Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited v. Rampal

Delhi High Court · 15 Oct 1998 · 2020:DHC:2189

Anup Jairam Bhambhani

W.P.(C) No.7749/2016

2020:DHC:2189

administrative appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that a forum not properly constituted as a Permanent Lok Adalat under the Legal Services Authorities Act lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes or grant interim relief in electricity misuse cases, setting aside the impugned order.

Full Text

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W.P.(C) No.7749/2016 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 30.06.2020 W.P.(C) No.7749/2016
TATA POWER DELHI DISTRIBUTION LIMITED ….Petitioner
Through: Mr. Manish Srivastava & Ms.Shivangi Krishna, Advs

VERSUS

RAMPAL ….Respondent
Through: Dr. L.S. Chaudhary, Mr. Viresh Chaudhary, Mr. Parambir Singh & Mr. Manoj Kumar
Bhagat, Advs.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

JUDGMENT

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.

The petitioner/Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited is aggrieved by order dated 20.07.2016 made by the learned Permanent
Lok Adalat in case No. EPLA-II/180/2016, whereby, while remanding the case as “unsettled” (sic) and giving opportunity to the respondent/Rampal to seek redressal of his grievance before the appropriate court or forum, the Presiding Officer has directed that the supply of electricity by the petitioner to the respondent shall not be disconnected for non-payment of misuse charges and penalties without due process of law. The petitioner is also aggrieved by the fact that in the impugned order the Presiding Officer has made certain adverse remarks against it and has directed that a copy of the order be circulated to various governmental authorities and senior officials. It is the petitioner’s contention that the impugned order has been made
2020:DHC:2189 __________________________________________________________________________________ by the Presiding Officer without jurisdiction and/or by exercising power and jurisdiction not vested in him by law.

2. It may be mentioned at the outset that the use of the words Presiding Officer, Lok Adalat and Permanent Lok Adalat in this judgement are to be read subject to what is stated in the concluding paragraphs, for the reason that regardless of the nomenclature given to the forum in the course of the proceedings leading upto to the present petition, the nomenclature used is, at places, inaccurate and incorrect in view of what has been clarified by the Supreme Court. Petitioner’s case:

3. The genesis of the matter is the disconnection of an electricity connection bearing CA No.60002943599 by the petitioner for alleged non-payment of about Rs. 8 lacs by the respondent towards dues for consumption of electricity. It is the petitioner’s case that in view of the demand raised by it, earlier-on the respondent filed a case before the Lok Adalat for settlement of the dues; consequent whereupon, on 03.06.2015 the matter was mutually settled between the parties and it was agreed before the Lok Adalat that the respondent would pay to the petitioner Rs.6,08,910/- by 12.06.2015 in settlement of the amounts owed. It was further agreed between the parties that upon payment of the said amount, the petitioner would restore the electricity supply to the respondent. However, it would appear that the respondent failed to pay the agreed amount, and as a result, the petitioner did not restore the electricity supply. Thereafter the respondent filed civil suit bearing No.223/2015 before the Civil Judge, Rohini Courts, New Delhi in which, vidé order dated 21.07.2015, the Civil Court directed that the respondent’s electricity connection be restored subject to the respondent paying 50% of the total outstanding demand. However, yet again, the respondent failed to comply with the direction of the Civil Court and the respondent’s electricity connection was therefore not restored.

4. Now, the respondent’s electricity connection was disconnected on 26.05.2010 on account of non-payment of dues of about Rs. 8 lacs. However it is alleged that during an inspection conducted by it on 28.07.2015 the petitioner found that the respondent had unauthorisedly restored the electricity connection; by reason of which petitioner initiated proceedings under section 126 of the Electricity Act 2003 (“Electricity Act” for short) and raised upon the respondent a demand of about Rs.30 lacs on account of unauthorised use of electricity, including misuse charges and a late payment surcharge.

5. The respondent sought amicable settlement of this demand, without however challenging the bill raised; and made an application to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DSLSA) for settlement of the dispute. The application made was referred to, what has been called, Permanent Lok Adalat-II by way of case No.EPLA- II/180/2016 from which the present proceedings have arisen.

