Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
PREM SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sanat Kumar, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Ravi Joshi and Mr. Vinayak Batta, Advocates. (M:9873980084)
Through: Mr. Neeraj Yadav and Ms. Aditi Sharma, Advocates. (M:9899426760)
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the impugned order dated 1st June, 2018 by which the objections filed by the Petitioner – Mr. Prem Singh have been dismissed by the Executing Court. The petition also challenges the order dated 17th July, 2018 by which the Petitioner’s objections have been disposed of as withdrawn.
2. A suit for possession and recovery was filed in 1977 by one Mr. Girdhari Lal Dhara against four Defendants - Mr. Amin Chand, Mr. Jagan Singh, Mr. Prem Singh and Mr. Dhiraj Singh. The land (“suit property”) is described in para no.1 of the plaint as under: “1. The plaintiff is the owner of the land measuring 4000 sq. yds. comprised in Khasra No. 742, situated in 2020:DHC:1765 the revenue estate of Village Mandawali, Fazalpur, Delhi. The plaintiff constructed thereon a Cinema measuring 450 sq. yds, one room 24' x 24' on the corner side (north west), and one room measuring about 24' x 24' on the side of the north west corner and three room back side. The constructed premises is shown in attached site plan and the same is annexed as Annexure-1.”
3. The case of the Plaintiff was that Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 approached the Plaintiff for grant of a license for running a cinema in the suit property, which was granted on 15th November, 1971 for a monthly license fee of Rs.2,000/- per month. Since the requisite permissions could not be obtained, the property could not be put to use. In February, 1972, possession was given back to the Plaintiff, however, on 1st April, 1972 an attempt was made to take forcible possession. An injunction suit was filed by the Plaintiff, which was settled by a compromise arrived at on 7th June, 1972. One of the terms of the compromise was as follows: “(d) That the defendants shall use the premises for cinema purposes only and not for any other purpose.” On the basis of the compromise, which was entered into, the Defendants used the suit property. It was the Plaintiff’s case that Defendant Nos. 1 & 2, without permission from the Plaintiff, thereafter permitted Defendant Nos.[3] & 4 to use the said site. As per the Plaintiff, Defendant Nos.[1] & 2 were allowed the use the land admeasuring 2,700 sq. yds in terms of the compromise, but the said Defendants used even the adjoining land unauthorizedly, and also carried out construction in the property. The Plaintiff called upon the Defendants to vacate and since the Defendants did not vacate the property, a suit for possession was filed. The prayer in the suit was as under: “It is, therefore, prayed that a decree for possession of the suit premises i.e. the land measuring 4000 sq. yads. in khasra no. 742 situated within the revenue estate of Village Mandawali, Fazalpur, Shahdara, Delhi alongwith the decree for Rs. 90,000/- as arrears of mesne profit/damages for use against the defendants. Without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to recover damages, it is submitted that if the defendants assert themselves as tenants and the court holds them as tenants, the decree for the said amount be passed as arrears of rent. Cost of the suit be also awarded. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper be also awarded to the plaintiff.”
4. Defendant Nos.[3] and 4 filed their written statement, wherein they admitted that the Plaintiff was the landlord and Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 were the tenants. It is the case of Defendants 3 & 4 that since the construction of the cinema hall could not be carried out by the Plaintiffs, they had joined Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 for investment in the construction and running of the cinema hall. The Defendant Nos.[3] and 4 claimed that they completed construction in the cinema hall in October, 1973 and the same was opened on 2nd December, 1973. The Defendant Nos.[3] and 4 were inducted in the property with the consent of the Plaintiff. The plaint did not annexe the site plan, though there is a mention of the site plan in paragraph no. 1 of the plaint. Defendant Nos.[3] and 4 filed a joint written statement in which an objection was taken that since the site plan had not been provided to them, the correctness of the site plan is denied. It was also averred in the written statement that the measurements of the suit property in the plaint were not correct. Paragraph No.1 of the written statement is reproduced below: “On Merits:
1. That para No.1 of the plaint is wrong hence denied. It is submitted that the plaintiff is the landlord qua defendants No.1 and 2. It is falsely stated by the plaintiff that he constructed the cinema hall. It is submitted that the plaintiff expressed his inability to undertake construction due to lack of finances and resources and accordingly the plaintiff requested the defendants to construct the cinema hall and the plaintiff undertook to reimburse or pay the costs thereof. It was on the understanding that the plaintiff had to construct a cinema hall as per rules and sanctions that the rent would be @ Rs.1500/- p.m. As the plaintiff could not undertake the construction as afore-stated and could not come forward for settlement about the cost of construction, the matter kept hanging. It is submitted that the tenancy of the premises vests with defendant No.1 and 2 and they had to start with joined the replying defendant and defendant No.4 for making investment on the construction and for running the cinema. The copy of the alleged plan has not been supplied, so its correctness is denied. The measurements given in the para of the plaint are not correct. It is denied that the hall etc. were constructed by the plaintiff.”
