Mukesh & Ors. v. State Govt of NCT of Delhi Through SHO & Anr.

Delhi High Court · 21 Nov 2025 · 2025:DHC:10608
Amit Mahajan
CRL.M.C. 4973/2025
2025:DHC:10608
criminal appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR and proceedings under IPC and POCSO offences arising from a family dispute on compromise and victim's disowning of allegations, exercising inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS with costs.

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CRL.M.C. 4973/2025
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: November 21, 2025
CRL.M.C. 4973/2025
MUKESH & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rohit Kumar, Ms. Jaishree Diwan, Ms. Kirti Nagi, Mr. Md. Aamir
Khan and Mr. Md. Aarif, Advs. All the petitioners in person.
VERSUS
STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI THROUGH SHO & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Raj Kumar, APP for the State
WITH
SI Sanjay, PS Mehrauli.
Mr. Rajan Kr. Prasad, Ms. Pratika Jha, Ms. Nisha and
Mr. Om Singh, Advs. Victim in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
JUDGMENT

1. The present petition is seeking quashing of FIR NO. 451/2023 dated 14.08.2023, registered at Police Station Mehrauli, for offences under Sections 341/323/509/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Sections 8/12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO’).

2. Chargesheet has been filed in the present case for offences under Sections 323/341/506/509/34 of the IPC and Sections 8/10/12 of the POCSO.

3. The present petition is filed on the ground that the parties have amicably settled all their disputes by way of Memorandum of Settlement dated 04.10.2023, out of their own will, and without any influence, coercion, fear or pressure.

4. All the parties are present in Court today and have been duly identified by the Investigating Officer.

5. On being asked, the victim/complainant states that the petitioners are her family members and an altercation took place between them, which led to making of false and exaggerated allegations against the petitioners.

6. She submits that all the parties have since resolved their disputes and she does not wish to pursue any proceedings arising out of the present FIR.

7. Offences under Section 323/341/506/509 of the IPC are compoundable whereas offences under Sections 8/10/12 of the POCSO Act are non-compoundable.

8. It is well settled that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) (erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) can compound offences which are non-compoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. The Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down parameters and guidelines for High Court while accepting settlement and quashing the proceedings.

9. In Narinder Singh & Ors. V. State of Punjab & Anr.: (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

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29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” (emphasis supplied)

10. It is not in doubt that the offences under Sections 8/10/12 of the POCSO are heinous in nature and involve mental depravity. Offences of such nature cannot be quashed merely because the victim has settled the dispute. Such offences, in true sense, cannot be said to be offences in personam as the same are crimes against the society.

11. In the present case, it is an admitted position that multiple FIRs were registered on the basis of exaggerated allegations arising solely out of personal animosity and an altercation between the parties. It is unfortunate that the parties resorted to such measures and even involved minor girls from their families in order to initiate criminal proceedings against each other’s family members.

12. However, once the victim is present before the Court and has deposed that the allegations were false, the likelihood of the petitioners’ conviction appears remote in the peculiar facts of the case.

13. Keeping in view the fact that the parties have amicably settled the dispute, this Court feels that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court and would only fester ill will and harassment to all the parties who are stated to be family members. I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

14. However, keeping in mind the fact that the charge sheet has already been filed in the case arising out of the present FIR, and the State machinery has been put to motion, ends of justice would be served if the petitioners are put to cost.

15. In view of the above, FIR No. 451/2023 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed, subject to payment of cost of ₹1,00,000/- by the petitioners, out of which ₹50,000/- is to be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee and ₹50,000/- is to be deposited with Arya Kanya Sadan, 1488 Pataudi House, Daryaganj, New Delhi for the benefit of destitute girls, within a period of twelve weeks from date.

16. Proof of deposit of cost shall be furnished to the concerned SHO.

17. The Police is at liberty to take appropriate action in accordance with law.

18. The present petition is allowed in aforesaid terms. Pending application also stand disposed of. AMIT MAHAJAN, J NOVEMBER 21, 2025 / ‘KDK’