Siddharth Goswami; Geetanjali Reddy; Aditya Sachdeva v. M/S Manmohan Singh Wadhwa Constructions Pvt Ltd

Delhi High Court · 17 Nov 2025 · 2025:DHC:10181-DB
C. Hari Shankar; Om Prakash Shukla
RFA(COMM) 356/2025
2025:DHC:10181-DB
commercial appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Municipal Corporation of Delhi's commercial appeal due to a 99-day delay in filing, holding that in commercial matters delay must be short and accompanied by bona fide and non-negligent conduct to be condoned.

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Translation output
RFA(COMM) 356/2025
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
RFA(COMM) 356/2025, CM APPL. 41378/2025, 38302/2025
& 57142/2025 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Sanjay Vashishtha, Standing Counsel
WITH
Mr. Siddharth Goswami, Ms. Geetanjali Reddy and Mr. Aditya Sachdeva, Advocates.
VERSUS
M/S MANMOHAN SINGH WADHWA CONSTRUCTIONS PVT LTD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Avinash Trivedi, Mrs. Ritika Trivedi, Mr. Rahul Aggarwal, Mr. Anurag Kaushik, Mr. Rhythem Nagpal, Mr. Jatin Arora and Mr. Rishank Gola, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
(ORAL)
17.11.2025 C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
RFA (Comm) 356/2025 and CM APPL. 41378/2025 (delay)

1. This is an application seeking condonation of delay of 99 days in filing the present appeal, which is directed against order dated 24 December 2024 passed by the learned District Judge, Commercial Court. The appeal was originally accompanied by CM APPL. 38301/2025 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. As the said application did not contain satisfactory grounds, we granted time to the appellant, on 3 July 2025, to file a better application explaining the delay. Ergo, the present application.

2. We deem it appropriate to reproduce the paragraphs of the application, which deal with the aspect of delay, in their entirety thus:

“2. That the impugned judgement was pronounced on the last working day of the Ld Trial Court before the commencement of winter vacations. Thereafter on the resumption of Court, the certified copy of the trial court judgement, decree sheet was obtained by the trial court counsel on 23.01.2025. The file thereafter reached the office of the executive engineer thereafter in around a weeks' time. 3. In the intervening period, in the first week of February 2025, several officials of the department were involved in election duties and were unable to pursue their official as well as legal matters efficiently. Thereafter the Assistant Engineer i.e. Mr Nitin Bharti moved a file to obtain a legal opinion - on weather (sic whether) grounds of appeal is made out or not after collating the entire trial court record and coordinating with the lawyer before the Trial Court for an express opinion which is also vetted by the law department of the municipal corporation of Delhi. 4. That, accordingly, after finishing obtaining the. requisite mandate, an engagement letter dated 24.04.2025 was issued by the law department to file an appeal and the appeal was prepared after a few conferences/discussions. Certain clarifications were also put to the concerned engineer - who in turn sought time to answer the technical questions as the matter concerned examination of third- party government record as well. 5. That the Chief Engineer concerned, who was supervising the matter and whose involvement was essential for vetting, approval/signing, and forwarding of the file for initiation of appeal proceedings, retired on 01.05.2025. Further, the newly appointed Chief Engineer, undertook to vet the legal files of the department which exhausted considerable time. In view of the changing of supervising authorities, the matter could not be finalized in a timely manner, and the transition in the office led to a temporary disruption in the decision-making chain, thereby contributing to the

delay. The office order depicting the allocation of additional duties to a Chief Engineer at Serial No.2 dated 01.05.2025 is annexed hereto as Annexure A-1.

6. That due to the volume of files handled by these departments and the requirement for detailed scrutiny, interdepartmental consultations, and compliance with procedural formalities, the vetting process took substantial time. These administrative bottlenecks further contributed to the delay, despite best efforts being made by the Appellant Corporation to expedite the process.

7. That due to the cumulative effect of the reasons, including the retirement of the Chief Engineer, deployment of key officers on election duty, obtaining of the certified copies and the mandatory vetting of the files and legal opinions etc. caused the delay. The Appellant shall take initiatives to mitigate such delays and will ensure timely compliances.

8. That the Appellant, being a statutory body, is required to follow a rigorous and multi-tiered procedure for the vetting, approval, and sanction of legal actions. The file pertaining to the present matter had to traverse through various departments and obtain necessary approvals at multiple levels, which inherently consumed additional time.