5. Issues were framed in the suit on 4th December, 1981. The same are extracted below: “1. Whether Defendant no. 1 and 2 are licensee in respect of the property in dispute? OPD
2. Whether Defendant no. 1 and 2 used the land over and above the land measuring 2700 sq. yards illegally and unauthorisedly? OPD
3. To what amount, if any, the plaintiff is entitled as damages? OPP
4. Whether the suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure? OPD
5. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties? OPD
6. Whether the suit is barred under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act? OPD
7. Relief.”
6. The ld. Single Judge decreed the suit on 28th August, 2001. The findings are as under: i) Defendant Nos.[1] and 2 were licensees in the suit property. ii) Defendant Nos.[3] and 4 were in occupation of the entire suit property apart from the original 2,700 sq. yds. The Defendants unauthorizedly took possession of 1,300 sq. yds, thus mesne profits were liable to be paid. iii) Mesne profits of Rs.2,000 per month for a period of three years were awarded. The operative portion of the decree reads as under: “This suit coming on this day for final disposal before this Court in the presence of the counsel for the parties as aforesaid while the defendant Nos.[1] &2 having been proceeded against ex-parte, it is ordered that a decree for possession of the suit property shown in red in the site plan Ex. PW.2/1 and Rs. 72,000/- towards mesne profit be the same is hereby passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. It is further ordered that the defendants are however allowed four weeks time to hand over possession thereof of the plaintiff. It is lastly ordered that the defendant herein do pay to the plaintiff herein the proportionate costs of Rs.6,561.80Ps. (Rupees six thousand five hundred sixty one and paise eighty only) of the suit incurred by the latter as taxed by the Taxing Officer of this Court.
7. The site plan, which was prepared and forms part of the decree, was exhibited by the draftsman - Mr. S. Pippal. His deposition is relevant, and is set out below: “I am a draftman, working in District Court at Tis Hazari. I have seen the plan Exhibit PW 2/1. This plan has been prepared by me and bears my signature. The plan is correct as per the situation of the site. The plaintiff had accompanied me when I visited the site for preparing this plan. Exhibit D[1] was shown to me by the plaintiff and I found it to be in accordance with the situation existing on the plot. xxxxxx by Sh. B. I. Singh, for Defendants 3 & 4. Exhibit D[1] is the document which was shown to me. Again said, I cannot say whether this was the document which was shown to me or its copy was shown to me. I had visited the site about two months ago. One hall, 2 rooms along with three rooms in the rear existed in property in question. I had seen the entire property only from the rear lane. I prepared my plan on the basis of the inspection from the rear lane and from the gate. I had taken measurement only on the site of rear lane. I did not make any attempt to enter this property. The width of front gate is not more than 10 ft. It is correct that there is no entrance to this property from the rear side. There is 6-7 feet high boundry wall, on the rear side. Cinema hall has been constructed there but it is not functional. It is wrong to suggest that I never visited the site and that I have prepared this plan only on the instruction of the Plaintiff.”
8. The journey of this litigation takes an interesting turn after the passing of the decree. RFA (OS) 29/2001 was filed challenging the decree. The said appeal was primarily argued on the question of Order II Rule 2 CPC, and was dismissed vide judgment dated 23rd September, 2008. A SLP, being SLP (Civil) No. 30633/2008 was filed, which was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 7th January, 2009.
