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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 11th September, 2019.
DR RAKESH VARMA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shankar Vaidiallingam, Mr. Baldev Krishan & Mr. Shivain Vaidialingam, Advocates (M-
9873432071)
Through: Mr. J.K. Bhola, Advocate for LR of D-1 (M-9811211146)
Mr. Kuljeet Rawal, Advocate for R-2 (M-8588082727)
JUDGMENT
1. The crux of the present petition is property bearing no. D-15, Mansarovar Garden, New Delhi, ad measuring 297 sq. yds. The Petitioner/Plaintiff - Dr. Rakesh Verma (hereinafter, „Plaintiff‟) filed a suit for specific performance seeking a decree in respect of agreement to sell dated 27th December, 1987 in respect of the suit property. In the suit, reliance was placed on receipt dated 2nd March, 1988, which according to the Plaintiff was an acknowledgment by the owner of the property – Mr. Vidya Sagar Bhagat, Defendant No. 1 (since deceased) that possession had been handed over and some of the consideration was paid. 2019:DHC:4478
2. Another suit was filed by Mr. Suresh Mansharamani -Respondent NO. 2/Defendant No. 2(hereinafter, „Defendant No. 2‟) wherein he claimed that he had entered into an agreement to sell with Mr. Vidya Sagar Bhagat dated 3rd May, 1988 in respect of the very same property. Both suits were being heard in this Court, and issues were framed on 14th March, 1995 on the Original Side of this Court.
3. The suits were thereafter transferred due to the increase in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, and evidence was recorded before the District Court. Evidence was concluded on 20th November, 2018, at which stage, an earlier application, which had been filed by Defendant No. 2 for leading the evidence of a handwriting expert was considered and the impugned order was passed, permitting the said handwriting expert to be examined. The impugned order reads as under:
4. Mr. Shankar Vaidialingam, ld. counsel appearing for the Plaintiff – submits that the re-opening of the evidence at this stage would be completely contrary to the pleadings of the parties and would also result in substantial delay in the suit inasmuch as the said receipt which has now been sought to be dislodged by the application, has in fact been admitted by Mr. Bhagat. Defendant No.2 has no locus to challenge the said receipt or the genuineness thereof.
5. He further submits that the reliance on this receipt was placed by the Plaintiff right from inception and there was no cause for Mr. Suresh Mansharamani to file this application in 2017, after a gap of almost 30 years. He submits that the manner in which the same has been decided by the Trial Court is contrary to law and would clearly cause impediments in the expeditious final disposal of the present suit.
6. On behalf of Defendant No. 2, Mr. Kuljeet Rawal, ld. counsel submits that his client has filed the application at the first instance inasmuch as the document was sought to be exhibited by the Plaintiff for the first time only on 19th August, 2017 by PW-1. The receipt was exhibited as Ex.PW-1/9 and within a month, thereafter, his client preferred the present application. In fact, no delay has been caused by his client as the evidence was permitted to be recorded before the Trial Court completely and only thereafter the present application was considered by the Trial Court. He submits that if there was any reason to delay, the evidence itself would not have been concluded by his client.
7. On behalf of Mr. Bhagat’s legal heirs, it is submitted by ld. counsel that his client had denied the existence of the receipt in the written statement itself and hence he supports the case of Mr. Suresh Mansharamani on this issue.
8. The Court has heard the ld. counsels for the parties and has perused the pleadings on record. There is no doubt that both the suits are of 1989, and the pleadings and documents, especially the Receipt dated 2nd March 1988, have been on record since inception. If any party wished to lead any evidence as to forgery or otherwise of the receipt dated 2nd March, 1988, the same ought to have been challenged in the pleadings and an issue would have been framed in this regard. All the parties had to lead their respective evidence, and the same could not have been deferred till the receipt was exhibited by the Plaintiff’s witness in 2017. Such an approach is contrary to the provisions of the CPC. This Court is not examining the question as to whether the receipt dated 2nd March, 1988 has in fact been admitted by the two Defendants or not. That is a question to be adjudicated at the stage of final hearing. The short issue, which arises in the present petition is whether Defendant No.2 should be allowed to lead evidence of the handwriting expert, 30 years after the filing of the suit, in this manner. The Trial Court, in the impugned order simply opines that though the suit is 30 years old, the handwriting expert ought to be permitted to lead evidence subject to the payment of Rs.3,000/- as costs. The approach of the Trial Court is not in accordance with law. There are timelines fixed in the CPC, which have to be adhered to. Further, the stage for leading evidence has long been completed. The manner in which the Court has observed that in a 30 year old suit, costs of Rs.3,000/- would be sufficient to compensate the delay, is itself completely perverse to say the least.
9. The suit being of 1989 vintage, Defendants No.1 and 2, if they intended to challenge the said receipt, ought to have done so in their pleadings, and ought to have led evidence of any expert whom they chose. Whether the same has been done or not, is an issue which the Trial Court will adjudicate on the basis of pleadings and the evidence on record. After the conclusion of evidence, the evidence of a handwriting expert cannot be permitted in this manner when no handwriting expert was produced by the Defendants, after the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s evidence. Accordingly, the permission to examine the handwriting expert has been wrongly granted.
10. The impugned order is set aside. The suits will now be decided, and judgment shall be pronounced by the Trial Court within a period of three months. No further delay shall be permitted to be caused by either party in the final adjudication of the suit.
11. Petition is allowed in the above terms. All pending applications are also disposed of.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUDGE SEPTEMBER 11, 2019