Kunal Gosain and Kartikey Sikka v. Jupinder Kaur Maker

8. It is evident from the aforesaid terms that the issue of transfer of the property back to the Trust has now been addressed, and Smt. Jupinder Kaur Maker has also undertaken not to claim any refund from the Trust in respect of the monies paid by her for the property in question. Further, the proposed trustees have undertaken not to sell the property in question, and to use the same for running the hospital.

9. Although a formal application for withdrawal of the suit has not been made in CS(OS) 3121/2011, it is clear from the modified terms taken on record in CS(OS) 558/2014 that the terms of settlement cover both these suits. Smt. Mohinder Singh, who is the plaintiff in CS(OS) 3121/2011, is also a signatory [though her constituted attorney] to the terms of the settlement taken on record in CS(OS) 558/2014. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs in CS(OS) 3121/2011 states that he has instructions to withdraw that suit as well.

10. Learned counsel state that Smt. Mohinder Kaur, wife of late Sardar Sujan Singh, passed away on 05.08.2014, during the pendency of the suits. With consent of learned counsel for the parties, Smt. Mohinder Kaur stands deleted from the array of parties in the two suits. In CS(OS) 558/2014, Mr. Sashikant (plaintiff no.4) has filed I.A. 18066/2019 for deletion of his name from the array of parties. With the consent of counsel for all the parties, the application is allowed and Mr. Sashikant (plaintiff no.4) is deleted from the array of parties. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs also states that defendant nos. 5 and 6 [in CS(OS) 558/2014] were erstwhile trustees of the Trust, and are not concerned with this settlement. Similarly, the Sub-Registrar, Tehsil- Mehrauli, was impleaded as defendant no.7 in CS(OS) 558/2014. However, the plaintiff does not seek any relief against defendant nos. 5, 6 and 7. On the oral request of learned counsel for the plaintiffs, defendant nos. 5, 6 and 7 are also deleted from the array of the parties.

11. The plaintiff will file an amended memo of parties incorporating the deletion of Smt. Mohinder Kaur, Mr. Sashikant, and defendant nos. 5, 6 and 7 [in CS(OS) 558/2014], from the array of parties within one week.

12. In view of the fact that the Trust’s funds have been derived from the contributions of the settlor and his family alone, and in view of the modified terms of settlement presented today, the application for withdrawal of the suit [I.A. 18067/2019 in CS(OS) 558/2014] is allowed and the suit is dismissed as withdrawn. Learned counsel for the parties, on instructions from their clients, undertake that all parties to the terms of settlement will act in strict compliance with the terms contained therein.

13. The interim board of trustees is discharged. The accounts and records of the Trust, which are lying in their possession shall be handed over to the new trustees through the Registrar General. List before the learned

14. The original title deed of the property was deposited with the Registrar General, pursuant to the order dated 03.10.2018. The same shall also be released to learned counsel for the plaintiffs, who will hand over the title deed to the newly appointed trustees.

15. In the facts and circumstances aforesaid, the suits are dismissed as withdrawn, alongwith the pending applications.” [Emphasis supplied]

6. As per Mr. Pritpal Singh/ the petitioner herein, since there was wilful disobedience of the aforesaid order by Ms. Jupinder Kaur Maker and Mr. Ajit Singh Maker/ the Contemnors herein, there was a spate of correspondences exchanged inter se the parties. The same finally resulted in the petitioner filing the present contempt petition under Section 12 read with Section(s) 10 and 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971[4], seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against the Contemnors for violation of the order dated 07.02.2020 and directions to the Contemnors to comply with the same, amongst other ancillary reliefs.