9. Defendant No. 3- Prem Singh, who is the Petitioner herein, then started independent proceedings by filing a suit against Mr. G. L. Dhara, Mr. Amin Chand and Mr. Jagan Singh. The relief sought in the suit is as under: “i … decreeing the suit in favour of the Plaintiff and against the defendants and the defendants be restrained by way of permanent injunction from interfering in the manner in the ownership right and title of the property and possession of the plaintiff without due process of law in respect of property bearing no. Khasra No. 742 measuring 3 bigha 6 biswa approx. 3324 square yards in Mandawali Fazalpur, Delhi which is in the name of the plaintiff
10. On 18th May, 2018, Mr. Prem Singh moved an application before the SDM for demarcation of Khasra Nos. 742 and 743.
11. After the SLP was dismissed, on 30th March, 2009, execution petition seeking execution of decree dated 28th August, 2001, which had been filed earlier, was revived. Bailiff was appointed by the executing court on 18th September, 2009. In the said proceedings, on 18th September, 2009, time was granted to Mr. Prem Singh to file objections. One Mr. Kishan Pal Singh, who is related to Mr. Prem Singh also filed objections to the execution. The statement of Mr. Prem Singh was recorded by the Court under Order X CPC. Since the bailiff could not take possession of the property, the Decree Holder – Mr. G.L. Dhara filed an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC.
12. On 27th November, 2009 the Court noticed that Mr. Prem Singh had filed an application with mala fide intentions to obstruct the execution proceedings and had also made allegations against the Court staff. The executing court observed that Mr. Prem Singh was causing delay in the execution of the decree, and the application was thus dismissed. Arguments were then heard on the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC filed by the Decree Holder. The executing court, vide order dated 8th December, 2009 records that when the bailiff went for execution of the warrants of possession on 29th September, 2009 the entire structure of the cinema had been demolished and various antisocial elements were also present at the time to obstruct the execution of warrants of possession. The second objector, Mr. Kishan Pal Singh claimed that he had purchased the property vide a registered sale deed on 6th August,
1994. In the execution petition, on 3rd December, 2011 the following issue was then framed: “1) Whether the objector/ obstructionist Sh. Kishan Pal Singh is the bonafide owner of property measuring 3 bigha 3 biswa bearing Khasra no. 742 within the estate of Village Mandwali Faizal Pur, Ilaka Shahadara, Delhi-92 having purchased the same vide sale deed dated 06.08.94? onus of proof on objector.”
13. Evidence was thereafter recorded on the above issue. On 19th August, 2014, the objections filed by Mr. Kishan Pal Singh were dismissed. The findings in the said judgment are as under:
14. On 17th April, 2018 the objections of the Judgment Debtor - Mr. Prem Singh were dismissed. The findings of the executing court are as under:
15. Objections were again filed by Mr. Prem Singh, which were dismissed on 1st June, 2018. The ground taken therein was that the decree in respect of the suit property is only in respect of Khasra No. 742 and not Khasra No. 743. On this issue, the executing court held as under:
16. A third set of objections was preferred by Mr. Prem Singh, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 17th July, 2018. Another set of objections was also filed by one Professor Mahavir Educational Cultural and Welfare Society. This set of objections was pressed on the basis of an alleged agreement dated 30th September, 2006, by which it was claimed that the Mr. G.L. Dhara had agreed to sell the land to the said Society, and CS (OS) 360/2009 was pending in the High Court. Since the Society had claimed that it had acquired possession of the property from Mr. Kishan Pal Singh, whose objections had already been dismissed on 19th August, 2014 which was also upheld by the High Court in EFA No.27/2014 vide order dated 24th September, 2014, the executing court held that the said Society could not claim any better rights then Mr. Kishan Pal Singh. The executing court further held that since no right, title or interest was created by the agreement to sell, the Society could not resist or obstruct the possession of the suit property being given to the Decree Holder. The observations of the Court in its order dated 25th January, 2016 are as under:
17. The present petition has now been filed challenging the orders dated 1st June 2018 and 17th July, 2018, by which the objections filed by Mr. Prem Singh have been rejected by the Executing Court.
