M/S ND INFO SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. v. REHABILITATION COUNCIL OF INDIA

15. Mr. Jayant Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the Admission Committee, during its meeting on 06.06.2025, unanimously resolved that all parties must adhere to the terms and conditions of the Agreement, and the petitioner would conduct and complete the admission process for the academic session 2025-2026. Acting pursuant to this resolution, the petitioner undertook all the steps necessary for completing the admission process. The petitioner had the exclusive contractual right to publish the counselling results and finalize admissions. By issuing the impugned circular dated 12.09.2025, the respondent has unlawfully attempted to curtail this right, in breach of the Agreement, thereby adversely affecting the lives of 48,000 specially abled candidates.

16. Mr. Mehta further contends that the petitioner has not committed any breach of the Agreement. All delays and failure in granting timely approvals, particularly those required to publish the compiled results, are solely attributable to the respondent. The respondent, having received all fees and complete date of the candidate from the petitioner, cannot now claim advantage from its own administrative lapses.

17. He urges that the delays in approvals are caused by the respondent’s internal administrative shortcomings, including a lack of coordination between the Admission Committee and the office of the Member Secretary. This disarray led to repeated postponements of key decisions. Under the contractual Scope of Work, the petitioner is required to obtain formal approvals at specific stages, especially before publishing results. Despite timely compliance and repeated reminders by the petitioner, the respondent’s inefficiency prevented issuance of approvals, causing avoidable delays for which the petitioner cannot be held liable either legally or equitably.

18. Learned senior counsel further submits that the monetary damages alone cannot remedy the reputational harm, breach of confidential data, or the disruption caused to thousands of specially abled candidates. This is not merely a commercial dispute; the admission process impacts thousands of candidates nationwide, whose education and development is directly affected if the academic session does not commence in a timely and orderly manner.

19. The respondent’s unilateral issuance of the impugned circular, without giving the petitioner an opportunity for hearing, violates the principles of natural justice. No party to a subsisting contract can alter or terminate material rights without affording the other party a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The respondent’s action is arbitrary, non-transparent, and ex facie illegal.

20. Additionally, the respondent is also estopped from curtailing the petitioner’s rights as the respondent has throughout been by words and conduct asking the petitioner to proceed with the counselling process. There is legitimate expectation in favour of the petitioner.

21. Mr. Mehta also drew my attention to the chaos created by the respondent wherein they have recommended 307 candidates for an institute having only 35 seats. He has also drawn my attention to emails received from candidates highlighting the chaos done by the respondent in Round I.

22. Lastly, Mr. Mehta submits that if the respondent’s action is allowed to proceed then the admission process would be conducted in a disorganized manner, causing undue distress and inconvenience to candidates. The petitioner may be denied a completion certificate, adversely affecting its credibility and ability to secure similar contracts in the future and the petitioner could face unwarranted litigation from aggrieved candidates. On behalf of the Respondent

23. In reply to the above submissions, Mr. Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent, contends that no concluded contract ever came into existence between the parties. The discussions and deliberations remained inconclusive and never matured into a formal agreement. At most, there were deliberations, which cannot be construed as a binding contract nor made subject to arbitration.

24. He further argues that the petitioner overstepped its authority by unlawfully collecting registration fees directly into its personal account. This act raised serious concerns and compelled the General Body to disengage from further deliberations or any intention of entering into a contract with the petitioner. Moreover, the impugned circular dated 12.09.2025 does not constitute an arbitrable issue, being an administrative decision that falls outside the scope of arbitration.

25. He further submits that, in the present factual context, the affected parties are not only the petitioner and respondent but also the institutions and prospective candidates seeking admission. The stay order has adversely impacted institutes and candidates, who are neither parties to the alleged contract nor to this petition. Hence, the petition suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties. He further contends that under the guise of this petition, the petitioner is in effect seeking a permanent and mandatory injunction, which is maintainable by way of filing a civil suit, and not by filing the present petition.

26. Lastly, he asserts that the petition seeks to obstruct the counselling process, which, in the absence of a specific contract, cannot be subjected to arbitration. As per the notified schedule, the first round of counselling covering the candidates first choice of course-wise institutions was conducted between 17.09.2025 and 20.09.2025. In the second round, remaining options exercised by the candidates were covered up to the date of stay, a total of 12,598 candidates have already secured admission across various institutes and courses.

ANALYSIS AND FINDING

27. I have learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

28. At the outset, the petitioner in the present petition has not specifically prayed for the mandatory injunction/specific performance but if the present petition is read as a whole then the petitioner is seeking to stall the counselling process commenced by the impugned circular dated 12.09.2025 issued by the respondent and in effect to make admission as per the list prepared by the petitioner.

