Kamlesh v. State of NCT of Delhi

4. We have heard the counsel for all the appellants and the State on various dates.

5. The accused have been convicted for causing death ofvictim Umesh Kumar and attempting to murder victims viz. Sunil and Vikas Anand and causing simple hurt to Sanjay and Aman in furtherance ofcommon intention on 15"' August,2013 at about 02:05 pm in gali in front ofHouse No.253, Gali No.13,Mann Singh Nagar,Anand Parbat,Delhi.

6. FIR No.146/2013 was registered at PS Anand Parbat on 15.08.2013 and charge sheet was later filed against all the accused. Charges were framed for offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 323 read with Section 34 IPG. The matter was committed for trial before the Sessions Court and upon pleading not guilty by the accused, evidence was recorded. The prosecution examined total of29 witnesses,statement ofaccused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded and the accused persons examined 4 witnesses in their defence. The Incident

7. As per the prosecution, the incident leading to the commission of offences occurred in the afternoon ofIndependence Day of year 2013 i.e. th 15 August, 2013 at around 2 pm. Complainant Sanjay, being father of Aman, gave Rs.lOO/- to him to purchase kites but while Aman was on his way in the street, the money was snatched by their neighbour Gaurav resulting in Aman returning back to his father crying and complaining. Sanjay accompanied Aman to the street downstairs where Gaurav was standing with his brother-in-law Sunil and cousin Yogesh and asked them CRL.A.27/2021 <6 other connected matters Page 5of41 the reason for snatching the money from Aman. Thereupon, Gaurav along with Yogesh and Sunil started to misbehave and beat Sanjay and Aman.On hearing their cries, Sunil(real brother ofSanjay), Vikas and Umesh(cousin brothers of Sanjay) came downstairs from their neighbouring houses. Accused Kamlesh (paternal aunt of accused Gaurav and Yogesh) also reached the spot and started abusing the complainants. Accused Kamlesh caught hold of Umesh from behind whereas accused Gaurav exhorted^ ^''sabko sabak sikha do" (teach a lesson) to all of them. All the accused persons took out knives from their possession and started inflicting injuries on Umesh indiscriminately and also attacked Vikas and Sunil with the knives when they tried to rescue their brother Umesh. As a result, Vikas sustained injuries on his left shoulder and Sunil was stabbed on his left chest. Complainant Sanjay took injured Umesh, Vikas and Sunil to Lady Hardinge Hospital in an auto around 3:00 pm and Umesh expired during treatment at 3.50 pm.

8. In their defence, the accused raised the plea that the scuffle was actually between the complainant and some outsiders on the issue ofev^^ teasing in which Aman was involved. On the suspicion that Gaurav had made a complaint against Aman regarding this eve teasing, Aman allegedly had beaten Gaurav with a bat and when accused Gaurav raised an alarm people gathered. In the meantime, brothers of Sanjay reached the spot with knives. Accused Sunil raised a further plea ofalibi that he was present in his village in Sonepat, Haryana and did not visit Anand Parbat, Delhi on that day. CRL.A.27/2021 <S other connected matters Page6of41

9. As per the post-mortem report (Ex.PW2/A), Umesh died due to haemorrhage and shock consequent upon stab wound on abdominal organ which was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature and could be produced by some sharp cutting and stabbing single edged weapon. In addition, he sustained four bruises elsewhere and another stab wound on his left forearm, all injuries being ante mortem in nature. As per the MLC Ex.PW4/A,the stab injuries sustained by the patient Sunil on his chest was dangerous to his life and he was diagnosed as hemothorax due to the trauma and collection of blood in his pleural cavity. MLC(Ex.PW26/A)of Vikas stated that he had suffered fractured injuries on his left elaviele bone which injury was opined as being grievous. Submissions by the Appellants:

10. The contentions raised by the accused in their appeals are cumulatively inter alia as follows:

(i) Conviction of the accused has been based on assumptions, presumptions, conjunctions and surmises and that there are material contradictions between the charge sheet and the evidence ofthe prosecution.

(ii) The area where the altercation took place was a congested and populated area and assuming many people were gathered, no one was made a witness forthe prosecution.

(iii) The police officials did not recover anything at the instance of

PWIO Aman. As per PW[9] Sunil, there was no evidence to CRLA.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 7of41 ) rsubstantiate whether the recovered knife belonged to the accused or not.

(iv) That the accused Kamlesh was also injured on her chest during altercation but was not medically examined.

(v) There were contradictions between the medical and the ocular evidence since as per the evidence led by the prosecution,th^ words''taabad todd chaaku maare" were used by the accuse^^ during this scuffle which could have meant numerous knife injuries but there were only two injuries on the victims.

(vi) The place of occurrence was near the house of the accused establishing that it was the family ofthe complainant who were the aggressors.

(vii) No knife has been recovered from accused Sunil and Yogesh despite the accusation that they were all possessing knives on their person.

(viii) There was no evidence that accused persons took undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner thereby attracting Exception(4)urider Section 300 IPG as being premeditated,in the heat ofpassion,upon a sudden quarrel.

(ix) At best in these circumstances, the influence drawn could be that fatal injury was inflicted by accused persons with the knowledge that they were likely to cause an injury which could lead to death but without any intention to cause death or to CRL.A.27/2021 <6 otherconnectedmatters Page8of41 cause such bodily injury and, therefore, would be punishable under Section 304(Part II)ofIPC.

(x) The learned trial court having observed that if this would fall under Exception (4) under Section 300 IPC, Section 34 could not have been invoked as there would be no common element in the participation ofthe crime.

(xi) The alleged exhortation attributed to accused Gaurav of

(xii) The PGR call as received (Ex.PW2I/A) mentioned that a lady had been hurt proving that the complainant had also used a knife and has no mention of the presence ofPW[3] Sanjay and PWIO Aman leading to the conclusion that they have been planted as alleged eye witnesses.

