The Delhi High Court held that a dispute over immovable commercial property without an executed agreement does not qualify as a commercial dispute under the Commercial Courts Act, dismissing the petition challenging the suit's withdrawal from the commercial court.
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CM(M) 237/2022 HIGH COURT OF DELHI CM(M) 237/2022 & CM No.13070/2022, CM No.13071/2022 SANDEEP KUMAR VOHRA ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Ashok Rajgopal, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR J U D G E M E N T (O R A L) 16.03.2022 CM No. 13071/2022 (exemption)
JUDGMENT
1. Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application is disposed of.
3. This petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeks adjudication of what the petitioner claims to be substantial questions of law arising out of an order dated 2nd March, 2022, passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court), Rohini in CS(Comm) 120/2020. The petitioner was the plaintiff in the said suit and the respondent was the defendant. The case set up by the 2022:DHC:1261 petitioner, as the plaintiff in CS(Comm) 237/2020 may be summarised thus.
4. The plaintiff claims to be the owner of a property situated at Shop No. Pvt. No.2, adjoining the corner, built on Flat No. AJ/12- A, Ground Floor at Shalimar Bagh, Rohini, Delhi-110088, ad-measuring 7' 1 /4" x 18' (‗the suit property‘). Defendants 1 and 2 in the plaint are Respondents 1 and 2 in the present appeal. Respondent 1 is the wife of the petitioner‘s brother, who expired on 11th October, 2005. Respondent 2 is the son of Respondent 1.
5. The plaintiff claims to have purchased the suit property in 1991 and to have been using the suit property for his own purposes till
1994. It is averred that, in 1994, the petitioner shifted his business to Gandhi Nagar, whereupon the suit property was let out to various tenants, the last of whom vacated the suit property in October, 2019. Thereafter, as the suit property, which is a shop, was lying vacant, it is averred that Respondent 1 approached the petitioner to purchase the shop. The petitioner was inclined to accept the offer, as he needed money to perform the nuptials of his daughter. Before any such agreement by which the property could be sold by the petitioner to Respondent 1 could be executed, the plaint avers, that Respondent 1 approached the petitioner to share a copy of the title deeds relating to the property, whereupon the petitioner informed her that the title deeds were lying with his father from whom they could be collected by Respondent 1. It is further averred – and learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to explain this averment to me – that Respondent 1 ―created a miscommunicado without the knowledge of‖ the petitioner and, based on such ―miscommunicado‖, usurped the original title deeds of the suit property from the petitioner‘s father. It is further alleged, in the plaint, that Respondents 1 and 2, in conspiracy with each other, broke the lock of the suit property and dispossessed the petitioner. The petitioner claims to have, thereafter, approached the respondents to return the original title deeds, but alleges that, instead of doing so, the respondents filed a criminal complaint before the police authorities alleging that the petitioner had committed criminal trespass. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has filed the plaint before the learned trial court. Paras 3 to 5 of the plaint, being of some significance in adjudicating the issue in the present petition, merit reproduction in extenso thus: ―3. That being considerate most of the rent received from the suit property was being utilized to maintain the father of the Plaintiff: being the Plaintiff duty bound and as the business of the Plaintiff was flourishing mostly during the said periods. That the Defendants are occupying certain shops in the vicinity of the suit property however, the Plaintiff is unaware of the nature of such occupation. That since the shop of the Plaintiff was lying vacant, the Defendant No.1 approached the Plaintiff to purchase the said shop by obtaining a bank loan as the Plaintiff was looking to sell the said shop in order to meet the expenses for his daughter's marriage. That before an agreement for such sale could be agreed upon or before a sale price could be finalized, the Defendant No.1 approached the Plaintiff to share a copy of the title deeds qua the said property whereupon the Plaintiff informed that the said title deeds are lying with the father of the Plaintiff due to the renovation therefore she may collect the photocopy of the title documents of the suit property, however, the Defendant No.1 created a miscommunicado without the knowledge of the Plaintiff.
