Suresh Kumar Garg v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-1

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731- 37].) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)], wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.

9. We do not think that the impugned order meets the mandate and legal requirements set out in the aforesaid summarization made by the Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. (supra). The impugned order, even if assuming the conclusion was justified, would faulter on the said account. Reference, in this regard, can be also made to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Rakesh Arora Vs. Commissioner of Customs, 2012 (276) E.L.T. 181 (Del.) and Nitesh Kumar Kedia Vs. Commissioner of Customs, Import & General, 2012 (284) E.L.T. 321 (Del.).

10. In these circumstances, we would hold that the impugned order fails to independently and specifically deal with and examine the contentions raised by the appellants. It fails to meet the parameters required, noticed and summarized by the Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

11. Accordingly, the aforesaid substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondent with an order of remand to the Tribunal for fresh decision. However, we clarify that we have not commented on merits or made any observation either in favour of the appellants or the respondent. The matter would be re-heard and decided a fresh on merits without being influenced by the impugned order.” 2.[4] We may note that although the coordinate bench had specifically indicated that its judgment would not apply to the appellant as well as to the other appellant i.e., M/s. Rudrakash Marketing, who has also filed an appeal i.e., CEAC 1/2021, which is, also listed on the board today, that observation will not come in our way of allowing the appeal in terms of the judgment dated 16.05.2018, as the fact of the matter is, at that juncture, neither the appellant nor M/s. Rudrakash Marketing had preferred their respective appeals, which is, what prompted the coordinate bench to say that their judgment would not apply to them. As is obvious, that position has altered.

3. Given this position, the appeal is allowed.

3.1. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 20.04.2017 is set aside qua the appellant.

3.2. The Tribunal, in this case as well, will decide the matter afresh, on merits, without being influenced by the observations made hereinabove.

4. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

RAJIV SHAKDHER, J TARA VITASTA GANJU, J MAY 18, 2022 Click here to check corrigendum, if any