6. The petitioner points-out that the prayer made by the respondent in the application filed before the DSLSA was for settlement of his misuse demand and not for adjudication of the dispute. However, when the petitioner offered to waive 50% of the misuse penalty and late payment surcharge in settlement of the dispute, the offer was not accepted by the respondent; and therefore on 09.07.2016 the petitioner made a request that the matter be ‘closed’.

7. It is the petitioner’s contention that instead of closing the matter simpliciter, the Presiding Officer proceeded to record serious, adverse observations and remarks against the petitioner and also granted to the respondent interim relief by directing that the respondent’s electricity connection be not disconnected for nonpayment of misuse penalty without following the due process of law. The Presiding Officer also directed that a copy of the order be circulated to various governmental authorities and senior officials, which the petitioner contends was entirely without jurisdiction or authority of law.

8. In the above factual backdrop, the petitioner has raised the following legal issues for decision in the present proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution: (a) Firstly, the petitioner contends that the Lok Adalat was constituted not under the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 (“LSA Act” for short) but under the directions issued by this court in Abul Hassan and National Legal Services Authority vs. Delhi Vidyut Board & Ors.1: whereby it was directed that a permanent and continuous Lok Adalat be established only to facilitate settlement of disputes by mutual agreement between parties, purely as a measure of conciliation without the Lok Adalat having any adjudicatory powers; (b) Secondly, the petitioner contends that even assuming, while denying, that the Lok Adalat was set-up under the LSA Act, since the Lok Adalat in the present case was only a one-member body, the constitution of the Lok Adalat was not in accordance with law as section 22B(2) of that statute requires setting-up of a three-member Permanent Lok Adalat;

22C(1) of the LSA Act, the Lok Adalat was barred from entertaining a matter relating to an offence which is not compoundable under any law; and in the present case the offence alleged was one under section 138 of the Electricity Act 2003 (“Electricity Act” for short), which invites imprisonment of upto 3 years or fine; which offence, according to the petitioner, is noncompoundable;

(d) Fourthly, the petitioner contends that the Lok Adalat could not have entertained the dispute in view of section 22C of the LSA Act, as the property in dispute exceeds Rs.10 lacs, since the misuse demand raised upon the respondent was about Rs. 30 lacs; (e) Lastly, the petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat was barred in view of section 145 of the Electricity Act which mandates that if the assessing officer (under section 126) or the appellate authority (under section 127) or the adjudicating officer is/are empowered to decide the dispute under the Electricity Act, then no Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain such dispute and no injunction can be granted in respect thereof.

9. It is the petitioner’s contention that for all the above reasons, the Presiding Officer ought not to have entertained the matter in the first place; and having entertained the matter, the Presiding Officer could in any case not have made the offending observations and remarks, nor could he have granted any interim relief to the respondent, especially since the Presiding Officer was referring the respondent to get his grievances adjudicated before an appropriate court or forum. The petitioner contends that once settlement had failed, the Presiding Officer could only have ‘closed’ the matter.

10. It may be mentioned for completeness that by order dated 01.09.2016 made in these proceedings, the operation of impugned order dated 20.07.2016 was stayed; and subsequently, on the respondent offering to pay the outstanding principal consumption charges excluding late payment surcharge, with the petitioner’s consent, the respondent’s electricity connection was directed to be restored. At that stage the matter was also referred for possible settlement to the Delhi High Court Mediation & Conciliation Centre. It transpired however, that settlement proceedings before the Mediation Centre failed and the matter was closed as being a “nonstarter” vidé Mediator’s report dated 16.01.2017. It also transpired that the respondent did not pay even the principal consumption charges of about Rs.7.60 lacs; and so the respondent’s electricity connection was not restored.

11. It would be appropriate at this stage to extract the portions of the impugned order, as referred to by the petitioner, which set-out the discussion and reasoning:

“3. This is yet another case that brings to the fore the sad state of affairs which comes to resolving and settling disputes between the consumers of Electricity and the monopolistic distribution company when some officials of the company indulge in raising bills in utter violation of legal provisions having cascading effect on similarly situated consumers. If the petitioner is coerced to settle this prima facie, illegal demand, the respondent would be encouraged to levy such demands against other customers who might be suspected of illegally restoring electric supply. In May and June 2012, I was officiating the work of respondent Distribution Company in the absence of regular

