Suraz India Trust v. Union of India

6. That it is a case where the faith of the applicant has been lost in the judiciary/justiceimparting agency, and it is the pious duty of the President, Secretariat being the part and parcel of Parliament to honour the Sovereign of the Nation ‗We the people of India‘. Therefore, the Mercy Petition dated 29-9-2008, Complaints dated 14-11-2008 and 22-12-2008 may either be put up before the Hon'ble President of India or in the alternative to forward the same to the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the recommendation to place the same before the Bench comprising of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India he being the head of the Judiciary for taking such decisions in light of the law laid down in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. If the applicant still remains unheard, the President Secretariat the more particularly Your Goodself will be solely responsible for the consequences. The abstract concerned of the law laid down in K. Veeraswami is reproduced for ready reference: (SCC pp. 682-83, para 12) ―12. … Undoubtedly, respect for the judiciary and its public credibility and dignity has to be maintained in order to ensure respect for the Judges in public and also for the decisions rendered by the Judges. … If these things are allowed to go unnoticed, it will create a serious inroad on the dignity, respect, and credibility and integrity of the high office which a Judge of the Supreme Court and of the High Court occupies resulting in the erosion on the dignity and respect for the high office of the Judges in the estimation of the public. As has been suggested by my learned Brother Shetty,

18. After we declined the request of Mr Rajiv Daiya, to be provided with professional assistance, he made the required undertaking, as a last ditch effort … and as a desperate final attempt that Suraz India Trust would henceforth not file any public interest litigation. In other words, he desired us to accept the liberty which we had afforded to him, at the outset, after his long-drawn submissions. Mr Rajiv Daiya also requested us that his statement be so recorded. We have painstakingly narrated the entire sequence of facts as they unfolded during the course of hearing. We also hereby record his undertaking to this Court as he suggested. *****

21. We find no contradiction in the position expressed above, and the inference drawn by us. We may only state, that he may not be in a position to project complicated questions of law, but he certainly had no difficulty in explaining and clarifying factual issues. In this context, we find it difficult to comprehend why the petitioner -Suraz India Trust, had approached this Court again and again. Mr Rajiv Daiya personally represented Suraz India Trust, in all court proceedings. He was individually found to be incompetent to render assistance, on complicated legal issues. Through the present writ petition the Trust has prayed for a declaration, that Section 3 of the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1968, be held unconstitutional, being violative of Article 124(4) of the Constitution. In the present writ petition it is also the prayer of the petitioner, that this Court declare, that the provisions of the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1968 are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and as such, the entire enactment be set aside. Why should a Trust be pursuing such a cause? Even if the prayers made in the petition were to be accepted, who would benefit therefrom? One would wonder, whether this petition had been filed bona fide? Or, is this petition a proxy litigation? For the present consideration, it is not necessary for us to go into all these questions. But these are certainly issues of concern, specially when, the same petitioner has been approaching this Court again and again, always on complicated legal issues. *****

24. When the case [Writ Petition (C) No. 204 of 2010] was heard by the three-Judge Bench on 7-1-2013, the same was dismissed. The understanding of the petitioner, that the matter was wrongfully placed before a three-Judge Bench, and thereafter, was wrongfully dismissed by the three-Judge Bench, obviously lacks any justification (for the reasons recorded in the foregoing paragraphs). We are, therefore satisfied, that the inferences drawn by Mr Rajiv Daiya, were the result of his lack of maturity and understanding of legal issues. The observations recorded by this Court (on an earlier occasion), that Mr Daiya was not competent to assist this Court on legal issues, is therefore, hereby endorsed.

25. As recently as in January 2017, Suraz India Trust filed the present Writ Petition (C) No. 880 of 2016 incorporating the following prayers: ―15. Main prayer It is, therefore, humbly prayed that by an appropriate writ, order or direction, this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to: (a) to declare the provisions of Section 3 of the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1968 as unconstitutional and void; the same being inconsistent and in contravention to the provisions of Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India; (b) to strike down the provisions of Section 3 of the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1968 being unconstitutional and against the basic structure of the Constitution;

(c) to declare that provisions of the Judges

(d) to pass any other order as this Hon'ble

Court may deem just and proper in the interest of justice in the facts and circumstances of the present case.‖ We are yet again constrained to observe, why should the Trust be pursuing such a cause? We would choose to say no more.

