to cross-examine witnesses without legal assistance, while the Appeals Committee later faulted her for inadequacies in cross-examination. This denial of counsel, coupled with reliance on untested testimonies, constitutes a breach of natural justice.

31. Limited and Flawed Exercise by the Appeals Committee: The Appeals Committee erroneously adopted the stance that its role was merely to see whether principles of natural justice were broadly followed, rather than exercising original arbitral jurisdiction under Clause 9. It failed to provide O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 9 of 29 independent findings on Articles of Charge II and III, cursorily upholding them without reasoned analysis, thereby abdicating its statutory function.

32. Arbitral Award Not Meeting Requirements of Law: Under Section 34 of the Act, an arbitral award must be reasoned, consider all contentions and reflect judicial application of mind. The present award merely reproduces the conclusions of the Inquiry Committee without reasons, rendering it unintelligible and perverse. Reliance is placed on State of Orissa v. Samantary Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine SC 856 and Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1, which permit interference where awards suffer from perversity, patent error, or lack of reasoning.

33. Disproportionate Penalty: Even assuming that misconduct was established, dismissal was excessive and disproportionate to the alleged charges, violating Article 14 as laid down in Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 442.

34. Relief Sought - Modification of Award: The petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation and seeks only removal of stigma. In exercise of powers under Section 34 of this Act, this Court may modify the arbitral award and substitute dismissal with voluntary retirement, in line with the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gayatri Balaswamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 9861, which recognized a limited power of modification under Section 34 of the Act.

35. Equitable Considerations: The petitioner has an unblemished record of 26 years. The dismissal has caused immense trauma, including serious health complications for her and her family. In these circumstances, equity and justice warrant interference with the impugned arbitral award to prevent perpetuation of grave injustice. O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 10 of 29 SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1

36. Mr. Chacko, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, has made the following submissions:

37. Proof of Misconduct through Direct Evidence: The petitioner was charged with demanding illegal gratification from students in return for academic favours. The charges were supported by cogent evidence, namely, recorded conversation with Akansha Gulia, admitted by the petitioner and testimonies of Saraswati Chhabra and Meghna Khanna, consistent and unshaken in cross-examination. The Inquiry Committee, after due process, found Charges I, II and III proved.

38. Fair Inquiry and Opportunity of Defence: The petitioner was supplied all documents and permitted to cross-examine witnesses pursuant to directions of this Court in W.P.(C) 7906/2008. She admitted the recorded conversation but failed to substantiate her claim of tampering when specifically asked. Thus, the petitioner was afforded full opportunity of defence and no violation of natural justice was made out.

39. No Bias or Illegality in Constitution of the Inquiry Committee: The Inquiry Committee was duly constituted by the Governing Body in accordance with Ordinance XII. The petitioner did not object to its composition during proceedings or in her writ petition. The Inquiry Committee as well as the Appeals Committee members did not participate in the final decision of the Governing Body. Thus, the allegations of bias are an afterthought and untenable.

40. Reasoned Findings by the Appeals Committee: The Appeals Committee independently assessed the evidence, including the transcript of the phone recording. It found the conversation natural and reliable and rejected the O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 11 of 29 explanation of the petitioner as unconvincing. It upheld the findings of the Inquiry Committee by a reasoned order, satisfying the mandate of law.

41. Modification of Penalty Already Granted: The Governing Body, on 07.11.2012, modified dismissal into simple termination, ensuring that the petitioner received all retiral dues. The petitioner accepted the benefits and having done so, cannot now seek further modification of the penalty.

42. Limited Scope of Judicial Review under Section 34: It is settled law that Section 34 of the Act does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or interference with findings of fact (National Highways Authority of India v. Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6524). The arbitral award can be set aside only for conflict with public policy, patent illegality, or violation of natural justice (National Highways Authority of India v. South Indian Bank Ltd. and Union Bank of India Ltd. & Anr., 2025:DHC:5126). The present petition raises only factual disputes without demonstrating perversity, illegality, or prejudice.

43. Disciplinary Proceedings Not Vitiated by Technicalities: In domestic inquiries, strict rules of evidence do not apply and logically probative material is sufficient as held in the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India & Anr., 1982 (1) SCC 143 and State of Haryana & Anr. v. Rattan Singh, 1977 (2) SCC 491. Both the Committees comprised eminent individuals with unimpeachable integrity and no prejudice was suffered by the petitioner.

44. No Violation of Constitutional or Statutory Protection: The petitioner is not a public servant and thus, Article 311 of the Constitution has no application. Further, the respondent No. 1 is not a statutory body and hence, no violation of statutory provisions arises. Thus, the present petition is liable to be dismissed. O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 12 of 29 SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 2

45. Ms. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2, has made the following submissions:

46. Scope of the Submissions: The submissions of the respondent No. 2 are confined to the only legal contention urged on behalf of the petitioner, namely, that the Appeals Committee failed to give its own finding on the issues raised and merely adopted the findings of the Inquiry Committee.

47. Independent Application of Mind by the Arbitral Tribunal: The findings of the Appeals Committee clearly establish that it duly appreciated the contentions of the petitioner, considered the material placed on record and thereafter gave its own findings. Even where the Appeals Committee concurred with the conclusions of the Inquiry Committee, such concurrence was arrived at only after independent consideration of the rival submissions and on being satisfied that the findings of the Inquiry Committee were just and proper.

48. Consideration of Quantum of Punishment: The Appeals Committee did not mechanically affirm the punishment imposed but applied its mind to the overall circumstances. Taking a balanced view, the Appeals Committee converted the punishment of dismissal into that of a simple termination, thereby safeguarding the retiral dues of the petitioner. This itself demonstrates independent evaluation and exercise of discretion by the Appeals Committee.

