Sandeep K L v. Union of India

GNCTD[9], though that case dealt with recruitment to a civil post, and arose out of a judgement of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner Manish Saini10, in that case, was accused of having attempted to rob a pedestrian at knife point, and an FIR was registered against him for having committed offences under Sections 398 and 401 of the IPC read with Sections 25, 54 and 59 of the Arms At, 1959. Consequent on the trial which followed, Manish was acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge11, on the ground that the statements of the PWs were not consistent, no independent witness had been joined and that it was unbelievable that Manish and his fellow accused, who were alleged to have been armed, did not put up resistance when intercepted by the Police officials. The learned ASJ concluded by holding that “the prosecution has miserably failed to establish its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt” and that, therefore, the accused, including Manish, were entitled to be acquitted. Five years thereafter, Manish applied for recruitment to the post of Sub-Inspector12 in the Delhi Police, via the Delhi Police Examination 2017. He was provisionally selected. He had disclosed, at the time of applying for the post, the fact that he had been arrayed as an accused in the FIR and that he had been acquitted by the learned ASJ. Solely on the ground of his involvement in the criminal case, his candidature for the post of SI was cancelled. The Screening Committee observed that, as Manish had been involved in a serious offence of attempted robbery and was in possession of spring actuated knives, he was unsuitable for recruitment to a disciplined force such as 315 (2024) DLT 707 (DB) “Manish” hereinafter "ASJ" hereinafter "SI" hereinafter the Police. Aggrieved thereby, Manish approached the CAT by way of an OA, which was dismissed by judgement dated 10 June 2022, relying, inter alia, on Methu Meda, which was cited before us by Mr. Saket. Manish, thereafter, approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10. This Court noticed that appointment to the Delhi Police was governed by Standing Order13 398/2018 dated 18 October 2018, which clearly noted that a candidate who had been involved in a criminal case could be disqualified from appointment even if he had disclosed his involvement. We also noted that the position, in law, regarding the controversy, was well settled. We took into consideration the judgements of the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh v State14, Pramod Singh Kirar v State of MP15, Methu Meda, State of Rajasthan v Love Kush Meena16, State of MP v Bunty17, and State of MP v Bhupendra Yadav18. Methu Meda itself notes the following principles, laid down by the learned 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v UOI19, in para 16 of the report, thus:

SO" hereinafter

38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.

38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.

38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision.

38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted: 38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.

38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.

38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.

38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form.

38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.

38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him. (Emphasis supplied)

11. Following these principles, this Court allowed the writ petition filed by Manish Saini.

12. When we apply these principles to the present case, we find that the offence of which the petitioner was accused, and was ultimately acquitted, was merely participating in an unlawful assembly and belabouring two persons. While we certainly do not intend to underplay the allegations against the petitioner, the fact of the matter remains that no evidence, establishing the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged act, was forthcoming, and the petitioner was ultimately acquitted. In this context, we may also refer, profitably, to para 14 of Methu Meda, which holds that the core considerations, while examining the suitability of a candidate who was involved in a criminal case and was acquitted, for appointment to a disciplined force, would be “the nature of offence, extent of his involvement, propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in future”. These factors are required to be examined by the Screening Committee before taking a decision on the suitability, or otherwise, of the candidate.

13. It is clear, to us, that the Screening Committee, at least in the impugned decision, does not appear to have reflected on these considerations. The decision proceeds on the premise that any, and every, candidate who was ever involved in a criminal case, would be ipso facto disentitled to appointment.

14. Methu Meda, which is the main plank of Mr. Saket’s opposition to the writ petition, clearly does not lay down any such absolute principle.

15. Holistically viewing the facts in the light of the law, we are of the opinion that, in view of fact that

(i) the petitioner was indicted in a relatively less serious offence, which is not established as involving moral turpitude,

(ii) the petitioner has no criminal antecedents except for the said incident,

(iii) the petitioner was acquitted of the said charges on 13

(iv) the learned JMFC noted that there was no legally admissible evidence against the petitioner, even if it was because of the witnesses turning hostile,

(v) the petitioner honestly declared the fact of the past criminal case at the time when he filled the application,

(vi) the impugned order letter 14 December 2024 is completely unreasoned, and merely states that the petitioner was “unsuitable for employment in CISF”, clubbing him with all other candidates who had criminal cases in the past,

(vii) the factors which are relevant to be taken into consideration in such cases, as delineated by the Supreme Court in Methu Meda, i.e., the nature of offence, extent of involvement of the petitioner, propensity of the petitioner to indulge in similar activities in future, have clearly not been taken into consideration by the Screening Committee, before rejecting the petitioner’s candidature, and

(viii) of these factors, given the fact this was the sole incident in which the petitioner was involved and there is no allegation of the petitioner having indulged in any such activity for five years between the date of his acquittal and the date of his joining services with the respondent, there is no reason to believe that the petitioner had the propensity to be involved in any such activities in future, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 14 December 2024 cannot sustain in law or in facts.

16. The decision to reject the petitioner’s candidature is accordingly quashed and set aside.

17. The petitioner’s candidature, therefore, stands restored. The process of his appointment to the post of Constable/GD would commence from the point at which his candidature was cancelled.

18. The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J. SEPTEMBER 15, 2025