4. That the Plaintiff being unaware that the Defendant No.1 had usurped the original title deeds of the suit property from the father of the Plaintiff; further surprisingly learnt in the month of November' 2019 that the Defendant No.1 in conspiracy with Defendant No.2 had broken the lock of the suit property illegally and dispossessed the Plaintiff thereto. Thereafter, the plaintiff approached the defendants to immediately return the original title deed alongwith the possession, however, the clever defendants, dodged the plaintiff by various threats, the plaintiff consequently, filed a complaint of Criminal Trespassing at Police Station informing them about the situation. Hence this suit.
5. The Plaintiff is approaching this Hon'ble Court as early as possible and the present Suit is filed within time and is not barred by the law of limitation. The Cause of Action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court in the favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in November'2019 whereupon, the Defendants illegally, unlawfully and without the consent of the Plaintiff took illegal possession of the suit property, hence, the cause of action is still surviving and continuing as the property is still in the illegal and unlawful possession of the Defendants and the possession has not yet been restored back to the lawful and peaceful ownership of the Plaintiff.‖
6. As noted hereinabove, the plaint was filed as a commercial suit, under the Commercial Courts Act.
7. Before the learned District Judge, the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the plaint on the ground that the dispute was not a ―commercial dispute‖ within the meaning of Section 2 of the Commercial Courts Act. Mr. Rajgopal, however, points out that no such preliminary objection was raised by the defendant. This objection has been upheld by the learned District Judge who has, consequently, directed that the case be placed before the Principal District Judge, Rohini, who has been requested to withdraw the case from the commercial court and assign the case to an appropriate court having jurisdiction to deal with it.
8. This order, dated 2nd March, 2022, passed by the learned District Judge, has been assailed by the petitioner in the present petition, preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The impugned order being brief, may be reproduced in extenso as under: ―CS (COMM.)/120/2020 CNR No. DLNW01-005204-2020 SANDEEP KUMAR VOHRA@ SARDEEP VOHRA Vs.
SEEMA VOHRA 2.3.2022 Present: Plaintiff in person with Sh. Sidharth Tyagi, Advocate. Both the defendants with Ms Menu Juneja, Advocate. An application under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC of plaintiff is pending. Defendant has filed written arguments to this application. Copy supplied. Ld. Counsel for defendant had raised an objection on 8.12.2020 orally that present suit does not involve a commercial dispute. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff has filed written submissions on this point. Arguments are heard. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff has drawn my attention to Section 2(1) (c) (vii) and explanation thereto and argues that since this is a suit for recovery of commercial shop, the commercial court has jurisdiction to try this suit. I have considered the submissions. Section 2(1) (c) of The Commercial Courts Act 2015 defines the commercial disputes. I reproduce the relevant portion of this provision as under: "2.. Definitions- (1).... (a)..... (aa).... (b).... (c) "Commercial dispute" means a dispute arising out of
(vii) agreements relating to Immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce. Explanation- a commercial dispute shall not sees to be a commercial dispute merely because- (a) it also involves action for recovery of immovable property........."
9. Mr. Rajgopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned District Judge placed an unjustifiably narrow construction on the word ―agreement‖, as used in Section 2(1)(c)(vii)1 of the Section 2. (1). In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,– Commercial Courts Act. He submits that there was no requirement of an ―agreement‖, for the purposes of the said provision, to be necessarily in writing. He has placed reliance, in this context, on Section 2(e) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (―the Contract Act‖) which reads thus: ―2. Interpretation-clause.—In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:— In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:—" *** (e) Every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement;‖
10. Mr. Rajgopal submits that, inasmuch as there had been an offer by Respondent 1 to the petitioner to purchase the suit property which, indisputably, was being used for commercial purposes, and as the petitioner had agreed to the said transaction and had, in furtherance of the said agreement, allowed Respondent 1 to obtain the title deeds..... (c) ―commercial dispute‖ means a dispute arising out of–.....
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(vii) agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce;.... Explanation: a commercial dispute shall not cease to be a commercial dispute merely because- (a) it also involves action for recovery of immovable property or for realisation of monies out of immovable property given as security or involves any other relief pertaining to immovable property; (b) One of the contracting parties is the State or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or a private body carrying out public functions;” from the petitioner‘s father, the dispute in the suit is a ―commercial dispute‖ within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii).
