Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 6th December, 2021
SH KHALIFA CHAIN SUKH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ram Kishan Saini and Ms. Neelam Saini, Advs. (M:9868500923)
Through: Mr. Aschim Vachher, Advocate.
JUDGMENT
1. This hearing has been done in physical Court. Hybrid mode is permitted in cases where permission is being sought from the Court.
2. The present petition challenges the impugned order dated 1st October, 2021 by which the applications of the Respondent/Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter as ‘DDA’) under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter “Limitation Act”) for condonation of delay, have been allowed by the Trial Court in CS No.152/20 titled Sh. Khalifa Chain Sukh v. DDA, thereby setting aside the ex-parte judgment/decree of the Trial Court, dated 16th November, 2019, and restoring the suit.
3. The brief facts are that a suit for permanent injunction was filed by the Petitioner/Plaintiff (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) against the DDA seeking a restraint order in respect of demolition of shops. The case of the Plaintiff is that he is the owner of 12 shops bearing Pvt. Nos. 1 to 12, situated over Plot No. 3A/112, Mpl. No. 11957, W.E.A, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 (hereinafter “suit property”). The reliefs sought in the plaint are as under: 2021:DHC:3962 “It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that a decree for permanent inject may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant including its agent, servants and officials etc. retraining them from demolishing the shops in question situated over plot of land bearing NO. 3A/112, Municipal No.11957, Sat Nagar, Karol Bagh New Delhi or otherwise interfering in possession in respect of the shows in question as shown ‘in site plant attached.”
4. The said suit was, initially, rejected by the Trial Court on 21st October, 2018. The said order was appealed by the Plaintiff and in the appeal the matter was stated to have been remanded for fresh adjudication vide order dated 17th December, 2018. On 18th December, 2018, the Plaintiff appeared before the Trial Court and summons were sent to the DDA. The summons were served upon the DDA, however, since none appeared for DDA, on 9th September, 2019, ex parte evidence was recorded and the suit was decreed ex parte on 16th December, 2019. Upon the said order being served upon DDA, an application was filed by DDA under Order IX Rule 13 CPC along with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in which the impugned order has been passed allowing the application of the DDA and ex parte decree has been set aside.
5. Ld. counsel appearing for the Plaintiff submits that no sufficient cause has been shown by DDA as to why it did not enter appearance in the suit once summons was served. He submits that DDA cannot be shown any leniency, by virtue of being a Government authority. Reliance is placed upon ML Mahajan v. DDA & Anr., 1992 RLR 242 to argue that the Government cannot have a better privilege than any other party before a Court of law.
6. On behalf of the DDA, Mr. Vachher, ld. Counsel, submits that the DDA does not recognise the Plaintiff as the owner of this suit property. He submits that the land is actually Government land and eviction proceedings under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, were initiated against the occupants of all the 12 shops and a detailed order being F. No.D/7(4)Basti Reghar/96/214 dated 30th July, 2018 was passed by the Estate Officer. Pursuant to the said order, it is stated that four shops have already been demolished, in respect of one shop the proceedings are going on before the Estate Officer, and for seven shops the occupants have challenged the Estate Officer’s order in appeal and there is a stay granted therein. He submits that the Plaintiff has no locus standi and cannot claim ownership in Government land. A copy of the said order has been emailed to the Court Master.
7. Heard ld. counsels for the parties. A perusal of the impugned order dated 1st October, 2021 shows that the Trial Court has gone into the question as to whether sufficient cause is established or not. The Court has noticed that there was an error in DDA’s office wherein the summons was not duly recorded into the S&S-I register of DDA, which led to a situation wherein the ex parte decree came to be passed. The Trial Court also considers the fact that eviction proceedings have already been initiated by DDA and also takes into account the pandemic situation for which the Supreme Court had also passed orders extending the limitation period in proceedings ongoing during the pandemic period, in In Re: Cognizance of Limitation [Suo Motu WP(Civil) No.3/2020, dated 8th March, 2021]. Since valuable rights were being compromised due to the ex parte decree, the Trial Court has allowed the application with costs of Rs.7,000/-. The reasoning of the Trial Court is set out below:
8. The case of the Plaintiff is that he has ownership rights in the suit property, i.e., over all 12 shops. The plaint and other relevant pleadings are not placed on record and neither is the evidence placed on record. The ex parte judgment which has been placed on record shows that the only claim is on the basis of construction. A perusal of the order passed by the Estate Officer dated 30th July 2018, shows that there is a long history of proceedings wherein various occupants have been claiming rights in the land. The said order records that the property bearing No. 3-A/112, Basti Reghar, Khasra No.2592, WEA Karol Bagh, New Delhi 110005 is a public premises. It records that, even previously vide order dated 24th January 1997, the Estate Officer had assessed damages against some occupants who had even paid damages. Again, notices were sent to some further occupants and even a public notice was issued. Finally, eviction order was passed. This sequence of events is recorded in the order dated 30th July, 2018, as below:
9. Therefore, DDA having already started eviction proceedings, and an eviction order having been passed on 30th July, 2018 by the Estate Officer, it cannot be stated that the Plaintiff was not aware of these eviction proceedings. Clearly, the eviction proceedings were not brought to the notice of the Court when the ex parte judgment/decree was passed.
10. In so far as the proposition being canvassed by the Plaintiff that Government agencies cannot be treated differently in respect of whether sufficient cause was made out or not, there is no doubt that this position is well-established. However, what is concerning in this case is the fact that the land is claimed to be public land by the DDA. Even when a query is put to the Plaintiff today, ld. counsel submits that even by adverse possession, the Plaintiff becomes the owner.
11. Under these circumstances, the Estate Officer having already taken cognizance and having passed an eviction decree qua these very shops, DDA is entitled to be heard on merits in the suit which has been filed by the Plaintiff qua the suit property. The Plaintiff cannot seek to steal a march over the DDA, especially when the allegation is that the land is public land.
12. While, there is no doubt that Government Departments have to be conscious and have to react with alacrity in any suit or proceedings, the Court also has a duty to safeguard public land. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Lekh Ram v. Gram Panchaayt Uleta [CRP No.1263 of 2016, decided on 11th April, 2019], in a case for declaration of ownership filed by a private party against the gram panchayat, set aside an ex parte order since public land was possibly involved and the Court found it preferable to err in favour of a public body. This in fact, followed the Supreme Court’s decision in United Bank of India v. Sh Naresh Kumar & Ors., 1996 (6) SCC 660 where it was held that where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality.
13. Under these circumstances, this Court does not find any error in the order passed by the Trial Court. However, in view of the delay by DDA in approaching the Court under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the costs granted are enhanced from Rs.7,000/- to Rs.25,000/- and the same shall be paid to the Plaintiff within a period of four weeks from today.
14. Apart from this modification, the impugned order is upheld. None of the issues on merits have been considered by the Court. The same shall be adjudicated upon in accordance with law, by the Trial Court.
15. It is made clear that DDA is expected to defend the suit promptly and not seek unnecessary adjournments before the Trial Court.
16. With these observations, the present petition, along with all pending applications, is disposed of.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH JUDGE DECEMBER 6, 2021 dj/ms