7. Besides both the sides addressing arguments on merits, Mr. Gaurav Gupta, learned counsel for the Contemnors, has raised a preliminary objection qua maintainability of the present contempt petition, which has been controverted by Mr. Pawanjit Singh Bindra, learned senior counsel for the petitioner as well. Submissions of Mr. Gaurav Gupta, learned counsel for the Contemnors: On maintainability:

8. As per Mr. Gaurav Gupta, the order dated 07.02.2020, of which contempt has been alleged against the Contemnors, is merely an order recording that CS(OS) 558/2014 of the petitioner was “… …dismissed as withdrawn… …”, and thus, the terms of settlement do not gain enforceability as a decree, more so, since, at best, it has the value of a contract entered into inter se the parties. The learned counsel submitted Hereinafter referred to as “the Contempt Act” that the said order is not amenable to challenge under the Contempt Act.

9. Placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang & Anr.5, the learned counsel submitted that it is only when an ‘imprimatur’ of the Court is put on the undertaking of the parties by passing a decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC or passing positive and affirmative directions that the consent of the parties gets the force of an order, or the colour of an ‘undertaking’ as specified under Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act. Therefore, since no decree has been passed by the Co-ordinate Bench on 07.02.2020 and the suit of the petitioner was simply “… …dismissed as withdrawn… …”, there were no directions given therein, much less, no undertaking given by the parties to the Court.

10. The learned counsel then submitted that the petitioner is seeking to enforce the terms of agreement contained in the order dated 07.02.2020 through a circuitous and indirect method by invoking the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. The learned counsel further submitted that by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, the petitioner is indirectly seeking to execute the order dated 07.02.2020 by way of the present contempt petition, which is not permissible.

11. The learned counsel further submitted that as per trite law, an order/ decree capable of execution is ordinarily not subject to contempt proceedings, however, the same does not imply that the converse is true as well. In other words, the learned counsel submitted that simply because an order, for whatever reason, is not executable, the aggrieved party/ the petitioner herein, cannot use the contempt jurisdiction as a terror tactic to make the opposite parties/ the Contemnors herein comply with the terms arrived inter se themselves outside of the Court.

12. To buttress his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon Babu Ram Gupta vs. Sudhir Bhasin[6], Hindustan Motors Ltd. vs. Amritpal Singh Nayar & Ors.7, R.N. Dey & Ors. vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik & Ors.8, Indian Overseas Bank vs. Lalit Kumar Aggarwal & Anr.9, A Ramalingam vs. V.V. Mahalinga Nadar10, Mohd. Amin vs. Mohd. Iqbal11, Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi12, Shri Praveen Kumar B.N. vs. Smt. Ranjitha L.13, I. Ismail vs. N. Raman & Anr.14 and Dropti Devi vs. Ram Pyari & Ors.15 to submit that the present contempt petition is not maintainable. On merits:

13. As per the learned counsel, Mr. Pritpal Singh, Mr. Ajit Maker and Mr. Satpal Maker have been made trustees of the Trust in compliance of the terms recorded in the order dated 07.02.2020. Drawing attention of this Court to a duly registered Supplementary Trust Deed dated 15.06.2020, the learned counsel submitted that the respondent no.2 has acted in terms thereof. The learned counsel, however, submitted that upon receipt of the Title Deeds of the subject

100 (2002) DLT 278 2000 INSC 229 2000 6 AD (Del) 1198 AIR 1966 MAD 21 2009 SCC Online Del 861 2011 INSC 709 CCC No.494/ 2024 SLP(C) No. 19992/2024 2024:DHC:1689 property from the Registry of this Court, though the petitioner was to hand over to the newly appointed trustees, the same is yet to be given effect to in terms of the settlement recorded in the order dated 07.02.2020.

14. The learned counsel submitted that, in any event, today, much water has flown since passing of the order dated 07.02.2020 inasmuch as in June, 2020, all the family members of late Sardar Sujan Singh including the Trustees have arrived at a fresh oral Family Settlement, pursuant whereto, not only several monetary transactions but release of rights/ shares and transfers, have also taken place inter se the parties, including the petitioner herein since then.