9. That the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate, but has occurred due to the aforementioned circumstances, which were beyond the control of the Appellant. The Appellant has acted diligently and in good faith throughout.” (Emphasis supplied)

3. The law relating to condonation of delay in commercial matters is now crystalized by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra v Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt Ltd[1]. We have also followed this decision in our judgments in Casablanca Apparels Pvt Ltd v Polo/Lauren Company LP[2] and NBCC (India) Ltd. v RIC Projects Pvt. Ltd.[3] The Court is required to adopt a strict stance.

4. The reasons given in the modified application for condonation of delay do not satisfactorily explain the delay of as much as of 99 days. The application states that a certified copy of the impugned judgment was obtained on 23 January 2025 without mentioning when any application for obtaining the certified copy was filed. Thereafter, it is stated that the file reached the office of the Executive Engineer within a week and in February 2025, several officials were involved in election duties. The names of the officers are not disclosed; however, during arguments, learned Counsel acknowledges that only two officers had proceeded on election duties. The application then states that the Assistant Engineer then “moved a file to obtain a legal opinion on whether grounds of appeal is made out or not”. The date of moving a file is not mentioned. Apparently, there is complete silence regarding the delay till 24 April 2025, when it appears that a letter was issued by the department of law to file an appeal and engage a Counsel. Even thereafter, it is stated that there is no explanation for further delay until 1 May 2025.

5. Mr. Sanjay Vashishtha, appearing for the appellant submits that the concerned engineer was transferred. That transfer took place on 1 May 2025. It cannot be, in any way explain the delay from December 2024 till May 2025.

6. The Court cannot, in commercial matters, exhibit the same magnanimity which it can exhibit in non-commercial matters. Speedy resolution of commercial matters is the need of the hour and that is why the Supreme Court in, Borse Bros, has called upon Courts to take a strict view in such matters. Para 63 of Borse Bros reads thus:

“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.”

Three principles emerge from the afore-extracted passage from Borse Bros. To condone delay, in commercial matters, beyond the statutory period of limitation,

(i) the delay must be short, and

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(ii) the party must have acted

(a) bona fide and (b) not negligently. Thirdly, condonation of delay is to be by way of exception and not by way of rule.

7. There is also a clear difference between an action which is bona fide and an action which is not negligent. While absence of bona fides would, in every case, be fatal, every bona fide action cannot be said to have been performed without negligence. Even where the delay in approaching the Court is not wanting in bona fides, therefore, the appellant, in commercial matters, would independently have to satisfy the Court that there was no negligence involved.

8. It was for this reason that we gave time to the appellant to file an application with better particulars. The opportunity has been allowed to go abegging. The present application clearly proceeds on the premise – by now legally moth-eaten, and categorically negated in paras 59 to 61 of Borse Bros itself – that Governmental litigation is entitled ipso facto to entertainment, irrespective of the delay involved. While it is true that Courts – including us – do show greater latitude where the Government is the litigant, given well-recognized bureaucratic hurdles and formalities, the onus still rests with the Governmental organization concerned to explain the delay. Once the explanation is forthcoming, the Court, no doubt, has to factor in the consideration of “file movement” which inescapably foreshadows the action.

9. For this latitude to be shown, however, the explanation has to be forthcoming. The present application, as we have already noted, does not provide a single relevant date. It does not trace the movement of the file. It does not identify the officers who were on election duty, or explain whether there was no one left in the office to deal with the file. Mere events are cited, without reference to any specific dates and times.

10. We are also conscious of the fact that we live in an e-age, in which the movement of files is more digital than physical. All authorities are required to stay in step with developments in technology, and the ease with which it has, with the passage of time, become, to do business.

11. In our view, it is time that the Government, and Governmental authorities, do not take condonation of delay for granted, and, where an application in that regard is required, at least provide the bare facts to show that matters have proceeded with due alacrity. That requirement, to our mind, is wanting in the present case.

12. Within the parameters of the law laid down in the Borse Bros case, we are not satisfied that sufficient cause has been made out to condone the delay in filing the appeal.

13. The application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

14. Resultantly, the appeal is also dismissed on the ground of delay without entering into its merits.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J NOVEMBER 17, 2025