Inder Pal v. State

1. The present leave petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. for setting aside the judgment dated 20.12.2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, South & South East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi in case S.C. No.01/2008, for the offences punishable under Sections 307/326/34 IPC. 2020:DHC:719-DB

2. The present leave petition has been accompanied with an application seeking condonation of delay of 2495 days in filing the present petition.

3. The counsel for the petitioner contends that the present petition could not be preferred within the stipulated period as the petitioner and his wife were involved and implicated in cross case FIR No.514/2007 and were convicted vide judgment dated 20.12.2010 and sent to jail. The counsel for the petitioner further contends that the leave petition was to be filed by the State, but as it failed to challenge the impugned judgment of acquittal and discharge its duties, the petitioner being aggrieved of the said judgment preferred the present criminal leave petition. The counsel further pleads that the petitioner was released on bail only after the order dated 5.5.2011 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 and 3 argued that the present leave petition is not maintainable as there is an enormous delay of seven years in preferring the leave petition against the impugned judgment of acquittal.

5. The learned counsel for Respondent no. 2 & 3 further argued that the petitioner has failed to give any cogent reason to condone the delay of 2495 days in filing the present leave petition. Learned counsel further contends that the explanation rendered by the petitioner in his application for condonation of delay is unacceptable as the petitioner had preferred an appeal against his conviction in case FIR No. 514/07 within the prescribed period of limitation, however, he failed to prefer the present leave petition within time.

6. He further contends that filing of an appeal by the state in every case of acquittal is not mandatory in law and is only an exception; hence, the present leave petition of the petitioner should be dismissed on his failure to explain the delay of 2495 days.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent no. 2 & 3.

8. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to refer to the explanation provided by the petitioner in his application for condonation of delay. The justification rendered by the petitioner in his application is as under: -

9. There is no dispute that the law relating to condonation of delay by the courts is well settled. In Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by L.Rs. vs. State of A.P. and Ors. reported in AIR 2011 SC 1199 the Apex Court has held as under:

10. In Esha Bhattacharjee vs Management Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 the Apex Court has laid down the principles related to the condonation of delay which are as follows: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.[1] i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.[2] ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.[3] iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.[4] iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.[5] v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.[6] vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.[7] vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.[8] viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.[9] ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10 x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11 xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12 xii) The entire gamut of facts is to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.