Presiding Officer. To my utter surprise, I had found that the respondent was levying illegal charges by including additional consumption security and service line charges among other charges in the alleged theft bills on the difference of sanctioned load and connected load allegedly found during inspection as no such levies were included by BSES RPL and BSES YPL in their theft bills whose cases used to be dealt by me as Presiding Officer of PLA-II. When I asked AGM, Sh. Sharma, whether such levies should not be stopped, he insisted that the respondent Distribution Company was legally entitled to levy such charges. I was therefore, constrained to pass a detailed order in the last week of June 2012 after hearing submission of Sh. Sharma who had also submitted lengthy written response, seeking response of the CEO of the respondent company and had sent the copies of my order to the Secretary, DSLSA, Chairman of DERC and Principal Secretary (Power), Govt. of NCT of Delhi. Thereafter, this illegal practice was stopped by the respondent company, after already realizing, it is alleged, several crores of rupees every month for a very long period. During May and June 2012, I had also noticed, another illegal practice of the respondent, who used to debit accounts of consumers with a penalty of Rs. 5,000/- to 10,000/- in case of alleged suspected illegal restoration of supply, by arrogating the power of prosecutor as well as a Magistrate because in such cases, the respondent acting as a complainant could only file criminal complaint u/s 138 of Electricity Act before Metropolitan Magistrate for a regular trial attracting maximum sentence of 3 (three) years of fine Rs. 10,000/- or both. This illegal practice was also stopped when I wished to pass a similar order. Now, the respondent seems to have resorted to levy misuse penalty of about Rs. 10,00,000/- lacs in this case of suspected illegal restoration of Electricity although Section 138 of Electricity Act attracts maximum fine of Rs. 10,000/only.” (Emphasis supplied) Referring to the foregoing portion of the impugned order, the petitioner points-out that the Presiding Officer has imported into the dispute at hand, what he says had transpired when he was presiding over the Lok Adalat in May and June 2012. The Presiding Officer has then based his order of 20.07.2016 on what is alleged to have happened in May and June 2012, which is wholly untenable.

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12. The petitioner also points-out that in the impugned order the Presiding Officer records as follows:

“4. I will now discuss the case in hand. Section 12(6)(b)(ii) which has been relied upon by the respondent reads as under: “Unauthorised use of Electricity means the usage of electricity by a means not authorised by the concerned person or authority or licensee.” Sh. Sharma has not explained nor there is a whisper in the lengthy written response dated 16.03.2016 as what means not authorised by the respondent licensee were used by the petitioner in allegedly making unauthorised use of electricity. Section 138 is the relevant provision of Electricity Act which applies on all fours to the facts of the present case. The relevant provision of this action (sic) reads as under : Section 138 (b) whoever unauthorisedly reconnects any meter with any electric line when the said electric line has been cut or disconnected shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or fine which may extend to Rs. 10,000/- or with both. This action can be initiated by filing criminal complaint before a competent court of criminal jurisdiction." In view of the aforesaid discussion, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the supply has been unlawfully (sic) disconnected by the respondent on 26.05.2015 and it has been unlawfully and illegally restored by the petitioner for his tenant, the respondent could not

have invoked and resorted to Sec 126(6)(b)(ii) for making assessment by charging misuse penalty twice the amount payable on normal tariff. It is admitted case of the department that the petitioner had made payment of all the payable demand for the period under dispute.

5. I have been constrained to pass this order as repeated requests of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner to drop this illegal misuse penalty has not been acceded to despite several adjournments as the petitioner had already made payment of regular bills raised on the relevant tariff for the period in dispute. The saddest irony is that in all of these cases, the Legal Department of the respondent has been represented by Shri D.P. Sharma AGM Legal who not only endorsed but had also vehemently justified these demands causing pecuniary loss to thousands of similarly placed poor consumers who have no means to withstand his unfair stand for settlement of their cases by taking a rigid stand “Accept his offer or leave”. Since there is no meeting ground between the parties. I have no option except to close the case. The case is therefore, closed as unsettled (sic) with liberty to the petitioner to seek redressal of his grievances in any court/forum. However, supply of the petitioner’s connection bearing CA No. 60002943599 shall not be disconnected for non-payment of these misuse penalties without due process of law.” Based upon the foregoing paras of the impugned order, the petitioner argues that the Presiding Officer has evidently undertaken an exercise in adjudication by holding that section 138 of the Electricity Act is applicable to the facts of the present dispute. Furthermore, it is argued, that the Presiding Officer has also granted an interim order in favour of the respondent by directing that the respondent’s electricity connection be not disconnected for non- payment of misuse charges/penalties without due process of law; though the law entitles the petitioner to disconnect electricity in the circumstances and for the wrongdoing committed by the respondent.

13. In support of its contention the petitioner has cited the following judicial precedents: (a) Abul Hassan (supra): to argue that the Permanent Lok Adalat was not constituted under the LSA Act but in compliance of orders of this court in Abul Hassan whereby the court directed that Permanent Lok Adalats be set-up in view of the huge pendency of cases against State departments and agencies; (b) State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Jalour Singh & Ors.2: to contend that a Lok Adalat does not have any adjudicatory or judicial functions; and that an award made by a Lok Adalat is not an independent verdict arrived at by any decision-making process, but is merely an administrative act;

Hassan[3]: to say that the non-adjudicatory role of the Lok Adalats has been reiterated by the Supreme Court and it has been held that a Lok Adalat cannot make any directions determining the rights/obligations/titles of parties if there is no settlement between them;

(d) Hindustan Lever Ltd. & Anr. vs. State Consumer

Redressal Forum[4]: to contend that the principle laid down in this case, which would apply equally to the present matter, is that proceedings conducted in the absence of the President of the State Consumer Disputes

(1996) 1 CALLT 254 (HC) Redressal Commission would be contrary to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 which mandates the presence of the President, and the proceedings and the order so passed would stand vitiated for that reason; (e) Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory & Ors.5: to urge that where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone. In Barangore Jute Factory, the court held a notification issued under section 3A of the National Highways Act 1956 to be illegal for not specifying the land sought to be acquired as per the mandate of the relevant section; (f) Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors.6: to further contend that where a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, such power has to be exercised only in the manner specified. In Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, the court held that a Settlement Commission constituted under section 245-D of the Income Tax Act 1961 does not have the power to reduce or waive interest under the procedural provision contained in section 245-D(6) of the statute; (g) Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Ltd. (SOUTHCO) & Anr. vs. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill[7]: to urge that in a case where Article 226 of the Constitution was invoked against issuance of notice under section 126 of the Electricity Act, the Supreme Court has held that while the High Court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to decide

AIR 2001 SC 3868 jurisdictional issues, it ought not to decide the merits of the matter, which should be remanded to the competent authority for adjudication. The case law cited by the petitioner is discussed below in this judgement. Respondent’s case:

14. On the other hand, the respondent has canvassed the following case before this court: (a) Firstly, it is the respondent’s contention that the Presiding Officer has not decided anything on merits; and if the petitioner was aggrieved by the observations made against it in the impugned order, the petitioner could have sought expunging of such observations instead of asking for the impugned order to be set-aside in its entirety; (b) Secondly, it is the respondent’s contention that under section 22C(8) of the LSA Act a Permanent Lok Adalat can indeed ‘decide’ a matter on merits in accordance with the procedure provided under section 22D. It is contended that an award rendered by a Permanent Lok Adalat is final and binding on the parties, whether the award is the result of a settlement or an adjudication on merits as contemplated under section 22E of the LSA Act;

(c) Thirdly, it is the respondent’s contention that there is a difference between a Lok Adalat set-up under section 19 of the LSA Act and a Permanent Lok Adalat set-up under section 22B(1) of the LSA Act inasmuch as a Permanent Lok Adalat is an adjudicatory body which can decide a dispute on merits if the parties fail to reach an agreement by conciliation; whereas a Lok Adalat is only a conciliatory body with no powers of adjudication;

(d) Fourthly, the respondent also contends, although referring to the merits, that the alleged action of the respondent, at most amounts to an offence under section 138 of the Electricity Act which attracts a fine of not more than Rs.10,000/- and that too after a full-dressed trial. The petitioner could therefore not have raised upon the respondent a demand to the tune of Rs. 32 lacs; (e) Lastly, for completeness it may be recorded, that the respondent also states that in compliance of interim order dated 14.03.2016, he had deposited Rs.12 lacs for reconnection of his electricity, which however was not done by the petitioner.

15. In support of his contentions the respondent has cited the following case law: (a) Interglobe Aviation Ltd. vs. N. Satchidanand 8: to contend that a Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under section 22B(1) should not be confused with a Lok Adalat organized under section 19; and that the former has both conciliatory and adjudicatory functions, having the power to decide a dispute if the parties fail to reach an agreement by conciliation; (b) Bar Council of India vs. Union of India[9]: whereby the Supreme Court has inter-alia upheld the power conferred on Permanent Lok Adalats under section 22C to adjudicate disputes where efforts at settlement between the parties fail. The case law cited by the respondent is discussed below in this judgement.

AIR 2012 SC 3246 Discussion and conclusions:

16. Based on the submissions made by the parties, the following questions arise for decision in the present proceedings: a. Whether the forum that rendered the impugned award was a ‘permanent and continuous Lok Adalat’ set-up in compliance of the directions issued by this court in the case of Abul Hassan (supra); or was it a ‘Lok Adalat’ set-up under section 19 of the LSA Act; or was it a ‘Permanent Lok Adalat’ set-up under section 22B of the LSA Act ? b. Depending upon the answer to question (a) above, is the impugned award within the ambit of the power and authority vested in the forum ?

17. The relevant statutory provisions which are required to be considered to answer the above questions are the following: Provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987: “Section 19 - Organization of Lok Adalats (1) Every State Authority or District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or every High Court Legal Services Committee or, as the case may be, Taluk Legal Services Committee may organise Lok Adalats at such intervals and places and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as it thinks fit. (2) Every Lok Adalat organised for an area shall consist of such number of:- (a) Serving or retired judicial officers and (b) Other persons, of the area as may be specified by the State Authority or the District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or the High Court Legal Services Committee, or as the case may be, the Taluk Legal Services Committee, organising such Lok Adalats. (3) The experience and qualifications of other persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) for Lok Adalats organised by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. (4) The experience and qualifications of other persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) for Lok Adalats other than referred to in sub-section (3) shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. (5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of:-

(i) Any case pending before or

(ii) Any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of, and is not brought before, any court for which the Lok Adalat is organised. Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law." “Section 22B. Establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats x x x x x x (2) Every Permanent Lok Adalat established for an area notified under sub-section (1) shall consist of:- (a) A person who is, or has been, a district judge or additional district judge or has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a district judge, shall be the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat and (b) Two other persons having adequate experience in public utility services to be nominated by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government on the recommendation of the Central Authority or, as the case may, the State Authority, establishing such Permanent Lok Adalat and the other terms and conditions of the appointment of the Chairman and other persons referred to in clause (b) shall be prescribed by the Central Government.” “Section 22C. Cognizance of cases by Permanent Lok Adalat (1) Any party to a dispute may, before the dispute is brought before any court, make an application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for the settlement of dispute; Provided that the Permanent Lok Adalat shall not have jurisdiction in respect of any matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law; Provided further that the Permanent Lok Adalat shall also not have jurisdiction in the matter where the value of the property in dispute exceeds ten lakh rupees; Provided also that the Central Government, may, by notification, increase the limit of ten lakh rupees specified in the second proviso in consultation with the Central Authority. (8) Where the parties fail to reach at an agreement under sub-section (7), the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, if the dispute does not relate to any offence, decide the dispute.” “Section 22D. Procedure of Permanent Lok Adalat The Permanent Lok Adalat shall, while conducting conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit (sic, merits) under this Act, be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice, and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.” "Section 22E. Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be Final (1) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act made either on merits (sic, merits) or in terms of a settlement agreement shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. (2) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court. (3) The award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. (4) Every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. (5) The Permanent Lok Adalat may transmit any award made by it to a Civil Court having local jurisdiction and such Civil Court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by that court.” Provisions of the Electricity Act 2003: “Section 138-Interference with meters or works of licensee. (1) Whoever, (a) unauthorisedly connects any meter, indicator or apparatus with any electric line through which electricity is supplied by a licensee or disconnects the same from any such electric line; or (b) unauthorisedly reconnects any meter, indicator or apparatus with any electric line or other works being the property of a licensee when the said electric line or other works has or have been cut or disconnected; or

(c) lays or causes to be laid, or connects up any works for the purpose of communicating with any other works belonging to a licensee; or.

