Yatendra Singh v. Indira Gandhi Institute of Physical Education and Sports Sciences & Anr.

15. Mr. Rupal distinguished the three judgments of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Gupta on the ground that in all those three cases, the Supreme Court had, in fact, confirmed that the petitioners were not eligible for admission to the courses in question, but had permitted the students to continue in view of contrary representations made to them by the authorities.

16. Mr. Rupal cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sneh Prabha and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others[6] to submit that a writ cannot be issued on the ground that a benefit has been wrongly given to other persons. The judgment of this Court in Madhu Joshi vs. University of Delhi and Others[7] was placed to emphasise that there can be no estoppel against the law, and an inadvertent mistake on the part of the University cannot lead to a right of the candidate to retain her admission. In Nand Kishore Garg vs. Jitender Singh Tomar and Others[8] also, a Coordinate Bench has held that making an application contrary to the applicable rules does not set up a case for grant of equitable relief. Mr. Rupal finally referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Maharshi Dayanand University vs. Surjeet Kaur[9] to argue that no right can be conferred upon a student even if the University has wrongly permitted her to take examinations of a particular course. Analysis

17. It appears from the submissions of learned counsel for the parties that the factual position is clear. The petitioners were granted admission to the B.Sc. course upon an error committed by the Institute. Had the Institute conducted the admissions correctly at the first instance, they would not have been admitted. However, there is no allegation of any wrongdoing on their part. Although the University offered them alternative courses for which they were eligible, and to which they would have secured admission on their

(2018) SCC Online Del 10963 [W.P.(C) 8259/2018 decided on 09.08.2018] (2020) SCC Online Del 208 [El. Pet. 2/2015 decided on 17.01.2020] own merit, they were not agreeable to give up the seats to which they had been granted admission. They had already commenced classes when their admissions were cancelled. [Although the notice dated 24.12.2020, by which the revised admission list was published, does not speak of cancellation of admissions already granted, the attendant circumstances, including the communication dated 07.01.2021 addressed to VV, show that this was the intent of the University.] The cancellation of the admissions was not preceded by any notice to the petitioners. Indeed, they may not have had much to say as the action was predicated not upon any default on their part, but upon an error at the University’s end. The petitioners have been studying in the B.Sc. course since, and factually, there are vacancies against which they can be accommodated.

18. The question to be considered in these circumstances is whether the petitioners ought to be permitted to continue or whether they are required to seek admission afresh in the course of their choice. The three judgments cited by Mr. Gupta suggest that it is possible for the writ court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction in their favour.

19. In Rajendra Prasad Mathur10, the question before the Supreme Court concerned cancellation of admissions to engineering courses in Karnataka University. During the pendency of the writ petitions before the High Court, the petitioners were permitted to continue their studies in the college. The writ petitions were thereafter dismissed by the writ court and the Division Bench. Before the Supreme Court, there was no challenge to the eligibility conditions, and the Supreme Court also Supra (note 3) rejected their contention that their qualifications, in fact, rendered them eligible. The view taken by the High Court was therefore affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, the Court directed as follows: “8. We accordingly endorse the view taken by the learned Judge and affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. But the question still remains whether we should allow the appellants to continue their studies in the respective engineering colleges in which they were admitted. It was strenuously pressed upon us on behalf of the appellants that under the orders initially of the learned Judge and thereafter of this Court they have been pursuing their course of study in the respective engineering colleges and their admissions should not now be disturbed because if they are now thrown out after a period of almost four years since their admission their whole future will be blighted. Now it is true that the appellants were not eligible for admission to the engineering degree course and they had no legitimate claim to such admission. But it must be noted that the blame for their wrongful admission must lie more upon the engineering colleges which granted admission than upon the appellants. It is quite possible that the appellants did not know that neither the Higher Secondary Examination of the Secondary Education Board, Rajasthan nor the first year BSc examination of the Rajasthan and Udaipur Universities was recognised as equivalent to the Pre-University Examination of the Pre-University Education Board, Bangalore. The appellants being young students from Rajasthan might have presumed that since they had passed the first year BSc examination of the Rajasthan or Udaipur University or in any event the Higher Secondary Examination of the Secondary Education Board, Rajasthan they were eligible for admission. The fault lies with the engineering colleges which admitted the appellants because the Principals of these engineering colleges must have known that the appellants were not eligible for admission and yet for the sake of capitation fee in some of the cases they granted admission to the appellants. We do not see why the appellants should suffer for the sins of the managements of these engineering colleges. We would therefore, notwithstanding the view taken by us in this Judgment, allow the appellants to continue their studies in the respective engineering colleges in which they were granted admission. But we do feel that against the erring engineering colleges the Karnataka University should take appropriate action because the managements of these engineering colleges have not only admitted students ineligible for admission but thereby deprived an equal number of eligible students from getting admission to the engineering degree course. We also endorse the directions given by the learned Judge in the penultimate paragraph of his Judgment with a view to preventing admission of ineligible students.”11

