Shri Mahesh Forge v. Kamal Dev Prasad

High Court of Bombay · 10 Dec 2021
Bharati Dangre
First Appeal No.1781 of 2008
labor appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Bombay High Court held that compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act must be proportionate to the assessed percentage of permanent disablement as per Schedule I, and reversed an award of 100% compensation when the disablement was only 34%.

Full Text
Translation output
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO.1781 OF 2008
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2778 OF 2021
Shri Mahesh Forge )
M.I.D.C. Gokul Shirgaon, )
Plot No.A-1, Tal. Karveer, )
District Kolhapur ) .. Appellant
VERSUS
Kamal Dev Prasad )
R/o C/o.Santram Laxman Gawali )
House No.246/02, Nerle, )
Tal.Karveer, Dist. Kolhapur ) .. Respondent

Mr.M.S.Topkar for the Appellant.
Mr.C.M.Kothari with Mr.Rahul Patil for the Respondent. ...
CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE, J.
RESERVED ON : 1st DECEMBER, 2021
PRONOUNCED ON: 10th DECEMBER, 2021
JUDGMENT

1. The First Appeal, fled by the employer, assail the judgment and order dated 19/06/2008 passed by the M.M.Salgaonkar Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation at Kolhapur in Application WC No.5/C-3/2005. Under the impugned judgment, Kamal Dev Prasad (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the employee’) is held entitled for compensation of Rs.3,20,555/- + 12% interest from 06/11/2004, till its realization. He is also entitled for penalty of Rs.1,60,178/-.

2. The Appeal came to be admitted on 11/11/2008 on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the Commissioner was right in awarding compensation equal to 100% for total permanent disablement, when the permanent disablement was to the extent of 34% only.”

3. The appellant is represented by the learned counsel Mr.M.S.Topkar whereas the respondent employee is represented by the learned counsel Mr.C.M.Kothari alongwith Mr.Rahul Patil. On perusal of the record and proceedings, I have heard the respective counsel on the substantial question of law.

4. The respondent claims to be an employee of M/s. Mahesh Forges, an establishment having 40 employees and he claim to be in the employment from 05/04/2002. He alleges that he was engaged to operate the forging machine and was in receipt of salary of Rs.2,500/- per month, which is recorded in the necessary documents maintained by his employer. On 06/11/2004, while he was engaged in the regular work of forging on the machine, which involved applying compressive force by hammer, at late night hours, some part of the machine fell on his hand while he was removing the band of the handle lock of the boxer machine and his right hand was caught in the machine. On account of the injury sustained on his right hand, he was admitted by his employer in ‘Dr.D.Y.Patil Hospital & Research Institute’ and he remained hospitalized till 24/12/2004. During his stay in the hospital, he underwent plastic surgery, but he lost one phalanx of his little fnger, two phalanges of the ring fnger, three phalanges of the middle fnger and 2 phalanges of the index fnger. The injuries ½ sustained by him are scheduled injuries and he suffered permanent disablement resulting in loss of 5o% of his earning capacity. However, claiming that this resulted in loss of 100% of his earning capacity, since he will not be able to undertake the work, which he could have undertaken before his accident, he claimed compensation accordingly. In the claim petition, fled under Section 22 read with Section 4(a) of the Workemen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as “the W.C. Act”), he claimed compensation of Rs.3,17,685/- alongwith interest at the rate of 12% and penalty of Rs.1,58,842.50/-

5. The claim was opposed by the employer by fling a written statement and a preliminary objection was raised for maintaining the application, on the ground that the accident had occurred when the employee acted in contravention of the instructions received by him from the Occupier and Supervisor. The defence is also taken, that the employee is not engaged on forging machine, but on his own, he operated the said machine, whereas the routine duty assigned to him was a ‘furnace operator’. It was, therefore, pleaded that the employee himself is responsible for breach/disobedience of an order imposed by the rules, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen and, therefore, is not entitled for any compensation, as claimed. It was also pleaded that, he was asked to resume duty after undergoing the treatment, but instead of resuming, he has joined the duty in some other factory at MIDC, Gokul Shirgaon, Kolhapur under the ghost name. In view of the said contention, the application was sought to be rejected.