15. In light of the aforesaid, the learned counsel for the Contemnors submitted that there is no contempt of the order of withdrawal dated 07.02.2020. In any event, the learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid facts clearly reflect that the terms recorded in the said order have since been modified by the parties. In effect, the learned counsel submitted that the present contempt petition being not maintainable is liable to be dismissed. Submissions of Mr. Pawanjit Singh Bindra, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner: On maintainability:

16. Per Contra, Mr. Pawanjit Singh Bindra, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present contempt petition is maintainable as the Contemnors have failed to comply with the modified consent terms of settlement embodied in the order dated 07.02.2020, backed by an express undertaking given on their behalf to the Court.

17. The learned senior counsel submitted that the aforesaid arguments qua maintainability run contrary to paragraph 4(i) of their own reply filed herein, wherein they have stated that the order dated 07.02.2020 was “… …based on mutual agreement of the parties… …”. As the said order is a consent order, non-compliance thereof by the Contemnors being a ‘wilful disobedience’, is a ‘civil contempt’ under Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act.

18. The learned senior counsel further submitted that in any event, paragraph 12 of the order dated 07.02.2020 clearly records that “… …Learned counsel for the parties, on instructions from their clients, undertake that all parties to the terms of settlement will act in strict compliance with the terms contained therein. … …”. Thus, there was a clear and unequivocal undertaking given by the Contemnors to the Court in addition to the terms arrived at inter se themselves, of which they are now in breach.

19. Relying upon Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang & Anr.16, wherein it is observed that “… …merely because an order or decree is executable, would not take away the Courts jurisdiction to deal with a matter under the Act … …”, and Urban Infrastructures Real Estate Fund vs. Dharmesh S. Jain & Anr.17 and HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. vs. Pradeep Shantipershad Jain & Ors.18, wherein the said view has been reiterated, the learned senior counsel submitted

2022 SCC OnLine 827 that the executability or lack thereof of an order does not have any bearing on the contempt jurisdiction of this Court, and in light of the order dated 07.02.2020, wherein the terms of agreement between the parties have been recorded, and the parties have given an undertaking to the Court, the present contempt petition is very much maintainable in the eyes of law. On merits:

20. As per the learned senior counsel, since the Contemnors have not acted in furtherance of Clause(s) 7(i)(c), 7(i)(d), 7(i)(f) of the terms of settlement reproduced in the order dated 07.02.2020, the Contemnors are in violation thereof and, thus, guilty of contempt. The learned senior counsel submitted that the Contemnors have instead illegally concocted the story of an oral Family Settlement, which, in itself without any particulars and/ or substantive proof and is but a figment of the Contemnors’ imagination to slide away from the order dated 07.02.2020. In any event, it is the case of the learned senior counsel that the petitioner never consented therefor.

21. The learned senior counsel further submitted that none of the parties were/ are at liberty to modify the terms of settlement arrived between themselves, much less, by way of an oral concocted Family Settlement, since the terms entered inter se the parties were duly recorded in the order dated 07.02.2020, and which led to withdrawal of the two suits. The parties were only to act thereon.

22. Based on the aforesaid submissions, the learned senior counsel submitted that this Court cannot go into execution of a subsequent oral Family Settlement, if any, inter se the parties. The learned senior counsel categorically denied and disputed all the submissions made by Mr. Gaurav Gupta, learned counsel for the Contemnors.

23. In light of the aforesaid, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present contempt petition is very much maintainable and the Contemnors are liable to be held guilty of contempt for wilfully not complying with the modified terms of settlement as also the express undertaking given by them, as per order dated 07.02.2020. Analysis & Findings:

24. This Court has heard the submissions of learned counsel for the Contemnors and the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and gone through the pleadings and documents on record as also the judgments cited at bar.

25. For adjudicating the moot issue of maintainability of the present contempt petition, this Court is to bear in mind that as per Section 2(b)19 of the Contempt Act, for this Court to invoke its contempt jurisdiction, there has to be a “… …wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court”. Hence, this Court is to adjudicate if, under the facts and circumstances involved herein, was there an “order” of which there has been “wilful disobedience” by the Contemnors, or, if there was an “undertaking” given by the Contemnors to the Court, of which there has been a “wilful breach” by the Contemnors. (b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;

26. A bare perusal of the order dated 07.02.2020, relevant portions whereof have already been extracted above, reflects that the parties jointly filed I.A. 18067/2019 in CS(OS) 558/2014 under Order XXIII Rule(s) 1 & 3 of CPC along with their respective affidavits, seeking withdrawal of the said suit after reproducing all the terms of amicable compromise arrived inter se themselves outside the Court. In fact, the said order also reflects that during the pendency of the said application, the parties sought some time to work out certain modifications to the proposed terms therein, and the presentation thereof resulted in the Coordinate Bench passing the order dated 07.02.2020. The order dated 07.02.2020 not only records the modified terms of settlement as desired by all the parties before the Co-ordinate Bench but also records the specific “undertaking” given at Bar by their respective counsels pursuant to their instructions. So much so, the same also records that though there was no formal (similar) application filed by the parties in CS(OS) 3121/2011 for withdrawal thereof, however, since the modified terms catered to both the said suits as well, the same was also withdrawn.

27. In effect, the said order dated 07.02.2020, which was passed pursuant to an application under Order XXIII Rule(s) 1 and 3 of CPC filed by both the parties, is very clear, accurate and specific and leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that it was not a case of a simpliciter withdrawal by one party, but a result of the consensus arrived at inter se the parties on the strength whereupon, the petitioner withdrew the said suit, and on which both the parties together obtained an imprimatur of the Court.

28. Interestingly, even in paragraph 4(i) of their own response to the present contempt petition, the Contemnors have categorically admitted that the order dated 07.02.2020 was “… …based on mutual agreement of the parties… …”, i.e. it was indeed a consent order obtained by all the parties, including the Contemnors herein. However, now by placing reliance upon paragraph 15 of the order dated 07.02.2020 wherein it is stated that the suit was “… …dismissed as withdrawn… …”, they have tried to give a whole new meaning to the said order, as also the proceedings therein before this Court. It is too late in the day now for the Contemnors to rebut and/ or resile from the contents of I.A. 18067/2019, which was jointly filed as also was accompanied by the respective affidavits of the Contemnors herein, which eventually led to passing of the order dated 07.02.2020.

29. Furthermore, a perusal of the modified terms of settlement, particularly paragraph 7(1)(i) thereof reveals that it was inherent in the very terms of agreement arrived at between the parties that, in addition to their undertaking(s) given to each other, they shall also specifically furnish an undertaking to the Court. In light thereof, when the intention of the parties to give an undertaking to the Court, followed by such undertaking actually given to the Court have been recorded in the order dated 07.02.2020, the Contemnors cannot be allowed to now contend before this Court anything contrary thereto by asserting that no undertaking was given to the Court.

30. Needless to say, as apparent from the order dated 07.02.2020, the specific “undertaking” given by the respective counsels for and on behalf of the parties including the Contemnors herein before the Court on 07.02.2020, was made voluntarily, without any coercion and/ or pressure from any quarters. Interestingly, the same has never been opposed/ challenged by anyone, much less, the Contemnors herein till now. Thus, it is clear that the same was made with their consent and knowledge. Under such circumstances, there can be no reason for this Court to hold that no undertaking was given by the Contemnors to the Court.