18. In the meantime, a challenge to the same orders, being Ex. F.A. 31/2018 was filed before the High Court, which was dismissed on 1st October, 2018 with the following order:
19. A preliminary objection has been raised by ld. counsel for the Decree Holder. He submits that the objections of Mr. Prem Singh, having been dismissed, what would be maintainable is only a suit or appeal and not a petition under Article 227. Ld. Senior Counsel for the Judgment Debtor – Mr. Prem Singh has responded, and his submission is that the scheme of Order XXI CPC shows that there are separate provisions which deal with Judgment Debtors who are parties to the suit and those who are not parties to the suit. According to him, Order XXI Rule 35 CPC envisages that if free access is not provided to the property in respect of which the decree is executed, either by the Judgment Debtor or any person bound by the decree, then the power to remove or break open any lock etc. vests with the Decree Holder. According to him, persons bound by the decree would either be the Judgment Debtor or transferee pendente lite, as per Rule 102 of Order XXI CPC. No one else would be covered.
20. Insofar as third parties are concerned, it is his submission that Order XXI Rule 97 CPC permits such parties to raise objections to resistance or obstruction being caused to possession being given of the immovable property. Such objections have to be decided as per the scheme of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and thereafter, Rules 98, 99 and 101. It is his submission that when there are objections raised by third parties i.e., persons who are not bound by the decree, the same would be governed by Rules 97 to 101, however, persons bound by the decree would be governed by Order XXI Rule 35 CPC.
21. He also submits that Section 47 CPC envisages questions to be determined by the Court which is executing the decree and this would also only be between parties to the suit or their representatives i.e., the Judgment Debtors or their representatives. Thus, he submits that while an appeal is provided for third parties who object to the execution of a decree, there is no appeal which is provided for parties who are bound by the decree i.e., the Judgment Debtors or transferee pendente lite. Thus, Article 227 can be invoked by such persons. He relies upon the judgments in Shri Tejpal Singh v. Shri Hardit Singh, etc. EFA (OS) 3/1980, Decided on 7th May, 1980 as also Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain & Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 6.
22. It is further submitted that the site plan, having only been filed after the cross-examination of PW-1, the question as to whether the decree, which is only in relation to Khasra No.742, can be executed in respect of Khasra NO. 743, is to be adjudicated by the executing court and the non-filing of the site plan is in violation of the stipulation contained in Order VI Rule 3 CPC. He relies upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in A/M Kothandaramasamy Koil v. Vairam SA (MD) No.15/2008 (Decided on 3rd January, 2012) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Laxman Singh v. Jagannath, 2000 (1) MPHT 384 in support of his submissions.
23. Ld. counsel appearing for the Respondent-Decree Holder has challenged the maintainability of the present petition on the ground that the dismissal of the objections under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC has culminated into a decree and thus, is appealable under Order XXI Rule 103 CPC. He submits that the petition under Article 227 is, thus, not maintainable. He relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal & Anr., (1997) 3 SCC 694 wherein the Supreme Court holds that `any person’ as contained under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC includes, apart from the Judgment Debtor, anyone claiming through him and even a person claiming independently or who are the transferees to the decree. He submits that in view of this decision, the petition deserves to be dismissed at the outset. He further submits that the Judgment Debtor – Mr. Prem Singh has availed of his remedy by filing Ex. F.A. 31/2018, which was also withdrawn and the Judgment Debtor having withdrawn the said petition, the present petition is not maintainable.
