Sarthak Gupta v. Income Tax Officer Ward 35(1) & Anr.

1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers:- “(a) a Writ of Certiorari or a Writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other Writ, Order or Direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India quashing and/or setting aside the impugned notice under section 148 dated 26.7.2022 (Annexure P-1) and the order under section 148A(d) of the Act dated 25.7.2022 for the assessment year 2014-15 (Annexure P-2); (b) a Writ of Prohibition or a Writ in the nature of Prohibition or any other Writ, Order or Direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directing Respondents No.1 and 2 not to take any action in furtherance to the impugned notice dated 26.07.2022 (Annexure P-1) and impugned order dated 25.07.2022 (Annexure P-2) during the pendency of this petition;

(c) To pass ad-interim orders in terms of prayer (b)

2. In effect, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 25.07.2022 passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act) and also notice under Section 148 dated 26.07.2022, primarily on the ground that, the proceedings relating to the Assessment Year (AY) 2015-16, shall be barred by time in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal [2024 INSC 754], which has been followed by this Court in Mectech knitfabs Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT Circle 16(1) New Delhi & An; [2025 (5) TMI 1967]. The learned counsel for the respondents do not contest the submissions made by Mr Satyen Sethi, counsel for the petitioner.

3. Suffice to state, on a similar issue, this Court in Lombard Portfolio Pvt Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle13(1) & Another; W.P.(C) 8349/2023, on which Mr. Sethi has also placed his reliance, had considered an issue relatable to the AY 2015-16 read with the Finance Act, 2021 wherein an order under Section 148A(d) and a notice under Section 148 of the Act were passed/ issued on 30.07.2022. This Court has in paragraph no.2 onwards has held that:-

144B of the Act and impugned Notice dated 19.05.2023 issued under Section 156 of the Act are bad in law as the same are beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 149 of the Act as amended by The Finance Act, 2021 which came into effect on 01.04.2021. Concedingly, the above impugned Notices and impugned Order having been passed post 01.04.2021, the same need to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that this issue is no more res integra and has been decided by this Court and also by the High Courts at Bombay and of Rajasthan and Special Leave Petition filed by the Revenue Department against the order of High Court of Bombay has been dismissed. He has also drawn our attention to the latest order passed by this Court in the case of Mectech knitfabs Pvt. Ltd. vs DCIT Circle 16(1) New Delhi & Anr. [2025 (5) TMI 1967] wherein this Court has in paragraph 11 onwards stated as under:-

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 2013-2014 31-3-2017 TOLA not applicable 31-3-2020 30-6-2021 2014-2015 31-3-2018 TOLA not 31-3-2021 30-6-2021 2015-2016 31-3-2019 TOLA not 31-3-2022 TOLA not 2016-2017 31-3-2020 30-6-2021 31-3-2023 TOLA not 2017-2018 31-3-2021 30-6-2021 31-3-2024 TOLA not f. The Revenue concedes that for the assessment year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after 1 April 2021 will have to be dropped as they will not fall for completion during the period prescribed under TOLA;”

12. In view of the above concession, the impugned notice and the proceedings relating thereto are required to be set aside. We may also note the decision of the Supreme Court in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors.: Civil Appeal No.5177/2025, decided on 02.04.2025. The said appeal arose from orders passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa and Cuttack declining to entertain batch of petitions filed by the Assessees. The attention of the Supreme Court was drawn to the concession made on behalf of the Revenue in Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal (supra) and noting the same, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals. The relevant extract of the said decision is set out below: