ANKUSH RANA AND ORS v. ICAR-INDIAN COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND ORS

candidates appear in the same examination, it was emphasised that the socalled sub-categorisation is irrational. Echoing the reasoning of the High Court, Mr Bhattacharya urged that IIT's grounds for framing such a discriminatory policy are faulty because whether it is IIT or a non-IIT technical institution the consequence of a candidate opting out of a particular course and seeking admission in a different institution would lead to the same consequence i.e. loss of one seat. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that there is a distinction between the two kinds of institutions.

12. It was submitted that Soutrik opted for the seat in IIT, Kharagpur but could not pull out of the admission process before expiry of the last date for doing so due to inadvertence. In these circumstances, he ought to be given the choice of appearing in the current JEE (Advanced) examination since his career is at stake and he has an equal right to better his opportunity as candidate who succeeds in securing admission in non-IIT institutions but do not opt to continue.

13. At the outset, this Court holds as insubstantial the objection on behalf of the respondent Soutrik that IIT should have approached the Division Bench in Letter Patent jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The ordinary rule of necessity that litigants should approach and avail of appellate remedies exhausting them before approaching this Court is a rule of convenience and not an immutable practice. It has been held to be so by this Court (Ref. State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra [State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309: 1996 SCC (L&S) 1240] ). Moreover, the discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution is flexible and sufficiently wide, to correct glaring errors and injustices. Furthermore, this Court had issued notice on 9-9-2021 [IIT, Kharagpur v. Soutrik Sarangi, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 964] and granted an interim order suspending the directions [Soutrik Sarangi v. IIT, Kharagpur, 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2772] of the High Court. On the two subsequent dates of hearing i.e. 17-9-2021 and 24-9-2021, there was no objection on the part of the respondent with respect to the maintainability of the present petition. Having regard to all these facts, the objection is hereby overruled. xxx xxx xxx

15. IITs are constituted under the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (hereafter “the Act”) and are declared to be technical institutions of education, declared by Parliament, to be of national importance (under Entry 64) of the Union List (List I) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India [ “64. Institutions for scientific or technical education financed by the Government of India wholly or in part and declared by Parliament by law to be institutions of national importance.”], set up to foster excellence in education. The appellant contends that IITs have created a world class academic platform dynamically sustained through quality teaching and internationally acclaimed research with excellent infrastructure and the best minds available. Admission to IITs is governed by the JEE (Advanced) Information Brochure which sets out the detailed rules of eligibility. That an examination is conducted exclusively by IITs and the National Testing Agency (“NTA”) has no role in this. The NTA's role is confined only to the JEE (Mains). The top 2.[5] lakhs successful candidates in the JEE (Mains) examination category wise — are allowed to appear in the JEE (Advanced) examination provided they fulfil other eligibility criteria. The admissions standards for IITs are prescribed by virtue of exercise of power under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. The planning of the JEE (Advanced) and the admissions process to various IITs is conceived and supervised by the Joint Administrative Board consisting of Directors of IITs, Members of the Joint Implementation Committee, representatives of the Union Government, CBSE, etc.”

16. In Hirandra Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows:- “21. The legal principles which govern the determination of a cut-off date are well settled. The power to fix a cut-off date or age-limit is incidental to the regulatory control which an authority exercises over the selection process. A certain degree of arbitrariness may appear on the face of any cut-off or age-limit which is prescribed, since a candidate on the wrong side of the line may stand excluded as a consequence. That, however, is no reason to hold that the cut-off which is prescribed, is arbitrary. In order to declare that a cut-off is arbitrary and ultra vires, it must be of such a nature as to lead to the conclusion that it has been fixed without any rational basis whatsoever or is manifestly unreasonable so as to lead to a conclusion of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

22. Several decisions of this Court have dealt with the issue. In Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan [Ami Lal Bhat v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 614: 1997 SCC (L&S) 1576], a two-Judge Bench of this Court dealt with the provisions contained in the Rajasthan Medical Services (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962. Rule 11(1) prescribed that a candidate for direct recruitment should not have attained the age of 35 years on the first day of January following the last date fixed for the receipt of applications. Rejecting the contention that the cut-off was arbitrary, this Court held that the fixation of a cut-off prescribing maximum or minimum age requirements for a post is in the discretion of the rule-making authority. The Court held thus: (SCC p. 617, para 5) “5. … In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable.” The same view has been adopted in other decisions, including those in

(i) State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad [State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad,

(1990) 3 SCC 368: 1991 SCC (L&S) 51] (“Ramjee Prasad”); (ii) Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal [Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, (1994) 4 SCC 212: 1994 SCC (L&S) 925] (“Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal”); (iii) Union of India v. Shivbachan Rai [Union of India v. Shivbachan Rai, (2001) 9 SCC 356: 2002 SCC (L&S) 197] (“Shivbachan Rai”); and (iv) Council of Scientific & Industrial Research v. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal [Council of Scientific & Industrial Research v. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal, (2009) 3 SCC 35: (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 547] (“Ramesh Chandra Agrawal”).

