Arun Kumar Gupta v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.

7. In Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan[4], though this Court came to the conclusion that the compulsory retirement awarded to the applicant was not in consonance with the law, it did not give relief to the petitioner on the ground that even under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can assess the performance of any judicial officer at any time with a view to discipline the black sheep or weed out the dead wood. This Court held that this constitutional power of the High Court is not circumscribed by any rule. Reference may be made to paras 40 and 47 of the judgment: “40. Article 235 of the Constitution of India enables the High Court to assess the performance of any judicial officer at any time with a view to discipline the black sheep or weed out the deadwood. This constitutional power of the High Court cannot be circumscribed by any rule or order.

47. In the instant case, we are dealing with the higher judicial officers. We have already noticed the observations made by the Committee of three Judges. The nature of judicial service is such that it cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of persons of doubtful integrity or who have lost their utility.”

8. In Syed T.A. Naqshbandi v. State of J & K,5, this Court held that while exercising powers of judicial review the Courts should not substitute themselves for the Committee/Full Court of the High Court. The following observations are pertinent: “10…Neither the High Court nor this Court, in exercise of its powers of judicial review, could or would at any rate substitute themselves in the place of the Committee/Full Court of the High Court concerned, to make an independent reassessment of the same, as if sitting on an appeal. On a careful consideration of the entire materials brought to our notice by learned counsel on either side, we are satisfied that the evaluation made by the Committee/Full Court forming their unanimous opinion is neither so arbitrary or capricious nor can be said to be so irrational as to shock the conscience of the Court to warrant or justify any interference. In cases of such assessment, evaluation and formulation of opinions, a vast range of multiple factors play a vital and important role and no one factor should be allowed to be overblown out of proportion either to decry or deify an issue to be resolved or claims sought to be considered or asserted. In the very nature of things it would be difficult, nearing almost an impossibility to subject such exercise undertaken by the Full Court, to judicial review except in an extraordinary case when the Court is convinced that some monstrous thing which ought not to have taken place has really happened and not merely because there could be another possible view or someone has some grievance about the exercise undertaken by the Committee/Full Court…”

9. In Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand[6], dealing with a case of judicial officers, this Court in relation to the powers under the same rule, after referring to a number of judgments, summarised the law on the point as follows:

10. In Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), this Court was dealing with the compulsory retirement of a judicial officer from the Delhi Higher Judicial Service. It was held that if the authority bona fide forms an opinion that the integrity of a particular officer is doubtful and it is in public interest to compulsorily retire such judicial officer, judicial review of such order should be made with great care and circumspection. It was specifically observed that when an order of compulsory retirement is passed, the authority concerned has to take into consideration the whole service record of the concerned officer which could include non­communicated adverse remarks also. It would be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court:

11. In R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M. P.8, this Court, after dealing with the entire law on the subject, framed the following 3 questions of law:

The Court took note of the fact that the appellant before it had been promoted and confirmed as District Judge and was also given selection grade and super time scale etc., but it held that these promotions would not wash off the earlier adverse entries which shall remain on record. It would be pertinent to refer to paragraphs 26 and 29 of the judgment which read as follows: “26. It is true that the appellant was confirmed as District Judge in 1985; he got lower selection grade with effect from 24­3­1989; he was awarded super timescale in May 1999 and he was also given above super timescale in 2002 but the confirmation as District Judge and grant of selection grade and super timescale do not wipe out the earlier adverse entries which have remained on record and continued to hold the field. The criterion for promotion or grant of increment or higher scale is different from an exercise which is undertaken by the High Court to assess a judicial officer’s continued utility to the judicial system. In assessing potential for continued useful service of a judicial officer in the system, the High Court is required to take into account the entire service record. Overall profile of a judicial officer is the guiding factor. Those of doubtful integrity, questionable reputation and wanting in utility are not entitled to benefit of service after attaining the requisite length of service or age.

29. Judicial service is not an ordinary government service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges hold the public office; their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. He must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justice impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and the rule of law to survive, justice system and the judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty.”

12. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Babu Lal Jangir[9], this Court held as follows:

13. In High Court of Judicature of Patna v. Shyam Deo Singh10, this Court was dealing with a case where a judicial officer was retired at the age of 58 years and was denied the benefit of service of 2 years. This Court has held as follows:

14. One of the main arguments raised by the petitioners is that since the petitioners have been promoted to various higher posts, their record prior to the promotion will lose its sting and is not of much value. Reliance is placed on the observations of this Court in D. Ramaswami v. State of T. N.11 wherein this Court held as follows:

15. Reference may also be made to the judgment of this Court in Pyare Mohan Lal (supra) in which while dealing with the concept of washed off theory, this Court after dealing with the entire case law on the subject held as follows:

16. The law on the subject of compulsory retirement, especially in the case of judicial officers may be summarised as follows:

(i) An order directing compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is not punitive in nature;