24. On merits, it is the submission of ld. counsel for the Decree Holder that the site plan, which is purported to be disputed today is the site plan, which was in fact filed by the Judgment Debtor itself before the Trial Court and the Executing Court. He relies upon two documents i.e. Ex.PW-2/1, the site plan prepared by the draftsman - PW-2 and Ex. D[1], which form part of the Executing Court record, which was filed by the Judgment Debtor and also the coloured site plan filed by the Judgment Debtor. He further submits that these three site plans have one thing in common i.e. entrance through Khasra No. 743 and passage for access to the suit property. He further submits that the deposition of PW[2] is clear to the effect that the site plan was prepared by him after inspecting the suit property. PW-2 clearly deposes that there is no entrance to the property from the rear side. He also deposes that there is no entrance to the property from the rear side but there is a gate on the front side of the property. These clearly show that the access to the property was from the gate in the front side. He further submits that Mr. Prem Singh is guilty of delaying the execution of the decree in this suit, which dates back to 1977, and in fact even in Mr. Prem Singh’s own documents of purchase, the passage is clearly mentioned, and the Executing Court found the same in its order (page 104 of the paperbook). He finally submits that Mr. Prem Singh is guilty of filing repeated objections before this Court. One set of objections were filed on 23rd October, 2009 which was dismissed as not pressed. A second set of objections were filed through Mr. Prem Singh’s brother’s father-in-law, Krishan Pal Singh, who posed as a purchaser of the property. The said objections were also dismissed by a ld. Single Judge of this Court on 24th September, 2014. The third set of objections were filed on 26th August, 2016, which were dismissed by the Executing Court on 17th April, 2018 and the said dismissal order has not been challenged. The present set of objections is, in fact, a fourth set of objections, which was filed on behalf of Mr. Prem Singh. The same was dismissed on 1st June, 2018 by the impugned order. He submits that Mr. Prem Singh did not rest there. Another set of objections was filed on 16th July, 2018, which was withdrawn on 17th July, 2018. He submits that the only attempt of the Judgment Debtor is to delay and to ensure that the decree is not given effect to and the land, which lawfully and legally belongs to the Decree Holder is not put to use by the Decree Holder. Thus, it is submitted that the present petition is not maintainable and is also liable to be dismissed on merits. The Trial Court’s order does not warrant any interference. Ld. counsel for the Plaintiff also relies upon the judgment in Sameer Singh & Anr. v. Abdul Rab & Ors., (2015) 1 SCC 379 to argue that this case would not fall for challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as the distinction has been clearly drawn up in the said judgment. Ld. counsel further submits that in order to prevent execution of the decree, a wall has been constructed beyond the gate, however, Mr. Sanat Kumar, ld. Senior Counsel for the Judgment Debtor disputes this version.
25. In rejoinder Mr. Sanat Kumar, ld. Senior Counsel submits that the categories of applications under Order XXI Rule 35 CPC on the one hand and Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and Order XXI Rule 99 CPC on the other hand, cannot be treated in the same manner. Clearly, there is a difference between the two types of applications that can be filed by the Decree Holder and the objections which may be filed by the Judgment Debtor. The same would not be an appealable decree under Order XXI Rule 103 CPC. It is further submitted that in Brahmdeo Chaudhary, the question was whether a third party’s objection to the decree would be maintainable under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC or Order XXI Rule 99 CPC. Thus, the question as to whether “any person” includes the Judgment Debtor was a question, which was answered by the Supreme Court only in passing and was at best an obiter.
26. The present petition raises the following two questions: i. Whether the present petition under Article 227 is maintainable after the Ex. F.A. was dismissed as withdrawn on 1st October, 2018, though liberty was granted? ii. Whether the impugned orders dated 1st July, 2018 are liable to be interfered with?
27. The submissions, which have been made and recorded hereinabove, are in respect of the scheme of Order XXI CPC. An examination of Order XXI CPC clearly reveals that when a decree is to be executed, if any resistance is faced, there are various remedies available to the decree holder:
(i) If free access is not afforded by any person who is in possession and who is bound by the decree, locks can be broken open and any act as is necessary for putting the decree holder in possession can be undertaken. (Order XXI Rule 35)
(ii) If there is resistance or obstruction by any person who is in possession of the property, the decree holder can complain of all such resistance to the executing court by means of an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The Court can then come to the conclusion as to whether the resistance or obstruction was with or without just cause under Order XXI Rule 98 CPC, and such order would be treated as a decree under Order XXI Rule 103 CPC.
(iii) The scheme is similar in respect of persons who are wrongfully dispossessed – such a party can approach the Court under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC, which would be considered under Order XXI Rule 101 CPC. Such an order would also be a decree under Order XXI Rule 103 CPC.