20. In A. Sudha12, the judgment in Rajendra Prasad Mathur13 was followed in the case of a candidate who had been admitted to the MBBS course contrary to the eligibility criteria. The judgment in A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh14, which was cited by the University, was distinguished on the ground that it concerned a case where students were themselves to blame because they sought admission in the concerned college despite the warning of the University that the college was not affiliated to it. In paragraph 18 of the judgment, the Court held as follows: “18. The facts of the instant case are, more or less, similar to the Rajendra Prasad Mathur case [1986 Supp Emphasis supplied. Supra (note 4)

SCC 740: AIR 1986 SC 1448:]. It has been already noticed that on the appellant's query, the Principal of the Institute by his letter dated 26-2-1986 informed her that she was eligible for admission in the First Year MBBS course. It was, inter alia, stated in the letter that the candidate should have obtained 50 per cent marks in the optional subjects in the B.Sc. examination. There is no dispute that the appellant had obtained 54 per cent marks in those subjects in the B.Sc. examination. The appellant was, therefore, quite innocent and she was quite justified in relying upon the information supplied to her by none else than the Principal of the Institute in the said letter in regard to the eligibility of the admission in the First Year MBBS course. In the circumstances, we do not think that we shall be justified in penalising the appellant by not allowing her to continue her studies in the MBBS course. Prima facie it was the fault of the Principal of the Institute but, in our view, the statement that was made by him in his said letter to the appellant as to the eligibility of the appellant for admission to the MBBS course, was on a bona fide interpretation of the regulations framed by the Mysore University for admission to MBBS course for the academic year 1985-86, which to some extent suffer from ambiguity. The regulations should have been more clear and specific. Be that as it may, following the decision of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Mathur case [1986 Supp SCC 740: AIR 1986 SC 1448:] while we dismiss the appeal, we direct that the appellant shall be allowed to prosecute her studies in the MBBS course, and that her result for the First Year MBBS examination be declared within two weeks from date.” 15

21. In Ashok Chand Singhvi16, the Supreme Court did not accept the explanation of the concerned university that the appellant had been admitted by mistake. However, it went on to hold that, even on the Emphasis supplied. Supra (note 5) assumption that the admission was by mistake, the appellant was not at fault, and therefore the principles of the judgment in Rajendra Prasad Mathur17 should be followed.

22. Mr. Rupal sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that in both A. Sudha18 and Ashok Chand Singhvi19, the applicants, who were later found ineligible for admission, had received specific assurances from senior functionaries of the concerned universities that they were eligible. Mr. Rupal submitted that no such assurances were found in the facts of the present cases.

23. This distinction urged by Mr. Rupal is misplaced in the facts of the present cases. It may first be noticed that all the three judgments concern eligibility. The Supreme Court found [at least in Rajendra Prasad Mathur20 and A. Sudha21 ] that the petitioners therein were, in fact, ineligible for admission. It nevertheless permitted them to continue in the courses to which they had been admitted. In Ashok Chand Singhvi22 also, even on the assumption that admission was granted mistakenly, the Court took the same view. The present case is not one of eligibility. There is no dispute that the petitioners were eligible for the B.Sc. course, and there was no doubt in this regard which would have occasioned a query or a response from the authority. They simply applied and were accepted. An applicant in such a situation cannot possibly be aware of his/her position in the merit list, which could give some ground for doubt or enquiry, to which the respondents would have had occasion to make any representation to the petitioners, one way or the other. To that extent, the admission list itself is the only statement expected from the respondents, which was in favour of the petitioners.

