Prof Mahabir Educational Cultural & Welfare Society v. Girdhari Lal Dhara

Delhi High Court · 24 Sep 2019 · 2019:DHC:4876
Yogesh Khanna
RFA No.371/2019
2019:DHC:4876
civil appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the plaintiff must prove continuous readiness and willingness, including financial capacity, to obtain specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property.

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RFA No.371/2019 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Reserved on: 19th September, 2019 Pronounced on: 24th September, 2019
RFA 371/2019 & CM APPL No.19363/2019, 41916/2019
PROF MAHABIR EDCATIONAL CULTURUL & WELFARE SOCIETY ..... Appellant
Through : Mr.Jai Sahai Endlaw, Advocate.
VERSUS
GIRDHARI LAL DHARA ..... Respondent
Through : Mr.Neeraj Yadav and Ms.Aditi Sharma, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA YOGESH KHANNA, J.
JUDGMENT

1. This Regular First Appeal is preferred by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 27.07.2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-04/East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi/ (hereinafter as the learned ‘Trial Court’) in Civil Suit No.125/2017 whereby the suit filed by appellant was dismissed.

2. The brief facts which led to filing of this appeal are appellant filed the aforesaid Civil Suit for specific performance in respect of the agreement to sell dated 30.06.2006 pertaining to the property No.742, situated in revenue estate of Village Mandawali, Fazadpur, Shahdara, Delhi, admeasuring three bigha and six biswas (hereinafter referred as the ‘suit property’), owned by the respondent. The respondent had informed 2019:DHC:4876 the suit property was under dispute as four persons namely Amin Chand, Jagan Singh, Prem Singh and Dhiraj Singh were in unauthorised possession of the said property and Suit No.486/1977 was filed by the respondent herein against them which, though, was decreed on 28.08.2001, but the RFA(OS) No.29/2001 was still pending as filed by two of the unauthorised occupants. The said agreement to sell was for Rs.1,50,000,00/-; out of which the appellant had paid Rs.5.00 Lac at the time of the entering into the agreement but since the earnest money was of Rs.30.00 Lac; the balance Rs.25.00 Lac was paid to the respondent through a post dated cheque dated 03.11.2006. It was agreed the balance sale consideration would be payable at the time of the execution of the sale deed on or before 03.01.2007.

3. On 30.10.2006, the appellant came to know about a public notice published in Dainik Jagran newspaper about filing of the civil suit against respondent by one Mr.G.V.S. Tomar, pending before the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Delhi with respect to the suit property.

4. The appellant when confronted the respondent and sought clarification, the respondent could not provide satisfactory explanation or reply to the existence of such litigation, hence the appellant issued directions to his banker to stop the payment of the cheque dated 03.11.2006 for Rs.25.00 lacs i.e., balance of the earnest money. On 31.10.2006, the appellant had rather informed the respondent vide legal notice not to present the PDC dated 03.11.2006 for encashment on the aforesaid ground. On 09.11.2006, the respondent had given a reply to the notice dated 31.10.2006 stating inter alia that cheque was sent for encashment, but it had returned with remarks insufficient funds and as such the appellant was not ready and willing to complete the transaction, hence the advance payment of Rs.5.00 Lac was forfeited.

5. On 11.02.2009, the appellant filed the abovesaid suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 30.09.2006 - Ex.P[1]. The respondent appeared and filed the written statement wherein he claimed that in view of the failure of the appellant to make balance payment of Rs.25.00 Lac, the agreement dated 30.09.2006 was cancelled and earnest money was forfeited. It was also alleged the appellant had concluded with Mr.G.V.S.Tomar to avoid payment of consideration.

6. Following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court:- “(i) Whether the plaintiff performed or has always been ready and willing to perform its part of contract according to the Agreement to Sell of 30th September, 2006 and if so whether plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of Agreement to Sell of 30th September, 2006? OPP

(ii) Whether the Agreement to Sell of 30th September, 2006 stood cancelled, as alleged in preliminary objections? If so, its effects? OPD.

