Anjar Ali Khan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

(v) After the Petitioners reported at their respective training centers, a

Color Blindness Test of all the candidates was conducted at the CISF Hospital, wherein the Petitioners were found to be suffering from „defective color vision‟.

(vi) Names of the Petitioners were thereafter forwarded to the Deputy

Inspector General/Director Medical, who directed the Petitioners to undergo a Review Medical Examination, wherein the Petitioners were again declared „unfit‟ due to „defective color vision‟.

(vii) Having been found as such, services of the Petitioners were terminated by their respective Commandants, in exercise of the power vested in them under Rule 25 of the CISF Rules, 2001, as follows: Serial No. Name of the Candidate Date of Appointment Date of Termination Order

1. Anjar Ali Khan 16.03.2017 02.12.2017

2. Bibek Kumar Singh 16.03.2017 02.12.2017

3. Ajay Kumar 16.03.2017 02.12.2017

(viii) Aggrieved by the termination orders, the Petitioners filed appeals under Rules 46 & 47 of the CISF Rules, 2001, which came to be rejected in light of the 2013 Guidelines.

4. Material on record indicates that the Petitioners, being aggrieved by the rejection of their appeals against the termination orders, approached this Court vide W.P. (C) 4846/2018, 4847/2018 and 4848/2018. However, the said writ petitions came to be withdrawn by the Petitioners, though their rights to challenge the 2013 Guidelines were reserved.

5. Thereafter, the Petitioners preferred the instant writ petition with prayers similar to those contained in the abovementioned withdrawn writ petitions. However, when the instant writ petitions came up for hearing on 12.09.2018, this Court granted permission to amend the prayers of the Petitioners by way of an application. Consequently, an application seeking amendment of the prayer clause was filed by the Petitioners, by way of which the following prayers are being sought: “i) To quash the order/guidelines dated 27-2-2013 issued by the Govt. of India vide F NO.45024/1/2008 Pers-II ii) Set aside/quash the letter/termination order dated 2.12.2017 and Order dated 4.2.2018, 5.2.2018 and 24.3.2018 passed by the appellate authority affirming the termination and direct the respondent administration to reinstate the petitioners in services; iii) Pass such order or further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.”

6. Accordingly, the challenge before this Court is two-folded – one being the challenge to the termination orders and other to the constitutional validity of the 2013 Circular.

7. Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners has broadly made the following submissions in pursuance of their prayers:

(i) The issue of retention of color-blind personnel recruited by the

Respondents/CISF has attained judicial quietus in light of the observations of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Sudesh Kumar v. Union of India in W.P. (C) No. 5077/2008 decided on 22.03.2011, Suresh Ram v. Union of Indiain W.P. (C) NO. 4561/2013decided on 22.07.2013 and P. Suresh Kumar v. Union of India &Ors.in W.P. (C) No. 356/2013.

(ii) Once the Petitioners were declared medically fit for the post of

Ct/GD, the termination orders passed after the completion of more than seven months of training is illegal and contrary to the law laid down by the High Court of Calcutta in Mintu Mondal v. Union of India &Ors. in W.P. 14868 (W) of 2016.

(iii) There is no intelligible differentia in the cut-off dates mentioned in the 2013 Guidelines, inasmuch as the Respondents/CISF could not put an embargo on only those candidates who have been recruited after the passing of the 2013 Guidelines, and not on those who have been recruited before 18.05.2012.

(iv) Termination of the Petitioners is not a „simpliciter termination‟, since the same is punitive in nature.

(v) The termination orders violate the doctrine of legitimate expectation, as the Respondents/CISF have terminated the Petitioners after selecting them in 2017, and then falling back to the 2013 Guidelines.

8. No other arguments, vis-à-vis recruitment to alternate posts etc., were advanced on behalf of the Petitioners.

9. Per contra, learned SPC appearing for the Respondents/CISF has submitted as under:

(i) The Petitioners were not part of the regular service of CISF at the time when the termination orders were passed.

(ii) Any candidate who suffers from color blindness in a disciplined organization like CISF and is posted in sensitive areas can result in hazardous consequences, as identification of colors is an important ability.

(iii) The issue of termination of a selected candidate found to be suffering from color blindness has been decided by the judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Abhilash Kumar &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors. in W.P. (C) No. 879/2018 delivered on 16.10.2018. The Coordinate Bench, while considering the 2013 Guidelines upheld the order of termination passed by the concerned authority therein, also observed that the yardstick adopted by the Indian Army for recruiting personnel is not the same as the one adopted by CISF.

(iv) The Petitioners furnished a self-declaration at the time of medical examination, to the effect that if at all it is found that the information given by them is proved to be false, they would face the consequences as per law.

10. Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.

11. First and foremost, this Court shall deal with the constitutional challenge to the 2013 Guidelines that has been pleaded by the Petitioners, as adjudication thereof would have a direct bearing on the outcome of the second challenge, which is to the validity of the termination orders passed by the Respondents/CISF.

12. Reference at the very outset is bound to be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in T.N. Education Deptt. Ministerial & General Subordinate Services Assn. v. State of T.N., (1980) 3 SCC 97, which provides a foundational insight into the jurisprudential background of service law:

13. Keeping in mind that no organ of the State can usurp the functions assigned to another, this Court recalls the judgment of the Apex Court in Asif Hameed and Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364, which provides an overview for the modus operandi to be adopted by the court, when a State action is challenged. The relevant observations are as under:

“All power is, in Madison's phrase, "of an encroaching nature". Judicial power is not immune against this human weakness. It also must be on guard against encroaching beyond its proper bounds, and not the less so since the only restraint upon it is self-restraint… Rigorous observance of the difference between limits of power and wise exercise of power – between questions of authority and questions of prudence – requires the most alert appreciation of this decisive but subtle relationship of two concepts that too easily coalesce. No less does it require a disciplined will to adhere to the difference. It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of wisdom to prevail to disregard one's own strongly held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs. But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the essence in the observance of the judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what Congress and the Executive Branch do."