6. In the application fled by the employee, the Commissioner/Labour Court, framed the issue as; “Whether the Applicant is entitled for the compensation as prayed for?”. The employee fled his evidence affdavit on 30/01/2006 where he reiterated his claim. On behalf of the employer, affdavit of one Baburao Tukaram Molke, Forging Operator, working with M/s. Mahesh Forge was fled. Both the witnesses were cross-examined by the learned counsel on the opposite side. The employer himself did not enter into the witness box. When his witness, Baburao Molke was cross examined, he admitted that he was working in different capacities and he has also admitted that it is not uncommon for the employees on the establishment to perform multiple tasks. He admit that the employees in the company are required to discharge their duties as per the directions of the owner or the supervisor. He admit that on the date of accident, Kamal Dev Prasad was removing the band of the handle lock and it was the company’s work. He admit that on the said date he was not engaged in any work, but was standing. It is also admitted that every employee has to work as per the directions of the supervisor.

7. With this material being brought on record, the Commissioner decided the application vide judgment dated 19/06/2008. Referring to the scheme contained in Section 3 of the W.C.Act, it is recorded by the Commissioner that the employer is liable to pay the compensation for the accident to a workman, caused during the course of his employment. On appreciation of the evidence of the claimant/employee and Shri Baburao Molake, the learned Judge record the admission of Shri Molake to the effect that he was working on the forging machine and the employee was working on the direction of the supervisor and the entr4ies in the chart are formal. It is further recorded that it cannot be believed that Kamal Dev Prasad went on the forging machine on his own, nor there is anything on record to show that he worked in disobedience of the expressed order or of any expressed rule. The learned CVOmssioner has, therefore, rendered a fnding to the effect tht the employer cannot claim any excuse under Sectin 3 of the W.C. Act.

8. The learned Commissioner accepted the claimthat the age of the employee was 28 years and he was getting salary of Rs.2,500/- per month. He further accept that there is no dispute about the amputation of the phalanges of the fngers of his right hand and it was physically verifed by him, during the course of hearing. Recording that there was no need of any medical certifcate being produced, since the injuries were covered in Schedule I, he has computed the loss of earning capacity to be 34%, by measuring the disability in Schedule I. The disability was categorized as permanent partial disability, which reduced the earning capacity of a workman in every employment, which he is capable of undertaking at that time and the injuries in Part II of Schedule I are said to be such injuries. Accepting the stand of the employee that he cannot undertake the work, which he was doing earlier to the accident, and, therefore, the loss of earning capacity is total, the learned Judge held him to be entitled to the compensation worked out in Section 4(1)(b) of the W.C.Act in the following manner:- “Rs.2500/- wages x 60% x 213.57 (relevant factor) = Rs.3,20,355/-” The opponent/employer was, therefore, held liable to pay the compensation to the employee on account of the permanent total disability incurred, alongwith interest of 12% with penalty of Rs.1,60,178/-.

