Jai Singh Joon & Ors. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.

9. On 5th February, 2018, an additional affidavit was filed by the LAC (North) reiterating that not only was vacant physical possession of land other than that in Khasra No.2 taken over way back on 2nd September, 1998, but even compensation was paid, on the dates earlier mentioned.

10. Additional affidavit likewise has been filed by the DUSIB, confirming that possession of land in Khasra No.2 was taken over on 26th April, 2008.

11. A further additional affidavit was filed by the LAC (North) on 11th September, 2018. In paragraph 7 of the additional affidavit it was stated that in respect of Khasra No. 2 Min (1-12), part compensation had been paid of Item No.07 to namely, Nand Kishore at Item No. 7/1 and Prithiviraj at Item No.7/2 on 23rd April, 1998.

12. When this case was listed for hearing on 19th December, 2018, learned counsel for the Petitioners stated that in relation to the averments made in paragraph 7 of the additional affidavit, the Petitioners had preferred an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 („RTI Act‟). He sought time to file a further affidavit.

13. Today in Court Mr Ghawana handed over a rejoinder affidavit and drew the attention of the Court to the Annexure-B thereto, which was a reply dated 15th March, 2019 received by him from the Public Relation Officer (HQ), District North in response to the application under the RTI Act. The said information confirms that the land in Khasra No.2 (1-12) has been acquired under the Award No. 24/2005-06; that possession thereof was taken over and handed over to the L&B on 26th April, 2008 and as per Statement-A “compensation in respect of above KH number has not been showed paid”. He also referred to Annexure-A to the rejoinder affidavit, which was a copy of the original notification dated 4th March, 2003 under Section 4 of the LAA where the land of the Petitioners in Khasra No.2, was not included. According to him, in the absence of a valid Section 4 LAA notification, there could not have been any valid award and therefore Award No. 24/2005-06 was void ab initio. He placed reliance on the decisions in Narendrajit Singh v State of U.P. 1970 (1) SCC 125 and Sandeep Kakkar v Union of India 111 (2004) DLT 291 (DB). Even with respect to taking of possession of the land in question, he placed reliance on the decision in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory (2005) 13 SCC 477 and submitted that in the present case, the statutory requirement for taking valid possession was not fulfilled.

14. Having considered the above submissions, the Court would like to first observe that the present Petitioners at no point in time questioned the land acquisition proceedings, which culminated in Award Nos. 18/2000-01, or even Award No.24/2005-06 under which the land in Khasra No.2 (1-12) in Village Bhalswa Jahangirpuri, Delhi was acquired. The details given are of cases instituted by other land owners and not these Petitioners. The Petitioners have no explanation to offer for the inordinate delay in approaching the Court for relief qua the aforementioned acquisition.

15. On the aspect of laches, the Supreme Court has in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (2018) 3 SCC 412 observed as under: “128. In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be used to revive the dead or stale claims and the matters, which have been contested up to this Court or even in the High Court having lost the cases or where reference has been sought for enhancement of the compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urged that physical possession has not been taken from them, such claims cannot be entertained under the guise of section 24(2). We have come across the cases in which findings have been recorded that by which of drawing a Panchnama, possession has been taken, now again under Section 24(2) it is asserted again that physical possession is still with them. Such claims cannot be entertained in view of the previous decisions in which such plea ought to have been raised and such decisions would operate as res judicata or constructive res judicata. As either the plea raised is negatived or such plea ought to have been raised or was not raised in the previous round of litigation. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not supersede or annul the court‟s decision and the provisions cannot be misused to reassert such claims once over again. Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawing the Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the case cannot be reopened under the guise of section 24 of Act of 2013.

129. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those who first deliberately refuse to accept the compensation, and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-motivated dilatory tactics, for decades together. On the contrary, the section is intended to help those who have not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being the legal obligation of the acquiring body so to do, and/or who have been illegally deprived of their possession for five years or more; in both the scenarios, fault/cause not being attributable to the landowners/claimants.

130. We are of the view that stale or dead claims cannot be the subject-matter of judicial probing under section 24 of the Act of

2013. The provisions of section 24 do not invalidate those judgment/orders of the courts where under rights/claims have been lost/negatived, neither do they revive those rights which have come barred, either due to inaction or otherwise by operation of law. Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all to be raised under the guise of section 24. Misuse of provisions of section 24(2) cannot be permitted. Protection by the courts in cases of such blatant misuse of the provisions of law could never have been the intention behind enacting the provisions of section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act; and, by the decision laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), and this Court never, even for a moment, intended that such cases would be received or entertained by the courts.”

16. It may be noted here that the reference made by a Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma (2018) 4 SCC 405 regarding the correctness of the aforesaid decision in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) is only as regards the extent to which it differs from the earlier view of the Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki (supra) regarding the tendering of compensation, and not on the question of petitions seeking declaration under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act being barred by laches. This legal position was explained by this Court recently in its decision in Mool Chand v. Union of India 2019 (173) DRJ 595 DB.

17. That apart, from the affidavits filed by the Respondents, it is clear that the Petitioners‟ assertion that they continued to remain in possession of the lands in Khasra Nos. 1/1, 1/2, 2 and 5 gives rise to disputed questions of fact. Even their claim of entitlement to compensation, which according to them was not tendered, has been disputed by the Respondents. The information obtained through the RTI Act, only adds further to this dispute. These disputed questions cannot possibly be examined in the present petition.

18. The decision cited by the counsel for the Petitioners are to no avail, considering the fact that the Petitioners have been sleeping over the matter for more than a decade. In view of the law explained by the Supreme Court as above, which has been followed by this Court in a large number of decisions including Mool Chand v. Union of India 2019(173) DRJ 595[DB], the reliefs as prayed for cannot be granted.

19. The petition is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 23rd December, 2014, which was affirmed on 18th January, 2018, is hereby vacated.

S. MURALIDHAR, J.

TALWANT SINGH, J. JULY 23, 2019 rd