11. Mr. Rajgopal has also placed reliance on Section 70 of the Contract Act, which reads thus:
“70. Obligation of person enjoying benefit of non-
gratuitous act.—
Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or
delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously,
and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is
bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to
restore, the thing so done or delivered. 1 —Where a person
lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers
anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such
other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to
make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore,
the thing so done or delivered.1" Illustrations
(a) A, a tradesman, leaves goods at B‘s house by mistake. B treats the goods as his own. He is bound to pay A for them.
(b) A saves B‘s property from fire. A is not entitled to compensation from B, if the circumstances show that he intended to act gratuitously.‖
12. Additionally, Mr. Rajagopal has invited my attention to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Jagmohan Behl v. State Bank of Indore[2]. He places special reliance on paras 10, 11, 12 and 18 of the said decision.
13. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, does not sit in appeal over the pronouncement of the court below. The scope of Article 227 jurisdiction is fundamentally in the nature of certiorari, in relation to which the following passages, from the well known decision of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan[3] correctly delineate the legal position, albeit in the context of Article 226:
7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible AIR 1964 SC 477 evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque[4], Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam[5] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh[6] ).
8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test AIR 1955 SC 233 AIR 1958 SC 398 AIR 1960 SC 1168 that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.
14. No doubt, if a palpable error of law is committed by the court below, or if the court refuses to exercise jurisdiction without due justification, a case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is made out.
15. Having perused the facts of the case, the impugned decision of the learned District Judge and having applied my mind to the submissions advanced by Mr. Rajgopal, I am unable to convince myself that such a case exists. While referring to Jaganmohan Behl[2], Mr. Rajgopal draws particular reliance to the wordings of the explanation to Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act. Insofar as it is relevant for the purpose of the present case, ―commercial dispute‖ is defined in Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act as ―a dispute arising out of…. agreements relating to immoveable property used exclusively in trade or commerce‖. Where the dispute relates to immoveable property, therefore, in order for the dispute to be a ―commercial dispute‖ three conditions are required to be simultaneously satisfied, viz that (i) the immoveable property should be used exclusively in trade or commerce, (ii) there must be an agreement relating to the said immoveable property and (iii) the dispute in the suit must arise out of such agreement. Indisputably, ingredient (i) stands satisfied and, arguendo, I may proceed on the premise that, for satisfaction of ingredient (ii) a written agreement is not necessary and an oral agreement between the parties would suffice.
16. Even read thus, however, via-a-vis the afore-extracted definition of ―commercial dispute‖ as contained in the Commercial Courts Act, the dispute in the present case does not satisfy the definition.
17. It cannot, in my considered opinion, be held that the dispute in the suit arises out of an agreement between the parties relating to the suit property. The case made out in the suit is that an agreement would have been entered into, had the respondent not usurped the title deeds of the property from the petitioner‘s father. No such agreement having, either oral or written was, therefore, ever executed between the parties. In fact, the grievance of the petitioner in the plaint is that, owing to the alleged subterfuge committed by the respondents, such an agreement could never fructify.
18. That apart, the case made out by the petitioner against the respondents, in the plaint, is that the respondents usurped the title deeds from the petitioner‘s father. This usurpation was not made either consequent to or in furtherance of any agreement between the parties. The grievance of the petitioner against such usurpation, by the respondents, of the title deeds cannot, therefore, be treated as ―arising out of‖ an agreement between the petitioner and the respondents, howsoever expansive an interpretation one may extend to the expression ―arising out of‖ – which, undisputedly is an expression of wide amplitude.
19. The dispute in the plaint cannot, therefore, be treated as arising out of any agreement between the parties in respect of the suit property, even if it were to be assumed that such an agreement existed.
