Anand Tokas v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr

1. The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment dated 29.04.2019, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)4902/2018,entitled Ram 2019:DHC:7558-DB Kumar v. Delhi Development Authority and Another,that has been followed in other conneeted petitions including W.P.(C)5307/2018, entitled Anand Tokas V. Delhi Development Authority and Another whereby, their prayer for issuing direction to the respondent/DDA to allot them a plot in Dwarka at the rate commensurate with the rate at which their land was acquired by the L&DO,has been rejected on the ground that the issue raised in the writ petitions on the effect of the Rule 6 (i) of the Delhi Development Act (Disposal of Nazul Land) Rules, 1981 has been duly interpreted by a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ramanand v. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 29 and that the said view was followed by the Supreme Court in Amolak Raj v. Union Of India, reported at MANU/SC/1147/2002, whereunder it was observed as follows: - "4. The learned counselfor the appellant contended that the appellant was entitledfor allotment ofaplot in terms ofRule 6ofthe Nazul rules i.e. DDA (Disposal ofDeveloped Nazul Land)Rules, 1981; even though plots are available in the area in which the appellant is claiming the allotment, he is denied the allotment; he also complained that the appellant did not receive any demand letter as stated in the impugned judgment.

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6. The full bench of the High Court in the case of Ramanand (supra), noticed in the impugned judgment, held that a person whose land has been acquired has no absolute vested right to claim allotment ofa plot as a matter of right; of course if a scheme provides for allotment of alternative plot, the same could be considered based on the scheme and the policy; it is clearfrom the records thatthe scheme ofallotmentofalternative plotsfor thepersons whose lands are acquired was modified from time to time; the appellant was allotted aplot asper the prevailingpolicy and the scheme as on the date of allotment. In our view, the appellant could not claim to be allotted aplot in aparticular area of his choice, even the recommendation made in his favour as extracted above clearly shows that allotment of alternative plot was subject to availability ofplot with the DDA and that recommendationfor allotment was not a legal commitmentfor allotment ofalternative plot. In this view, the High Court was rightin dismissing the writpetitionfollowing ^ its earlierfull benchjudgment. The contention that no letter ofdemand was received by the appellant to make payment in respect of the plot allotted is seriously disputed by the learned counselfor the respondent-DDA. However, the High Court left it open to the appellant to make payment ofthe amountasper the demandletter within aperiodofone month from the date of receipt of the order passed in the writ petition alongwith interest@ 18% per annum and subject to other conditions. It may not be necessary to go into the controversy whether the letter ofdemand was received by the appellant or not. It may be enough if we grant some more time to make payment. Wefind no merit in the appeal in the lightofwhatis stated above. Hence,it is dismissed. However, f the time is extended by two months from today to make payment and to satisfy other conditions as stated in the impugnedjudgment."

2. Given the above position, the learned Single Judge arrived atthe eonclusion that the deeision ofthe respondent/DDA to allot alternative plots at pre-determined rates only in developing areas and not in fully developed areas wherein land value has escalated,is a legal and valid deeision and does not deserve any interferenee.

3. After addressing arguments for some time, Mr. Rao, learned eounsel for the appellants, states on instruetions that he may be permitted to withdraw the present appeals while reserving the right of the appellants to approaeh the Supreme Court for reeonsidering the view expressed in Amolak Raj (supra) on the interpretation of Rule 6 of the Delhi Development Aet(Disposal ofNazul Land)Rules, 1981.

4. The present appeals are aeeordingly disposed of, alongwith the pending applieations as not pressed with liberty granted as prayed for. HIMA KOHLI,J ASHA MENON,J SEPTEMBER 16,2019 s LPA 582/2019 Page4of[4] /