Surjeet Singh v. Manju Bala & Ors.

1. An application for eviction under Section 14(1)(a) and (j) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter, “DRC Act”) was filed by Ms. Manju Bala against Late Mr. Mathura Dass, now represented by his son Mr. Surjeet Singh, i.e., the Petitioner herein (hereinafter, “Tenant”). The said eviction petition related to property bearing Garage No.91 (Shop), Gulabi Bagh, Delhi-110007 (hereinafter, “suit property”).

2. In the said eviction petition, a decree was passed on 28th February, 2013, by the ld. Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter, “ARC”), the operative portion of which reads as under:

3. The order granted the benefit of Section 14(2) of the DRC Act to the Tenant. Vide order dated 14th September, 2010, directions were passed for deposit of rent and this order attained finality as it was never challenged. In view of the defaults in payment of rent, vide order dated 30th May, 2013, the ARC declined the benefit under Section 14(2) of the DRC Act to the Tenant. The order dated 30th May, 2013 was then appealed before the ld. Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter, “RCT”) and vide order dated 27th September, 2014, the RCT dismissed the appeal and observed as under: “… A bare perusal of the above-said deposition of the appellant before the Ld. ARC would show that the appellant not only admitted the order dated 14.9.2010 to have been passed U/s 15(1) of 'the DRC Act', but, his conduct in depositing the rent amounts in the account of the respondent, also shows that there was no dispute or doubt as regards the relationship of landlord and tenant amongst the parties. Even otherwise, though, the order dated 14.9.2010 directs deposit/payment of arrears of rent within two months in the Court or to pay the same to the respondent in his account, instead of one month as contemplated U/s 15(1) of the DRC Act and also provides for such deposit or payment without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties, a constructive reading of the order leaves no doubt that it is an order passed U/s 15(1) of „the DRC Act', otherwise, the order would have been only for the deposit of the rent amounts with the Controller U/s 15(4) of „the DRC Act'. Grant of more time to deposit the arrears than as stipulated U/s 15(1) i.e. one month, by no means, can be said to vitiate such an order. At the most, it can be taken to be an irregularity in as much as, such directions did not curtail any right of the appellant, as provided under law.

5. In view of the foregoing, I do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is hereby, dismissed. Keeping in view however, the fact that the appellant has assailed the judgment dated 28.2.2013, whereby, the petition filed U/s 14(1)(a) of 'the DRC Act' has been granted, the operation of the impugned order shall remain in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal preferred before this Tribunal against judgment dated 28.2.2013. Appeal stands disposed off accordingly.” Thereafter, vide order dated 11th December, 2017, the RCT also upheld the initial order dated 28th February, 2013.

4. The present petition was heard by this Court on 23rd December, 2019 and 24th December, 2019. Ld. counsel who was appearing for the Tenant at that time had submitted that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. Even the demand notice seeking eviction was, according to him, defective in nature. Ld. counsel also argued that notice was given to the wrong premises as the same was addressed to premises no.91 whereas the correct address is 91/3. On the said date, the Court had, after hearing the parties, adjourned the matter to 24th December, 2019, directing the Tenant’s counsel to seek instructions from the Tenant as to whether he would be willing to vacate the suit property if some time is granted.

5. On 24th December, 2019, ld. counsel for the Tenant did not appear. The Tenant, who was present in person, was not willing to make any statement. A new counsel was engaged by the Tenant who now appears and submits that there was no default under Section 14(2) and that the rent was deposited contemporaneously. He further submits that if time is granted, he would like to produce evidence showing that the rent was paid and therefore the findings of the ARC and the RCT are incorrect. He seeks an opportunity to place this evidence on record.

6. On the other hand, ld. counsel for Respondent No.1 (hereinafter, “Landlady”) submits that initially the benefit which was granted to the Tenant has also not been availed of and finally, the benefit has been refused under Section 14(2). The eviction decree has been passed and the appeal against the same has also been dismissed. Accordingly, no discretion is liable to be exercised in favour of the Tenant in a petition under Article 227.

7. This Court has heard the parties and perused the record. The primary ground that has been urged to challenge the impugned order is that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the notice which was served was defective in nature. A perusal of the judgment of the ARC shows that this aspect has been considered in detail. The findings of the ARC on this issue are as under: -