(d) maliciously injures any meter, indicator, or apparatus belonging to a licensee or wilfully or fraudulently alters the index of any such meter, indicator or apparatus or prevents any such meter, indicator or apparatus from duly registering, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both, and, in the case of a continuing offence, with a daily fine which may extend to five hundred rupees; and if it is proved that any means exist for making such connection as is referred to in clause (a) or such re-connection as is referred to in clause (b), or such communication as is referred to in clause (c), for causing such alteration or prevention as is referred to in clause (d), and that the meter, indicator or apparatus is under the custody or control of the consumer, whether it is his property or not, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such connection, reconnection, communication, alteration, prevention or improper use, as the case may be, has been knowingly and wilfully caused by such consumer.” “145. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.- No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which an assessing officer referred to in section 126 or an appellate authority referred to in section 127 or the adjudicating officer appointed under this Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.” Discussion & Conclusions

18. While this court has consciously been using the term ‘forum’ to refer to the body that has passed the impugned order, it is necessary at this point to decide the true nature of such forum, namely as to whether the forum was a ‘permanent and continuous Lok Adalat’ setup in compliance of the directions issued by this court in the case of Abul Hassan (supra); or was it a ‘Lok Adalat’ set-up under section 19 of the LSA Act; or was it a ‘Permanent Lok Adalat’ set-up under section 22B of the LSA Act.

19. In Abul Hassan (supra) cited by the petitioner, a single Judge of this court had expressed the dire need for setting-up Lok Adalats to address the huge pendency of cases relating inter-alia to public utility services and had directed as follows (para numbers as in the ILR Delhi report): “3.... It was in this context that the Parliament enacted the Legal Services Authority Act 1987 (sic). One of the aims of the act is to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of legal system promotes justice on the basis of an equal opportunity. The Act gives statutory recognition to the resolution of disputes by compromise and settlement by the Lok Adalats. The concept has been gathered from system of Panchayats which has roots in the history and culture of this country. It has a native flavour known to the people. The provisions of the Act based on indigenous concept are meant to supplement the Court system. They will go a long way in resolving disputes at almost no cost to the litigants and with minimum delay. At the same time the Act is not meant to replace and supplant Court system. The Act is a legislative attempt to decongest the Courts of heavy burden of cases.” “13..... Already a lot of precious time has been lost in the implementation of the Act. It was in October, 1987 that the Act was enacted by the Parliament with a view to creating legal authorities and establishing Lok Adalats and ensuring that the people of India receive expeditious justice on the basis of equality. Despite the urgent need to take steps to remove clogging of cases in Courts, the Act was not enforced for almost eight years after its enactment. It was only on November 9, 1995 the provisions of the Act except Chapter III relating to setting up of Legal Services Authorities were extended to all States and Union Territories. Chapter III, however, was enforced in eleven States and one Union Territory during the period November, 1995 to September, 1996. Since the remaining States and Union Territories failed to enforce and implement the provisions of chapter III, the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v. Union of India and Others, JT 1998 (6) 645 = III (1998) SLT 658 (SC) and Supreme Court Legal Services Committee v. Union of India and Others, JT 1998 (4) 320 = X (1998) SLT 214 (SC), intervened in the matter in passed directions for enforcing and implementing the Act. Even today despite such a heavy backlog of cases there are certain quarters who are still not willing to make use of the provisions of the Act. It appears that the misgivings of the DDA and MTNL in regard to the setting up of permanent Lok Adalats must be ignored. It is in the interest of the citizens of India that permanent Lok Adalats are established and held continuously so that the purpose for which the Act was enacted could be achieved. It appears to me that unless permanent and continuous Lok Adalats are set up, it may not be possible to reduce the pendency in Courts. Besides, the solitary appearance of parties before a Lok Adalat which is organised for a day or two may not be adequate for arriving at a compromise or settlement. The need of the hour is frantically beckoning for setting up Lok Adalats on permanent and continuous basis......”

