Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 28th November,2019
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI) ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Amit Gupta, APP for the State with
SI Raju Yadav, PS Sultanpuri
Through: None
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
JUDGMENT
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
Application stands disposed of.
The present application is filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay of 17 days in filing the present leave petition.
For the reasons stated in the application, the present application for condonation of delay in filing the present leave petition is allowed.
Application stands disposed of.
2019:DHC:6493-DB
1. By the present Leave Petition filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’) the State seeks leave to appeal against the judgment dated 26.07.2019 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-01, Special Court (POCSO) North West District, Rohini Court, Delhi whereby the respondent (accused before the Trial Court) was acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections 376/506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and Sections 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as ‘POCSO’).
2. The brief facts of the case, as mentioned by the learned Trial Court are reproduced as under: “Brief facts of the prosecution case are that on 09.03.2016, DD No.3A at 1.00 a.m in the night was recorded and pursuant to that IO reached the house of the victim where victim complained of rape. She was taken to SGM hospital where she was found pregnant and after counselling victim gave her statement that she is living at the second floor of her rented accommodation where accused Satyavir lives on the first floor. She came back from her village about three months before and accused used to stare at her. About 5-6 days after her returning from the village, she went to the house of accused to take Rs.100/- from him lent by her mother to the accused. Accused made forcible physical relations with her at the point of knife and also threatened to kill her. Since then for about two months, he continued to rape her under threat. She missed her monthly periods and informed her mother who brought pregnancy test kit from the chemist and found UPT positive and called the PCR. On this complaint, present FIR was registered. IO prepared the site plan and arrested the accused and got him medically examined. Statement of the victim u/s 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded where she reiterated her police complaint. After orders from CWC, the pregnancy was terminated and the samples from the fetus was seized and sent to FSL and awaiting result, present charge sheet was filed against the accused before this Court. Copy supplied to the accused. ”
3. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused person, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses in all. The incriminating evidence and circumstances were put to the accused person during his statement recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein he claimed to have been falsely implicated in the present case and chose not to lead any evidence in his defence.
4. The Trial Court in the impugned judgment while acquitting respondent-accused has held as under:-
5. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment Mr. Amit Gupta learned prosecutor appearing for the State argued that the judgment dated 26.07.2019 is based on conjectures, surmises and the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the testimony of the prosecutrix in its right perspective ignoring the well-settled proposition of law that the sole testimony of the victim in the case of sexual assault is sufficient to base conviction of the accused.
6. Learned prosecutor further contended that the Trial Court has given undue weightage to minor discrepancies in the statements of the prosecutrix (PW-3) contrary to which her statement is consistent and corroborative in nature and there are no major omissions and contradictions in her testimony. He further submits that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the incident. He further submits that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that there is a presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of POCSO Act against the respondent-accused and it is for the respondent-accused to prove to the contrary. He further contended that the impugned judgment is a case of legal defects and the trial court has failed to appreciate the testimony of the prosecutrix in its correct perspective, and therefore is liable to be set aside.
7. We have heard the learned APP for the State at length and perused the available material on record.
8. It is a settled principle of law that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault without corroboration from any other evidence and where the testimony of a victim of sexual assault instills confidence in the Court the same can be relied upon for conviction of the accused. It is also a well settled principle of law that corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the victim is not a requirement of law but a guidance to prudence under the given circumstances. In Mohd. Ali @ Guddu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 272, the Apex Court has observed as under: -
9. In view of the settled law, we shall now examine whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimony of the victim is trustworthy, credible and can be relied upon or not and in order to test the veracity of the deposition of prosecutrix, it needs to be examined thread bare. The prosecutrix was examined as PW-3 and during her cross-examination she deposed “Ye kehna sahi hai ki case karne se do mahine pehle ek din accused ne gusse mai mere gaal per bahut zor se ‘chata’ maara aur mujhe wahan se bhaga diya. Vol. Mere kaan se khoon bhi nikal gaya tha. Ye kehna sahi hai ki uske baad mujhe accused per bahut gussa aa gaya aur main us se rooth gai. Ye kehna sahi hai ki us thapad wali ghatna ke baad maine socha ki us jallad ne mere sath aisa kyon kiya jabki mere aur uske achhe sambandh the aur mere gharwalaon ke sath bhi uske achhe sambandh the. Ye kehna sahi hai ki uske baad maine than li ke maiu use us thapad ka maza zaroor chakhaungi.”.