20. The reliance, by Mr. Rajgopal, on the Explanation to Section 2(1)(c) is fundamentally misplaced and in that regard, I entirely agree with the reasoning of the learned District Judge in the impugned order. The Explanation merely states that a ―commercial dispute‖ would not seized to be a commercial dispute merely because it also involves action for recovery of immoveable property or for realisation of moneys out of immoveable property or any other relief pertaining to immoveable property. Explanation (a) is therefore, in the nature of a saving clause which saves commercial disputes from being uprooted from the applicability of the Act of any of the exigencies envisaged therein. In other words, if a dispute is, in the first instance, a ―commercial dispute‖ within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c), what explanation (a) clarifies is that it would not cease to be a ―commercial dispute‖ by reason of one or more of the exigencies contemplated by the said explanation.
21. As, in the present case, the dispute is not a ―commercial dispute‖ within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c) in the first place, no occasion arises for taking recourse to the Explanation.
22. This issue, which is of some nuance, has been correctly understood by the learned District Judge, who has observed, with respect to Clause (a) of the Explanation, that it was in the nature of an additional clarification that a dispute which was a ―commercial dispute‖ within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c) would also include a case where the dispute related to recovery of immoveable property. The three exigencies envisaged in Explanation (a) to Section 2(1)(c) do not, therefore, operate as additional circumstances, over and above Clauses (i) to (xxii) of Section 2(1)(c) to treat a dispute as commercial. The interpretation that Mr. Rajgopal seeks to place on the explanation would amount to treating the three circumstances envisaged in explanation (a) as three additional circumstances, over and above the 22 circumstances contemplated by Section 2(1)(c) in which a dispute would be treated as a ―commercial dispute‖. That is, in my view, a completely unsustainable interpretation of the Explanation.
23. In view of the above, no occasion arises for this Court to pronounce on the provisions of the Contract Act, on which Mr. Rajgopal placed reliance as, in the opinion of this Court, even if it were to be treated that there was an agreement between the parties – which, on facts, does not appear to be the case - the dispute between the parties could not be said to be arising out of such agreement.
24. Adverting, now, to the judgment of the Division Bench in Jagmohan Behl[2], I failed to understand how the said decision can come to the aid of the petitioner. That was a case where there was an agreement between the parties and a suit was filed for recovery of mesne profits alongwith interest. Para 3 of the judgment clearly states that the suit property was given on lease by the plaintiff to the defendant for five years at a monthly rent of ₹ 40,000/-. Para 8 of the judgment specifically notes that the suit sought recovery of rent and mesne profits which, clearly, would be a dispute arising out of the agreement between the parties.
25. In view thereof, paras 10, 11, 12 and 18 of the said decision, on which Mr. Rajgopal placed reliance, may be reproduced thus: ―10. The explanation in the present case has to be read as part and parcel of clause (vii), for the language of the explanation shows the purpose, and the construction consistent with the purpose which should be placed on the main provision. The main provision, therefore, has to be construed and read in the light of the explanation and accordingly the scope and ambit of sub-clause (vii) to clause(c), defining the expression ―commercial dispute‖, has to be interpreted. The explanation harmonises and clears up any ambiguity or doubt when it comes to interpretation of the main provision. In S. Sundaran Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman (1985) 1 SCC 591, it was observed that explanation to a statutory provision can explain the meaning and intendment of the provision itself and also clear any obscurity and vagueness to clarify and make it consistent with the dominant object which the explanation seems to subserve. It fills up the gap. However, such explanation should not be construed so as to take away the statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or to set at naught the working of the Act by becoming a hindrance in the interpretation of the same.
11. Clause (c) defines the ―commercial dispute‖ in the Act to mean a dispute arising out of different sub-clauses. The expression ―arising out of‖ in the context of clause (vii) refers to an agreement in relation to an immoveable property. The expressions ―arising out of‖ and ―in relation to immoveable property‖1 have to be given their natural and general contours. These are wide and expansive expressions and are not to be given a narrow and restricted meaning. The expressions would include all matters relating to all agreements in connection with immoveable properties. The immoveable property should form the dominant purpose of the agreement out of which the dispute arises. There is another significant stipulation in clause (vii) relating to immoveable property, i.e., the property should be used exclusively in trade or commerce. The natural and grammatical meaning of clause
(vii) is that all disputes arising out of agreements relating to immoveable property when the immoveable property is exclusively used for trade and commerce would qualify as a commercial dispute. The immoveable property must be used exclusively for trade or business and it is not material whether renting of immoveable property was the trade or business activity carried on by the landlord. Use of the property as for trade and business is determinative. Properties which are not exclusively used for trade or commerce would be excluded.