9. The Appeal which is fled by the employer specifcally avers that the respondent/employee was claiming compensation under Section 4(1)(c)(i) of the W.C.Act and the learned Commissioner erred in presuming 100% disability and computed the loss of earning capacity, without referring to the assessment, as set out in the W.C. Act. Mr.Topkar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, vehemently submits that this assessment of loss of earning capacity at 100% is completely erroneous and unsustainable, since there can be no base for such an inference, particularly since the provision, Section 4(1)(c)(i) of the Act provides that the compensation would be such percentage, which would have been payable in case of permanent total disablement as is specifed therein, as being the percentage of the loss of earning capacity caused by that injury. He would submit that having held that the disablement was 34%, the learned Commissioner ought to have computed the loss of earning capacity to the extent of 34%, instead he has calculated it as 100%, and has arrived at a fgure of Rs.3,20,355/-, which is apparently erroneous. According to him, calculating the loss of earning capacity as 34%, the amount which ought to have been derived by the learned Commissioner is Rs.1,08,920/- and accordingly the penalty and the interest ought to have been levied. It is also argued that the respondent had not produced any medical certifcate, recording the disability or the percentage of loss of earning capacity and, therefore, by calculating the disability as set out in Part II of Schedule I, which enlist the injuries deemed to be result in ‘permanent partial disablement’, by working out the percentage of loss of earning capacity given under the said Schedule, the percentage is rightly calculated as 34%. The submission of Mr.Topkar is, in any case, the injury which is sustained by the respondent employee do not fall in Part I of Schedule I which enlist the injuries deemed to result in permanent total disablement. Per contra, learned counsel Mr.Kothari appearing for the respondent, would submit that though the disablement of employee is to the extent of 34%, the loss of his earning capacity is 100% because the nature of work, which he was undertaking prior to the accident, cannot be performed by him in the wake of the disablement, which has deprived him of his earning capacity and this would be counted as loss of 100% of earning capacity. His submission is to the effect that the parameters which are liable to be invoked while awarding the compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1888 are not applicable in case of compensation to be awarded under the W.C. Act and by referring to a recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pappu Deo Yadav Vs. Naresh Kumar & Ors.1, he would request this Court to consider the important aspect that when it comes to the loss of earning capacity due to permanent disability, the same should be treated as 100%, since he will never be able to work as a ‘Forging Operator’. The phalanges of his three fngers of right hand has cost him his source of livelihood, as he was aged 27 years at the time of accident and he is not trained to undertake any other job, resultantly the disability has adversely impacted his earning capacity, which the learned Commissioner has rightly taken into consideration, is the submission. The learned counsel would strenuously submits that the traumatic effect of the injury on the respondent as well as his family also deserves a sympathetic consideration and the argument is, any accident, 1 2020 AIR (SC) 4424 whether it is a motor accident or an accident, which takes place in the course of employment. deserves similar consideration as it result into tremendous mental trauma and not only the victim but the entire family undergo inconvenience and also result in loss of dignity for the victim if he is unable to be engaged in any other job, which he was earlier capable of. Learned counsel also placed reliance on the another decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Jithendran Vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.[2] as well as a decision of this Court in case of Transport Manager, Thane Municipal Transport Undertaking, Administrative Building Vs. Rajendra

10. In the wake of the rival submissions, I turn to the substantial question of law, required to be answered in the Appeal. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 is an enactment to provide for the payment of compensation by certain classes of employers to their employees for injury caused by accident. The said enactment being enacted to deal with the hardship to the employees working in various industries, with increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to the workmen alongwith the comparative poverty of the workmen themselves. The enactment cast an obligation on the employer to provide adequate medical treatment to their workmen, to mitigate the effects of the accident and also to add the sense of

2 Civil Appeal No.6494/2021 decided on 27/10/2021 3 2020 (5) Mh.LJ 480 security so as to render the industrial life more attractive and increase the available supply of labour. The Act defnes two terms with which I am concerned with, being ‘partial disablement’ in Section 2(g) and ‘total disablement’ in Section 2(l) which read thus:- “2(g) ‘partial disablement’ means, where the disablement is of a temporary nature, such disablement as reduces the earning capacity of a employee in any employment in which he was engaged at the time of the accident resulting in the disablement, and, where the disablement is of permanent nature, such disablement as reduces his earning capacity in every employment which he was capable of undertaking at that time; provided that every injury specifed in Part II of Schedule I shall be deemed to result in permanent partial disablement.” “2(l) ‘total disablement’ means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a employee for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement.”