(xiii) The recovery ofthe alleged knife cannot be treated as recovery under Section 27 ofthe Indian Evidence Act, 1872 since as per disclosure statement ofthe appellant he had not mentioned that he had hid it under a stone whereas the recovery was such.

(xiv) The prosecution had not been able to prove covert/overt act of the appellants, meeting of their minds or pre-arrangement to prove common intention. At most, it could be inferred that it was a free fight where both sides received injuries during the scuffle and one of such injuries prove fatal. There was no eye witness to state that who gave the fatal blow to the deceased. CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 9of41 r'

(xv) The knife that was recovered at the behest of accused Gaurav was not blood stained and no forensic analysis had been conducted on the same.

(xvi) As per the Supreme Court in Shahjahan AH & Ors. v. State of

Maharashtra(2017)4 SCC(Cri)675 conviction under Section 302 was converted to that under Section 304 (II) IPG and limited to the sentence already undergone. (xvii)A host ofjudgments were relied upon by the appellants in their written submissions and in their pleadings in support of their contentions,which are listed as under: a) Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka MANU/ SC/0248/2022 b) Amiruddin vs.State(DelhiAdmn.)MANU/SC/1313/2019 c) Bhagirath vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/1208/2018 d) Matadin vs. State ofMaharashtra MANU/SC/0477/1998 e) A.Shankar v. State ofKarnataka(2011)6SCC279 f) Stalin V.State,(2020)9SCC524Mathai v.State ofKerala, (2005)3SCC260 g) Virsa Singh v. State ofPunjab,1958SCR 1495 h) Ramesh Vithalrao Thakre v. State ofMaharashtra,(2009) 17SCC438 i) Heera Lai v. State Govt. ofNCT,2014 SCC Online Del CRL.A.27/2021 <S other connected matters Page 10of41 j) Trimbak v. State ofM.P.,AIR 1954SC39 k) Pradeep v. State(NCT ofDelhi), 2018 SCC Online Del I) Chhotu Kumar v. State(NCTofDelhi),2021SCC Online Del3533 m)Dharampal v. State,2011SCCOnlineDel3123 n) Shahajan AH v. State ofMaharashtra,(2017)13SCC481 a) Sunil Khergade v. State ofMaharashtra,(2016) 15 SCC p) JagtarSingh v. State ofPunjab,(1983)2SCC342 q) GirijaShankar v. State ofU.P,(2004)3SCC 793 r) Mohan Singh v. State ofPunjab,AIR 1963SC174 s) Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh 1989(2)SCC217 t) Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State ofMahrashtra (2013)6 SCC 770 u) Madhavan& Ors v. the State ofTamilNadu(2017)15SCC v) Dashrath v. State OfM.P.in Crl.A No. 76/2008 w)Shyam v. State ofDelhi,2019SCC Online Del9187

11. The learned senior eounsel for aceused No.2 (Gaurav) additionally submitted as under:

(i) Only one injury was the fatal injury and it was not known who had eaused it.

(ii) Only one knife was recovered at the instance ofaccused No.2

Gaurav from a public place and it reportedly had darkish material on it but no forensic examination was conducted. Two witnesses saw knife in the hands of other accused Yogesh and not Gaurav, therefore, it equld not be proven that the knife recovered from Gaurav was used in the murder.

(iii) Evenifthe accused werecarryingknivesbutitwasnotforthk^

(iv) The main act of delivering any fatal blow has not been attributed to the others and, therefore, a ease under Section 34 cannot be sustained.

(v) There were no proven previous criminal antecedents of the accused which go against the accused and extent of their conviction.

(vi) There was no evidence of any previous enmity between the appellants and the victims.

(vii) The injury caused to Kamlesh during the fight was not rebutted.

(viii) The fatal injury was caused through the and rib damaging the liver. The nature and specificity ofthe injury could not have been intended in a street fight. Therefore, relying on Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Virsa Singh, the intention was clearly not to inflict that particular injury. CRL.A.27/2021 tS: other connected matters Page 12of41

(ix) Appellant Sunil was arrested after two months and the rest of the appellants were arrested immediately.Sunil presented a plea ofalibi which has not been examined.

(x) PW-18 was the recovery constable who recovered the knife from Yogesh and later stated that it was Gaurav and that she could not identify the knife. In light of inter alia the above contentions, the appellant's plea as advanced by their Counsels was that conviction under Section 304(Part I) was extremely harsh in the circumstances and they were already in custody for eight years. Submissions by the Father ofthe Deceased;

12. In the appeal by the father of deceased under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C.,the following contentions have been raised by the appellant:-

(i) The facts and circumstances of the case warrant a conviction under Section 302 IPG for the murder ofvictim Umesh and the learned Trial Court was in error in mitigating it to Section 304 (Parti)IPG.

(ii) Despite having returned findings under Section 300 (Thirdly)

(iii) To bring a case under Exception (4) of Section 300 IPG, all ingredients as articulated in Pappu v. State ofM.P.(2006)7 CRL.A.27/2021 <6 otherconnected matters Page 13of41 7r A: see 391 ought to be made out, which have not been in the ■ facts ofthis case.

(iv) There was no provocation from the complainants of the deceased. In fact the aggression was purely by the accused. The situation in question cannot be covered under Exception (4)to Section 300IPG since it was not provoked by the victimcomplainants. The knives were already therewith thd(Pl appellants and they were pre-weaponized.

(v) The contrary hypothesis suggested by the accused that the scuffle started on account ofeve teasing by Aman,followed by " accosting by Gaurav and Aman having beaten Gaurav with a bat is completely fabricated since no such injuries were received by Gaurav and no medical examination was ever conducted.

(vi) The suggestions of previous enmity were given by the defence in the cross-examination of PW[3] Sanjay and PW[5] Vika^l^ therefore, suggesting that there was premeditation on this account.

