Sharmila Seth v. Union of India & Ors.

1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking a declaration under Section 24(2) of The Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013(hereinafter “the 2013 Act”) that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of Plot No. A-35, Krishna Nagar Extension, admeasuring 272.20 sq.yards comprised in Khasra NO. 465/3/2 situated in Village Ghondli, Delhi (hereinafter the “subject 2019:DHC:4449-DB property”) acquired vide Award No.3/83-84, be deemed to have lapsed since the Award was made more than five years prior to the commencement of this Act and the compensation has not been paid.

2. The reliefs sought in the petition read as under:

3. The notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter 'the LAA'), was issued on 4th November 1976. The declaration under Section 6 of the LAA was issued on 10th October

1979. Subsequently, an Award dated 9th July 1983, bearing NO. 3/1983-84 was passed in respect of land situated at Khasra NO. 465/3/2 situated in Village Ghondli, Delhi.

4. The case set out in petition is that the Petitioner's mother Late Ms. Pushpa Chhibbar was the owner of the subject property. She died interstate on 18th March 1994, and the subject property devolved equally on the Petitioner, her father, her two sisters and her brother, and she is one of the co-owner.She or her predecessors-in-interest, were never made part of the Acquisition proceedings despite them being 'interested persons'. It is also the case of the petitioner that in the year 1987, the Respondent No.4 trespassed over the subject property of the petitioner by placing certain construction material for the purpose of building a road. A suit bearing No. 419 of 1987 was filed by Smt. Pushpa Chhibbar, against Respondent No.4 seeking an Injunction to restrain them from constructing the road and dispossessing her from the said Property. However, during the pendency of the suit, Respondent No. 4 constructed the road rendering the suit infructuous. Consequently, the said suit was withdrawn by Petitioner’s mother and a fresh suit bearing No. 647/99 of 1989, was filed seeking inter alia mandatory injunction, directing Respondent No.4 to remove the illegally constructed road and related material from Petitioner’s property.The trial court vide its judgment dated 15th September 2011 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs therein. Respondent No.4 filed an appeal against the said judgment, bearing No.

RCA DJ No. 74/2016 titled “MCD vs K.N Chhibbar and Ors”. In the said proceedings, petitioner for the first time came to know of the Acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject property, when the said fact was revealed by Respondent No.4.

5. From the above noted facts it emerges that although the Petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest had challenged the construction of road on the subject property, they never initiated any proceedings challenging the land acquisition. Now after the passing of the 2013 Act, a prayer for declaration of lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings is made on the ground that the compensation has not been paid. Whether petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest falls in the category of “interested person” or not; and whether she was made a party to the acquisition proceedings or a notice was issued to her; and such other alike questions are not subject matter of the present proceedings, which is premised on the plea of deemed lapsing under the 2013 Act. Likewise, disputes and questions relating to deposit of compensation in the account of the land owner for the subject property are factual and cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction of this Court. Here, we are concerned with petitioner’s right to seek the reliefs enumerated above. On this aspect, significantly, there is no explanation whatsoever offered in the petition for the inordinate delay in coming forward to seek relief under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. The Award for the said property was passed in 1983, whereas the present petition has been filed after more than three decades. The petition is obviously barred by laches. Petitioner’s bald averment of gaining knowledge of the proceedings pursuant to disclosure by Respondent No.4 in the year 2012, can’t be countenanced. The delay in approaching the court can be condoned or accepted only if sufficient reasons are assigned. It cannot be done on the vague, frivolous and flimsy grounds. The inaction on the part of the Petitioner cannot ignored on a plea of no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings which are carried out by publication of notifications in the gazette. At this stage, after more than 30 years, respondents cannot be expected to fish out from the record, the relevant documents to establish payment of compensation or taking over of possession with regard to the said property. The immense delay places the respondents to immense handicap and prejudice in the matter of defending these proceedings. There is thus no explanation whatsoever in the petition for the inordinate delay in the Petitioner coming forward to seek relief under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.

6. The Supreme Court has dealt with issue of delay and laches in Mahavir v. Union of India (2018) 3 SCC 588, in the context of the 2013 Act. The said judgment is unambiguous in emphasising that claims that are barred, and where there is total inaction, are not meant to be revived by the 2013 Act. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court in the said decision read as under: “22. In our opinion, the cases in which there is deliberate action of the owners for not collecting the compensation and they do not want to receive it, Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not come to their rescue as provisions are to help those persons who are deprived of compensation but not for those who deliberately had not received it and litigated for decades for quashing of proceedings avoiding to receive compensation by willful act. The failure to deposit in court under Section 31(1) in such cases would attract only interest as envisaged under Section 34 of the Act and the provisions of Section 24cannot be so invoked in such cases.

23. In the instant case, the claim has been made not only belatedly, but neither the petitioners nor their previous three generations had ever approached any of the authorities in writing for claiming compensation. No representation had ever been filed with any authority, none has been annexed and there is no averment made in the petition that any such representation had ever been filed. The claim appears not only stale and dead but extremely clouded. This we are mentioning as additional reasons, as such claims not only suffer from delay and laches but courts are not supposed to entertain such claims. Besides such claims become doubtful, cannot be received for consideration being barred due to delay and laches.

24. The High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot be permitted to be raised in the court, and cannot be adjudicated as they are barred. The High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot be a subject matter of inquiry after the lapse of a reasonable period of time and beneficial provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act are not available to such incumbents. In our opinion, Section 24 cannot revive those claims that are dead and stale.

25. xxx xxx xxx

26. The provision of Section 24 does not invalidate courts judgments/orders in which right have been finally lost or due to inaction is barred. Law does not permit examination of barred or totally fraudulent claims. The provisions of the law cannot be permitted to be defrauded or misused. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act cannot be invoked in such cases. The High Court has rightly declined to entertain the writ petitions filed by the petitioners. It is not conceivable how the petitioners could file such a petition in a laconic manner relating to the prime locality at New Delhi that too for hundreds of acres with the delay of more than 100 years.” (emphasis supplied)

7. The aforesaid Judgment has been considered by the Supreme Court in the decision of Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra reported at (2018) 3 SCC 412, relevant portion of which is reproduced hereunder:- “128. In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be used to revive the dead or stale claims and the matters, which have been contested up to this Court or even in the High Court having lost the cases or where reference has been sought for enhancement of the compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urged that physical possession has not been taken from them, such claims cannot be entertained under the guise of section 24(2). We have come across the cases in which findings have been recorded that by which of drawing a Panchnama, possession has been taken, now again under Section 24(2) it is asserted again that physical possession is still with them. Such claims cannot be entertained in view of the previous decisions in which such plea ought to have been raised and such decisions would operate as res judicata or constructive res judicata. As either the plea raised is negatived or such plea ought to have been raised or was not raised in the previous round of litigation. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not supersede or annul the court’s decision and the provisions cannot be misused to reassert such claims once over again. Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawing the Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the case cannot be reopened under the guise of section 24 of Act of 2013.

129. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those who first deliberately refuse to accept the compensation, and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often illmotivated dilatory tactics, for decades together. On the contrary, the section is intended to help those who have not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being the legal obligation of the acquiring body so to do, and/or who have been illegally deprived of their possession for five years or more; in both the scenarios, fault/cause not being attributable to the landowners/claimants.