11. Section 3 of the enactment is the liability of the employer to pay compensation, if personal injury is caused to the employee in an accident, arising out of and in the course of the employment, with the exception provided in the proviso. The amount of compensation to be paid is specifed in Section 4 and in the wake of the defnition of ‘partial disablement’ and ‘total disablement’, the compensation is payable. Where permanent total disablement results from the injury, the compensation payable is governed by Section 4(1)(b), which is an amount equal to 60% of the monthly wages of the injured employee, multiplied by the relevant factor or an amount of Rs.One Lakh and Forty Thousand, whichever is more. Where permanent partial disablement results from the injury, the compensation is provided in Section 4(1)(c) and it is bifurcated into two parts; (i) in case of injuries specifed in Part II Schedule I, such percentage of the compensation which would have been payable in case of permanent total disablement as is specifed therein, as being the percentage of the loss of earning capacity caused by that injury; and (ii) in case of an injury not specifed in Schedule I, such percentage of the compensation payable in case of permanent total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity (as assessed by the qualifed medical practitioner) permanently caused by the injury. Explanation I and Explanation II, appended to the said Section is relevant, which read thus:- “Explanation I.- Where more injuries than one are caused by the same accident, the amount of compensation payable under this head shall be aggregated but no so in any case as to exceed the amount which would have been payable if permanent total disablement had resulted from the injuries. Explanation II.- In assessing the loss of earning capacity for the purposes of sub-clause (ii), the qualifed medical practitioner shall have due regard to the percentages of loss of earning capacity in relation to different injuries specifed in Schedule I.”

12. On perusal of Schedule I appended to the Act, it is found to be divided into two parts; being Part I enlisting the list of injuries deemed to result in permanent total disablement and Part II enlisting list of injuries deemed to result in permanent partial disablement When Part I is perused, it consists of those injuries, which has resulted in loss of hands and a foot, double amputation through leg or thigh, loss of sight which would render the claimant unable to perform any work for which eye sight is essential, absolute deafness and severe facial disfgurement. Part II enlist the injuries which would result in loss of earning capacity with varying ranges and against each of the injuries described in Column 2 of Part II of the Schedule I, percentage of loss of earning capacity is given in Column 3. The injury of the applicant is listed in Part II of Schedule I under Head A-Fingers of right or left hand and in terms of Explanation I appended to Section 4, which provide that the injuries, if more than one, being caused by same accident, the amount of compensation has to be aggregated, but it shall not in any case, exceed the amount which would have been payable, if permanent total disablement has resulted from the injuries. Accordingly, the injuries sustained by him, when pitched against the last column in the said charge, refecting the loss of earning capacity, the picture which emerges is as under:- “i. one phalanx of little fnger 5% (37) ii. two Phalanges of ring fnger 6% (36) iii. three Phalanges of middle fnger 12%(31) iv. 2 Phalanges of index fnger ½ 11%(28) Thus, strictly going by Section 4 read with Schedule I Part II, disablement of the respondent is 34%. Based on that, the loss of earning capacity would also be the same i.e. 34%. Admittedly, there is no medical certifcate produced on record, showing to the contrary and necessarily the compensation to be awarded will be governed by Section 4(1)(c)(i).

13. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent is that the injuries sustained in the accident and its impact on the life of a victim cannot be calculated arithmetically and that is how the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the issue in various decisions. My attention is invited to the following observations made by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pappu Deo Yadav (supra) “16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 2 SCC 343], this Court specifcally gave the illustration of a driver who has permanent disablement of hand and stated that the loss of future earnings capacity would be virtually 100%. Therefore, clearly when it comes to loss of earning due to permanent disability, the same may be treated as 100% loss caused to the appellant since he will never be able to work as a driver again. The contention of the respondent Insurance Company that the appellant could take up any other alternative employment is no justifcation to avoid their vicarious liability. Hence, the loss of earning is determined by us at L 54,000 per annum. Thus, by applying the appropriate multiplier as per the principles laid down by this Court in Sarla Verma v. DTC [(2009) 6 SCC 121: (2209) 2 SCC (Civ) 770: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002], the total loss of future earnings of the appellant will be at L 54,000 W 16 + L 8,64,000.” Recently, in Anthony Alias Anthony Swamy v. Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C. (2020) SCC OnLine SC 493, where the victim was a painter by profession, a three-judge bench had followed Raj Kumar v. Ajany Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343 and Nagarajappa v. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2011) 13 SCC 323. The High Court had assessed the injury to be 25% permanent disability, although the treating doctor had said that the injury incurred by the bus passenger (who was earning L 9,000/- per month) was 75% of the left leg and 37.5% for the whole body. In Raj Kumar Supra n.22, the physical disability of the upper limb was determined as 68% in proportion to 22.23% of the whole body. The High Court had assessed the injury as 25% and granted compensation. However, this court assessed the injury on the basis that the disability was 75%. The earning capacity of the appellant as on the date of the accident stand completely negated and not reduced. He has been rendered permanently incapable of working as painter or to do any manual work. The appellant is therefore held entitled for compensation for loss of future earning based on 75% permanent physical functional disability recalculated with a salary by applying the multiplier.” The observations in case of Sandeep Khanduja Vs. Atul Dande[4] to the following effect are also relied upon, “Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of 4 2017(3) SCC 351 permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation.”

14. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pappu Deo Yadav (supra), has made the following observations:- “22. In parting, it needs to be underlined that Courts should be mindful that a serious injury not only permanently imposes physical limitations and disabilities but too often inficts deep mental and emotional scars upon the victim. The attendant trauma of the victim’s having to live in a world entirely different from the one she or he is born into, as an invalid, and with degrees of dependence on others, robbed of complete personal choice or autonomy, should forever be in the judge’s mind, whenever tasked or adjudge compensation claims. Severe limitations inficted due to such injuries undermine the dignity (which is now recognized as an intrinsic component of the right to life under Article 21) of the individual, thus depriving the person of the essence of the right to a wholesome life which she or he had lived, hithero. From the world of the able bodied, the victim is thrust into the world of the disabled, itself most discomfting and unsettling. If courts nit-pick and award niggardly amounts oblivious of these circumstances, there is resultant affront to the injured victim.”

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15. The aforesaid position of law is well accepted in the light of the power to award compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. The recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Jithendran (supra), the situation faced by an impaired claimants is described in the following words, “10. While the permanent disability as certifed by the doctors stands at 69%, the same by no means, adequately refects the travails the impaired claimant will have to face all his life. The 21 year old’s youthful dreams and future hopes were snuffed out by the serious accident. The young man’s impaired condition has certainly impacted his family members. Their resources and strength are bound to be stressed by the need to provide full time care to the claimant. For the appellant to constantly rely on them for stimulation and support is destined to cause emotional, physical and fnancial fatigue for all stakeholders.” The above observations are made in the light of provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is described to a social welfare legislation which makes it imperative that the compensation should be justly determined and it is no doubt true that the compensation must refect a genuine effect in law restore the dignity of a human being. The compensation awarded must be realistic compensation commensurating the trauma and sufferings, but the question that arise is, whether the aforesaid parameters can be invoked in the case of compensation to be awarded under the W.C. Act.

16. The W.C. Act is distinct in its scope than the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and it provides a simple and expeditious remedy to an employee, who suffers an injury by an accident in the course of his employment. It is in form of a basic security, being offered to an employee to minimize the hardship faced by him and his family in case, he meets with an accident. The obligation of the employer in the W.C.Act springs out of the relationship of master and servant and not out of tort. The employee is not expected to prove any negligence on part of the employer to claim compensation nor any proof of accident is required to be offered. He become entitled to claim the compensation worked out in the backdrop of his pay package and age, and on his establishing that the accident has occurred during and in the course of the employment. The obligation of the employer is determined by a mere circumstance that the injury was sustained in an accident which was caused while the employee was discharging his duty in the course of the employment. The civil remedy which was already available for bringing a suit for damages in respect of the injuries was removed out of the purview of the remedy available to such a workman by insertion of sub-section 5 in Section 3 of the W.C.Act, which reads thus:- “(5) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to confer any right to compensation on a employee in respect of any injury if he has instituted in a Civil Court a suit for damages in respect of the injury against the employer or any other person; and no suit for damages shall be maintainable by a employee in any Court of law in respect of any injury- (a)if he has instituted a claim to compensation in respect of the injury before a Commissioner; or (b)if an agreement has been come to between the employee and his employer providing for the payment of compensation in respect of the injury in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” The compensation,which an employee/workman is entitled to under the W.C. Act is a statutorily imposed compensation sans pleadings and proving negligence.

17. On comparison of the said enactment with the Motor Vehicles Act, which also provide for claim against the third party, it imposes a liability to pay compensation and it is based on liability of torts, based on negligence. Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides for liability without fault in certain cases (no fault liability) under section 140. It also contains the provision in form of Section 143 where the principles of no fault liability is made applicable to certain claims under the Act 8 of 1923. Section 143 provides that the provisions of Chapter X shall also apply in relation to any claim for compensation in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person under the W.C. Act, 1923 resulting from an accident of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 140 and for this purpose, the said provisions shall, with necessary modifcations, be deemed to form part of that Act. Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act pertains to the insurance of motor vehicles against third party risk and Section 147 prescribes nature of insurance policy to be covered under the said Chapter, including that the policy issued by the person who is authorised insurer and it insures the person or classes of persons specifed in the policy to the extent specifed in sub-section (2). The proviso, however, stipulates that the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect on bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the W.C. Act in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee, who is engaged in driving the vehicle. Section 149 cast a duty on the insurer to satisfy the judgments and awards against the persons insured in respect of third party risks. Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for an option regarding claims for compensation and it reads thus:- “167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 ( 8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both.”

18. Once an option being exercised and award being passed under either of the enactment, it is not open for the claimant to avail the remedy under the other.

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Mohd. Nasir & Anr.[5] has compared the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the distinction and commonality between the same is highlighted in paragraphs 23 and 24 in the following words:- “23. Both, the 1923 Act and 1988 Act are benefcent legislation insofar as they provide for payment of compensation to the workmen employed by the employers and/or by use of motor vehicle by the owner thereof and/or the insurer to the claimants suffering permanent disability. The amount of compensation is to be determined in terms of the provisions of the respective Acts. Whereas in terms of the 1923 Act, the Commissioner who is a quasi-judicial authority, is bound to apply the principles and the factors laid down in the Act for the purpose of determining the compensation, Section 168 of the 1988 Act enjoins the Tribunal to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just.

