Tarun Krishan Aggarwal & Anr. v. SHO, P.S. Hauz Qazi & Ors.

Delhi High Court · 19 Feb 2021 · 2021:DHC:626
Prathiba M. Singh
W.P.(C) 2282/2021
2021:DHC:626
civil appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that enforcement of arbitral interim orders under Section 17 must be through executing courts and not by direct police action, staying arbitral proceedings pending compliance.

Full Text
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W.P.(C) 2282/2021
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 19th February, 2021
W.P.(C) 2282/2021 & CM APPL. 6623/2021
TARUN KRISHAN AGGARWAL & ANR. ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Arvind Sharma, Advocate. (M:
9811736977)
VERSUS
SHO, P.S. HAUZ QAZI & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Sameer Vashisht, ASC for GNCTD with Mr. Manashwy Jha, Advocate for R-1 to 3.
Mr. Niraj Kumar, Advocate for R-4 and 5.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH Prathiba M. Singh, J.(Oral)
JUDGMENT

1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode (physical and virtual hearing).

2. The Petitioners are stated to have availed of a loan facility with Kotak Mahindra Bank (hereinafter, ‘Bank’). The total loan disbursed to the Petitioners was Rs.15,00,000/-. A total amount of Rs.12,88,555.20/- is outstanding, though, the Petitioners have made several representations to the Bank for restructuring of the loan.

3. Various emails were sent by the Petitioners to the Bank for restructuring of the loan, which are annexed along with the petition. However, on 21st November, 2020, the Petitioners received notice dated 4th November, 2020, along with appointment letter dated 2nd November, 2020 by which an arbitrator was appointed by the Bank. The said arbitrator is an advocate based in Chennai. Suddenly, on 21st December, 2020, i.e. within a few weeks of the Petitioners receiving the notice, they received an order 2021:DHC:626 dated 7th December, 2020, purportedly passed by the arbitrator.

4. There are two versions of this order dated 7th December, 2020 which are placed on record. In the first version, one Mr. Shorya Verma, has been appointed as the receiver to take possession and custody of the movable properties of the Petitioners mentioned in the schedule. The operative portion of the order reads as under: “Accordingly, Order is passed directing the appointment of Mr. Shorya Verma as the receiver for taking possession and custody of the moveable properties of respondent, mentioned in the schedule hereunder and for which purpose the said receiver is hereby authorized to take necessary aid from police, in whose jurisdiction the properties are found. And further the respondents are directed to disclose their other assets as mentioned in para 2 above, to the receiver appointed.”

5. In the second version of the order, four persons have been appointed as the receivers. The operative portion of the order is as under: “Accordingly, Order is passed directing the appointment of Mr. Sanjeev Jain or Ravi Bansal or Ashok Kumar as the receiver for taking possession and custody of the moveable properties of respondent, mentioned in the schedule hereunder and for which purpose the said receiver is hereby authorized to take necessary aid from police, in whose jurisdiction the properties are found. And further the respondents are directed to disclose their other assets as mentioned in para 2 above, to the receiver appointed.”

6. Ld. counsel for the Petitioners submits that Respondent No. 4, i.e., Mr. Ramashankar, an officer of the Bank, along with the Delhi Police, reached the residence of the Petitioners at about 1:00 pm on 30th December, 2020 and forcibly entered the premises. There are allegations that an amount of Rs. 20,000/- was taken by the constable, however, this is disputed by the police. It is further alleged that the Petitioners were forced to make an NEFT transfer of Rs.59,205/- to the Bank and also give the Bank a cheque of Rs.1,18,410/-. Further, on 1st January, 2021, Respondent No.4 is stated to have visited the Petitioners and threatened them into depositing a further sum of Rs.59,205/- into the account of the Bank. Subsequently, Petitioner No.1 visited Respondent No.3 in the police station. Attempts are stated to have been made to meet Respondent No.1, however, Respondent No.1 refused to meet Petitioner No.1. On 6th January, 2021, a complaint was filed by the Petitioners with Respondent No.1 against police officials who had accompanied Respondent No.4 to threaten the Petitioners. A further complaint was made against Respondent No.3 being appointed as the Investigation Officer, on the ground that the Petitioners’ complaint was also against him. The Investigating Officer was subsequently changed, however, the Petitioners’ submission is that they continue to be harassed by the Respondents. Accordingly, the Petitioners pray for the following: “(a) direct the respondent No.2 to take appropriate action on the complaint of the petitioners and be further pleased to direct respondent No.3 to issue receipt of having received Rs.20,000/- in cash which till date has not been given by him towards his expenses in giving police protection to respondent No.4; (b) direct respondent No.2 to take appropriate action against respondent No.4 for misusing the police as representative of respondent No.5 to extract money without following due process of law;

(c) restrain the Respondent No.6 from proceeding further as his appointment is contrary to the law settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court and is not in accordance with due procedures of law as laid down under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996;

(d) pass any other writ, order and direction that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the larger public interest.”

