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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 16th September, 2025
51508/2025 SUSHILA BHATNAGAR THROUGH HER LR RAJ KRISHAN BHATNAGAR .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. N.K. Bhatnagar, Mr. Arkam Khan and Ms. Tanushree Khandelwal, Advocates
Through: Ms. Manika Tripathy, Standing Counsel
No.5.
Mr. Siddharth Panda, Mr. Anil Pandey and Mr. Ritank, Advocates for Respondents no. 2 and 4
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE, J.
1. This petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby the petitioner has questioned the Award No.1/2008-09/North East dated 26th July, 2008, to the extent it determines the value of the land, structure and solatium. The petitioner, in the present petition, has sought enhanced compensation as per the prevailing market rate.
2. The further challenge is to the communication dated 06th September, 2011 issued by the Respondent No.4-Land Acquisition Collector/ADM (North-East), whereby the alleged reference preferred by the land owner under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1894’) seeking reference to the Court for grant of enhanced compensation was rejected.
3. The petitioner has also prayed for issuance of directions to the respondents to provide an alternate plot of land as re-settlement/rehabilitation package towards compensating the loss of livelihood.
4. The facts necessary for deciding the petition are as under:-
5. The land in question located at plot no.10/9 B, Gali no.2, Friends Colony Industrial Area, G.T Road, Shahdara (Khasra No.1142/320/306/8), Delhi was purchased by the husband (now deceased) of Smt. Sushila Bhatnagar i.e. the petitioner, whose LRs are pursing the present case before this Court. The said purchase was under the sale deed dated 12th March, 1959 with an occupancy certificate dated 27th July, 1960 issued by Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
6. Mr. Jai Kishan, deceased husband of petitioner expired in 1997 and after his death, the property was inherited by the petitioner by way of natural succession and after the petitioner's death in the year 2009, the LRs of petitioner are claimed to have inherited the property and the rights therein by virtue of succession.
7. In relation to the aforesaid land acquisition proceedings claimed to have been initiated, the Award came to be passed vide Award dated 26th July, 2008 under the Act of 1894.
8. It is the case of the petitioner that the aforesaid Award was common for the properties referred to in the said Award and there are 34 claimants under the said Award whose land was acquired.
9. It is alleged that the compensation was paid at much meager rate, so also for the structures standing on the property. The LRs of petitioner claimed that they were awarded following compensation: - Unit Rate: Rs.1973 per sq. mtr. Total Area of the petitioner’s land: 421.53 sq. mtr. Land Value: 421.53 x 1973: Rs.8,31,678.69/- Solatium @ 30%: Rs.2,49,503.60/- Additional amount @ 12% = Rs.99,801.44/- (as per period determined by the LAC) Cost of structures= Rs.4,33,700.00/- Total Compensation: Rs.16,14,683.73/- Rs.16,14,684.00/-
10. As such, the LRs of the petitioner claim that they have received compensation to the tune of Rs.16,14,684.00/-.
11. Being aggrieved, the LRs of the petitioner, who are interested parties, were not accepting the aforesaid Award, and preferred an application in writing to the Land Acquisition Collector seeking matter to be referred to the Collector for the determination of Court whether the objection for lowest compensation offered is justifiable, and sought enhanced compensation @ Rs.60,000/- per sq. metre and also allotment of similar commercial land in lieu of land acquired. Such reference was made by the petitioner on 12th September, 2008 to the respondent-Land Acquisition Collector.
12. After examining the aforesaid reference preferred by the petitioner on 12th September, 2008, the Land Acquisition Collector pursuant to the scheme of Section 18 of the Act of 1894 directed the petitioner to appear before the Land Acquisition Collector on 25th April 2011 vide communication dated 9th April 2011 as there were certain deformities/shortfalls viz mis-match of Khasra Number recorded in the Award and the one claimed in the application under Section 18.
13. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner clarified the said position about the mis -match of Khasra Number, however, the request of the petitioner for making reference pursuant to the mandate of Section 18 of the Act of 1894 came to be rejected vide impugned order dated 06th September, 2011.