(vii) The deposition by PW[2] Dr. Mukta Rani on the nature of injuries was that they were sufficient to cause death and, therefore. Section 300 (Thirdly) applies. The pulse of the deceased was found to be very weak as per PW-1 the doctor who recorded the MLC and examined the deceased and he further stated that the omentum was protruding and therefore CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 14of41 D the fatal injury was severe and grave. As per PW-28 and PW-8, the injuries to Sunil were also grievous injuries.

(viii) They were four injured eye witnesses, namely, PW[3], PW[5],

PW[9] 'and PWIO viz. Sanjay, Vikas, Sunil and Aman respectively thereby providing the best evidence in favour of the incident as it occurred.

(ix) The three knives had caused four stab injuries, two on the deceased Umesh and one each on Vikas and Sunil even though Sunil's injury was not fully an incision but had been mentioned in the MLC as grievous injury.

(x) The examination of the weapon would reveal that it was not a normal kitchen knife but of26 cm length with 15 cm of blade and 11 cm of handle as also the injuries corresponded to cut marks on the clothing.

(xi) The fight was not a free for all and was triggered by a petty issue of snatching of Rs.lOO/- which shows that there was intentto kill in any event.

(xii) Reliance was placed on \irsa Singh v. State ofPunjab, 1958

SCR 1495 Paras 8, 9 & 12, 13 particularly for bringing a case under Section 300 (Thirdly). The said decision stated that intention to cause death would not matter in those circumstances as long as there is intention to inflict bodily injury which is objectively proved and that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course ofnature to cause death. CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 15of41 >•- Submissions by the Prosecution:

13. Submissions were advanced on behalf of the Additional Public Prosecutor which are inter alia as under:

(i) The injuries which have been inflicted on the victims are not just a single injury but multiple injuries. The appellants have relied uponjudgments which are ofsingle injury.

(ii) The injury to PW-9 as testified by the PW-8 doctor was a grievous injury and not a simple injury and,therefore,there was no question in giving the benefit of doubt to the appellants on their intent to inflict fatal blows. Even PW-5 had a fractured collarbone as a result of him being secured by one of the accused.

(iii) There was no sudden fight which had ensued between the appellants and the victims but was provoked by the appellants who were clearly the aggressors and were also respectively armed with knives. The injury which caused the fatality was opined by the doctor as one sufficient to cause death since it was deep incision which had pierced between the ribs and seriously punctured and cause severe damage to the organs inside.

(iv) The prosecution relied upon inter alia the following authorities in support oftheir arguments: a) Pargan Singh v.State ofPunjab,(2014)14 SCC 619 b) AbdulSayeed v. State ofM.P.,(2010)10 SCC 259 CRL.A.27/2021 <6 other connected matters Page16of41 u c) State ofHaryana v. Tek Singh,(1999)4 SCC 682 d) State ofM.P. v. Uclaibhan,(2016)4 SCC 116 e) Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B.,(1994) 2 SCC f) Ravji V. State ofRajasthan,(1996)2 SCC 175 g) State ofM.P. v. Munna Choubey,(2005)2SCC 710 The Evidence;

14. As per DD No.22A,a call was received through the PCR at 2:30 pm reporting that a man has been attacked by knife at House No.253, Gali No.13, Than Singh Nagar, New Delhi. Subsequently, vide DD No.23A infonnation was received at 02:43 pm that in fact two people had been loiifed. This call was received by PW-22the PCR constable,thereafter PW-

14 Constable Mahesh Kumar and PW-25 SI Kamal went to the spot and came to know that the injured had already been shifted to Lady Hardinge Hospital by the PCR. PW-14 thereafter recorded the statement of Sanjay and based on this "Rukka", FIR was registered at 18:15 hours,and the crime team was also called. The crime team member collected the blood stained earth control, the blood stained clothes ofthe deceased, blood in gauze and these were duly sealed.

15. On 16"^ August,2013,PW-25 and PW-29 Inspector Dalbir Singh got secret information that the appellant Kamlesh was present at her house and accordingly by requisitioning a proper team Kamlesh was apprehended and was duly identified in court later by PW-29. Thereafter Yogesh and Gaurav were also apprehended from a plot at the backside of a CNG petrol pump CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 17of41 and were also duly identified in court later by PW-29. Pursuant to the disclosure statement, appellant Gaurav got recovered the weapon ofoffence i.e. knife from under stone near the boundary wall of the plot which was duly seized. Appellant Yogesh also led the police team to a pile ofgarbage at military road where he had thrown away the weapon ofoffence i.e. knife but it could not be found.

16. PW-2(Dr. Mukta Rani),the doctor who conducted the post morteiH^ on the body ofthe deceased Umesh testified that there were six injuries out of which four were abrasions on various parts ofthe body and two incised stab wounds - one over the inner-lower front ofright side ofthe chest which had penetrated through the skin,tissue and muscle and cutthrough the liver, while the later incision was over the back ofthe left forearm. PW-2 testified that the cause of death was haemorrhage and shock consequent upon stab wound of abdominal organ via injury No.3 i.e. the stab injury which was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course ofnature and could be produced by some sharp cutting and stabbing single edged weapon. PW-2 further opined that the other abrasion injuries could be produced by blunt forced weapon and object. Subsequently,after being shown the weapon ofoffence, PW-2 gave a subsequent opinion confirming that the two incised wounds could have been produced by the weapon examined by her. The weapon itself was about 26.[5] cm knife with about 15.[5] cm of blade and 11 cm of a wooden handle and about 3 cm wide and tapering down to a sharp point. PW-28,the orthopaedic doctor at the hospital on the assessment ofthe injury sustained by Vikas Anand opined that it was a grievous injury. All the MLCs duly recorded that the deceased Umesh and the other injured viz. CRL.A.27/2021 & otherconnected matters Page 18of41 Sunil and Vikas had been admitted at the hospital by Vikas on 15"" August, 2013 at about 3:15 pm. The MLC of Sunil also recorded a stab wound on the left ofthe upper chest. There was no proofofany injury on Kamlesh.