31. Thus, taking a wholistic background, the only position emerging from a reading of the order dated 07.02.2020 in its entirety, is that the withdrawal of the suit was not a unilateral and/ or singular act on the part of the petitioner, rather, the said withdrawal was a consequential act founded upon the modified terms of settlement, which formed an integral part of the order itself. Further, there was an additional specific undertaking furnished by the learned counsel for the parties to remain bound and abide by the consent terms recorded therein before the Court on the said date of the order, i.e. 07.02.2020. In other words, had there been no such terms of settlement and “undertaking” made by the Contemnors/ parties therein, there would have been no order dated 07.02.2020. Hence, both the modified terms of settlement, as well as the said undertaking were an integral part of the order dated 07.02.2020, and the Contemnors cannot be permitted to interpret the said order selectively to suit their convenience.

32. Lastly, the contentions qua filing and/ or maintainability of an execution petition, and/ or the outcome thereof are of no relevance since the same has no applicability to the facts involved in a contempt petition. As such, the outcome of the execution petition Ex.P. 65/2021 filed by the petitioners herein bears no connection with the present petition. At the end of the day, the issue of contempt is between the Court and the Contemnor and not inter se the parties.

33. Now adverting to the provision governing “civil contempt” under Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act, a bare reading thereof clearly shows that the legislature, in its wisdom, has categorised it in two distinct categories, firstly as a “wilful disobedience” of a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court, as well as secondly as a “wilful breach” of an undertaking given to the Court. The disjunctive use of the word “or” between the two abovesaid categories clarifies the legislative intent that both the said categories of contemptuous behaviours have been made separately amenable to contempt jurisdiction.

34. Also, specifically by use of the word “any” in the first category, it is clear that the Statute confers ample powers upon the Court to invoke its contempt jurisdiction, without adverting to the precise nature of the “… …judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court… …”, be it after adjudication on merits by the Court, or after recording the terms of consent inter se the parties before it. Similarly, in the second category, the only rider to the word “undertaking” is that it should be “… …given to the Court… …”, without any additional requirements/ qualifications thereto.

35. This Court finds able support in the judicial dictum rendered by a three-judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang and Anr.20, wherein it has been held as under:-

contrary in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury [AIR 1948 Cal 294: 49 Cri LJ 567] does not therefore correctly reflect the law.

16. In the face of such apparent divergence, the Sanyal Committee was set up and asked to examine the law of contempt with a view to its clarification and reforming it wherever necessary. The present statute is the outcome of those suggestions.

17. The Sanyal Committee Report which preceded the framing the enactment of the Act, had opined: “The 1952 Act is sound as far as it goes. While its provisions may be retained, its scope requires to be widened considerably.”

18. The Act has been duly widened. It provides inter alia for definitions of the terms and lays down firmer bases for exercise of the court's jurisdiction in contempt. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt as meaning “wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court”. (emphasis supplied) Analysed, the definition provides for two categories of cases, namely, (1) wilful disobedience to a process of court, and (2) wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. As far as the first category is concerned, the word “any” further indicates the wide nature of the power. No distinction is statutorily drawn between an order passed after an adjudication and an order passed by consent. This first category is separate from the second and cannot be treated as forming part of or taking colour from the second category. The legislative intention clearly was to distinguish between the two and create distinct classes of contumacious behaviour. … … x x x x x x x x x x

23. … …As we have earlier noted, the section itself provides that wilful violation of any order or decree, etc. would tantamount to contempt. A compromise decree is as much a decree as a decree passed on adjudication. It is not as has been wrongly held by the Calcutta High Court in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury [AIR 1948 Cal 294: 49 Cri LJ 567] merely an agreement between the parties. In passing the decree by consent, the court adds its mandate to the consent. A consent decree is composed of both a command and a contract. The Bombay High Court's view in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka [AIR 1950 Bom 336: 52 Bom LR 363] correctly represents the law that a consent decree is a contract with the imprimatur of the court. “Imprimatur” means “authorised” or “approved”. In other words by passing a decree in terms of a consent order the court authorises and approves the course of action consented to. Moreover, the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure require the court to pass a decree in accordance with the consent terms only when it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement. x x x x x