23. In Ramjee Prasad [State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, (1990) 3 SCC 368: 1991 SCC (L&S) 51], the State issued advertisements for the post of Assistant Professors and prescribed 31-1-1988 as the last date for the receipt of applications. Applicants must have had three years of experience. Contending that applicants could not meet the prescribed requirement of experience by the date prescribed, the cut-off date was challenged as being arbitrary and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. A two-Judge Bench of this Court upheld the cut-off date and held thus: (SCC pp. 373-74, para 8)

24. In Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal [Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, (1994) 4 SCC 212: 1994 SCC (L&S) 925], the date with reference to which the age eligibility of a person desirous of sitting in the competitive examination for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Foreign Service was fixed as 1 August of every year. The preliminary exam would normally be held annually before 1 August. Rejecting the contention that the cut-off date is arbitrary and hence ultra vires, a two- Judge Bench of this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 214-16, paras 5-8) “5. As to when choice of a cut-off date can be interfered with was opined by Holmes, J. in Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman [Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 1928 SCC OnLine US SC 92: 72 L Ed 770: 277 US 32 (1928)] by stating that if the fixation be “very wide of any reasonable mark”, the same can be regarded arbitrary. What was observed by Holmes, J. was cited with approval by a Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works [Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, (1975) 1 SCC 305] (in para 10) by also stating that choice of a date cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. It was further pointed out where a point or line has to be, there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, and so, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.

6. The aforesaid decision was cited with approval in D.G. Gose & Co. (Agents) (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [D.G. Gose & Co. (Agents) (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1980) 2 SCC 410]; so also in State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad [State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, (1990) 3 SCC 368: 1991 SCC (L&S) 51] …

7. In this context, it would also be useful to state that when a court is called upon to decide such a matter, mere errors are not subject to correction in exercise of power of judicial review; it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared to be void…

8. … As to why the cut-off date has not been changed despite the decision to hold preliminary examination, has been explained in Para 3 of the special leave petition. The sum and substance of the explanation is that preliminary examination is only a screening test and marks obtained in this examination do not count for determining the order of merit, for which purpose the marks obtained in the main examination, which is still being held after 1st August, alone are material. In view of this, it cannot be held that continuation of treating 1st August as the cut-off date, despite the Union Public Service Commission having introduced the method of preliminary examination which is held before 1st August, can be said to be “very wide off any reasonable mark” or so capricious or whimsical as to permit judicial interference.”

25. In Shivbachan Rai [Union of India v. Shivbachan Rai, (2001) 9 SCC 356: 2002 SCC (L&S) 197], the Union Public Service Commission advertised for direct recruitment to the post of Assistant Director in the Central Poultry Breeding Farms and prescribed an age-limit of 35 years as on 31-5-1990 with a relaxation of five years for government servants. The earlier notification did not provide a limitation on the age relaxation. The five-year stipulation was challenged as being arbitrary and ultra vires. A two-Judge Bench upheld the notification and held thus: (SCC p. 358, para 6) “6. … Prescribing of any age-limit for a given post, as also deciding the extent to which any relaxation can be given if an age-limit is prescribed, are essentially matters of policy. It is, therefore, open to the Government while framing rules under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to prescribe such age-limits or to prescribe the extent to which any relaxation can be given. Prescription of such limit or the extent of relaxation to be given, cannot be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The only basis on which the respondent moved the Central Administrative Tribunal was the earlier Rules of 1976 under which, though an age-limit was prescribed, a limit had not been placed on the extent of relaxation which could be granted. If at all any charge of arbitrariness can be levied in such cases, not prescribing any basis for granting relaxation when no limit is placed on the extent of relaxation, might lead to arbitrariness in the exercise of power of relaxation.”

26. In Ramesh Chandra Agrawal [Council of Scientific & Industrial Research v. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal, (2009) 3 SCC 35: (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 547], the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research framed a scheme for the absorption of researchers working in their laboratories and institutes following the directions of this Court. It was prescribed that eligible applicants must have 15 years of continuous research on 2-5-

1997. The Director was conferred powers to relax the requirement. Contending that the tenure of researchers is ordinarily 13 years, the prescription of 15 years was challenged as being ultra vires and arbitrary. This contention was accepted by the High Court. On appeal, a two-Judge Bench of this Court examined the scheme and applicable avenues to researchers. Noting that there was no ceiling of 13 years on researchers, this Court upheld the prescription of 15 years and the cut-off date. The Court held thus: (SCC p. 52, paras 29-30)

the object sought to be achieved. 2-5-1997 was the date fixed as the cut-off date in terms of the Scheme. The reason assigned therefor was that this was the date when this Court directed the appellants to consider framing of a regularisation scheme. They could have picked up any other date. They could have even picked up the date of the judgment passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. As rightly contended by Mr Patwalia, by choosing 2-5-1997 as the cut-off date, no illegality was committed. Ex facie, it cannot be said to be arbitrary.