49. No Blind Borrowing of Findings: In light of the above, it is stated that the Appeals Committee had not blindly borrowed the findings of the Inquiry Committee and the record demonstrates active application of mind and reasoned satisfaction by the Appeals Committee. O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 13 of 29

50. Preclusion from Raising Fresh Objections: Further, the petitioner, who was represented by counsel before the Inquiry Committee, did not seek any opportunity to lead fresh evidence. Having failed to avail such opportunity, the petitioner is now precluded from contending that the Appeals Committee should have permitted or considered fresh evidence and hence, the present petition is liable to be dismissed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

51. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

52. The contours of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act are well settled. This Court is not an appellate forum and cannot reassess or reappreciate evidence as if sitting in appeal. Its role is supervisory and intervention is permissible only on the limited grounds expressly provided in Section 34 of the Act. The arbitral award can be set aside only for conflict with public policy, patent illegality, or violation of natural justice.

53. This principle has been laid down in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Limited, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 522, wherein the Hon’ble Court endorsed the position in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 and Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highway Authority of India, AIR 2019 SC 5041, on the scope for interference with domestic award under Section 34 of the Act. The relevant paragraph reads as under:

O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 14 of 29 person would have arrived at it; or the construction of the contract is such that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view. [Patel Engg. Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC 167: (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 149.] A “finding” based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside under the head of “patent illegality”. An award without reasons would suffer from patent illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by deciding a matter not within his jurisdiction or violating a fundamental principle of natural justice.” On Charge No. I - Demand of Cash, Mobile Phone and Saree from Aakanksha Gulia

54. The principal charge against the petitioner concerns a recorded conversation between her and a student, which formed the foundation of the disciplinary action. The Appeals Committee examined this evidence in detail and observed: “A perusal of the above transcript does show that the conversation proceeded on a very natural basis and the flow of the conversation does not indicate that it was altered or amended or certain portions omitted. It was also stated that the telephone on which the recordings was made did not belong to Aakanksha Gulia but belonged to Saraswati Chhabra. Aakanksha Gulia stated that the conversation on her phone was O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 15 of 29 recorded on Saraswati Chhabra‟s phone who was also a witness to the incident. … … However, insofar the transcript of the tape is concerned, it does appear to be natural and worthy of reliance. In our view, Charge No. 1 had been fully brought home and the findings of the Enquiry Committee and the action thereupon taken by the Governing Body and affirmed by the Vice Chancellor after taking a legal opinion are not such so as to warrant interference in this appeal. We have to keep in mind the fact that a domestic enquiry has to be procedurally fair, which, in this case, clearly was and consequently, no fault could be found by us in the conduct of the enquiry. The appellant‟s plea that the transcript was edited is not substantiated by perusing the flow of the conversation and even if it is assumed that the appellant‟s case of editing the portion of the tape in the end where she provided her residential address is correct, the reliance of the enquiry committee upon the conversation cannot be faulted. Similarly the appellant‟s plea that she was trying to trap the student Akanksha Gulia, is unnatural and seems to have been prepared to meet the damaging impact of the recorded conversation. Similarly the plea that a senior Counsel was present at about 11.30 A.M on a working day at home is puzzling and not acceptable. Thus the charge of demand of a Nokia Phone or money to increase the attendance is fully borne out. …” O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 16 of 29

55. This Court finds no infirmity in the reliance on such material. In Rattan Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court settled the principle that strict rules of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, do not apply to domestic enquiries. What is required is some material which is logically probative for a prudent mind. The relevant paragraph reads as under:

O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 17 of 29 passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.”

56. In the present case, the recorded conversation, corroborated by witness testimony, constitutes probative material that reasonably supports the findings of guilt. The contention of the petitioner that the tape was edited or that she was attempting to trap the student was duly considered and rejected by the Appeals Committee as implausible.

57. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the conclusion reached by the Appeals Committee is based on appreciation of evidence, application of mind and is plausible, as the finding of guilt on Charge No. I is based on evidence which satisfies the test of probative value as recognised in Rattan Singh (supra). Hence, the concurrent finding of the Inquiry Committee and the Appeals Committee on evidence cannot be re-appreciated under Section 34 of the Act. O.M.P. 150/2013 Page No. 18 of 29 On Charge No. II - Demand of an Inverter from Saraswati Chhabra

58. With respect to the second charge, the Appeals Committee recorded the following finding: “5.[1] Insofar as Article II of the charge sheet is concerned it related to the demand for illegal gratification made to the Student Saraswati Chhabra for improving her attendance. The Student‟s testimony for a demand of an inverter not having been controverted in cross-examination, the said charge was held proved by the enquiry committee and no fault can be found with this finding. Accordingly we agree with the Enquiry Committee that Charge 2 is also proved.”

59. The Inquiry Committee, in its Report dated 19.07.2010, had elaborated and analyzed the evidence in detail. It recorded the testimony of the complainant, Saraswati Chhabra, who categorically deposed that when she was in the First Year, the petitioner had demanded an inverter from her in exchange for attendance. Upon refusal, she was subjected to harassment in the Second Year, being denied attendance for trivial delays while other students were granted relaxation.

60. The Report further records that the witness was made available for crossexamination by the petitioner in several meetings. Ultimately, she was crossexamined at length on 17.12.2009. Despite this opportunity, the petitioner did not put any question to controvert the allegation of demand for an inverter. On the contrary, the witness reiterated in cross-examination that the demand had indeed been made and that her subsequent difficulties in securing attendance were retaliatory in nature.

61. The Inquiry Committee thus concluded: