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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3636 OF 2016
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Appellant(s)
JUDGMENT
This matter has a somewhat chequered history.
In 1943, Government of India requisitioned 4 acres and
34 gunthas of the land owned by one Rajabahadur Bhagwandas
Haridas, bearing Survey No. 120/2 (Part) of Village Malad, Mumbai, in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. On 27.07.1949, the
Collector, Thane, de-requisitioned 2.68 acres in the Survey
No. 120 Part 2 out of the aforesaid 4 acres 34 gunthas.
Ultimately, despite the land having first being requisitioned, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’), was issued on 24.10.1975 acquiring the aforesaid extent of
8623 square meters. A declaration under Section 6 of the
Act was issued on 30.11.1978. According to the respondents herein, a Draft Award was passed under Section 11 of the Act
2020 INSC 127 on 23.09.1986, against which references were made, both under Section 18 and 30, of the Act. The respondents confirmed that after symbolic possession was taken on 06.01.1987 by the State, such possession has remained with the State till date. In a proceeding that was filed, insofar as other lands in Village Malad were concerned, covered by the same section 4 notification, this Court in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2012) 6 SCC 348, allowed an appeal by the land owner. After stating in paragraph 2 that the very same section 4 notification was issued in order that a Central Ordinance Depot for the Union of India be made for defence purposes, the judgment records that the beneficiary of these lands, being the Central Government, was served, but did not appear at the time of hearing of the appeal. The appellant in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case (supra) argued several points before this Court, which were resisted by the learned counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra, basically on the ground that the writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as was done by the impugned High Court judgment. After setting out Section 4 of the Act, this Court observed that the requirement that the notification under Section 4 be published in the Official Gazettee and the requirement that the Acquiring Authority should publish public notices of the substances of such notification in a convenient place or
places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situate, are cumulative conditions, both being mandatory. The Court then held: - “13. In the instant case, the respondents before the High Court had filed their reply affidavit. They did not dispute the contentions of the appellants that they had not issued any public notices as required under Section 4 of the Act. They only reiterated that such notification was published in the Official Gazette. Since the mandatory requirement as required under Section 4(1) of the Act is not complied with by the respondents, while acquiring the lands in question, in our opinion, the entire acquisition proceedings requires to be declared as null and void.
14. This Court in J&K Housing Board v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul has observed that all the formalities of serving notice to the interested person, stipulated under Section 4 of the Act, has to be mandatorily complied with in the manner provided therein, even though the interested persons have knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. This Court further observed thus:
15. In view of the conclusion that we have reached on the first issue canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants, we do not think that other issues that the learned counsel for the appellants has raised and canvassed before us need to be answered.” It may only be mentioned that in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case (supra), the challenge was made by way of a writ petition filed in 1987, as opposed to the present challenge, which was made only in the year 2002. Ms. Rekha Pandey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has raised several points in support of this appeal. First and foremost, she adverted to an order of this Court dated 27.03.2018 by which a Division Bench of this Court has referred this matter to a larger Bench of three Judges. This order reads as follows: “1. The land of the respondents was acquired vide notification dated 24.10.1975 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). The said land was earlier requisitioned in the years 1942 to 1945 for defence purpose. Award was made in the year 1986 and symbolic possession of the land was taken on 06.01.1987. Objections of the award were filed by the respondents against the award. A reference under Section 18 of the Act was made which was disposed of. Thereafter, the writ petition was filed by the respondents mainly on the ground that there was no due publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act which was a mandatory requirement.
2. The High Court upheld the plea of the respondents relying upon judgment of this Court in “Kulsum R. Nadiadwala Vs. State of Maharashtra” (2012) 6 SCC 348.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that having regard to the fact that the land was already being used for defence purpose since the year 1942 to 1945 and the notification under Section 4 issued on 24.10.1975 was challenged for the first time by the writ petition filed on 24.06.2002, the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches as entertaining such petition will seriously affect public interest. It was submitted that view taken in the relied upon judgment ignores the concept of laches.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that in spite of delay and laches, this Court in the aforesaid judgment quashed the acquisition.