29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 125 observed as under:-

measure of protection. The concluding words of the section, “and the court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it” also suggest that the normal rules that govern the court in the grant of interim orders is not sought to be jettisoned by the provision. Moreover, when a party is given a right to approach an ordinary court of the country without providing a special procedure or a special set of rules in that behalf, the ordinary rules followed by that court would govern the exercise of power conferred by the Act. On that basis also, it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance of convenience, prima facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act.”

30. A division bench of this Court in GTL Infrastructure Ltd. v. S.C. Wadhwa & Sons (HUF), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1717 observed as under:-

xxxxxxxxx

17. It is apparent from the above that the powers of the court to order interim measures of protection under Section 9 of the A&C Act are wide and are not confined solely to orders that can be passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1&2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. However, the court would be guided by the principles underlying the said Code. Clearly, such orders would also extend to granting the relief, if such relief is admissible on admitted facts.”

31. In NHAI v. HK Toll Road (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2376, I too, had the benefit of dealing the scope of mandatory injunction as an interim measure. Although it was discussed in detail with regard to the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal, however, since the scope and jurisdiction of the Court and the Arbitral Tribunal while granting interim measure are pari materia, it would be apposite to extract the relevant paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment:-

which is normally associated with the grant of a mandatory injunction. The second point is that in cases in which there can be no dispute about the use of the term “mandatory” to describe the injunction, the same question of substance will determine whether the case is “normal” and therefore within the guideline or “exceptional” and therefore requiring special treatment. If it appears to the court that, exceptionally, the case is one in which withholding a mandatory interlocutory injunction would in fact carry a greater risk of injustice than granting it even though the court does not feel a “high degree of assurance” about the plaintiff's chances of establishing his right, there cannot be any rational basis for withholding the injunction.‟

20. Hence, in view of the above judgments, it is clear that the court has wide powers to fashion appropriate interim order including mandatory interlocutory injunction. Such powers could also be exercised under Section 17(1)(e) of the Act by the arbitrator. As noted above, exercise of power for grant of interim orders is a fact dependent exercise.”

65. I am in complete agreement with the view taken in the aforesaid judgment as the powers of the AT to grant interim measures are pari materia with the powers of court and also, sub-clause (e) of Section 17(1)(ii) gives power to AT to grant interim protection as may appear to be just and convenient. However, the said discretion cannot be exercised in a routine manner. The same has to be exercised in view of the facts of each case. The Supreme Court in Samir Narain Bhojwani v. Aurora Properties & Investments has already observed that an interim mandatory injunction is not to be easily granted. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted below:

an interlocutory application.‟

26. The principle expounded in this decision has been consistently followed by this Court. It is well established that an interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted. It is an order that is passed only in circumstances which are clear and the prima facie material clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of justice demanded that the status quo ante be restored byway of an interim mandatory injunction. [See Metro Marins v. Bonus Watch Co. (P) Ltd., Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh and Purshottam Vishandas Raheja v. Shrichand Vishandas Raheja].”

66. The interim mandatory injunction is an extraordinary relief and the same should not be granted unless there are clear and compelling reasons for it.

32. From the aforesaid judgments, it is well settled that the Court is vested with wide powers to grant interim measures, including the grant of mandatory injunctions, if the facts and circumstances so demand. The legislative intent behind section 9 is to enable the Court to preserve the subject matter of the arbitral dispute, and therefore its scope cannot be narrowly confined to prohibitory injunctions alone. At the same time, the grant of a mandatory injunction is an extraordinary relief which cannot be exercised in a routine manner. It is consistently held that such relief can only be granted when a strong prima facie case is made out, where withholding would result in greater injustice than granting. Thus, while section 9 empowers the Court to issue mandatory injunctions, the exercise of such discretion is conditioned upon clear, compelling, and exceptional circumstances, guided by the principles of balance of convenience, irreparable harm, and the requirement of what is “just and convenient.”

33. In light of this background, I shall now proceed to deal with the present case in hand.

34. The letter dated 02.06.2025 of the respondent written to the petitioner is extracted below:- “To, The DGM Pre Sales ND Info System Pvt. Ltd. T-08-06-02 Common Wealth Garnes Village, Laxmi Nagar, Near Akshardham Temple, New Delhi -110092 Sub: Submission of Service Agreement and Authorization Letter - reg. Ref.: Service Agreement dated 9/8/2022 with RCI Madam/Sir, Please refer to the agreement signed then on subject cited above. The National Board of Examination in Rehabilitation (NEER) in its 3rd Meeting of the General Body conducted on 09.05.2025 has decided that the MoU signed between NBER - RCI and ND Info Systems in August 2022 for one year with further renewed for three years for centralized online admissions to be explored and deliberated with same terms & conditions and continued.

2. In this regard, if interested you may submit your consent within 7 days to work on the same terms and conditions as mentioned in the agreement referred above on. ….”

35. The petitioner vide its letter dated 03.06.2025 gave its consent to continue with the engagement on the same terms and conditions, which was initially valid for one year and subsequently renewed for three years.

