Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: November 28, 2025
ATUL GANDHI .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Deepak Singh & Mr. Deepanshu Tomar, Advs.
Through: Mr. Amol Sinha, ASC for the State
SI Jitender Kumar, PS- Anand Parbat R3 in person
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition is filed seeking quashing of FIR NO. 540/2025 dated 23.09.2025, registered at Police Station Anand Parbat, for offences under Sections 420/406/467/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), and all proceedings arising therefrom.
2. The brief facts of the case are that Respondent No. 2 is the license holder of property bearing No. HR-22A & HR-22B, Ramjas Industrial Estate, Opp. Janta Park, Anand Parbat Industrial Area, New Delhi- 110005 (hereafter ‘the subject property’). It is alleged that the subject property was given to the petitioner on rent.
3. It is alleged that the petitioner despite being a tenant on the subject property, had obtained a new electricity connection in his name without obtaining any verbal or written consent from Respondent No. 2.
4. It is alleged that the said electricity connection was obtained on the basis of forged and fabricated documents prepared at the instance of the petitioner. Pursuant to a complaint given by Respondent No. 2 the present FIR was registered.
5. The present petition is filed on the ground that the parties have settled their disputes amicably and have entered into a Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.11.2025, out of their own free will and without any force, pressure or coercion.
6. The petitioner and Respondent No. 3 are present in person in Court and have been duly identified by the Investigating Officer.
7. It is stated that Respondent No. 3, who is the son of Respondent No. 2 and brother of Respondent No. 4, is representing the said respondents as well. Although no document has been placed on record which authorises Respondent No.3 to represent Respondent Nos. 2 and 4, pertinently, the petition is also accompanied by no objection affidavits tendered on behalf of the said respondents wherein they have categorically deposed that they have no objection if the FIR is quashed.
8. On being asked, Respondent No. 3 states that he has no remaining grievance against the petitioner. He states that he does not wish to pursue the proceedings arising out of the present FIR, and he has no objection if the same is quashed. He further reaffirms that Respondent Nos. 2 and 4 have no objection to quashing of the FIR either.
9. Offences under Sections 420/406 of the IPC are compoundable whereas offences under Sections 467/468/471 of the IPC are non-compoundable.
10. It is well settled that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) (erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) can quash offences which are noncompoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. The Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down parameters and guidelines for High Court while accepting settlement and quashing the proceedings. In the case of Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.: (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed as under:-
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.” (emphasis supplied)
11. Similarly, in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.: (2017) 9 SCC 641, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed as under:-
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” (emphasis supplied)
12. Keeping in view the nature of dispute and that the parties have amicably entered into a settlement, this Court feels that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive and continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court. I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.
13. However, keeping in mind the fact that the State machinery has been put to motion, ends of justice would be served if the petitioner is put to cost.
14. In view of the above, FIR No. 540/2025 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed, subject to payment of total cost of ₹20,000/- by the petitioner, to be deposited with the Delhi Police Welfare Society, within a period of four weeks from date.
15. Let the proof of deposit of cost be submitted to the concerned SHO.
16. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications stand disposed of. AMIT MAHAJAN, J NOVEMBER 28, 2025/“SS”