17. PW-3 Sanjay, the father ofthe boy Aman,testified that when his son came and complained that Gaurav had snatched Rs.lOO/- from him, he accompanied Aman and saw that Gaurav was standing between Gali No.12 and 13 alongwith his brother-in-law Sunil and his brother Yogesh. Upon PW-3 asking Gaurav as to why he had snatched the money, all three started abusing him, upon which PW-3's cousin Umesh (the deceased) and Vikas (PW-5)came downstairs hearing the noise ofthe quarrel, as well as Sunil (PW-9, PW-3's brother). Scuffle ensued and all three accused took out knives and attacked them whereupon Vikas, Umesh and Sunil received injuries and the accused then ran away from the spot before somebody called the PGR. PW-3 denied the suggestion in his cross-examination that a fight took place between him and some other people and that he and his brother were found misbehaving with some girls or that his son Aman had beaten up Gaurav and, therefore, a scuffle had taken place. PW-5 Vikas narrated the same incident from the point when he came to the spot having heard the noise of the quarrel and also stated that accused Kamlesh had come and caught hold ofUmesh from behind while Gaurav exhorted "sabko sabak sikha do"and thereupon all three accused took out knives from their possession and started inflicting injuries on Umesh indiscriminately('dabar tod chakuon se hamla A:/>'fl").When he and his brother tried to intervene and saved Umesh they were also attacked and received injuries. PW-10 Aman testified on similar lines and confirmed that Kamlesh had abused them and CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 19of41 secured Umesh from behind while Gaurav exhorted "aajinka kaam tamam kar dete hain"and the knife attaek happened immediately thereafter. While PW-3 stated that the whole episode had finished in 15 minutes,PW-5 in his testimony suggested that "the incident took place within seconds". The appellants had tried to point to this inconsistency as well as the one in the description of exhortation by Gaurav in support of their case. However, considering it was a scuffle followed by a knife attack with number o^ people involved and the witnesses were all victims and injured,these minor deviations in a situational description may not be relevant for establishing reasonable doubt in favour ofaccused.

18. PW-9 Sunil, the brother ofPW-3 also testified that Gaurav, Yogesh and their brother-in-law (also called Sunil) were beating PW-3 and PW-10 and when he reached his cousin Vikas and deceased Umesh had also arrived. On their intervention, Kamlesh also reaehed and apprehended Umesh from behind while Gaurav said that we should teach them a lesson (sabko sabak sikhate hain). Upon that exhortation, Yogesh, Gaurav and Sunil took out knives and inflicted knife blows on Umesh. When they tried to interven^ Sunil and Yogesh came towards PW-9 and gave knife blows due to which he received injuries on the left side ofhis chest, pursuant to which they fled from the spot. PW-9 also identified all the accused appellants in court.

19. Appellant Sunil in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stated that he had been falsely implicated in the case and was not present at Delhi at the time ofthe incident. In this regard,the defence led evidence of Vinod as DW-4(brother-in-law ofSunil)who testified that on 15'*^ August, 2013, he was called up by the accused Sunil at his house around 12-12:30 CRL.A.27/2021 & otherconnected matters Page20of41 i p.m. as it was a holiday and they had food together and that he remained with Sunil till evening hours and in between they wentto the chaupal to play cards as well. However, no further proof was provided by the defence to corroborate the testimony ofDW-4.

20. As regards the issue whether there was enmity and therefore a motive for the appellants to have inflicted injuries on the victims and killed Umesh, a suggestion was put to PW-3 in his cross-examination by the defence counsel that "due to the previous enmity with family ofaccused Gaurav, Sunil has been falsely implicated". Therefore, the suggestion of prior enmity by the defence counsel itself suggests that there was indeed some prior enmity which the defence wanted to use as a justification for the prosecution falsely implicating the accused. Analysis:

21. On a meticulous examination of the evidence on record, the submissions by the parties,this Courtfinds inter alia that: (a) The whole incident ofthe appellants attacking the complainants with knives was witnessed by four eye witnesses viz. Sanjay, Aman,Sunil and Vikas, all four being injured and out ofwhich Sunil and Vikas were seriously injured. This resulted in the death ofUmesh the cousin brother ofSanjay. The testimonies ofcomplainant Sanjay as PW-3,Vikas^as PW-5,Sunil as PW-9 and Aman as PW-10, the four injured eye witnesses, are consistent with each other, minor contradictions CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 21 of41 notwithstanding. There is nothing which would discredit these testimonies as to the incident. (b) The fact that the appellants Gaurav, Sunil and Yogesh were already in the street and had accosted Aman,snatching Rs.lOO/from him,which led to Aman's father Sanjay approaching them is also evidentfrom the testimonies ofthe eye witnesses, which havenotbeendiscreditedintheircross-examinations. ^ (e) The fact that these three appellants Gaurav, Yogesh and Sunil were already standing there and later joined in by Kamlesh, while the complainant Sanjay came and was then followed by Vikas and Sunil makes it evident that it was the appellants which had orchestrated and triggered the fight and not the complainants and his family members.