7. After perusal of the record, this Court is of the opinion that the manner in which the order under Section 17 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, ‘Act’) is sought to be enforced through the police and the receiver would be contrary to law. Section 17 of the Act reads as under:

17. Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal. -- (1) A party may, during the arbitral proceedings, apply to the arbitral tribunal--

(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely: - (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;

(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;

(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;

(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the arbitral tribunal to be just and convenient, and the arbitral tribunal shall have the same power for making orders, as the court has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. (2) Subject to any orders passed in an appeal under section 37, any order issued by the arbitral tribunal under this section shall be deemed to be an order of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the same manner as if it were an order of the Court.]”

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8. A perusal of Section 17 shows that any order passed under Section 17 can only be enforced in accordance with law. Thus the party in whose favour an order under Section 17 is passed ought to approach the executing court in the concerned area for appropriate orders. The manner in which the ld. Arbitrator has directed appointment of a receiver and passed an order permitting the bank to take police aid is prima facie not tenable.

9. In Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 125, the Supreme Court has held that the underlying principles of the CPC would be applicable for grant of interim measures under Section 9 of the Act. Extending the rationale of Adhunik Steels (supra) to orders passed under Section 17 of the Act, the Madras High Court, in Flywheel Logistics Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd. & Ors., (2020) 7 MLJ 475, has held as follows:

“28. It may be noticed that the concluding words of Section 17(1) is now identical with Section 9(1) and runs “and the court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it”. A fortiori, there can, therefore, be no quarrel that the Tribunal, like a Court under Section 9(1) is, therefore, legally mandated to test the case of the applicant with reference to the wellknown parameters of a) prima facie case b) balance of convenience and c) irreparable loss before granting an order of injunction. …
40. In such view of the matter, this Court is of the view that while appointing a receiver as an interim measure under section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the tribunal has to follow the procedure well established as indicated above in various judgments. …
44. This Court has also come across mechanical Orders passed for appointment of receiver to seize the vehicle. Though the contract for hire purchase provides for repossession of vehicles by appointing a receiver, the tribunal has to follow the procedures as contemplated under law. When the properties are movables, running machineries, receiver cannot be mechanically appointed to seize the movables out of which the respondent is earning his livelihood. Merely because the contract provides for repossession of machineries, Order directing repossess the vehicle cannot be passed mechanically without the tribunal satisfying well settled position of law. If really, the appointment of receiver is required, to secure the amount, receiver can be appointed to oversee the business and collect the income and not to seize machineries to keep them in idle condition. When such Orders are passed and machineries are kept in idle, it will in fact diminish not only the value of the machineries but also lead to loss of livelihood of the other side. Such circumstances has to be foreseen by the tribunal while passing the Orders.
45. As per Order 40 of Civil Procedure Code, the purpose of appointing a receiver as contemplated under Order 40 has to oversee the property in respect of which the receiver is to be appointed. The receiver, in fact, would be given a power to manage, protect and preserve and improve the property, besides collection of rents thereon. Even the Court has no power to remove from possession or custody of the property, any person whom any party to suit has not a present right so to remove. Whenever the receiver is appointed in respect of the property, he has to furnish security as the court thinks fit, duly to account for what he shall receive in respect of the property and submit his accounts at such periods and in such form as the Court directs and pay the amount due from him as the Court directs and be responsible for any loss occasioned to the property by his wilful default or gross negligence. As far as management of the property is concerned, he has responsibility over the property and he cannot commit gross negligence. Sub Clause 4 of Order 40 CPC deals with enforcement of receiver duties. High Court Amendment (Madras) Act that in the event, the receiver failed to submit the accounts, the Court can even attach his property.
46. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that mechanically receiver cannot be appointed to deal with the property. His appointment is coupled with the responsibilities and duties. Whereas, in the pretext of power granted in the contract, the receivers have been mechanically appointed under section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, particularly in the dispute arising out of the hire purchase agreement. Therefore, the Order of the tribunal is capable of execution as a decree of a civil Court, the arbitral tribunal has to follow the procedures as contemplated under law.”

10. The authority allegedly exercised by the police for enforcement of the order passed by the arbitrator is clearly questionable. Under such circumstances, it is deemed appropriate to call for a status report from the ACP of the concerned area, as to the facts pleaded in the present case. In addition, a report shall be placed on record by Mr. Sameer Vashisht, ld. counsel appearing for the Delhi Police, after obtaining instructions from the Commissioner of Police, as to whether it is commonplace for the police to accompany receivers who are officers of the respective Banks, for enforcing orders passed by arbitrators, without approaching an executing court, as alleged in the present case. If so, how many such actions have been taken in the last two months, i.e. December, 2020 and January, 2021. Let the data be placed on record before this Court. The report shall be filed within four weeks.

11. The Bank is permitted to file a reply to the petition within four weeks. In its reply, the Bank shall confirm the contents of the petition and as to whether it is common for the Bank and its receivers to take police help straightaway without an order passed by the executing court, by visiting the residences/premises of borrowers along with the police. If so, how many such actions have been taken by the Bank in the last two months i.e., December 2020 and January 2021.

12. Considering the nature of this matter, the proceedings before the ld. Arbitrator shall remain stayed, subject to the Petitioners depositing a sum Rs. 5,00,000/- before this Court within four weeks. The said amount shall be deposited in the name of the Registrar General of this Court and kept in an FDR on auto-renewal mode.

13. List on 23rd April, 2021.