25. In such circumstances it would neither be in consonance with the statute, judicial authority, principle or logic to draw any distinction between the wilful violation of the terms of a consent decree and wilful violation of a decree which is passed on adjudication. The decision in Babu Ram Gupta case [(1980) 3 SCC 47: 1980 SCC (Cri) 527] must, therefore, be limited to its own peculiar facts. … …” [Emphasis supplied]

36. Thus, the interpretation sought to be given to the order dated 07.02.2020 by the Contemnors is not sustainable for the reason that it would tantamount to undermining the sanctity of an order passed by a Court of law as also the respect and authority commanded by a Court of law. The order dated 07.02.2020, though resulting in withdrawal, is very much an “order”, especially one wherein an “undertaking” was expressly given to the Court. The same cannot be rendered meaningless, devoid of value, having no force of law.

37. More so, when judicial orders are openly flouted or Court proceedings are disrespected, it takes away from the rule of law, leading to loss of trust and faith in the whole Judicial System, as the respect and authority commanded by the Courts constitute the greatest assurances to an ordinary citizen that their vital rights will be protected. If the same goes away, it would be against the underlying principles enshrined in the Contempt Act, which was enacted for upholding and preserving the fundamental rights to personal liberty and freedom of expression of the citizens as also to safeguard the majesty and dignity of the Courts of law and preserve the image and authority of the Judiciary.

38. In light of the foregoing discussions, the present contempt petition is maintainable since the order dated 07.02.2020, which has remained unchallenged by the Contemnors till date, and as such, has attained finality. The same is undeniably an “order” which was passed with consent of the parties, including the Contemnors, based on the outcome of what transpired inter se the parties therein. Once again, every detail whereof has been finely captured in the said order. Similarly, there can be no qualm that there was an “undertaking” made by the parties on the said date while passing of the order. Such an undertaking, as per the settled position of law, not only connotes but is also within the purview of an “undertaking” given to the Court. Thus, the ingredients for invoking the contempt jurisdiction as provided under Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act have been duly made out, and the contention of the Contemnors that the present contempt petition is not maintainable are bound to be negatived.

39. Now, adverting to the question as to whether the Contemnors are guilty of committing contempt of Court as alleged by the petitioner, this Court once again needs to refer to the provisions contained under Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act.

40. Although, the broader explanation has been covered in the foregoing paragraphs, however, this Court needs to elucidate upon the key expressions provided in the aforesaid clause i.e. ‘wilful disobedience’, which means an act or omission done voluntarily/ knowingly/ intentionally/ deliberately with the specific intent to do something which the law otherwise forbids or to fail to do something that the law requires to be done, that is to say, with the evil intent/ bad purpose to either disobey or to disregard the law. Consequently, for maintaining an action for civil contempt like the present one, the petitioner while alleging contempt is required to satisfy this Court of there being a “wilful disobedience” of a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or “wilful breach” of an undertaking given to the Court by the Contemnors against whom the contempt is alleged. Sans the same, no act can ipso facto amount to contempt.

41. Thus, existence of a “wilful disobedience” or “wilful breach” in terms of Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act, is, thus, the most important and a necessary element while adjudicating upon a petition for contempt, since the issuance of a Show Cause Notice therein and imposition of punishment thereafter, has wide ramifications and farfetching consequences. Accordingly, the Court is required to exercise circumspection and proceed further only after being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was/ is indeed a disobedience/ breach which was conscious/ deliberate/ wilful on the part of the alleged contemnor(s).

42. In the present proceedings, it is the case of the petitioner that the contemnors have wilfully disobeyed the order dated 07.02.2020 and breached the undertaking contained therein by not complying with the modified terms of settlement, particularly, by not acting in furtherance of Clause(s) 7(i)(c), 7(i)(d), 7(i)(f) of the terms of settlement reproduced in the order dated 07.02.2020.