(d) The testimonies ofthe eye witnesses also corroborate that it was the appellants (except for Kamlesh) who were already armed with weapons and had knives on their person, which they took out in order to inflict injuries on the complainant, Vikas an^ Sunil and the deceased Umesh. Kamlesh even though not possessing a weapon played the critical role in securing the deceased from the hack and exhorting the others to attack, by stating that the complainant and his family members should be taught a lesson. (e) The fight which ensued was not a "free-for-all" but was clearly triggered at the behest of the appellants by snatching Rs.lOO/from PW-10 Aman demonstrating thereby an intent to invite a CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 22of41 fight and an opportunity to cause injury to the complainant and his family who were residing in close proximity. (f) The fatal injury inflicted on deeeased Umesh was severe as evident from the deposition of the doctor who conducted the post mortem and was suffieient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Besides the fatal injury to deceased Umesh, there were five other injuries which were reported by the doctor. Knife injuries were also sustained by Sunil(on the left of the upper chest) and on Vikas, whieh was, as per medical opinion,a grievous injury. (g) The exhortation of Gaurav was specifically reported by PW-5, PW-10 and PW-9 and despite minor differences in the exact phraseology of the exhortation, it was evident that there was a call by Gaurav to hurt and cause severe injury, even fatal (inka kaam tamam kar dete hain and sabak sikhate hain). (h) The plea ofalibitaken by appellant Sunil was not proven by the defence and no corroboration was offered of a mere statement by DW-4 nor were the prosecution witnesses put a suggestion in their cross-examination that they did not see Sunil since he was not there.

(i) The alternative theory put forward by the defence that it was certain frivolous act by PW-10 Aman that had resulted in the fight was not substantiated in any manner whatsoever to form a credible testimony. CEL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 23of41

22. The issue, which is now to be examined,is whether in these facts and circumstances, was the learned Trial Court correct in handing down a conviction ofSection 304(Part I)/308/34 IPG or, as contended by the father of the deceased, that it ought to be under Section 302/307/34 IPG. This enquiry necessitates a review of the principles set-out by the Hon'ble Supreme,Court ofIndia in certain notablejudgments.

23. Mr. Ramesh Gupta, Senior Advocate appearing for accused No.! placed reliance during his submissions on Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka MANlJ/SG/0248/2022 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding a criminal appeal arising out of a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPG observed as under: "08. The underlying basic assumption orfoundation in criminal law is the principle of personal culpability. A person is criminally responsible for act or transactions in which he is personally engaged or in some other way had participated. However, there are various modes and capacities in which a person can participate in a crime. He can instigate, be a facilitator or otherwise aid execution ofa crime. Section 34IPC incorporates the principle of shared intent, that is, common desisn between the two perpetrators, which makes the second or other participants also an equal or joint perpetrator as the main orprincipalperpetrator...

18. Section 34 IPC makes a co-perpetrator, who had participated in the offence, equally liable on the principle of joint liability. For Section 34 to applv there should be common intention between the co-perpetrators, which means that there should be community ofpurpose and common design or pre arranged plan. However, this does not mean that co- CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page24of41 perpetratorsshould have engaged in any discussion, agreement or valuation. For Section 34 to applv, it is not necessary that the plan should he pre-arranged or hatched for a considerable time before the criminal act is performed. Common intention can be formed just a minute before the actual act happens. Common intention is necessarily a psvcholozical fact as it requires prior meetins:ofminds. In such cases, direct evidence normally will not be available and in mostcases, whether or not there exists a common intention has to be determined by drawing inference from the facts proved. This requires an inquiry into the antecedents, conduct ofthe co-participants or perpetrators at the time and after the occurrence. The manner in which the accused arrived, mounted the attack, nature and type ofinjuries inflicted, the weapon used, conduct or acts of the co-assailants/perpetrators, object and purpose behind the occurrence or the attack etc. are all relevantfactsfrom which inference has to be drawn to arrive at a conclusion whether or not the ingredients ofSection 34 IPG are satisfied. We must remember thatSection 34IPG comes into operation against the co-perpetrators because they have not committed the principal or main act, which is undertaken/performed or is attributed to the main culprit or perpetrator. Where an accused is the main orfinalperpetrator, resort to Section 34 IPG is not necessary as the saidperpetrator is himselfindividually liablefor having caused the injury/offence. A person is liablefor his own acts. Section 34 or the principle ofcommon intention is invoked to implicate and fasten joint liability on other co-participants. Further, the expression/term "criminal act" in Section 34 IPG refers to the physical act, which has been done by the coperpetrators/participants as distinctfrom the effect, result or consequence. In other words, expression "criminal act" referred to in Section 34 IPG is differentfrom "offence". For example, ifA and B strike Lathi at X, the criminal act is of striking lathis, whereas the offence committed may be of murder, culpable homicide or simple or grievous injuries. The expression "common intention" should also not be confused with "intention" or "mens rea" as an essential ingredient of several offences under the IPG. Intention may be an ingredient CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page25of41 ofan offence and this is apersonal matter..." - (emphasis added)

24. However, in the opinion of this Court, Section 34 finding is appropriate and correct since all the Appellants collectively without exception were seeking to cause injuries to the complainant, the deceased and the family. The underscored part ofthe judgement cited clearly states that common intention is to be inferred from the facts and can be formed minute before the actual act.

25. As regards whether conviction ought to be under Section 304 or Section 302IPG,the learned senior counsel relied upon Virsa Singh v. State ofPunjab (1958) SCR 1495; AIR 1958 SC 465 to state that the test was "21....whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficientforce to cause the kind ofinjuryfound to have been inflicted...".

26. There is no doubt that the locus classicus on the nuances of Section 300(Thirdly)IPG is the decision ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court in Virs^^ Singh (Swpra).The appellanttherein was sentenced to imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPG for murder ofthe victim which was caused as a result of spear thrust and doctor who had examined the injury had opined that it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The learned Trial Court in that case decided that the case falls under Section 300 (Thirdly)and convicted the accused under Section 302IPG.The High Court accepted the finding but the appellant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court CRL.A.27/2021 <£ other connected matters Page26of41 stressed that an injury in a chance situation cannot amount to an offence of murder. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Virsa Singh (supra)held as under:

It was said that the intention that the section requires must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficientin the ordinary course ofnature to cause death." Observing that this is a favourite argument in this type ofease,the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated that it is fallacious. In a succinct and pithy analysis of Section 300 (Thirdly), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Virsa Singh (supra) held as under: "73.In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injuryfound to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as,for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted. It is, ofcourse, not necessary to enquire into every lastdetail as,for instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the bowelsfall out, or whether he intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge ofanatomy could never be convicted,for, ifhe does not know that there is a CRL.A.27/2021 <fc other connected matters Page 27of41 heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot be said to have intended to injure them. Ofcourse, that is not the kind of enquiry. It is broad-based and simple and based on commonsense: the kind ofenquiry that "twelve good men and true"couldreadily appreciate and understand.

14. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the followingfacts before it can bring a case under Section 300 "thirdly".

15. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury ispresent.

16. Secondly, the nature ofthe injury must be proved: These are purely objective investigations.

17. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict thatparticular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.

18. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiryproceedsfurther and.

19. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury ofthe type just described made up ofthe three elements set outabove is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course ofnature. This part ofthe enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention ofthe offender.

20. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout)the offence is murder under Section 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury ofa kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act ofthat kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest ofthe enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter ofpurely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of CRL.A.27/2021 other connected matters Page28of41 nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course ofnature and claim that they are not suilty ofmurder. Ifthey inflict injuries ofthat kind, they mustface the consequences: and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or othe]w\'ise unintentional." The Hon'ble Supreme Court further noted in Para 22 after referring to decision ofLord Goddard in R. v. Steane(1947)1

ALL ER 813 as under: * "22....In the absence of eyidence, or reasonable explanation, that the prisoner did not intend to stab in the stomach with a degree offorce sufficient to penetrate that far into the body, or to indicate that his act was a regrettable accident and that he intended otherwise, it would be peryerse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. Once that intent is established (and no other conclusion is reasonablypossible in this case, and in any case it is a question offact), the rest is a matter for objectiye determination from the medical and other eyidence about the nature andseriousness ofthe injury."

27. Also, in. Virsa Singh (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court after ^ appreciating thefacts stated thatifthere is no evidence that another kind of injury was intended as opposed to one which caused death, it can only lead to an objective analysis of the nature and seriousness of the injury. The Hon'ble Supreme Court states as under:

CRL.A.27/2021 <6 other connected mutters Page 29of41 r ■ out ofthe wound and that digestedfood oozed outfrom cuts in three places. In the absence ofevidence, or reasonable explanation, that the prisoner did not intend to stab in the stomach with a decree offorce sufficient to penetrate that far into the body, or to indicate that his act was a regrettable accident and that he intended otherwise, it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. Once that intent is established (and no other conclusion is reasonablypossible in this case, and in any case it is a question offact), the rest is a matter for objective determination from the medical and other evidence about the nature andseriousness ofthe injury.".

28. The issue whether an injury ofthe nature,that was caused in the given circumstances, would merit a conviction under Section 304 IPG or under Section 302 IPG consequent to the situation contemplated by Section 300 (Thirdly). In this regard the enunciation oflaw in Virsa Singh (supra)still holds the field. The Hon'ble Supreme Gourt has concluded by that decision that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300(Thirdly);

(i) It mustestablish objectively thatthe bodily injury is present;

(ii) The nature ofinjury must be proved,purely objective investigation;

(iii) It must be proved that there was 'an intent to inflict that particular body injury. It should not be that particular body injury was accidental or unintentional or that the such kind of injury was not intended;

(iv) It must be proved that the injury that is established in point (i) is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course ofnature and this must be a purely objective exercise. CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page30of41

29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that once these 4 elements are established, it will not matter there was ""no intention to cause death" or ''there was no intention to cause the injury that would cause death in ordinary course ofnature" or "there was no knowledge that injury ofthat kind is likely to cause death." The only requirement to convict an accused for an offence under Section 300(thirdly)would be to prove that an injury existed and the nature of the injury is such that would cause death in ordinary course ofnature and that the intention was to cause that particular injury, irrespective of whether there was lack of knowledge or intent that would cause death.

30. The essence ofthe articulation and analysis by the Hon'ble Supreme Couit is contained in the following sentence which forms part of.the judgment. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficientto cause death in the ordinarycourse ofnature andclaim thatthey are notguilty ofmurder."

31. On the issue of nature of the injury and the intent to inflict that particular injury, reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant upon Daulcit Trintbak Shewale and Ors. v.State ofMaharashtra MANU/SC/0460/2004 where the Hon'ble Supreme Courtstated on the facts ofthe case which involved afight between two groups ofpeoplethat: 8....It is difficult to come to the conclusion that the appellants went and assaulted the deceased with the intention to kill him. Ifthat was the intention there would have been many more injuries on other vital parts ofthe CRL.A.27/2021& otherconnectedmatters Page31of41 hodv. as also the fact that no attempt was made to kill the other two brothers ofthe deceased even though they were outnumbered. Thefactthatthe appellants hadsoughtpolice help also indicates that they did not intend to take the law into their own hands in thefirst instance. Further thefact that though many ofthe appellants carried axes the doctor who conducted the post mortem found only one incised wound on theforehead. This also indicates that the accused persons did not really intend to kill the deceased. At the same time, it is to be notedthat theprosecution has,not been able to identify who really caused Injury No. 12 which caused the death ofthe deceased.In such circumstances, we think it is not safe to infer that the appellants shared a common intention ofcausing the death ofthe deceased, but it would be more appropriate to hold the appellantsguiltyof causing grievous hurt an offence which ispunishable under Section 326IPG." (emphasis added)

32. Similarly, reliance was also placed on Amiruddin v. State (Delhi Admn.)MANU/SC/1313/2019 where pursuant to an exhortation,there was only one blow which had been given to the deceased with a knife but the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "7. We are ofthe view that the fact that there was a sinsle blow and no attempt was made to give another blow and there is no evidence to show that the Appellant was prevented from giving another blow indicate that his intention was not to kill the deceased.