28. The question in this case is whether the impugned order is one passed under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC or under Order XXI Rule 35 CPC. A perusal of the records of the Executing Court would show that since the time the decree has been passed, there have been objections after objections being filed by Mr. Prem Singh or instigated by Mr. Prem Singh or at the behest of Mr. Prem Singh. The said objections are: i. Objections by Mr. Kishan Pal Singh, who is a relative of Mr. Prem Singh i.e., his brother’s father-in-law which were dismissed on 19th August,
2014. ii. Objections by Professor Mahavir Educational Cultural & Welfare Society, which claimed that it had obtained possession from Mr. Kishan Pal Singh -which were dismissed on 25th January, 2016. iii. Three sets of objections by Mr. Prem Singh, which were dismissed vide orders dated 17th April, 2018, 1st June 2018 and 17th July 2018.
29. In the entire process, the Decree Holder has also moved an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC in view of the resistance/ obstruction. All these objections/ applications were decided under various provisions of Order XXI CPC. The prayer in this petition is specifically in respect of orders dated 1st July, 2018, by which two sets of objections were dismissed. The objections were filed by Mr. Prem Singh under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC, which were rejected by the executing court. Further, even if the orders are treated as orders under Order XXI Rule 35 CPC by which locks could be broken open, either way, Mr. Prem Singh has availed of his remedies in law. A perusal of the order dated 1st October, 2018 in Ex. FA No. 31/2018 shows that ld. counsel for the Petitioner withdrew the said appeal “under instructions” and sought liberty to file proper proceedings. The Court, while dismissing the appeal left open the question as to whether any remedy of appeal was available and whether any other remedy could be availed of by Mr. Prem Singh.
30. The question as to whether under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, the Judgment Debtor would be included in the term “any person” in fact, as a question of law, need not even be decided in the present petition. The Supreme Court has, in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Anr. (supra) held that `any person’ under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC includes the Judgment Debtor. The present petition is one under Art.227 challenging the orders rejecting the objections. The said orders have been passed in multiple objections preferred both under Order XXI Rule 35 and Order XXI Rule 97. Thus, the thin line which is sought to be drawn does not arise and the petition is being entertained.
31. In the present case, Mr. Prem Singh has been wearing various hats and has also ensured that the decree, which was passed way back in 2001 has not been executed till date. The original suit itself was of 1977 and the Petitioner herein has tried every trick to resist execution, despite being a party to the original suit. Such mala fide attempts by Mr. Prem Singh include: i. Filing of a suit for injunction after the decree was passed in the first Suit filed by the Decree Holder Mr. G.L. Dhara. ii. Filing proceedings before the SDM for demarcation, when the site plan was clear all along. iii. Filing of objections through a family member – Mr. Kishan Pal Singh. iv. Filing of objections thorough a Society, which claimed rights through the said family member – Mr. Kishan Pal Singh v. Filing at least three separate sets of objections under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC even after the order for breaking open locks was passed.
32. Thus, irrespective of whether Mr. Prem Singh is to be dispossessed under Order XXI Rule 35 CPC or after dismissal of objections under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, the impugned orders cannot be deemed to be erroneous. Warrants of possession have been repeatedly issued by the executing court in this case. In fact, the order dated 17th April, 2018, which was objected to by Mr. Prem Singh, was a direction to break open locks under Order XXI Rule 35 CPC. Mr. Prem Singh himself has repeatedly invoked Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The distinction sought to be drawn between these two provisions is only an attempt to conflate the entire issue, and nothing more. The executing court has, rightly, dismissed the objections of the Petitioner with costs. Thus, the petition is held to be maintainable and the impugned order is upheld.
33. Owing to the completely mala fide conduct and abuse of the Court process by the Judgment Debtor, the present petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.[5] lakhs. Let the costs be paid within four weeks. If the same is not paid, the Decree Holder shall be entitled to recover the same in the execution proceedings, pending before the executing court. All pending applications are disposed of.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH, J. MARCH 19, 2020/dj/RG