(iii) What is the effect of dishonouring of the cheque of Rs.25,00,000/given by the plaintiff to defendant in terms of Agreement to Sell of 30th September, 2006? OPD

(iv) Relief”

7. On the issue of maintainability, the learned Trial Court erred in determining the suit was not maintainable relying upon I.S.Sikandar (Dead) by LRs vs K.Subramani and Others (2013) 15 SCC 27. The Coordinate Bench of this Court relying upon Mrs.Kanthamani vs. Mrs.Nasreen Ahmed 2017(15) SCC 27 had rather settled the issue. In Radhey Shyam vs Varsha Yadav 2018 VI AD (Delhi) 175 this Court held:-

“33. The Defendant had not raised the defence that since the Plaintiff had failed to seek a declaration that the termination of the agreement was invalid, the suit is not maintainable. Such a defence ought to be
raised in pleadings and not at the Appellate stage. In view of the same, no issue regarding the validity of the termination was framed. As held in Kanthamani (supra), it cannot be permitted to be raised at the appellate stage.”

8. Since no issue of maintainability was framed, hence the learned Trial court erred in holding the suit was not maintainable.

9. The learned Trial Court vide the impugned judgment had also held a) the testimony of the Secretary of the appellant society is bereft of the details as to what was the explanation given by the respondent and why it was not found satisfactory. PW[1] had deposed in his affidavit that he being the secretary of appellant society on seeing public notice dated 30.10.2006 had rushed to the respondent and met him at his office and asked him for clarifications and though, the respondent had given the explanation but was not found satisfactory. However PW[1] did not say anything in his affidavit as to what was such explanation and why the appellant society was not satisfied with such explanation; b) the contents of such explanation have also not been disclosed despite the respondent admittedly was not in possession of the suit property and the appellant has been made aware of the ongoing litigation between the respondent and unathorised occupantsm, pending before the Division Bench of this Court, yet the appellant had agreed to purchase the suit property and even had paid Rs.5.00 Lac as part of the earnest money. On the other hand, the respondent/DW[1] and his son DW[2], both had testified they had convinced the secretary of the appellant society (PW[1]) and even offered PW[1] the refund of Rs.5.00 Lac; c) it was incumbent upon the appellant society to disclose the explanation given by the respondent, particularly, considering the peculiar nature of the suit property viz under litigation; d) there is no provision in the Indian Contract Act which permits a party to avoid performance of the contract/promise merely due to suspicion that the other party may not be in a position to perform the contract; and e) admittedly, Mr.G.V.S.Tomar had instituted a suit against the respondent, subsequent to the execution of the agreement to sell Ex.P[1] as such the respondent could not have disclosed such subsequent litigation in the agreement itself. Even otherwise, in his suit Mr.Tomar nowhere asserted himself to be an owner and admittedly filed only a photocopy of the agreement to sell allegedly executed by the respondent for a piece of 300 sq.yds. of land, out of 4000 sq.yds. of land viz. the suit plot. Even the original agreement to sell was never filed by Sh.Tomar in his suit, hence the respondent repeated alleged such suit was a frivolous suit, moreso it pertain to even less than 1/10th of the subject property and hence there was no reason for the appellant to stop the payment of Rs.25.00 lac, when, admittedly, the agreement to sell Ex.P[1] contained a clause the payment of Rs.25.00 lac could not be stopped by the appellant in any circumstance; f) the learned Trial Court also referred to Section 54 of The Contract Act, particularly illustration c to say when a contract consists of reciprocal promises, such that one of them cannot be performed till the other has been performed, and the promiser of the promise last mentioned fails to perform it, such promiser cannot claim performance of reciprocal promise; it was observed the agreement to sell Ex.P1consisted of reciprocal promises, such that the performance of sale was linked to the reciprocal promise to make the payment of Rs.30.00 Lac by 03.11.2006. The agreement to sell rather stipulated the post dated cheque bearing No.835233 dated 03.11.2006 drawn on Syndicate Bank, Nirman Vihar, Delhi for Rs.25.00 Lac is to be cleared in whatsoever circumstances, lest the amount of Rs.5.00 Lac shall be forfeited and g) the plea of suspicion was palpably false and moonshine solely created to hide the appellant’s incapacity to meet its obligation under the agreement. The statement of bank account of appellant, from 01.11.2006 to 04.11.2006 Mark P[1] show the appellant society had a balance of Rs.5.14 Lac only in its bank account and though it had instructed the bank to stop payment but in fact the PDC dated 03.11.2006 was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds in its account.