(ii) An order directing compulsory retirement of a judicial officer has no civil consequences;

(iii) While considering the case of a judicial officer for compulsory retirement the entire record of the judicial officer should be taken into consideration, though the latter and more contemporaneous record must be given more weightage;

(iv) Subsequent promotions do not mean that earlier adverse record cannot be looked into while deciding whether a judicial officer should be compulsorily retired;

(v) The ‘washed off’ theory does not apply in case of judicial officers specially in respect of adverse entries relating to integrity;

(vi) The courts should exercise their power of judicial review with great circumspection and restraint keeping in view the fact that compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is normally directed on the recommendation of a high­powered committee(s) of the High Court. It is in the light of the aforesaid law that we will now consider the factual aspects of the present case.

17. In view of the fact that the Screening Committee has given detailed reasoning only after the orders of this Court referred to above and in view of the limited scope of judicial review when there are no allegations of mala fide, we would have avoided giving reasons to uphold such an order since it does not amount to punishment and is not penal in nature. However, since the petitioners have insisted that there is no material against them, we have no option but to refer to some of the reasons given by the Screening Committee. Case of Shri Arun Kumar Gupta

18. As far as Mr. Arun Kumar Gupta is concerned, there are two very serious allegations against him. The first is that when he was working as Deputy Director, Administrative Training Institute at Ranchi, as many as 10 ladies, who were Civil Service Probationers, made allegations that he was using unwarranted and objectionable language during his lectures, citing indecent examples and using words having double meaning, thereby causing embarrassment to the lady officers. We have perused the complaints which are filed with the reply and the common refrain is that the language used by Mr. Gupta during his lectures was highly sexist.

19. There is also another allegation that he had physically hurt a washerman by placing a hot iron on the head of the washerman who had allegedly not ironed his clothes properly. It would be pertinent to mention that the Principal District Judge had reported to the High Court that the victim had personally approached him immediately after the occurrence and he (the Principal District Judge) found that the victim had sustained burn injuries and he got the victim treated. It is true that Mr. Arun Kumar Gupta was exonerated by the successor judicial officer before whom the complainant denied having suffered any injury but we may note that this is a preliminary inquiry and the successor Principal District Judge did not even care to examine his predecessor Principal District Judge, who had not only been approached personally by the washerman, but who had himself noted the burn injuries and had got the victim treated. Therefore, we are of the view that the Screening Committee was right that the victim may have been put under some pressure to withdraw his complaint. These occurrences are of the year 2011­ 2012 and cannot be said to be very old.

20. In our view, the aforementioned two instances are sufficient to decide the case against the petitioner. We may also note that Shri Raju Ramchandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has urged that the Screening Committee had only taken the entries from 1992­1993 to 2004­2005 and had ignored the entries from 2005­2006 to 2016­2017. As explained by Mr. Sunil Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the High Court, all the ACRs were before the Screening Committee but in the order it is only the adverse entries which have been noted. Be that as it may, we are of the view that even if these adverse entries are ignored, the petitioner cannot be granted relief for the reasons aforesaid. Case of Shri Raj Nandan Rai

21. As far as this officer is concerned, we find that his record on many counts is not at all good. His reputation and integrity have been doubted more than once in the years 1996­1997, 1997­ 1998 and 2004­2005. Some adverse remarks have been conveyed to him. In the year 2015­2016, even his knowledge of law and procedure is found to be average and his relation with the members of the Bar was found not very good. There are also allegations against him of having granted bail for illegal gratification and substance has been found in this allegation in the report of the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi (who is equivalent to the Principal District Judge). The officer had granted bail by noting in the order that Section 327 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was bailable whereas the offence is non­ bailable and an unrecorded warning regarding the integrity of the judicial officer was issued to him in 2012. Conclusion

22. As is obvious from the law quoted above, adverse entries with regard to integrity do not lose their sting at any stage. A judicial officer’s integrity must be of a higher order and even a single aberration is not permitted. As far as the present cases are concerned, the matter has been considered by the Screening Committee on two occasions and the recommendations of the Screening Committee have been accepted by the Standing Committee on both occasions. The action taken is not by one officer or Judge, it is a collective decision, first by the Screening Committee and then approved by the Standing Committee.

23. Senior judges of the High Court who were the members of the Screening Committee and Standing Committee have taken a considered and well­reasoned decision. Unless there are allegations of mala fides or the facts are so glaring that the decision of compulsory retirement is unsupportable this court would not exercise its power of judicial review. In such matters the court on the judicial side must exercise restraint before setting aside the decision of such collective bodies comprising of senior High Court Judges. In our opinion these are not fit cases to interfere with the said decisions.

24. In view of the above, both the writ petitions are dismissed. Any pending application(s) shall stand(s) disposed of. ……………………………..J. (L. Nageswara Rao) …………………………….J. (Deepak Gupta) New Delhi February 27, 2020