24. Both the Acts aim at providing for expeditious relief to the victims of accident. In these cases, the accidents took place by reason of use of motor vehicles. Both the statutes are benefcial ones for the workmen as also the third parties. The benefts thereof are available only to the persons specifed under the Act besides under the contract of insurance. The statutes, therefore, deserve liberal construction. The legislative intent contained therein is required to be interpreted with a view to give effect thereto.” Recording that both the statutes provides for the mode and manner in which the percentage of loss of earning capacity is required to be calculated, it is held that the two enactments provide that the amount of compensation in cases of this nature would be directly relatable to the percentage of physical disability s suffered by the injured vis-a-vis the injuries specifed in the First Schedule of the 1923 Act. It has been further recorded as under:- “Indisputably where injuries are specifed in the First Schedule, the mode and manner provided for the purpose of calculating the amount of compensation would be applicable.” In Para 28, while dealing with the overlapping of the accident, which though covered under the 1923 Act, but arises out of use of motor vehicles in terms of provision of 1988 Act is succinctly set out in the following words:- “28. The 1923 Act would also be applicable to the claims applications arising out of the use of motor vehicles in terms of the provisions of 1988 Act for the purpose of determination of the amount of compensation where the victim of the accident suffers from disability in the cases coming within the purview thereof. The note appended to the Second Schedule of the 1988 Act raises a legal fction, stating that “injuries deemed to result in permanent total disablement/permanent partial disablement and percentage of loss of earning capacity shall be as per Schedule I under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923”. Permanent disability, therefore, for certain purposes have been co-related with functional disability.” The test to be applied in such cases as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is to fnd out the nature of injuries and as to whether the same falls within the purview of Part I and Part II thereof, whereas Part I specifes the injuries which would deem to result in permanent total disablement and Part II specifes injuries which would be deemed to result in permanent partial disablement. It is held that the distinction between the ‘permanent total disablement’ and ‘permanent partial disablement’ is that whereas in the former it is 100% disablement, in the latter it is only the disablement to the extent specifed in the Schedule and similar terms have been used in clauses (a) and (b) of Para 5 of the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. It, by reference, incorporates the provisions of the First Schedule to the 1923 Act. The Second Schedule of the Act of 1988 set out the schedule for compensation for third party fatal accident/injury cases, which claims and clause (b) therein set out the compensation for accident resulting in permanent disability which is computed as Rs.Five Lakhs. Percentage disability as per Schedule 1 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 with a proviso that minimum compensation in cases of permanent disability shall not be less than Rs.50,000/- Therefore, the percentage disability is to be computed as per Schedule 1 of the Employee’s Compensation Act. In National Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs.Mubasir Ahmed[6], the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 8 has held as under:- “8. Loss of earning capacity is, therefore, not a substitute for percentage of the physical disablement. It is one of the factors taken into account. In the instant case the doctor who examined the claimant also noted about the functional disablement. In other words, the doctor had taken note of the relevant factors relating to loss of earning capacity. Without indicating any reason or basis the High Court held that there was 100% loss of earning capacity. Since no basis was indicated in support of the conclusion, same cannot be maintained. Therefore, we set aside that part of the High Court’s order and restore that of the Commissioner, in view of the fact situation. Coming to the question of liability to pay interest, Section 4-A(3) deals with that question. The provision has been quoted above.” The two decisions, which have been referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) being in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) and Ramprasad Balmiki Vs. Anil Kumar Jain[7], the functional disability which was calculated to be result into loss of earning capacity at a percentage more than the percentage of disability incurred was founded at and the disability has been calculated as per Schedule of the 1923 Act.

20. Based on the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement, since the respondent has failed to produce any certifcate of a Doctor, demonstrating that his disability is more than 34%, the case would squarely fall within Part II of Schedule 1 where the aggregate of the disability on account of loss of phalanges of fngers of his right hand has been worked out to be 34%, in absence of any material brought on record to show that the loss of earning capacity is 100%, going by the explanation appended to Section 4, the compensation awarded by calculating the loss of earning capacity as 100% is an erroneous approach. The loss of phalanges of the fngers of one hand in any case has not resulted into permanent total 7 (2008) 9 SC 492 disability which would have entitled him for compensation of 100% loss of earning capacity. The learned Commissioner has acted contrary to the provisions contained in the W.C.Act and has misguided himself on the said aspect.

21. The respondent chose to avail the remedy under the W.C. Act and the learned Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation determined the quantum of compensation as quantifed in Schedule. The W.C. Act offers no leeway in the matter of compensation of damages and the process is mechanical and has to be worked out strictly in accordance of the factors set out in Section 4 which are relevant for determination of the amount of compensation. The disablement has been classifed in the enactment as partial disablement or total disablement; in the former the disablement is described as such it reduced the earning capacity of a employee in any employment in which he was engaged at the time of the accident, resulting in the disablement and then it is classifed as being temporary in nature, but the disablement is of permanent nature where it reduces his earning capacity in every employment which he was capable of undertaking at that time. In contrast, total disablement signify the disablement, whether temporary or permanent in nature as it incapacitates a employee for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement. The injuries sustained by the respondent are the one, which fnd place in Part II of Schedule I, being loss of some portion of fngers of his right hand and in case of injury specifed in Part II of Schedule I, the compensation to be awarded is such percentage of compensation, which would have been payable in case of permanent total disablement specifed therein as being the percentage of loss of earning capacity caused by that injury. The Act also prescribes the percentage of loss of earning capacity qua each injury set out in Schedule I and as far as the present case is concerned, by invoking Explanation I appended to Section 4, the aggregate of the loss of earning capacity as against the injuries sustained by the employee is calculated as 34%. As per Section 4(1)(c)(i), the compensation to be awarded has been calculated as the percentage which would have been payable in case of permanent total disablement as is specifed therein as being the percentage of the loss of earning capacity caused by that injury and in this case, the disability being worked out as 34% and since every injury specifed in Part II of Schedule I shall be deemed to result in permanent partial disablement, the amount of compensation payable to the respondent has been rightly worked out as 34% of the compensation to be awarded in case of permanent partial disablement to that extent. Therefore, the loss of earning capacity will have to be considered proportionate to the loss of disablement, aggregated as 34%. This would, therefore, liable to calculated as under:- Rs.2500 X 60% = Rs.1500 X factor 213.57=Rs.3,20,355/-; and 34% of this amount is Rs.1,08,920/- only.