24. Based on the aforesaid judgments, the relief sought by the petitioners is merited. In fact, as noted above, the Supreme Court granted relief to the petitioners in those cases even though they were ineligible for admission. To that extent, the present petitioners stand on a better footing. There is no grievance as to their eligibility. They have not been accused of any wrongdoing. As far as they are concerned, they were admitted in due course and started attending classes. Today, there are vacancies against which they can be adjusted for the year in which they took admission. Due to the lapse of time, the University will also not be able to take admissions to the vacant seats even if the petitioners are denied the relief sought.

25. Turning now to the judgments cited by Mr. Rupal, the principle laid down in paragraph 8 of Sneh Prabha23 is only that Article 14 does not contemplate the concept of negative equality, i.e. a petitioner cannot seek relief only because the benefit was wrongly conferred upon someone else. It is in this context that the Supreme Court has observed that the equality clause does not extend to perpetuate a wrong. The petitioners in the present cases do not, however, seek relief on the basis of any such claim of equality, and the judgment has no application whatsoever. Supra (note 6)

26. In Maharshi Dayanand University24, the concerned student took admission to the B.Ed. course despite the fact that she was pursuing a regular M.A. course. This was contrary to the Rules of Examination. The finding is that the student had applied for admission in the B.Ed. course without disclosing the fact that she is pursuing a regular course. The Court has specifically noted as follows:

The Court took the view that the Rules of Examination of the University did not permit her to apply for admission even in the B.Ed. correspondence course, and the directions of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to the University to issue the degree to her were therefore set aside. The decision of the Court turns on the statutory prohibition contained in the Rules of Examination, and on the conduct of the respondent therein. In the present cases, neither was there a statutory prohibition to the admission of the petitioners, nor has any default on their part being alleged or demonstrated.

27. The judgment of a coordinate bench in Madhu Joshi25 dealt with a case where the petitioner was admitted to the M.A. (Sociology) course in the “merit category”, although she did not have an undergraduate degree with Honours in Sociology. The Court held, in the face of the published eligibility criteria, that she did not meet the required qualification. It may be noted that in that case, a submission Supra (note 9) Supra (note 7) had also been advanced on behalf of the University that it was misled by the manner in which the petitioner had stated her qualifications in her application for admission. In the present cases, the question of eligibility does not arise and therefore, the principle that admission cannot be granted contrary to the statute does not come in the way.

28. The judgment in Nand Kishore Garg26 deals with an election petition. One of the questions raised was regarding the qualification of the elected candidate who claimed to have an LL.B. degree and had enrolled as an Advocate. The Court found that he did not possess the requisite qualifications for admission to the LL.B. course, and relied inter alia on the decision in Maharshi Dayanand University27 and the Division Bench decision of this Court in Bidisa Chakraborty vs. Indira Gandhi National Open University28. The decision again turns on the eligibility criteria and on the fact that the candidate had taken admission to the LL.B. course although he was aware that he was not a graduate as the B.Sc. degree relied upon by him was “non-existent and fabricated”. The present cases are distinguishable on all these grounds.

29. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the petitioners’ admission in the B.Sc. course at the Institute ought not to be disturbed at this stage. Conclusion

30. The writ petitions are therefore allowed, to the extent that the respondents are directed to permit the petitioners to continue in the Supra (note 8) Supra (note 9) (2014) SCC Online Del 3910 [LPA 473/2014 decided on 01.08.2014] B.Sc. course at the Institute. The communication dated 07.01.2021 addressed by the University to VV is also quashed. The pending applications also stand disposed of.

31. There will be no orders as to costs.

PRATEEK JALAN, J. AUGUST 24, 2021 ‘hkaur’