10. Further, during her cross-examination she had stated that there were no cordial relations between the accused and her parents, as she had deposed that “Ye kehan sahi hai ki accused ko jab bhi paison ki zaroorat hoti thi to wo mere mummy papa se le leta tha. Ye kehna sahi hai ki mere gaon se aane ke baad bhi paise dene ka ye silsila chal raha tha. Ye kehna sahi hai ki meri mummy mai aur accused mai paise lautane ka ya paise dene per nokjhok hoti rehti thi. Ye kehna sahi hai ki paise lene ke baad accused jaldi se use lautata nahi tha aur hume paise lene ke liye uske kai chakkar katne padte the.”
11. The conduct of the prosecutrix shows that she has falsely implicated the respondent-accused in the present case to take revenge against him because of the longstanding monetary disputes inter se between her family and the prosecutrix and had also developed a predetermined intention to implicate the respondent-accused in the present case because the respondent-accused had viciously slapped her two months prior to the alleged incident.
12. Further, the learned trial court has precisely taken the view that the medical evidence does not support the case of the prosecution because as per the medical examination (i.e. MLC of the prosecutrix) there was no Vulva Injury with any swelling, bruising and bleeding. Thereupon, even the FSL report does not support the version of the prosecution because no DNA profile was generated from Exhibit ‘1’ (Fleshy material described as “POC of victim Anjali”).
13. However, as far as the age of the prosecutrix is concerned the trial Court had concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove the fact that the victim was minor at the time of the incident or was born on 12.05.2003. The relevant portion of the trial Court judgment has been reproduced as under:
14. Consequently, this court is in agreement with the finding of the trial court that the prosecution has failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix. Though, the presumption under Sections 29 & 30 of the POCSO Act would be attracted, in the present case, yet the conflicting version of the prosecutrix on material points creates a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the statement/testimony of the prosecutrix.
15. Undoubtedly, there is no dispute with the legal submission of the learned APP for State that conviction in a rape case can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if the same is consistent, credible and trustworthy and instills confidence in the Court.
16. The Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Sham Singh Vs The State Of Haryana reported in (2018) 18 SCC 34 has laid down the following principles which need to be taken into consideration while analyzing the elements of false allegations in the case of rape because the same can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused. Relevant portion from the aforesaid judgment is extracted below:
17. Further, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Rohit Bansal Vs State reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9937 has discussed that there is no hesitation in establishing that rape causes great suffering and embarrassment to the prosecutrix, contrarily false implication of committing a rape also results in defaming the reputation and social dignity of the accused. The germane portion of Rohit Bansal (Supra) is extracted below:
18. Keeping in view the facts of the present case and applying the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that it would neither be fair nor reasonable to convict the respondent-accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix/victim, which had been wavering and was not consistent as recorded by the Learned Trial Court. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent-accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
19. It is a settled law that while deciding a leave to appeal petition filed by the State, in case two views are possible, the High Court must not grant leave, if the trial court has taken one of the plausible views, in contrast thereto in an appeal filed against acquittal. Upon re-appraisal of evidence and relevant material placed on record, in case, the High Court reaches a conclusion that another view can reasonably be taken, then the view, which favours the accused, should be adopted unless the High Court arrives at a definite conclusion that the findings recorded by the trial court are perverse, the High Court would not substitute its own views on a totally different perspective.
20. Having regard to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ghurey Lal vs. State of U.P. reported at 2008 (10) SCC 450, we do not find that there is any perversity in the reasoning given in the impugned judgment and for the abovementioned reasons, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the same.
21. Accordingly, the present leave petition, being bereft of merit, is dismissed.
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J. MANMOHAN, J. NOVEMBER 28, 2019 gr