8. The second aspect ofthe matter is whether the act of giving the blow with the knife wasso imminently dangerous as to impute knowledge to the Accused that would lead to the death ofthe deceased. It bears repetition that one blow wasgiven and thattoo at the back.Itcannot besaidthatthe blow was so imminently dangerous as to impute knowledge to the Appellant that he was committing such an act which would cause the death ofthe deceased. CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Pag^32of41

9. In view ofthe above discussion, we are ofthe view that the Accused should have been held guilty ofcommitting the offence punishable Under Section Part II ofSection 304, Indian Penal Code." (emphasis added)

33. In the opinion ofthis Court,these decisions do not help the appellants as there was more than one injury on the deceased and on other persons as well. Also there were clearly multiple assaults with the knives on the complainants and it was not a situation of one single unintended or accidental injury. As to who caused the specific fatal injury may not be relevant in these facts and circumstances since all the accused demonstrated a united,collective, orchestrated intentto cause injuries to the complainants.

34. The Counsel for the appellants in order to press applicability of Exception 4to Section 300 IPC relied upon SItaltajan All& Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.(2017)13 SCC 481 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a fact situation ofa confrontation held that: ''...neither prior concert nor common intention to commit a murder. During the course of their business activity the accused reached the dhaba where the deceased waspresent. An altercation took place during the discussion they were having behind the dhaba. That led to a sudden fi2ht during which A-1 attacked the deceased with a knife. Exception 4 to Section 300 is applicable to the facts ofthis case. As we are convinced that the accused are responsible for the death of Sarfrai, we are of the opinion that they are liable for conviction under Section 304 part II of the IPC...'" CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page33of41

35. However,facts ofthis case are distinguishable since in this situation it was a sudden fight at a dhaba, without any provocation and no premeditation. Furthermore,the decision ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court has decided clearly on the facts ofthat case and after''scrutinising the material on record", without having laid down any specific principle oflaw which would assistthe appellant in any manner.

36. On the issue ofsudden fightand the applicability ofException(4)t® Section 300 IPG,reliance was also placed upon Bhagirath v. The State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/1208/2018 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "7....The fourth exception to Section 300 Indian Penal Code deals with death committed in sudden fight without premeditation. The sudden fight implies the absence of premeditation. Even asper the evidence ofPW-6, there was a wordy quarrel and in that quarrel the Appellant inflicted farsi blow on the head of the deceased. As the injuries inflicted on the deceased in the sudden fight between the deceased and the Accused party. There was no premeditation. One injury was caused to the deceased by A farsi blow on the head which indicates that the Appellant has nottaken undue advantage ofthe deceased. The manner the occurrence and the injury inflicted on the deceased attract Exception 4 to Section 300. In the facts and circumstances ofthe case, the conviction ofthe Appellantis modified Under Section 304 Part-IIndian Penal Code and thesentence isreducedto theperiodalready undergone."

37. On the issue of exhortation, reliance was placed upon Matadin v. State ofMaharashtra MANU/SC/0477/1998 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: CRL.A.27/2021& otherconnectedmatters Page34of41 Co "11. The courts below have notfound that the language which Matadin used exhorting hisfellows was used in such a tone as to exhort them to kill Ashok or to cause grievous hurt to him by using dangerous weapons or means. When the words "maro sale ko" are used it coidd mean "to beat" or even "to kill" a person. Though the witnesses have stated that these words were used by Matadin in abusive way butfrom that it could not be said that he exhorted hisfellows to kill Ashok. We, therefore,set aside the conviction andsentence ofMatadin under Section 302 read with Section 34IPC and instead convict him under Section 324/110 IPC. It was stated before us that he has already undergone rigorous imprisonmentfor aperiod ofone year and four months. We will sentence him to suffer rigorous imprisonmentfor the period already undergone by him and to fine."

38. In the opinion ofthis Court the exhortation in the facts ofthe instant appeals i.e. "inka kaam tamam kar dete hain and sabak sikhate hain" was clearly an indication to cause maximum damage and injury to the victims and it was quite possible that more than one person could have been severely and fatally injured.Thus this ease would not assist the appellants.Nor would Exception(4)to Section 300IPG apply since,there was premeditation and it was not a sudden fight but a fight invited and triggered by the accused who were already armed with sharp weapons.

39. In Pappu v. State ofM.P.(2006)7 SCC 391 the Hon'ble Supreme Court ofIndia dealt with an incident offatal lathi blow during an altercation between the accused and the deceased for which the accused was convicted and sentenced alongwith other eo-accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The argument for the accused appellant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that the assault happened in the course of a sudden CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page35of41 quarrel, there was no pre-meditation and the aecused had not taken advantage or acted in a cruel manner in giving lathi blow. The issue, therefore, revolved around in applicability ofException(4)of Section 300 IPG.In this regard the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: 1, "13. Thefourth exception ofSection 300 IPC covers acts done in asuddenfight. The saidexception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception isfounded upon the same principle,for in both there is absence ofpremeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is totaldeprivation ofself-control, in case ofException 4, there is only that heat ofpassion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4as in Exception 1; butthe injury done is notthe direct consequence ofthatprovocation. InfactException 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, orsomeprovocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct ofboth partiesputs them in respect of guilt upon equalfooting. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearlv not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placedon one side. For ifit wereso, the exception more appropriatelv applicable would be Exception I There is noprevious deliberation or determination tofight. Afight suddenly takes place,for which both parties are more or less to be blamed.It may be thatone ofthem starts it, butif the other had notaggravated it by his own conductit would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation andaggravation, anditis difficultto apportion the share ofblame which attaches to eachfighter. The help ofException 4can be invoked ifdeath is caused(a)without premeditation;—(bj in a sudden fisht: (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or actedin a cruel CRL.A.27/202!& otherconnectedmatters Page36of41 or unusual manner: and(d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To brin^a case within Exception 4allthe imredients mentioned in it must he found. It is to be noted thatthe "fisht"occurringin Exception 4to Section 300 JPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fipht. Heat of passion requires thatthere nuist be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account ofthe verbal altercation in the beginning- A fi^ht is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is notpossible to enunciate anv generalrule as to whatshall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question offact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the provedfacts ofeach case. For the application ofException 4, itis notsufficienttoshow thatthere wasasudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It mustfurther be shown that the offender has nottaken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage". Deliberating further,the Hon'ble Supreme Courtstated in para 14 and 15 as under:

14. h—cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is ^iven. Section 302 IPCis ruledout.Itwoulddepend upon the weapon used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part ofthe body on which it was given and several such relevantfactors."

40. This issue of premeditation has further been deliberated upon in Bahadur Naik v. State ofBihar (2000) 9 SCC 153 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated in Para 3 as under: CRL.A.27/2021 <6 otherconnectedmatters Page37of41 "3. From the evidence on record, itstandsproved that there wassufficientlightatthe place ofoccurrence to identify the appellant. We are also unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the conviction deserves to be converted to one under Section 304 IPG either Part I or Part II thereof because there was no premeditation. The premeditation can develop on thespotas well. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances ofthe case. In the present case, the deceased was given 5/6 dagger-blows. In view of the evidence on record the contentionfor converting the sentence as aforesaid cannot \ be accepted."

41. In Sukhdev v. State of Punjab (2007) 15 SCC 364 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has relied upon and extracted the above stated observations in Pappu V. State of M.P. (Supra) and concluded that Exception (4) of Section 300 IPG had no application.

42. Similarly, in DayalSingh v. State ofUttaranchal(2012)8 SCC 263 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in dealing with a fact situation where the accused gave afatal lathi blow tothe deceased as aresultofa quarrel inthe village fields,noted in Para 13 as under: "13. From the narration of the above facts, brought on record by the prosecution and proved in accordance with law, it is clear that there are three eyewitnesses to the occurrence. Outofthem, two are injured witnesses, namely, PW[2] andPW 4. PW2is the son ofthe deceased andPW[4] is the wife. Presence ofthese two witnesses at the place of occurrence is normal and natural. According to PW 4, she had gone to the place of occurrence to give food to her husband andson around 12 noon, which is the normal hour for lunch in the villages. The son ofthe deceased had come CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page of41 to thefield with hisfather to work. They were putting earth on the mend which was objected to by the accused persons who had come there with lathis and with a premeditated mind ofcausing harm to the deceased. Upon enquiry, the deceased informed the accusedpersons that the mend was a joint property of the parties. Without provocation, the accused persons thereupon started hurling abuses upon Pyara Singh and his son, and assaulted the deceased with lathis. PW2andPW[4] intervened to protect theirfather and husband respectively, but to no consequence and in the process, they suffered injuries. In the meanwhile, when the accused persons were challenged by PW 5 and Satnam Singh, who were close to the place ofoccurrence, they ran away. The presence ofPW 2, PW 4 and PW 5 cannot be doubted. The statement made by them in the court is natural, reliable and does not suffer from any serious contradictions. Once the presence ofeyewitnesses cannot be doubted and it has been established that their statement is reliable, there is no reason for the court to not rely upon the statement ofsuch eyewitnesses in acceptins the case ofthe prosecution. The accused persons had come with premeditated mind, together with common intention, to assault the deceased and all ofthem kept on assaulting the deceased till the time he fell on the ground and became breathless."

43. It clearly transpiresfrom the above facts and circumstances that(i)the bodily injury was present; (ii) the nature of the injury was severe causing fatality; (iii) the fatal injury was not accidental but was intended to be caused by the appellants and (iv) the fatal injury was sufficient as per medical opinion to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. All four parameters of Virsa Singh {supra)having been metin this case,this Court is also ofthe opinion that Exception(4)ofs.300 is not available to the defence CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 39of41 CT' '1 ysince allfour ofthe parameters as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pappu V. State ofM.P.{supra)do not apply in this case-the fight was not sudden since the appellants had invited the situation where they eould become assailants and the premeditation was evident even ifit developed at the spur ofthe moment or at the time between when they accosted Aman and when his father approaehed them to reason with them. Conclusion: m

44. In light of the above analysis and diseussion, this Court is of the considered view that the version of the prosecution is duly supported by ocular evidence, medieal reports and ehain of circumstances which proves beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged erime has been eommitted by the appellants. This Court however aecepts the plea ofthe father ofthe deeeased appellant in Crl.A.616/2020 and convicts the Appellants for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC instead ofSeetion 304(1)IPC as was by the learned Trial Court. All other eonvictions shall remain as per the learned Trial Courtjudgment ofeonviction. Sinee the learned Trial Court awardej sentence ofimprisonment for life for the offenee punishable under Section 304(1) IPC, the said sentence is awarded for offence punishable under seetion 302/34 IPC. Sentenees awarded by the learned Trial Court on other counts are maintained.

45. Crl. Appeals 27/2021, 97/2021, 566/2020 and 604/2020 are aecordingly dismissed. Crl. A. 616/2020 is hereby allowed to the extent mentioned in the previous paragraph. CRL.A.27/2021& otherconnectedmatters Page40of41 A

46. Copy of this order be uploaded on website and be also sent to Superintendent, Tihar Jail for intimation to the appellants and updation of records.

JUDGE AUGUST 8,2022/mk

(MUKTA GUPTA) JUDGE CRL.A.27/2021 & other connected matters Page 41 of41