10. The learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment also held:- "30. The properties of secretary are different from the properties owned by society. Merely because secretary of the society has several properties does not mean that the society has control over these properties. The testimony of PW-1 / Secretary, in this regard, also cannot be accepted as subsequently such statement can be made by any member of the society to show availability of the funds. If the secretary was actually willing to give his properties to the society then he should have done so by donating the properties to the society, but without donating / gifting the properties to the society, the secretary cannot say that he was willing to sell his properties to arrange funds for the plaintiff society. If readiness and willingness is accepted in such manner, then there would be no case left as every party would prove readiness and willingness by examining distant relative or friend who hold properties worth the consideration amount.

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33. There is no resolution or minutes of meting placed on record by plaintiff society to show its members had resolved to purchase the suit property from the funds procured by selling the properties of its secretary and its family members (Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment titled as Matadin Yadav Vs. Midas Lid Pvt. Ltd., 2013 (139) DRJ 280).

34. It is also pertinent to mention that the cheque of balance earnest amount of Rs. 25 lakhs is dated 03.11.2006 and as per plaintiff society, the public notice regarding litigation with Sh. G.V.S. Tomar came into its knowledge on 30.10.2006 i.e. just two days prior to the date on which cheque was to be presented. Admittedly, the plaintiff society did not have funds to honor the said cheque on 31.10.2006. Hence, the arrangement had to be made within three days i.e. 31.10.2006, 01.11.2006 and 02.11.2006 to deposit sufficient amount in plaintiff's bank account so that the cheque is honored, however, no evidence has been adduced on record to prove that any agreement to sell / attempt to dispose off any property of the secretary was made. There is no iota of evidence to establish had the notice dated 31.10.2006 not been published, the plaintiff society had funds or could have arranged funds in three days i.e. 31.10.2006, 01.11.2006 and 02.11.2006 to honor the cheque of Rs. 25 lakhs of balance earnest money. Merely stating and placing on record, title documents of properties of secretary of the society would not suffice. The inevitable conclusion is that the plaintiff society neither had liquidated funds nor it had the capacity to raise funds for payment of balance earnest amount of Rs.25 lakhs."

11. Though the learned Trial Court has gone to discuss the collusion between Mr.G.V.S.Tomar and the appellant herein, but to me, it was not needed, being not relevant to decide the controversy in issue. Further the learned counsel for the appellant argued that DW[1] – the respondent in his affidavit Ex.DW1/A did not depose any fact, as contained in his written statement, except the case is false and that his son DW[2] would depose, but, admittedly, in his cross-examination, the appellant had put its entire case to the respondent and the respondent did reply to each and every question asked, thus proving his case through his cross-examination. The appellant rather helped the respondent to prove his contention by eliciting facts not so deposed by DW[1] and to bring those on record. Even otherwise, the plaintiff cannot take resort to shortcomings of the defendant to prove his case and rightly held so by the learned Trial Court.

12. The evidence of witnesses from both the sides during trial, admittedly proved the execution of agreement to sell dated 30.06.2006- Ex.P[1]; public notice dated 30.10.2006-Ex.PW1/4; notice dated 31.10.2006-Ex.P[2] issued by the appellant; reply dated 09.11.2006-Ex.D[1], given by the respondent; the dishonor of the post dated cheque dated 03.11.2006 of Rs.25.00 Lac issued by the appellant, due to insufficiency of funds; and lastly there being no sufficient balance in the account Mark P[1] of the appellant on the relevant date of encashment of cheque dated 03.11.2006.

