M/S MERINO REALTORS(P)Ltd v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

1. In all these petitions, the facts more or less are similar and the reliefs W.P.(C)1475/2017andother connectedmatters Page2of[8] sought are almost identical. They are accordingly being disposed ofby this common order.Nevertheless,each ofthe petitions was heard separately.

2. For the sake of convenience W.P.(C) 1475 of 2017 titled M/s Merino Realtors(P)Ltd. v. UOI& Ors.is taken up as the lead case.The prayers in the petition read asimder: "(i) issue a writ of certiorari and/or any other writ, order or direction of the similar nature declaring the entire acquisition with respect to 1/5^ undivided share in agricultural land measuring 81 Bighas and 6 Biswas(Equal to 16 Bighas and 5 Biswas), comprised in Khasra Nos. 600(2-15), 629(44-9), 639 (12-4),647(8-7),649(2-8),651(0-17)&972/673/674/367(10- 6),situated in the revenue estate of Village Maidan Garhi,NCT of Delhi, having lapsed and further quashing the impugned notification No.F.9(16)/80- L&B dated 25.11.1980 issued under section 4, Notification No.F.9(28)/85-L&B dated 18.06.1985 issued under Section6ofthe Land Acquisition Act,1894 and the Award no.23/87-88 with respect to 1/5^^^ undivided share in agricultural land measuring 81 Bighas and6Biswas(Equal to 16 Bighas and 5 Bisv/as), comprised in Khasra Nos, 600 (2-15), 629(44-9), 639 (12-4), 647 (8-7), 649 (2-8), 651 (0-17) & 972/673/674/367(10-6),situated in the revenue estate ofVillage Maidan Garhi,NCT ofDelhi. AND

(ii) issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other writ, order and direction of the similar nature issuing directions to the Respondents not to disturb or hinder the possession and enjoyment of the Petitioner over 1/5^*^ undivided share in agricultural land measuring 81 Bighas and6Biswas(Equalto 16 Bighas and 5 Biswas), comprised-in Khasra Nos. 600(2- 15\ 629(44-9), 639 (12-4), 647 (8-7), 649 (2-8), 651 (0-17) & 972/673/674/367(10-6),situated in the revenue estate ofVillage Maidan Garhi,NCT ofDelhi." W.P.(C)1475/2017andotherconnectedmatters Page3of[8]

3. The narration in the petition reveals that the notification under Section 4 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894('LAA') was issued on 25^*^ November 1980, followed by declaration under Section 6 of the LAA on 18 June

1985. The impugned Award No.23/1987-88 was passed way back in 1987-

88. There is no explanation in the petition for the inordinate delay in approaching the Courtfor relief. )

4. It is stated in the petition that "the Petitioner is the owner in,actual physical possession of undivided share in agricultural land measuring 81 Bighas and 6 Biswas (Eqiial to 16 Bighas and 5 Biswas), comprised in KhasraNos.600(2-15),629(44-9),639(12-4),647(8-7),649(2-8),651(0-

17) & 972/673/674/367 (10-6), situated iii the revenue Estate of Village Maidan Garhi." It is stated that one Shri Hoshiyar Singh was the recorded owner ofthe land in question and after his demise,the land was inherited by his two sons. It is stated that the Petitioner through his authorised representative purchased the subject land from the two sons by way of an Agreementto Sell(ATS)dated 10^*^ September 2005 and General Power of Attorney(GPA)dated 2 April 2006.

5. In the counter-affidavitfiled on behalfofthe LAC,it is submitted that the Petitioner is claiming ownership of the land based on an ATS arid GPA which are not valid instruments conferring title on the Petitioner. It is stated that possessionofKhasraNos.600(2-15),629(44-9),639(12-4),647(8-7), 649(2-8),651 (0-17)972/673/674/367(10-6)was-taken and handed over to the DDA on 16^"^ July 1987. On the aspect ofcompensatiorl, it is submitted that the compensation amount has been paid to the recorded owners. In the W.P. (C)1475/2017and otherconnected matters Page4ofS present case, a compensation amount ofRs.5,09,237.84 was paid to each of the sons ofthe recorded owner. 6:In the counter-affidavit filed by the DDA,it is submitted that the petition is barred by delay and laches. It is further submitted that the Petitioner has purchased the property in question through GPAs and ATS which are not valid instruments of sale. It is also submitted that the land in question has been purchased by the Petitioner after the award has been passed which is barred by Section 4 ofthe Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972. No rejoinder has been filed by the Petitioner to the counter affidavit ofthe LAC or the DDA.