26. After Writ Petition (C) No. 204 of 2010 was dismissed (on 7-1-2013 ), this Court was repeatedly approached by Suraz India Trust to assail the order dated 7-1-2013 through a variety of routes, including contempt petitions (fully detailed above), questioning the legitimacy of listing of the above writ petition for hearing, before a three-Judge Bench. All these challenges were impermissible in law. These challenges completely lacked jurisdiction. The narration recorded hereinabove, leaves no room for any doubt, that Suraz India Trust's actions, in repeatedly invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, were clearly uncalled for. In 64 of the cases, when Suraz India Trust approached this Court, as per the details indicated above, it did not find any success whatsoever, and not a single direction, ever came to be issued by this Court, out of its repeated endeavours. No one, who does not understand the nicety of legal issues, as has been demonstrated by the actions of Suraz India Trust, can be permitted to endlessly waste the Court's time. The different contempt petitions filed by Suraz India Trust against a Chief Justice (whilst he was still in office), and against the Secretary General of the Supreme Court, amongst others, were wholly groundless, baseless and ill-founded.

27. The waste of judicial time of this Court, is a matter of serious concern. The course of action adopted by the petitioner (despite its alleged, bona fide intention) was not in consonance with law. When the petitioner did not get the orders that it hoped for (or, felt it was entitled to), the petitioner pointedly expressed its anger, towards all and sundry … and even by name. The petitioner took its grievance, to the highest executive functionaries in this country. The petitioner agitated its claim by airing its grievances to the Chief Justice of India and the Judges of this Court — at their private residences. The petitioner aired its protestation, even against the Secretary General of the Supreme Court. These officers were targeted because they had filed/lodged matters filed by Suraz India Trust, for the simple reason that they were not maintainable. Having considered the same, we are satisfied that the administrative determination by officers of the Registry of this Court was fully justified.

28. The posting of a matter filed by the petitioner, by the then Chief Justice, before a three-Judge Bench was also a matter which was unnecessarily agitated repeatedly. Even by filing contempt petitions against the then Chief Justice himself. Filing contempt petitions, one after the other, on issues which lacked justification, also highlighted the Trust's illegitimate misadventures. Mr Rajiv Daiya, appearing for the petitioner Trust, is an emboldened persona. He has expressed his ire even against six Judges of the Rajasthan High Court, including its Chief Justice, and against three Judges of the Supreme Court, besides its Chief Justice. We are of the view that all these actions of the petitioner were wholly unjustified. Mr Rajiv Daiya did not attempt to even make the slightest effort, to reason out the same, or to demonstrate the veracity of his actions. Having gone through the hearing, over a length of time expressed hereinabove, the least we can say is, that the petitioner has been seriously remiss in his judicial interventions.

29. Extremely important matters are taken up for consideration on a daily basis, and they lag behind sometimes, because individuals who were not competent to assist this Court, insist without due cause, to be granted a prolonged hearing. Hearing is sometimes sought (as in the instant case) even in matters, which the petitioners themselves are incompetent to understand and handle. All such misadventures have to be dealt with sternly, so as to prevent abuse of judicial time. Specially by such individuals, who freely cast imaginary and scandalous accusations, in making out their submissions. We could have initiated sterner action against Mr. Rajiv Daiya for the position canvassed by him, against the Judges of the Rajasthan High Court, as also of this Court. We, have restrained ourselves from any strong handed approach just for once. In future, such leniency may not come by. But this order, should be considered as a warning enough, for the future.

30. It is however not possible for us, to let off Suraz India Trust without any remedial consequences, for its filing of misconceived petitions. We therefore hereby direct, that Suraz India Trust shall henceforth refrain itself absolutely, from filing any cause in public interest, before any court in this country. Similarly, Mr. Rajiv Daiya shall absolutely refrain himself from filing any cause in public interest, either directly or through any other individual, hereinafter, in any court. In all pending matters, whether before this Court or before any other High Court, which may have been initiated by Suraz India Trust and/or by Mr. Rajiv Daiya, as a cause in public interest, it shall be imperative for Suraz India Trust/Mr. Rajiv Daiya to place the instant judgment/order on the record of the case, in case the petitioner decides not to withdraw the same unilaterally.

31. For the judicial time wasted by Suraz India Trust, we consider it just and appropriate to impose exemplary costs on it. This is imperative, as it would discourage the instant nature of indiscretion, not only at the hands of Suraz India Trust, but also at the hands of other similarly placed individuals, who may have been emboldened, to adopt the course treaded by Mr. Rajiv Daiya. The costs imposed on the petitioner are hereby quantified at Rs. 25 lakhs (Rupees twenty-five lakhs only). The aforesaid costs shall be deposited by Suraz India Trust, with the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Welfare Trust, within three months from today. Failing deposit, the above costs shall be recoverable from Mr. Rajiv Daiya, its Chairman, through his personal proceeds, if necessary.‖ (Emphasis supplied in part)

8. To a query, by us, as to whether he had complied with the direction, of the Supreme Court, to pay ₹ 25 lakhs as costs, Mr. Daiya, who appears in person, submits that the aforesaid judgement, dated 1st May, 2017, of the Supreme Court, had not yet attained finality, as he had preferred petitions before the Hon‘ble President of India. This issue, he submits, was still alive in the Supreme Court. He cautioned us that it would, in fact, be criminally contemptuous, on our part, to question him in this regard, as it would be amounting to interference with the proceedings in the Supreme Court.