36. It is also relevant to extract the letter dated 06.06.2025 of the respondent:-

37. It is also relevant extract the letter dated 04.09.2025 of the respondent to the petitioner:-

38. The petitioner has relied on these assurances and conducted the following steps:- “i. Finalization of dates for the exam as per the instruction of the RCI, i.e. last date for submission of application, online generation of admit cards, date of examination, date of declaration of result ii. Scrutiny of application forms iii. Feeding of data iv. Allotment of date and time of examination v. Release of hall tickets/ admit cards vi. Development of Multiple Choice Question Bank vii. Conduct of on line examination viii. Preparation of result ……….”

39. From the record, it is clear that all these steps have been taken by the petitioner and it was only the result which was to be declared by the petitioner with the approval of the respondent which they never gave.

40. On perusal of all the communications extracted above, it is clear that the Agreement was further extended by the respondent and the petitioner gave its consent for the same which prima facie indicate that the Agreement was extended. Further, the respondent till the date of the impugned circular dated 12.09.2025, had been corresponding with the petitioner and urging the petitioner to take steps towards finalizing the results. Despite the same, the respondent has suddenly taken unilateral decision by way of the impugned circular, which according to me, prima facie, seems to be arbitrary and malafide. The said unilateral action of the respondent not only raises serious questions of arbitrariness but also cries foul of fairness.

41. During the hearing also, Mr. Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent was unable to answer as to why the list prepared by the petitioner was not accepted by the respondent and why there was delay in granting approval to the said list. The counter affidavit of the respondent also does not deal with the same. Hence, I have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that the petitioner has made out a prima facie case in its favour.

42. The next ingredients namely whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the petitioner and the petitioner would suffer irreparable harm and injury if the impugned circular dated 12.09.2025 is not stayed needs consideration.

43. In the present case, nearly 48,000 specially abled candidates have registered for admission after a gap of two years. Their academic careers and future employability hinge upon timely commencement of the 2025-26 session. I cannot permit a stalemate situation between the petitioner and respondent to indefinitely stall the counselling and admission process. The larger public interest in ensuring continuity of education far outweighs the contractual disagreements between the parties.

44. As regards balance of convenience is concerned, staying the operation of the impugned circular would effectively stall the admission process until the Arbitral Tribunal adjudicates the disputes. As noted above, the counselling has already been commenced and the first round has been concluded with thousands of candidates securing seats, any interruption would cause uncertainty, chaos, and dislocation of the academic calendar. On the other hand, permitting the counselling to continue under the supervision of the respondent, while safeguarding the petitioner’s right to pursue its contractual and arbitral remedies, would ensure that candidates do not become collateral damage in this inter se dispute. The balance of convenience, therefore, tilts heavily in favour of allowing the admission process to proceed in the interest of candidates, even if it means that the petitioner’s contractual grievances are left to be resolved in arbitration.

45. As regards irreparable loss and injury is concerned, the petitioner has urged that the respondent’s unilateral action has deprived it of its right to publish results and complete the process, thereby causing reputational damage and financial loss. I am of the view that such losses can be quantified and compensated by way of damages, especially when the Agreement itself prescribes a fee of Rs. 172/- per candidate (exclusive of taxes) as per the Annexure 2 annexed with the Agreement. In case the Arbitrator, as and when appointed, comes to a finding that the petitioner has wrongly been deprived of the amounts due and payable to the petitioner and despite the petitioner performing its part of the contractual obligation, the petitioner can always be compensated monetarily. On the other hand, the specially abled candidates stand to suffer irretrievable harm if the admission exercise is indefinitely stalled even for a while.

CONCLUSION

46. For the said reasons, I am constrained to hold that although the petitioner has established a prima facie case but has not been able to demonstrate that the balance of convenience in its favour and irreparable harm which cannot be compensated in terms of money.

47. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.

48. Needless to add, the observations made above are only for the purpose of deciding the present petition and shall not come in way of the Arbitral Tribunal as and when appointed, while adjudicating the disputes on merits.

49. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.

50. Before parting with the judgment, I am constrained to take note of the conduct of the respondent which is far from satisfactory. The respondent, throughout the admission process, have by their acts, conducts and actions led the petitioner to believe that the petitioner would be concluding the admission process in terms of the Agreement (subsequently extended). At the last moment, while issuing the impugned circular dated 12.09.2025, the respondent has taken a Uturn and published the merit list as well as counselling schedule in a haphazard and chaotic manner (the same is evident from the list submitted by the petitioner showing the candidates much in excess being referred for the counselling to the institutes having much lesser seats). It is only in the interest of the candidates which has been kept paramount in this dispute and it is hoped and expected that the respondent shall ensure smooth admission process and shall prevent chaos and confusion.

JASMEET SINGH, J SEPTEMBER 26th, 2025/(MSQ)