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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 17th November, 2025
ATUL PRATAP SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Mahima Malhotra and Mr. Aayush Goswami, Advocates along
Through: Mr. Sanjay Lao, Standing Counsel for the State
Mr. Nipun Kumar and Mr. R. Mansoori, Advocates for R-2 along
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition is filed seeking quashing of FIR NO. 572/2018 dated 22.11.2018, registered at Police Station Shakar Pur, for offences under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), including all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
2. It is averred that the marriage between Respondent No. 2 and the Petitioner was solemnized on 01.07.2009, as per Hindu rites, rituals and ceremonies. One child was born out of the said wedlock. Thereafter, some misunderstandings took place between the parties and they started residing separately.
3. Subsequently, Respondent No. 2 made a complaint against Petitioner and his family members, alleging that she was subjected to cruelty by them, which later culminated into the aforementioned FIR.
4. The chargesheet has been filed in the present case only against the petitioner.
5. The present petition is filed on the ground that the matter is amicably settled between the parties before the Delhi Mediation Centre, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi on 20.11.2023, out of their own free will, without any force, pressure or coercion. Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 have also obtained decree of divorce and intend to live their future lives peacefully.
6. In terms of the Settlement dated 20.11.2023, the petitioner has agreed to hand over all the jewellery articles and household articles to Respondent No.2 as per Annexure A of the Settlement and pay a sum of ₹3,00,000/-, which is handed over today to Respondent no. 2 in the Court by way of a Demand Draft bearing no. 839187 dated 15.11.2025 drawn on by UCO Bank.
7. Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 are present in person in the Court and have been duly identified by the Investigating Officer.
8. On being asked, Respondent No. 2 states that she has received the entire settlement amount and she has no objection if the proceedings emanating from the subject FIR are quashed.
9. Offences under Sections 406 of the IPC are compoundable whereas offence under Section 498A of the IPC is noncompoundable.
10. It is well settled that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) [erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] can quash offences which are noncompoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. The Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down parameters and guidelines for High Court while accepting settlement and quashing the proceedings. In the case of Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.: (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed as under:-
Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.” (emphasis supplied)
11. Similarly, in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.: (2017) 9 SCC 641, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed as under:- “16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is noncompoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” (emphasis supplied)
12. Keeping in view the nature of the dispute and that the parties have amicably resolved their disputes, this Court feels that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court. I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.
13. In view of the above, FIR No. 572/2018 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.
14. It is made clear that this Court has not gone into the legality of the settlement or any right in relation to the custody of the minor child.
15. It is also clarified that the legal rights of the minor child will not be affected, in any manner, whatsoever by the present order.
16. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application(s) also stand disposed of. AMIT MAHAJAN, J NOVEMBER 17, 2025 DU