22. The question of law formulated while admitting the Appeal is, therefore, answered to the effect that the learned Commissioner has committed an error in awarding the compensation equal to 100% for permanent total disablement when the permanent total disablement was only to the extent of 34%. Resultantly, the claimant is entitled for compensation only to the extent of the disablement, being computed as 34%.

23. Now, there is some quandary about the interest to be paid and the penalty which is levied. Since, there was delay in making the payment, the interest to be levied is 12%, which can be calculated as follows: Rs.1,08,920 x 12% x 4 years = Rs.52,281/- The 50% of penalty to be payable as per Section 4(a) would be a fgure of Rs.54,460/-. Thus, based upon this calculation, the total amount payable is Rs.2,15,661/-.

24. In terms of the directions issued by this Court on 11/11/2008, the respondent was permitted to withdraw an amount of Rs.2,25,000/- out of the amount deposited with the Commissioner, subject to fling of a personal bond. This order was specifcally passed recording a prima facie fnding that since the total permanent disablement of the claimant was 34%, he is entitled to at least 34% of the compensation and the penalty amount as has been awarded. Since, the substantial question of law involved in the Appeal was regarding the liability to pay rest of the amount, the partial relief came to be granted.

25. By order dated 26/04/2019 passed on the Civil Application No.1280 of 2019 where the direction was sought against the appellant to deposit the remaining awarded amount and permit the claimant to withdraw the same, though it was strongly opposed by learned counsel Mr.Topkar at that time, the appellant was directed to deposit remaining amount with interest in the offce of the Labour Court, Kolhapur. However, no withdrawal was permitted in the wake of the earlier order passed on 11/11/2008. The appellant was directed to deposit the remaining amount, which was invested in a Fixed Deposit in the Nationalised Bank and the Appeal was directed to be listed for hearing. There was some inconsistency in the calculations and, therefore, a review application was fled and the remaining amount was estimated as Rs.4,09,778/-. This Court, therefore, permitted deposit of Rs.4,00,000/- in the Registry of this Court as a compliance of the earlier order, with liberty being granted to seek withdrawal.

26. As a consequence, Interim Application No.2778 of 2021 is taken out seeking withdrawal and upon such an application being fled, since the parties expressed that they are ready to argue the Appeal for fnal hearing, being admitted on 11/11/2008, the Appeal itself is heard.

27. As per learned counsel Mr.Topkar, the appellant has deposited the total amount of Rs.10,51,755/-, which though deposited, is not permitted to be withdrawn. The total amount payable to the claimant is Rs.2,15,661/- whereas he was permitted to withdraw an amount of Rs.2,25,000/-. I do not deem it appropriate to direct any refund of the amount by the respondent. As far as the other amount deposited by the appellant is concerned, on the Appeal being allowed, the amount deposited in this Court is permitted to be withdrawn by the appellant alongwith the interest with interest accrued thereupon.

28. In view of the disposal of the First Appeal, the Interim Application does not survive and stands disposed of. ( SMT.

BHARATI DANGRE, J.)