7. In any event,the assertion ofthe Petitioner that it continues to remain in possession ofthe land in question gives rise to a disputed question offact which cannot be examined in this petition. Moreover,the documents on the basis ofwhich the Petitioner is claiming ownership are not valid. A perusal ofthe said documents reveals that they do not confer any valid right,title or interest in respect ofthe lands in question in favour ofthe Petitioner.In this tK case,the Notification under Section 4 ofLAA was issued on 25 November 1980 and the Award was passed on 5^^ June 1987.The Petitioner having ful] knowledge about the status of the land in question and without taking permission from the competent authority as required under Delhi Land (Restriction ofTransfer)Act,1972 has entered into the above transactions in respect ofthe lands in question. The validity of the above documents are, therefore,extremely doubtful.In the circumstances,the Courtis not satisfied that the Petitioner has been able to even primafacie demonstrate its,locus W.P. (C)1475/2017and otherconnected matters Page5of[8] standi to file this petition and claim any relief under Section 24(2)ofthe Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,2013('the 2013 Act').

8. On the aspect oflaches,in Mahavir v. Union ofIndia(2018)3SCC588 the Supreme Court has observed as under: "23. In the instant case, the claim has beeri made not only belatedly, but neither the petitioners nor their previous three generations had ever approached any ofthe authorities in writing for claiming compensation. No representation had ever been filed with any authority, none has been annexed and there is no averment made in the petition that any such representation had ever been filed. The claim appears not only stale and dead but extremely clouded. This we are mentioning as additional reasons,as such claims not only suffer from delay and laches but courts are not supposed to entertain such claims. Besides such claims become doubtful, cannot be received for consideration being barred due to delay and laches. 24.the High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot be permitted to be raised in the court,and cannot be adjudicated asthey are barred.The High Courthas rightly observed thatsuch claims cannot be a subject matter ofinquiry after the lapse ofa ^ reasonable period oftimeand beneficialprovisions ofSection24 of the 2013 Act are not available to such incumbents. In our opinion. Section 24cannot revive those claims that are dead and stale."

9. The above decision has been reaffirmed by the judgment ofthe thi-ee Judges Bench ofthe Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra(2018)3SCC412where it was observed as under:- "128, In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be used to revive the dead or stale claims and the matters, v.Lich have been W.P.(C)1475/2017midotherconnectedmatters Page6of[8] contested up to this Court or even in the High Court having lost the cases or where reference has been soughtfor enhancementof the compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urged that physical possession has not been taken from them, such claims cannot be entertained under the guise of section 24(2). We have come across the cases in which findings have been recorded that by which ofdrawing a Panchnama,possession has been taken, now again under Section 24(2)it is asserted again that physical possession is still with them.Such claims camiot be entertained in view ofthe previous decisions in which such plea ought to have been raised and such decisions would operate as resjudicata or constmctive resjudicata. As either the plea raised is negatived or such plea ought to have been raised or was not raised in the previous round oflitigation. Section 24 ofthe Act of2013 does not supersede or annul the court's decision and the provisions cannot e misused to reassert such claims once over again. Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way ofdrawing the Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the case cannot be reopened underthe guise ofsection 24 ofActof2013.

129. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid ofthose who first deliberately refuse to accept the compensation, and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-motivated dilatoiy tactics, for decades together. On the contrary, the section is intended to help those who have not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being the legal obligation of the acquiring body so to do,and/or who have been illegally deprived oftheir possession for five years or more;in both the scenarios, fault/cause notbeing attributable to the landowners/claimants.

130. We are ofthe view that stale or dead claims cannot be the subject-matter ofjudicial probing under section 24 of the Act of2013. The provisions of section 24 do not invalidate those judgment/orders of the courts where under rights/claims have been lost/negatived, neither do they revive those rights which have become barred, either, due to inaction or otherwise by operation oflaw. Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all to be raised under the guise of section 24. Misuse of provisions of W.P.(C)1475/2017andotherconnectedmatters Page7of[8] section 24(2) cannot be permitted. Protection by the courts in cases ofsuch blatant misuse ofthe provisions oflaw could never ' have,been the intention behind enacting the provisions ofsection 24(2)ofthe 2013 Act; and, by the decision laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation(supra),and this Court never,even for a moment, intended that such cases would be received or entertained by the courts."

10. It may be noted here thatthe reference made by a Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma (2018) 4 SCC 405 # regarding the correctness ofthe aforesaid decision inIndoreDevelopment Authority v. Shailendra {supra)is as regards the extent to which it differs from the earlier view ofthe Supreme CourtinPuneMunicipalCorporation