12. The explanation stipulates that a commercial dispute shall not cease to be a commercial dispute merely because it involves recovery of immoveable property, or is for realisation of money out of immoveable property given as security or involves any other relief pertaining to immoveable property, and would be a commercial dispute as defined in sub-clause (vii) to clause (c). The expression ―shall not cease‖, it could be asserted, has been used so as to not unnecessarily expand the ambit and scope of sub-clause (vii) to clause (c), albeit it is a clarificatory in nature. The expression seeks to clarify that the immoveable property should be exclusively used in trade or commerce, and when the said condition is satisfied, disputes arising out of agreements relating to immoveable property involving action for recovery of immoveable property, realization of money out of immoveable property given as security or any other relief pertaining to immoveable property would be a commercial dispute. The expression ―any other relief pertaining to immoveable property‖ is significant and wide. The contours are broad and should not be made otiose while reading the explanation and sub-clause (vii) to clause (c) which defines the expression ―commercial dispute‖. Any other interpretation would make the expression ―any other relief pertaining to immoveable property‖ exclusively used in trade or commerce as nugatory and redundant. *****
18. Lease of immoveable property is dealt with under the Transfer of Property Act in Chapter V thereof. The said enactment vide section 105 defines what is lease, lessor, lessee and rent and vide section 107 stipulates how leases are made and can be terminated. Leases can be both oral or in writing. Noticeably, sub-clause (vii) to clause (c) in Section 2 of the Act does not qualify the word ―agreements‖ as referring to only written agreements. It would include oral agreements as well. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act deal with the effect of non-payment of rent, effect of holding over and most importantly the determination of the leases or their termination. It cannot be disputed that action for recovery of immoveable property would be covered under sub-clause (vii) to clause (c) when the immoveable property is exclusively used in trade or commerce. Read in this manner, we do not think that claim for recovery of rent or mesne profit, security deposit etc., relating to immoveable property which was used exclusively in trade or commerce should not be treated as a commercial dispute in view of the language, ambit and scope of sub-clause (vii) to clause (c) to Section 2 of the Act. These would qualify and have to be regarded as commercial disputes. The use of expression―any other relief pertaining to immoveable property‖ would mean disputes relating to breach of agreement and damages payable on account of breach of agreement would be covered under sub-clause (vii) to clause (c) to Section 2 of the Act when it is arising out of agreement relating to immoveable property exclusively used in trade and commerce.‖
26. The Division Bench has, in the afore-extracted passages, noted the wide amplitude of the expression ―arising out of‖ and ―in relation to‖. Significantly, in para 11, the Division Bench notes that, if the immoveable property, forming subject matter of the suit was used exclusively for trade or business, ―it is not material whether renting of immoveable property was the trade or business activity carried on by the landlord‖. This clearly indicates that the Division Bench was conscious of the fact that the case before it involved an agreement between the parties, under which the suit property was given on rent by one to the other.
27. Para 12 of the decision goes on to expound on the explanation to Section 2(1) and the wide ambit of the words ―any other relief pertaining to immoveable property‖. There can be no cavil, whatsoever, with the position in law as enunciated in para 12. If the dispute arises out of an agreement relating to commercial property, whether the agreement were oral or in writing, there can be no question of the matter being treated as non commercial merely because of the existence of one or more of the exigencies envisaged by Explanation (a). This is what para 12 of the decision of the Division Bench in Jagmohan Behl[2] states.
28. The reliance on para 18 of the judgment in Jagmohan Behl[2], in my view, stands sufficiently answered by the discussion hereinabove.
29. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that no occasion arises for this Court to interfere with the impugned order dated 2nd March, 2022 passed by the District Judge (Commercial Courts), especially within the narrow parameters of the jurisdiction vested in this Court by Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
30. The petition is accordingly dismissed in limine.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
MARCH 16, 2022
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