43. There is no categoric response of the contemnors to the assertions made by the petitioner in the present contempt petition as they are simply trying to take cover behind the alleged subsequent acts/ facts which have emerged subsequent to the passing of the order dated 07.02.2020. There is hardly anything on merit from which this Court can infer that the contemnors have complied with the said order dated 07.02.2020 and thus cannot be held guilty of contempt. Though they have raised an issue qua an alleged oral Family Agreement, admittedly, the same is hardly of any relevance since it took place only in June, 2021, i.e. after the said order had been passed. The same is, in fact, of no concern/ value since the same is only a verbal assertion, without any proof of substance, made by the contemnors and also since the contemnors have never apprised this Court of having taken any steps against the petitioner consequent thereto.

44. In fact, all that Mr. Gaurav Gupta, learned counsel has argued on behalf of the contemnors is/ are only subsequent events, and there has all throughout been a stoic silence about what they have done pursuant to the said order dated 07.02.2020. It goes without saying that it has never been the case of the contemnors that they have complied with the order dated 07.02.2020. The same, in view of the fact that there has been no other argument(s) addressed by Mr. Gaurav Gupta, learned counsel for the contemnors. As such, any assertion made by the contemnors in their pleadings has been given a go bye on their own as no whisper has been made qua them.

45. Since the said order dated 07.02.2020 is the last line of argument for the parties before this Court as it is the one and only order under consideration, the contemnors cannot seek to take benefit of any latter acts and post events after having consented to passing of the order dated 07.02.2020, more so, when they were/ are free to initiate appropriate proceedings therefor, if any, against the petitioner in accordance with law. Moreover, considering any latter act(s), is beyond the domain of this Court and unacceptable since this Court in this contempt petition is only confined to the compliance of the said order dated 07.02.2020 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court.

46. In such a scenario, where a defaulting contemnor chooses to remain silent qua compliance of an order wherein there is a categoric “undertaking” given on his/her/its behalf to a Court of law, then it is a clear dual case of “wilful disobedience” as also “wilful breach” on the part of said contemnor.

47. It can thus be clearly held that the contemnors have even after having given a solemn “undertaking” before this Court on 07.02.2020 to abide by the terms of settlement inter se the parties have chosen to sit back and frustrate the said order of this Court. They have also failed to come up with any reasonable expression/ reason for doing so, more so, when having the said order dated 07.02.2020 staring at their faces. Non-compliance by the contemnors, based on unsubstantiated circumstances/ future development/ hinderances, cannot per se be allowed to sustain by the Courts, as if permitted, it would frustrate the course of justice.

48. Alas! as per the settled position of law, a contempt Court is only required to adjudicate as to whether or not the alleged contemnor has ‘wilfully disobeyed’ a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or ‘wilfully breached’ an undertaking given to the Court and travelling outside the realms of the said order or undertaking is impermissible in law.

49. Thus, going into the validity of the alleged oral family agreement would tantamount to transgressing beyond the jurisdiction conferred to the contempt Court.

50. Lastly, in view of the aforesaid, the case laws cited by learned counsel for the contemnors, not being applicable to the facts herein, are of no aid to them. Conclusions:

51. In view of the aforesaid observations, analysis, reasonings and findings, since the petitioner has been able to make out a plausible/ sufficient case for initiation of contempt proceedings against the Contemnors, all the said Contemnors are held guilty of contempt of Court for being in “wilful disobedience” of the order dated 07.02.2020 passed in CS(OS) 558/2014 wherein the terms of settlement arrived inter se the parties have been recorded, as also for the “wilful breach” of the “undertaking” given to the Court based thereon on the said date.

52. Accordingly, list for order on sentencing on 04.12.2025 at 03:30 P.M., when each of the Contemnors are directed to remain present in person.

53. In the meanwhile, each of the Contemnors will be free to purge the contempt and file affidavit(s) qua the same on or before 04.12.2025.

SAURABH BANERJEE, J. NOVEMBER 14, 2025 ab/deepak