14. The petitioner thereafter preferred a review application on 9th December, 2011 before the Land Acquisition Collector seeking review of the order dated 6th September, 2011, however, it is claimed that the same was also rejected as the petitioner has not received any response.
15. According to the petitioner, the land in question, after its possession was taken, was used for RUB Project and the same was duly commissioned. It is the case of the LRs of the petitioner that they are entitled for the benefit of rehabilitation project as is reflected in the communication issued by the GNCTD Land and Building Department on 28th September, 2004. Alleging that the petitioner’s constitutional right and also the fundamental rights are violated, the petitioner has preferred the present petition with the aforesaid relief.
16. The contention of learned counsel appearing for petitioner that the land of the petitioner acquired under the Award dated 26th July, 2008 is not a fact in dispute. According to him, the reference made by the petitioner pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1894 on 12th September, 2008 is borne out of the record. Once such a reference is made by the petitioner, it is not open for the Land Acquisition Collector to reject the same as he cannot adjudicate the title of the petitioner to the land acquired. According to him, once compensation is paid and is received by deceased husband of petitioner and other blood relations, who are claiming to be the LRs, it is necessary to infer that they are persons interested under Section 18 and as such, are entitled to prefer the reference under Section 18. In such an eventuality, it is urged that the Land Acquisition Collector ought to have made reference to the Civil Court as mandated under Section 18 of the Act of 1894. Even otherwise, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the assurance given by the respondents particularly the GNCTD Land and Building Department in communication dated 28th September, 2004 ought to have been honoured by implementing the Rehabilitation Package in favour of the petitioner. As such, the counsel for petitioner would urge that the petitioner is entitled not only for the relief of grant of enhanced compensation under the Award, but also for directions to the respondent- Land Acquisition Collector to make a reference under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 to the Civil Court for grant of enhanced compensation by quashing communication dated 6th September 2011. In the alternative, the petitioner has sought relief of directions to the respondents to implement the communication dated 28th September, 2004 thereby extending the benefit of the Rehabilitation Package in favour of the petitioner.
17. As against the above, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on advance copy, have urged that the petition is hopelessly time barred. It is claimed that the Award dated 26th July, 2008 and the impugned communication dated 6th September, 2011 passed by the Land Acquisition Collector are questioned after a period of more than 15 years. As such, it is claimed that the petition is liable to be thrown out at the threshold without even going into the merits of the matter.
18. It is further claimed that no promise was made to the petitioner or predecessor in title as has been claimed in the alleged communication dated 28th September, 2004 as referred to in para no.12 of the petition, and there cannot be any issue of estoppel in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
19. Our attention is equally invited towards the order dated 28th March, 2024 delivered in Writ Petition (Civil) No.12617 of 2018- Sushila Bhatanagar (Since Deceased) Through her LR. Raj Krishan Vs. Union of India & Ors, wherein the relief claimed by the petitioner, challenging the acquisition proceedings being hit by Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-settlement Act 2013, came to be turned down as the said petition was withdrawn with liberty to file afresh.
20. We have considered the aforesaid submissions. The passing of Award in regard to the land mentioned in the petition is borne out from the record. Admittedly, the Award was passed on 26th July, 2008, and it was open for the petitioner to take appropriate steps questioning the said Award immediately thereafter, as it is not the case of the petitioner that the Award was not within their knowledge. Rather, the further conduct of the petitioner of preferring an application seeking reference pursuant to mandate provided under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 speaks of the petitioner having such knowledge.
21. It appears that the reference made by the petitioner was rejected vide communication dated 6th September, 2011, and same is questioned before this Court after lapse of a period of about 13 years.
22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and Ors, (2024 INSC 314) has held to the following effect:
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.”
23. In another case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Ors [(1996) 11 SCC 501] while considering issue of challenge to notification of acquisition of land where acquisition proceeding were completed and award was passed and writ petition filed thereafter challenging the acquisition notification, it was held that:
4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.”