5. We are of the view that delay and laches may be a bar to challenge to the acquisition after 27 years. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennaiversus M. Meiyappan and ors (2010) 14 SCC 309 this Court held that inland acquisition proceedings the Court should not encourage stale litigation as it may hinder projects of public importance. The contra view in threeJudge Bench decision in Dayal Singh versus Union of India (2003) 2SCC 593 was held to be in conflict with the Constitution Bench judgment in Rabindranath Bose versus Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 84 and three- Judge Bench judgment in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. versus M.A. Rasheed(2004) 4 SCC 460. The said judgment was cited with approval in recent judgment of threeJudge Bench in Indore Development authority versus Shailendra (Dead) through Lrs. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.2098[2] of 2017 –pronounced on 8th February, 2018).
6. In view of above, the view taken by twoJudge Bench in Kulsum R.Nadiadwala versus State of Maharashtra(2012) 6 SCC 348 to the effect that delay and laches have to be ignored is not free from doubt.
7. Thus, we are of the view that the matter needs to be placed before a Bench of three Judges.
8. Accordingly, let the papers be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions.” Ms. Pandey, learned counsel, has argued before us that as a matter of law, such a huge delay in filing a writ petition against Section 4 notification cannot possibly be countenanced. She has also argued that in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case (supra), really speaking, the delay is only of one year, as the Award in this case was issued only in the year 1986, and the writ petition filed in that case was of 1987. In the present case, the writ petition, as has been stated earlier, was filed only in 2002. Another important point of difference, according to the learned counsel is that notice was personally served on the respondents in this case, which is not the case in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case (supra). She also raised the point that was raised in the special leave petition filed by the Union of India which is that Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case (supra) is “per incuriam” inasmuch as it decided a point which arose out of the Amendment Act of 1984, when the Section 4 notification was only of 1975, the 1984 Amendment Act not being retrospective. She further went on to state that, in any case, the Constitution Bench is taking up, as one of the pleas before it in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal and Others Etc. (SLP (C)Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016) whether delay would apply as a good ground for dismissing a writ petition on the ground of laches insofar as challenges to land acquisition proceedings are concerned, and that we should await the judgment of the Constitution Bench before proceeding with the judgment in this case. She kept harping upon the fact that the acquisition in this case is for important defence purposes and possession of this land has been with the Union Government since 1942. She also stated that Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s judgment, if properly read, did not amount to quashing of the entire section 4 notification, particularly in view of the last paragraph of the judgment, where the claim of the appellant was restricted only to 50 per cent of the land in question, the direction being that the respondents shall hand over 50 per cent of the vacant possession of the said land to the appellant forthwith. As against these submissions, Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, argued that that the section 4 notification in both these cases being the same, and Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case being a final judgment of this Court in which a review petition and a curative petition have been dismissed, the said judgment would apply on all fours to the facts of this case. He pointed out that the question of delay, though raised by the learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the State, was not directly answered in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case inasmuch as, according to the Division Bench of this Court in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case, a mandatory condition of a section 4 notification not being adhered to, would amount to there being no acquisition at all in the eye of law. On this ground, he defended the impugned judgment passed by the Bombay High Court. Though this Court has, by its order dated 27.03.2018, referred this case to a larger Bench in view of the decision in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case that delay and laches have to be ignored, we are of the view that on the facts of this case, we need not answer this question. This is for the reason that the section 4 notification that was struck down in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case is the very notification in the facts of this case. We may also note that in paragraph 13 of the Kulsum R. Nadiadwala’s case set out hereinabove, this Court quashed the entire acquisition proceedings stating that they be declared as null and void. We are unable to agree with Ms.Pandey’s contention that the Section 4 notification not only deals with various other lands in Village Malad but also deals with a land in a different village altogether viz., Village Wadhawan, and that this Court’s judgment did not go to the extent of declaring the acquisition bad so far as village Wadhawan is concerned. So far as village Malad is concerned, where the land in Kulsum