Sanjeev Nagnath Upade v. The Commissioner of Police

1. This petition takes an exception to the order of Detention bearing No. D.O. No. 07/CB/DP/2021 dated 17.05.2021 issued Bhagyawant Punde under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 (‘M.P.D.A. Act’) by the Respondent No. 1.

2. During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner restricted her arguments to the contentions raised in grounds (b) and (d).

3. It is submitted that there was delay in passing the order of detention. Learned counsel for the petitioner invites attention of this Court to the ground no. (b), so also the affdavit fled by respondent and submits that there is a considerable delay in passing the order of detention and on that ground alone the petition deserves to be allowed. In support of aforesaid contention, the learned counsel pressed into service the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Pradeep Nikant Paturakar Vs. S. Ramamurthi & Ors[1], Shakeel Sait Vs. C.D. Singh & Ors[2], Niyazuddin 2 Sonu Ansari Vs. State of Maharashtra[3], Mohsin Ahmed Vs. State of Maharashtra[4], Parvez Faizulla Khan Vs. A.K. Roy & Ors[5] and Aalam Yousuf Shaikh Vs. Commissioner of Police Pune[6]. 1 1993 Supp (2) SCC 61 2 Cr.W.P. No. 429/1996 3 2013 ALL MR (Cri) 3870 4 2014 ALL MR (Cri) 2409

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits that it was incumbent upon the respondent authority to place on record the report submitted by the investigating offcer in C.R. No. 127/2021, thereby adding Section 3(2) (Va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. In support of aforesaid submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the ratio laid down in the following judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of V.C. Mohan Vs. UOI & Ors[7], Kamlal K. Khushlani Vs. UOI[8] and UOI Vs..

5. It is submitted that the detaining authority placed reliance upon the in-camera statements of two witnesses and one C.R. No. 127/2021 registered with Faujdar Chawadi Police Station for the offences punishable under Section 143, 144, 147, 323, 324, 504, 506 of IPC read with Section 3(2)(Va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. It is submitted that the in-camera statements of two witnesses recorded on 1st March 2021 and 3rd March, 2021 about the incidents alleged to be taken place in the month of January, 2021 and February 2021 and detention order has been passed on 17th May, 2021. Therefore, there is a considerable delay in between the date of alleged incidents, recording of in-camera statements and passing of order of detention. Therefore the said in-camera statements cannot be relied upon and in case those statements are excluded from consideration what remains is only one offence (C.R. No. 127/2021) registered against the petitioner. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prays that the petition may be allowed.

6. On the other hand, the learned APP appearing for Respondent-State and its offcials relied upon the affdavit in replies fled by the Commissioner of Police, Solapur City, Solapur and Deputy Secretary Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Special), Mantralaya, Mumbai and submitted that the detention order has been passed in accordance with the procedure under the M.P.D.A. Act. It is submitted that the detaining authority specifcally stated that the petitioner has committed offences which would fall within the Chapter XVI and XVII of IPC. The authority has also perused the in-camera statements of witnesses and arrived at the subjective satisfaction and passed the order of detention. It is submitted the DCP who scrutinized the proposal of detention was tested positive of Covid-19 and he was on medical leave from 26th February, 2021 to 18th March, 2021, and, therefore, there was a delay in submitting the proposal onward to the detaining authority. Therefore, the learned APP submits that the petition may be rejected.

7. We have given careful consideration to the rival submissions. With the able assistance of learned counsel for the petitioner and learned APP, perused the pleadings and grounds taken in the petition, anenxures thereto, replies fled by the respondents and the original record maintained by the offce of respondents in relation to the detention proceedings initiated against the petitioner. Upon careful perusal of ground (b) taken in the petition and replies fled by the respondents it appears that in-camera statements of witness ‘A’ and ‘B’ were recorded and verifed in between 2nd and 4th March, 2021 for the incident occurred in the last week of January and frst week of February, 2021. The proposal for detention was initiated on 5th March, 2021 and the detention order was passed on 17th May, 2021. If the delay from initiation of proposal till passing of the detention order is taken into consideration, the same is not properly explained by the detaining authority. It appears that DCP of concerned Zone scrutinized the proposal for detention and gave endorsement on 8th March 2021 and forwarded the proposal to DCP (Crime) on the very same day. However, DCP (Crime) tested positive of Covid-19, so he was on medical leave from 22nd February, 2021 to 18th March, 2021. On 25th March, 2021 the said DCP (Crime) scrutinized the proposal. However, the delay from 18th March, 2021 till 25th March, 2021 remained unexplained. As already observed the proposal was scrutinized by the DCP (Crime) on 25th March, 2021, however, the said proposal was submitted on 5th April, 2021. There was delay of 9 days which remained unexplained.

8. On 8th April, 2021 ACP (Crime) perused the proposal, all relevant documents and submitted to DCP (Crime) on the same day. April, 2021 DCP (Crime) perused the proposal, documents and applied his mind and with recommendation submitted the proposal to the detaining authority on the same day. It shows that the delay between 8th April, 2021 to 15th April 2021 remained unexplained, when the perusal of the said report was done on the same day. DCP (Crime) has submitted proposal to the detaining authority on 15th April, 2021. The detaining authority gave endorsement and perused the proposal and documents on 5th May,

2021. Consequently, there was delay about three months in passing the order of detention. There is no denial to the fact that the in-camera statements of witnesses were recorded on 1st March, 2021 and 3rd March, 2021 for the incidents occurred in the month of January 2021 and February 2021, however, the order of detention was passed in the month of May, 2021, so there is considerable gap between the recording of in-camera statements about alleged incident happened in the month of January & February 2021, and passing of the impugned order of detention, while the C.R. NO. 127/2021 was registered on 16th February, 2021 with the Faujdar Chawadi Police Station. Even from the registration of aforesaid offence there is a delay of three months in passing the impugned order of detention. What matters is the explanation offered by the respondent authorities for such considerable delay.

9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Paturakar (Supra) in Para 9 to 14 held thus:-

9. According to Mr. Gupte, the explanation given by the High Court for the delay that the "procedure required sometime before the powers are exercised" is not the explanation offered by the detaining authority and there fore that explanation should not be accepted to the prejudice of the right of the detenu. In support of his submission that the unexplained and undue delay in passing the order vitiates the impugned detention order, he drew our attention to a decision of this Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala, to which one of us (S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.) was a party. In that case after recapitulating the various decisions on this point the following dictum has been laid down: (SCC p. 748, para 10) “The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

10. Reference also may be made to Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, in which case this Court observed: (SCC p. 655, para 16) “Delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person, for, in certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law is that the delay must be satisfactorily explained by the detaining authority.”

11. We feel that it is not necessary to refer to all the decisions on this point.

12. Countering the argument of Mr. Gupte, the learned Additional Solicitor General drew our attention to Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, in which this Court held that the non-explanation of the delay between 2nd February and 28th May, 1987 could not give rise to legitimate inference that the subject of satisfaction arrived by the District Magistrate was; not genuine. In the same decision, the learned ' Judges have pointed out "It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and deter mined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation". A perusal of the various decisions of this Court on this legal aspect shows that each case is to be decided on the facts and circumstances appearing in that particular case.

13. Coming to the case on hand, the detention order was passed after 5 months and 8 days from the date of the registration of the last case and more than 4 months from submission of the proposal. What disturbs our mind is that the statements from the witnesses A to E were obtained only after the detenu became successful in getting bail in all the prohibition cases registered against him, that too in the later part of March, 1991. These statements are very much referred to in the grounds of detention and relied upon by the detaining authority along with the registration of the cases under the Act.