24. The petitioners are not coming forward before this Court explaining the aforesaid delay of 13 years caused in disclosing their cause before this Court. The fact remains that the Award is questioned almost after a period of 16 years, whereas the impugned communication dated 6th September, 2011 is questioned after lapse of 13 years from the date of communication. In such a scenario, relying upon the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we are of the view that the petitioner has failed to explain the laxity and delay in filing the present petition and as such, we do not find any circumstances which warrant the invocation of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
25. Apart from above, this Court is required to be sensitive to the unsuccessful attempt on the part of the petitioners in contesting their claim under Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Re-settlement Act, 2013. The petitioner has withdrawn the said petition with liberty to file a fresh petition. Just because a Division Bench of this Court has granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition after the order dated 28th March, 2024 delivered in Writ Petition (Civil) No.12617 of 2018 (supra), by itself, will not bring the claim of the petitioner within limitation.
26. Apart from above, if we consider the various legalities of the order dated 6th September, 2011, wherein payer of the petitioner pursuant to statutory mandate of Section 18 of the Act of 1984 came to be rejected for mis-match of Khasra Number, what was expected of the petitioner was to immediately question the said order before this Court.
27. It appears that in case if the persons interested, like the LRs of the petitioner, have any grievance about the Award including that of receipt of inadequate compensation, it is open for such interested persons like LRs of petitioner to prefer a written application to the Collector requesting that the matter referred to the Civil Court for determination about the amount of compensation. Such application requires to state the grounds on which the person interested are objecting to the Award, within a period of six weeks from the date of Award of the Collector, or within six weeks of receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12 of Act of 1894, or within six months from the date of Collector’s Award. Admittedly, in the case in hand, the petitioner has already accepted the amount of compensation and is seeking enhancement of compensation.
28. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 mandates the Collector to forward the reference to the Civil Court within the prescribed time period. The Collector in such an eventuality is empowered to reject the time barred application and is under an obligation to do so. Even if it is considered that the persons like petitioner are person interested, still, it is mandatory for them to prefer an application in writing in a time bound period by disclosing the necessary details of the property in question. In the case in hand, the petitioner is unable to prima facie demonstrate that their land was acquired under the Award in question, the Collector, in our opinion, was justified in rejecting the claim in view of provisions of Section 18(1) of the Act of 1894 as in such an eventuality, the petitioner prima facie has failed to satisfy the mandate under Sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the Act.
29. We are equally required to be sensitive of the fact that once the reference is forwarded by the Collector under Section 18 to that of the Civil Court, the Civil Court is required to pass an Award in writing, duly signed by the Judge presiding over said Court, and such Award is termed as a ‘decree’ within the meaning of Sub-section(2) of Section 26 of the Act of 1894. In case, if aggrieved by such decree, the interest person can prefer an appeal under Section 54 of the Act of 1894 read with Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the form of ‘First Appeal’.
30. It appears that the petitioner has neither questioned the impugned communication passed by the Collector immediately after passing of the same, nor an appeal as contemplated under Section 54 of the Act of 1894 is preferred.
31. In such an eventuality, in our opinion, the claim put forth by the petitioner can be said to be hopelessly time barred, and it cannot be said that the petitioner is entitled for the reference to be forwarded to Civil Court by the Land Acquisition Collector pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1894.
32. Even otherwise, the contention of the petitioner that they are entitled for benefit of Rehabilitation Scheme, as has been communicated by the GNCTD Land and Building Department on 28th September, 2004, also cannot be accepted as the said communication is neither produced on record, nor can be said to be giving any assurance to the petitioner. Even the Rehabilitation Scheme of which the petitioners intend to take benefit, is also not produced on the record.
33. For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition, in our opinion, is sans merits and is, accordingly, dismissed.
34. Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of accordingly.
35. A copy of this judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court forthwith.
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE (JUDGE)
ANISH DAYAL (JUDGE) SEPTEMBER 16, 2025/ay/ss