13. The learned counsel for the appellant then argued the time was never an essence of the contract and referred to Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act, which read:

"55. Effect of failure to perform at a fixed time, in contract in which time is essential.—When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. Effect of such failure when time is not essential.—If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Effect of acceptance of performance at time other than that agreed upon.—If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so."

14. It is though a settled position in agreements of sale/purchase of immovable properties that such liverage can be given, but one cannot ignore the decision in Sardamani Kandappan vs S. Rajalakshmi and Others (2011) 12 SCC 18 which read:-

“24. Relying upon the observation of this court in N.Srinivasa v. Kuttukaran Machine Tools Ltd. [2009 (5) SCC 182] that "in the contract relating to immovable property, time cannot be the essence of the contract", the appellant put forth the contention that in all contracts relating to sale of immovable property, time stipulated for performance, even if expressed to be the essence, has to be read as not being the essence of the contract and consequently the contract does not become voidable by the failure to perform before the specified time. A careful reading of the said decision would show that the sentence relied on (occurring in para 31) apparently was not the statement of legal position, but a conclusion on facts regarding the contract that was being considered by the court in that case, with reference to its terms. In fact the legal position is differently stated in para 27 of the said decision, thus: "27. In a contract for sale of immoveable property, normally it is presumed that time is not the essence of the contract. Even if there is an express stipulation to that effect, the said presumption can be rebutted. It is well settled that to find out
whether time was the essence of the contract. It is better to refer to the terms and conditions of the contract itself." 37........The steep increase in prices is a circumstance which makes it inequitable to grant the relief of specific performance where the purchaser does not take steps to complete the sale within the agreed period, and the vendor has not been responsible for any delay or nonperformance. A purchaser can no longer take shelter under the principle that time is not of essence in performance of contracts relating to immovable property, to cover his delays, laches, breaches and `non-readiness'.......
43. Till the issue is considered in an appropriate case, we can only reiterate what has been suggested in K.S. Vidyanadam (supra):
(i) Courts, while exercising discretion in suits for specific performance, should bear in mind that when the parties prescribe a time/period, for taking certain steps or for completion of the transaction, that must have some significance and therefore time/period prescribed cannot be ignored.
(ii) Courts will apply greater scrutiny and strictness when considering whether the purchaser was `ready and willing' to perform his part of the contract.
(iii) Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring the time-limits stipulated in the agreement. Courts will also `frown' upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean a purchaser can wait for 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. The three year period is intended to assist purchasers in special cases, as for example, where the major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor and possession has been delivered in part performance, where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser."
15. Admittedly, in his reply dated 09.11.2016 - Ex.D[1], the respondent had once again tried to convince the appellant by saying the suit filed by Mr.Tomar was a frivolous one yet the appellant did not come forward to make the payment of entire consideration or to get the sale deed registered and rather waited for more than 2½ years to file its suit for specific performance. The plea of the appellant viz, the contract was wrongly terminated on 09.11.2006 could have some substance if the appellant had at least come forward to pay complete earnest money of Rs.30.00 Lac within the time frame as stated in agreement or by immediately filing a suit for specific performance. The appellant in any case, was not justified in waiting for more than 2½ years of the termination to say he was always willing and ready to perform his part of contract, per section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, as under:-
"16. Personal bars to relief.—Specific performance of a contract
cannot be enforced in favour of a person—
(a)-(b) xxxx
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),—
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction."
16. Section 16(c) (supra) talks of readiness and willingness; readiness means a person has money to perform his obligation throughout and willingness is a state of mind. On record there is an FIR No.421/2009 dated 06.09.2009 registered at police station Mandawali Fazadpur, Delhi under Sections 420/468/471 Indian Penal Code-Ex.DW-2/2 against an agent wherein the appellant, has alleged cheating by such agent who had promised to get the appellant-the required loan to purchase the subject property. The FIR (supra) rather goes on to show that even in the year 2008 the appellant had no money to purchase the subject property. Admittedly even on 03.11.2006, per statement of bank account Mark P[1], the appellant had no sufficient amount either in its account. If the appellant was really ready and willing to purchase property nothing could have prevented it to either give a rejoinder to the reply dated 09.11.2006 Ex.D[1] and to comply with payment schedule or to file suit for specific performance immediately thereafter. The appellant was obliged to show its readiness by at least keeping money/sale consideration in its account rather it slept for about 2½ years and only when the limitation was going to expire, filed this suit and then entered into the premises illegally, when the agreement to sell Ex.P[1], had clearly stipulated:-
“IV. Whereas it has been mutually ……. That the first party will assign all his rights title or interest in the property in question as well as the rights conferred on the Ist party by virtue of the decree passed by the Hon’ble High Court in his favour and the second party as assignee / purchaser of the property will be entitled and empowered to take such action including execution for taking the possession and / or for recovery of damages which are now a days being paid monthly as per the directions of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi.”