30. The High Court, however, proceeded on the basis that the cut-off date should have been the date of issuance of the notification. The employer in this behalf has a choice. Its discretion can be held to be arbitrary but then the High Court only with a view to show sympathy to some of the candidates could not have fixed another date, only because according to it, another date was more suitable. In law it was not necessary. The court's power of judicial review in this behalf although exists but is limited in the sense that the impugned action can be struck down only when it is found to be arbitrary. It is possible that by reason of such a cut-off date an employee misses his chance very narrowly. Such hazards would be there in all the services. Only because it causes hardship to a few persons or a section of the employees may not by itself be a good ground for directing fixation of another cut-off date.”

27. These judgments provide a clear answer to the challenge. The petitioners and the appellant desire that this Court should rollback the date with reference to which attainment of the upper age-limit of 48 years should be considered. Such an exercise is impermissible. In order to indicate the fallacy in the submission, it is significant to note that Rule 12 prescribes a minimum age of 35 years and an upper age-limit of 45 years (48 years for reserved candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes). Under the Rule, the age-limit is prescribed with reference to the first day of January of the year following the year in which the notice inviting applications is published. If the relevant date were to be rolled back, as desired by the petitioners, to an anterior point in time, it is true that some candidates who have crossed the upper age-limit under Rule 12 may become eligible. But, interestingly that would affect candidates who on the anterior date may not have attained the minimum age of 35 years but would attain that age under the present Rule. We are adverting to this aspect only to emphasise that the validity of the Rule cannot be made to depend on cases of individual hardship which inevitably arise in applying a principle of general application. Essentially, the determination of cut-off dates lies in the realm of policy. A court in the exercise of the power of judicial review does not take over that function for itself. Plainly, it is for the rule-making authority to discharge that function while framing the Rules.

28. We do not find any merit in the grievance of discrimination. For the purpose of determining whether a member of the Bar has fulfilled the requirement of seven years' practice, the cut-off date is the last date for the submission of the applications. For the fulfilment of the age criterion, the cut-off date which is prescribed is the first day of January following the year in which a notice inviting applications is being published. Both the above cut-off dates are with reference to distinct requirements. The seven year practice requirement is referable to the provisions of Article 233(2) of the Constitution. The prescription of an age-limit of 45 years, or as the case may be, of 48 years for reserved category candidates, is in pursuance of the discretion vested in the appointing authority to prescribe an age criterion for recruitment to the HJS.”

17. From the conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it is palpably clear that fixing of cut-off dates is neither the domain nor the remit of the Court exercising power of judicial review unless the threshold laid down by the Supreme Court is met i.e., fixation of the cut-off date is without any rational basis or manifestly unreasonable. Counsel for ICAR is right in his submission that whenever a cut-off date is prescribed for any examination or a selection process, some aspirants will fall on the wrong side of the line, but this by itself is not enough to hold that the cut-off date is arbitrary. Petitioners herein call upon the Court to extend the cut-off date by 15 days predicated on the fact that they have completed the pre-requisite courses by 27.09.2025 and 30.09.2025, as the case may be. Petitioners are unable to point out that fixation of cut-off date of 15.09.2025 is in any manner arbitrary and merely because this date does not suit the Petitioners, the same cannot be interfered with. Cut-off dates cannot be tailormade to suit the requirements of every aspirant in any selection/examination process. It is no doubt true that the cut-off date prescribed by ICAR has put the Petitioners to a disadvantage, more particularly, as they have appeared in the examination and scored well, however, it cannot be overlooked that fixation of this cut-off date was the domain of ICAR as a part of its regulatory function to formulate the eligibility criteria and fixation of cut-off dates to determine eligibilities of aspiring candidates. There is also merit in the contention of ICAR that there may have been several candidates who may not have applied for the examination owing to the prescribed cut-off date and Petitioners cannot be permitted to take a march over them only because they have approached the Court and/or appeared in the entrance examination.

18. No cogent material is placed on record by the Petitioners which leads to a conclusion that the prescribed cut-off date is so unreasonable, capricious or whimsical that it requires interference by the Court. Courts have repeatedly held and I quote “The law, however, cannot soothe every wound”. Petitioners are unable to make out a case that they have a vested and enforceable right to claim that the cut-off date be extended. Moreover, Petitioners were clearly and admittedly not eligible for admission to Ph.D. Programmes for the academic year 2025-2026 and knowing this, they had taken the entrance exam and cannot claim special equities owing to the fact that they have taken the entrance examination and obtained high scores and ranks. Eligibility criteria and cut-off date have been applied uniformly and across the board and cannot be relaxed for the Petitioners as that would amount to discrimination and will be iniquitous to those who had either not applied or had not taken the examination finding themselves ineligible on the cut-off date. No mandamus can, therefore, be issued to ICAR to act contrary to the laid down criteria and/or the prescribed cut-off date.

19. Accordingly, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed along with pending application.

JYOTI SINGH, J NOVEMBER 14, 2025 S.Sharma