9. Our research, however, reveals that this is not the position and that, in fact, MA 507/2017, which was referred, by the petitioner, seeking modification of the judgement of the Supreme Court, was dismissed by order dated 5th December, 2017, and, subsequently, on 8th February, 2018, the Supreme Court, noting the fact that the costs of ₹ 25 lakhs, as directed by it, had not been deposited by the petitioner, despite repeated orders, has gone to the extent of directing its Registry not to accept any application or petition on behalf of the petitioner, or Mr. Rajeev Daiya. The order, dated 8th February, 2018, reads thus: ―The petitioner who is appearing in person has not deposited the costs of ₹ 25,00,000/- in spite of repeated orders. All the applications and the writ petition are dismissed. The Registry is directed not to accept any application or petition on behalf of Suraz India Trust or Mr. Rajiv Daiya.‖ It merits mention, here, that the petitioner has placed, on record, all other orders passed by the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) 880/2016, and the various applications filed therein, except for the above order dated 8th February, 2018, which Mr. Daiya chose to conceal even during the course of submissions made before us in Court.

10. The petitioner has not chosen to place, on record, Writ Petition

(Civil) No. 469 of 2009, which was filed by him before the Supreme

Court, either. A reading of the order, dated 6th December, 2010 supra, whereby the Supreme Court disposed of the said writ petition, however, discloses that the petitioner had, in the said writ petition, alleged that ―his legal rights‖ were violated. We have gone through the present writ petition, and do not find even the whisper of an averment, let alone allegation, regarding violation of any of the rights of the petitioner, fundamental or otherwise. The writ petition is founded entirely on hypotheses, assumptions and presumptions, regarding perceived inaction, on the part of the executive, in coming to the aid of persons – not one of whom has either been identified or named – who suffer legal wrongs. The challenge, to the various provisions of the Cr.P.C., of which the writ petition seeks quashing, is also founded on hypothetical averments, without a single concrete instance being highlighted in the entire writ petition. The order, dated 6th December, 2010 supra, passed by the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 469 of 2009, allowed the petitioner to move this Court for ventilation of his rights, and not to file yet another public interest litigation. The petitioner, apparently, initially filed W.P.(C) 8155/2015 and, thereafter, simply withdrew the said writ petition, on 31st August, 2015, ―with liberty to file a fresh writ petition in proper form and with appropriate relief‖. The averment, in the writ petition, that the said withdrawal was with liberty to the petitioner to file a public interest litigation, does not follow from the order dated 31st August 2015, or elsewhere from the record.

11. This Court is not prepared to countenance a public interest litigation, at the instance of the litigant who is in contempt of the Supreme Court, and is wilfully defying, with total impunity, the direction of the Supreme Court, as contained in its judgement dated 1st May, 2017 supra. We enquired, from the petitioner, as to whether he intended to comply with the direction, of the Supreme Court, or to pay the costs as imposed by the judgement dated 1st May, 2017, as given the tenor of the said judgement, the observations contained therein and the purpose of imposing the said costs, we are not convinced that it would be appropriate for us to entertain the petitioner, or provide an audience to him, until and unless he complies with the order of the Supreme Court. Mr. Daiya, however, persisted in his assertion that the judgement dated 1st May, 2017, had not yet attained finality and that he was, therefore, not bound to comply therewith.

12. We cannot agree. It is not possible, or proper, for us, to provide an audience to the petitioner, once the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of directing the Registry not to entertain any petition, either by the petitioner or by Mr. Daiya. Article 144 of the Constitution of India requires all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India, to act in aid of the Supreme Court. We cannot, therefore, entertain the petitioner, where the Supreme Court has shut its doors to him, for all times to come. This, in our view, would fly directly in the face of Article 144 of the Constitution of India, and would amount to judicial misadventurism, on our part.

13. We, therefore, decline to entertain the present writ petition which is, accordingly, dismissed.

14. All pending applications stand disposed of accordingly.

CHIEF JUSTICE

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.