17. The appellant could have entered possession of the suit property only on assignment i.e. by way of sale deed, but it surreptitiously took over the possession after allegedly settling the matter with Mr.G.V.S.Tomar. Such possession, allegedly, is held to be illegal by the courts of competent jurisdiction but since is not relevant here I need not deliberate on this issue. Suffice is to say less than 5% of the sale consideration is paid till date by the appellant but strangely enough it pleads its readiness.

18. In Baldev Behl & Others vs Bhule & Others 2012 (132) DRJ 247 wherein the Court noted:-

“17. I have recently in the case titled as Laxmi Devi vs. Mahavir Singh being RFA No. 556/2011 decided on 1.5.2012 declined specific performance, one of the ground being payment of only nominal consideration under the agreement to sell. Para 11 of the said judgment reads as under:- "11. Besides the fact that respondent/plaintiff was guilty of breach of contract and was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract lacking in financial capacity to pay the balance consideration, in my opinion, the facts of the present case also disentitle the respondent/plaintiff to the discretionary relief of specific performance. There are two reasons for declining the discretionary relief of specific performance. The first reason is that the Supreme Court has now on repeated
occasions held that unless substantial consideration is paid out of the total amount of consideration, the Courts would lean against granting the specific performance inasmuch as by the loss of time, the balance sale consideration which is granted at a much later date, is not sufficient to enable the proposed seller to buy an equivalent property which could have been bought from the balance sale consideration if the same was paid on the due date. In the present case, out of the total sale consideration of Rs.5,60,000/-,….”

19. In N.P.Thirgnanam (dead) by LRs vs Dr. R Jagan Mohan Rao & Others AIR 1996 SC 116 it was held:-

“5. It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the court, which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under s.20 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 (for short, 'the Act'). Under s.20, the court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit alongwith other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract.”

20. In Sushil Jain vs Meharban Singh & Others 2012 (132) DRJ 421 it was held:-

"11. Section 16(c) of the Specific Reliefs Act, 1963 requires every plaintiff in a suit for specific performance to aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Readiness means existence of financial capacity and willingness means intention to go ahead with the transaction. Admittedly, there is not a single document on record which shows the financial capacity of the plaintiff right from

November, 1995 till the filing of the suit and even thereafter till the present stage of final arguments......"

21. Thus in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances as detailed above, where the appellant has not been able to show its readiness by depicting existence of its financial capability throughout viz, a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance and also where the appellant had given to the seller even less than 5% of the sale consideration and rather filed this suit after 2½ years of the transaction, the order of the learned Trial Court cannot be faulted with. There is no merit in the appeal, hence is dismissed. The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

22. No order as to costs.

YOGESH KHANNA, J. SEPTEMBER 24, 2019 M