“16. The need to establish permanent and continuous Lok Adalat(s) and to resort to alternative dispute resolution mechanism cannot be overlooked. The Lok Adalat and alternative dispute resolution experiment must succeed otherwise the consequence for an over- burdened court system would be disastrous. The system needs to inhale the life giving oxygen of justice through the Lok Adalats. “17. In the circumstances, therefore, it is directed that permanent Lok Adalats shall be set up in the Delhi Administration, Delhi Development Authority, Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, Municipal Corporation of Delhi, New Delhi Municipal Committee, General Insurance Corporation of India by the Delhi State Legal Services Authority within a period of four weeks. It is further directed that these Lok Adalats shall meet at such intervals as may be dictated by the necessity to hold the same according to the workload. However, to start with Lok Adalats in the Delhi Administration, D.D.A., M.T.N.L., M.C,D., N.D.M.C. and the G.I.C. can be held twice a week. In case of D.V.B. the Lok Adalat shall be held five days a week in view of the

large number of cases which are pending in various courts. The D.V.B. shall comply with the order dated October 15, 1998 and subsequent orders. Each of the above said organisations shall provide adequate and proper infrastructure for holding the Lok Adalats. Affidavits in compliance shall be filed by the Delhi State Legal Services Authority, Delhi Administration, D.V.B., D.D.A., M.T.N.L., M.C.D., N.D.M.C. and the G.I.C.”

20. A meaningful reading of the aforesaid judgement shows that the directions issued by the single Judge of this court in Abul Hassan (supra) for establishment of “permanent and continuous Lok Adalat(s)” were in fact by way of implementation of the LSA Act which, as the single Judge observed, though enacted in October 1987 was not implemented at least till November 1995; and thereafter the Supreme Court was constrained to issue directions for enforcement and implementation of the LSA Act in Supreme Court Legal Services Committee vs. Union of India & Ors.: AIR 1998 SC 2940 and in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee vs. Union of India & Ors.: (1998) 5 SCC 762. Accordingly the directions for setting-up of Lok Adalats in Abul Hassan (supra) were required to be implemented in accordance with the provisions of the LSA Act and not de-hors that statute.

21. In Interglobe Aviation Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court has explained the essential nature of the proceedings before a Permanent Lok Adalat, and the difference between a Lok Adalat and a Permanent Lok Adalat in the following words:

“27. The nature of proceedings before the Permanent Lok Adalat is initially a conciliation which is non-adjudicatory in nature. Only if the parties fail to reach an agreement by conciliation, the Permanent Lok Adalat mutates into an adjudicatory body, by deciding the dispute. In short, the procedure adopted by the Permanent Lok Adalats is what is popularly known as “CON-ARB” (that is, “conciliation-cum-

arbitration”) in the United States, where the parties can approach a neutral third party or authority for conciliation and if the conciliation fails, authorise such neutral third party or authority to decide the dispute itself, such decision being final and binding. The concept of “CON-ARB” before a Permanent Lok Adalat is completely different from the concept of judicial adjudication by the courts governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Permanent Lok Adalat not being a “court”, the provision in the contract relating to exclusivity of jurisdiction of courts at Delhi will not apply. x x x x x “32. We may also at this juncture refer to the confusion caused on account of the term Permanent Lok Adalat being used to describe two different types of Lok Adalats. The LSA Act refers to two types of Lok Adalats. The first is a Lok Adalat constituted under Section 19 of the Act which has no adjudicatory functions or powers and which discharges purely conciliatory functions. The second is a Permanent Lok Adalat established under Section 22-B(1) of the LSA Act to exercise jurisdiction in respect of public utility services, having both conciliatory and adjudicatory functions. The expression “Permanent Lok Adalat” should refer only to Permanent Lok Adalats established under Section 22-B(1) of the LSA Act and not to the Lok Adalats constituted under Section 19. However, in many States, when Lok Adalats are constituted under Section 19 of the LSA Act for regular or continuous sittings (as contrasted from periodical sittings), they are also called as Permanent Lok Adalats even though they do not have adjudicatory functions. “33. In LIC v. Suresh Kumar this Court observed: “It is needless to state that Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction or authority vested in it to decide any lis, as such, between the parties even where the attempt to arrive at an agreed settlement between the parties has failed.” The said decision refers to such a “Permanent Lok Adalat” organised under Section 19 of the Act and should not be confused with Permanent Lok Adalats constituted under Section 22-B(1) of the Act. To avoid confusion, the State Legal Services Authorities and the High Courts may ensure that Lok Adalats other than the Permanent Lok Adalats established under Section 22-B(1) of the Act in regard to public utility services, are not described as Permanent Lok Adalats. One way of avoiding the confusion is to refer to the Lok Adalats constituted under Section 19 of the Act on a regular or permanent basis as “Continuous Lok Adalats”. Be that as it may.”

Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited v. Rampal

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