11. Before proceeding further, I will first of all give finding to the effect as to whether there exists a relationship of landlordtenant between parties which is sine qua non for taking up proceedings under DRC Act. Respondent in reply filed by him has denied that petitioner is landlord qua suit property though he has admitted himself to be tenant in suit property. Respondent has stated that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between parties as no document has been shown to the respondent about sale of suit property. It is stated that petitioner has never attorned respondent as tenant after purchase of property if any nor she has shown any document on basis of which she purchased property nor previous landlord has written any letter to respondent or spoken verbally to accept petitioner as landlord as she had purchased the property. Respondent has further stated that respondent is tenant of Sh. Surinder Kumar s/o Sh. Ram Das Kharbanda @ Rs. 100/- per month and that respondent had taken suit property on rent from Late Sh. Ram Das. Petitioner in her affidavit has exhibited Agreement to sell and purchase with regard to suit property dated 19.09.2007 [Ex. PW-1/1] and GPA in her favour with regard to suit property dated 19.09.2007 [Ex. PW-1/2]. Originals of both Ex. PW-1/1 and Ex. PW-1/2 have been produced by petitioner during her examination in chief and both these Exhibits bear her signatures and no objection with regard to their mode of proof has been taken by respondent. No relevant question regarding Ex. PW-1/1 and Ex. PW-1/2 has been asked from petitioner in cross-examination of petitioner. No suggestion denying authenticity of Ex. PW-1/1 and Ex. PW-1/2 has been given to petitioner in crossexamination of petitioner [ Except one suggestion that Ex. PW-1/1 is totally illegal and void but it has not been asked as to why the same is illegal and void]. All these facts prove Ex. PW-1/1 and Ex. PW-1/2 on Court record. Respondent in order to challenge ownership of petitioner qua suit property has called RW-3 with record of suit property. RW-3 in his examination in chief has stated that in the year 1990, suit property was mutated in name of Sh. Surender Kumar Kharbanda. He has stated that property was allotted in name of Sh. Kartar Singh. He has stated that an application for sale permission has been moved on behalf of Sh. Kartar Singh but that the same was not allowed as certain objections were raised. RW-3 in his cross examination has stated that House Tax Department is different in MCD from Land and Estate Department and that he does not know whether the property has been presently transferred in name of petitioner in House Tax Department. Perusal of Ex. PW-1/1 and Ex. PW-1/2 show that these documents have been executed by one Sh. Surinder Kumar Kharbanda s/o Late Sh. Ram Das. Respondent in reply/WS filed by him has admitted himself to be tenant of Sh. Surinder Kumar Kharbanda s/o Sh. Ram Das Kharbanda. In both Ex. PW-1/1 and Ex. PW-1/2, it has been mentioned that Smt. Shanti Devi w/o Sh. Ram Das purchased suit property from Sh. Kartar Singh s/o Hardit Singh who as per lease deed produced by RW-3 Ex. RW-3/A was original lessee. From parentage mentioned in these documents, it appears that Surinder Kumar Kharbanda is son of Ram Das Kharbanda and Smt. Shanti Devi. In lease deed Ex. RW3/A, it has been mentioned that lessee can transfer land after obtaining permission of the lessor. RW-3 in his examination in chief has stated that an application for sale permission has been moved on behalf of Sh. Kartar Singh but the same was not allowed as certain objections were raised. He has stated that in the year 1990, suit property was mutated in name of Sh. Surender Kumar Kharbanda and previously property was in name of Shanti Devi w/o Sh. Ram Das. From deposition of RW-3, it appears that application for sale permission was moved on behalf of Kartar Singh for Smt. Shanti Devi as RW-3 has also stated that previously property was in name of Smt. Shanti Devi. From lease deed brought on record by RW-3, it is clear that even Surinder Kumar Kharbanda was not owner of suit property though suit property was mutated in his name. Respondent on the other hand has stated himself to be tenant of Sh. Surinder Kumar Kharbanda but Surinder Kumar Kharbanda himself did not have perfect title with regard to suit property. It is not clear that as to by which mode suit property came in hands of Surinder Kumar Kharbanda i.e. by way of any transfer document or by way of testamentary document but it appears that he is son of Smt. Shanti Devi and his name stands mutated in records so far as suit property is concerned. It is well settled that Mutation does not confer any title but for the purpose of Delhi Rent Control Act, it is also well settled that a person is entitled to initiate proceedings under the Act however imperfect his title may be and for initiation of proceedings under the Act, his rights in the suit property should be more than a tenant. It is clear from record produced by RW-3 that Surinder Kumar Kharbanda was not owner of suit property and that he was not having perfect title to suit property and as a consequence of the same, he can not pass a better title to petitioner than he himself had in the suit property but in any eventuality, he was having more rights in the suit property certainly as compared to respondent as respondent has himself admitted himself to be tenant of Surinder Kumar Kharbanda. In both Ex. PW-1/1 and Ex. PW-1/2, Surinder Kumar Kharbanda has given rights to petitioner to let out suit property and to realize rent. When status of Surinder Kumar Kharbanda as landlord qua suit property has been admitted by respondent and authenticity of Ex. PW-1/1 and Ex. PW-1/2 has not been challenged by respondent, for the purposes of present petition to my mind petitioner is landlord of suit property qua respondent in view of my discussion made in this para. However it is made clear that this observation/finding of mine is not going to effect title of suit property as this Court is not a competent Court to give any finding with regard to title of suit property and it is only a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction which can give finding to this effect and finding given by this court is limited only for the purposes of this petition. It is therefore held for purposes of present petition that there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between parties.”

8. A perusal of the above findings of the ARC shows that the original documents were produced and exhibited as PW-1/1 and PW-1/2, to prove ownership of the suit property. Secondly, the ARC has relied upon the statement of RW-3 who is the LDC from the Land and Estate Department, MCD, Delhi. The ARC concluded that the Tenant has himself admitted as having been inducted by Mr. Surinder Kumar Kharbanda. The said Mr. Surinder Kumar Kharbanda had given rights in the suit property to the Landlady by virtue of exhibit PW-1/1 and PW-1/2. Since the Tenant admitted to having been under the tenancy of Mr. Surinder Kumar Kharbanda, the ARC held that for the purposes of an eviction petition, Respondent No.1 has to be treated as the Landlady. Thus, according to the ARC, the landlord-tenant relationship stood established.

9. Insofar as the service of notice is concerned, the ARC observed that the legal notice dated 28th August, 2009 (Ex. PW-1/3) was relied upon by the Landlady, as per which no rent had been paid by the Tenant since 2001. The ARC concludes that since the Landlady was not cross-examined on the aspect of service of notice, the evidence of the Landlady remained unrebutted. The ARC also relied upon the registered AD card (Ex. PW-1/8) to arrive at the conclusion that the service of the notice stands proved. The ARC arrived at the conclusion that the ground for eviction under Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act is made out. The ground under Section 14(1)(j) of the DRC Act was, however, rejected by the ARC on account of inconsistencies in the Landlady’s affidavit and cross-examination and the lack of any documentary proof to support the Landlady’s claims.

10. The RCT has also examined the record and concluded, vide the impugned order dated 11th December, 2017, as under: -