19. When a State action is challenged, the function of the court is to examine the action in accordance with Law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution and if not, the court must strike down the action. While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not an appellate authority. The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of legislature of executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers.” [Emphasis Supplied]

14. The above position has been further developed in the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Ram LubhayaBagga,(1998) 4 SCC 117. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as under:

15. In the case of Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain, (2004) 4 SCC 737, the Apex Court held as under: “16. The scope of judicial review of governmental policy is now well defined. Courts do not and cannot act as Appellate Authorities examining the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy of the Government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere with policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review.”

16. While optimistically affirming the judgment in Asif Hameed (supra), the Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Gopinath Dash,(2005) 13 SCC 495, held as under:

fundamental right is not shown Courts will have no occasion to interfere and the Court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the Court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government.

8. The Court should constantly remind itself of what the Supreme Court of the United States said in Metropolis Theatre Company v. City of Chicago (1912) 57 L Ed 730; "The problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is the best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review.”

17. Reference is also made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Admn., (2001) 3 SCC 635, wherein the following observations were made:-

to express their opinion as to whether at a particular point of time or in a particular situation any such policy should have been adopted or not. It is best left to the discretion of the State.”

18. The position that emerges from the above case laws, is that policy decisions are open for judicial review albeit for a very limited purpose. This Court has leeway to interfere into the realm of policy matters of the Government, if the policy in question is absolutely capricious and noninformed by reasons, or totally arbitrary, offending the basic requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

19. In terms of the aforementioned observations of the Apex Court, it is clear that it is a constitutional obligation of the Court to examine that in the framing of policy, no law is violated, nor are the people‟s fundamental rights transgressed upon, except to the extent permissible under the Constitution of India.

20. Since the Petitioners‟ challenge to the 2013 Guidelines is mainly that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court shall adopt the twopronged test followed by the Apex Court, to determine if such violation has in fact occurred. The said test would require this Court to determine if there is a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The object of the 2013 Guidelines is easily discernible from a bare reading thereof, which indicates that if the personnel of CAPF or AR is suffering from abnormal vision and is not able to distinguish between uniforms, there are risks of them being unable to protect themselves or their colleagues or adequately battle insurgents/terrorist groups. The 2013 Guidelines also make it clear that the policy of boarding out personnel who have been declared unfit, applies to all types of unfitness, whether it be unfitness in physical parameters or in any other SHAPE component [i.e., Psychiatric, Hearing, Appendages, Physical and/or eyesight].

21. In the opinion of this Court, the wording of the 2013 Guidelines reflects a level of candor, inasmuch as it is prima facie apparent therefrom that the Government admits certain orders issued in the years 1991, 1997, 2002, 2008, 2011 and 2012, which provided for a bar on boarding out of those personnel having been recruited prior to a particular date, as against the standing policy and public interest. With a view to rectify this departure from the standing policy and public interest, the 2013 Guidelines provide that no such recruitment of persons with defective vision/suffering from color-blindness shall take place in the future, and if still such recruitment is done only to discover the vision problems at a later stage, the doctor having declared such candidate as fit would be proceeded against in departmental proceedings for major penalty.

22. Another noteworthy facet contained in the 2013 Guidelines is the express provision therein to apply the same prospectively. This is in line with the principles culled out by the Apex Court in the judgment of Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit v. Manu,(2023)19 SCC 30, which, in essence, postulates that if a Government Order is treated to be in the nature of a clarification of an earlier Government Order, it may be made applicable retrospectively. Conversely, if a subsequent Government Order is held to be a modification/amendment of the earlier Government Order, its application would be prospective as retrospective application thereof would result in withdrawal of vested rights, which is impermissible in law.

23. Thus, the purpose of the 2013 Guidelines was not only to bar candidates with defective vision/color blindness from entering into the force supported with reasons for such decision, but also to provide clarity regarding the prospective applicability of the same. With the 2013 Guidelines chalking out the possible adverse effects of recruitment of such personnel, this Court is not inclined to deem the 2013 Guidelines as arbitrary, unreasonable or perverse. As such, the challenge of the Petitioners to the 2013 Guidelines as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, fails.

24. This Court‟s attention is also drawn towards the contention urged on behalf of the Respondents/CISF, that at the time when the termination orders were issued to the Petitioners, they were not a permanent part of CISF as they were serving their respective probation periods. This contention is what create a distinction between the instant writ petitions from those adjudicated by the Coordinate Benches of this Court in Sudesh Kumar (supra), Suresh Ram (supra) and P. Suresh Kumar (Supra).

25. The purpose of probation, as has been recognized in the judgment of the Apex Court in Kazia Mohammed v. Muzzammil v. State of Karnataka,(2010) 8 SCC 155,is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders. In other words, the scheme of probation is to judge the ability, suitability and performance of an officer under probation.

26. It is trite law that probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved by the competent authority if found unsuitable. As such, there exists a distinction between termination of a probationer and that of a permanent/confirmed employee. Though arbitrariness on part of the State is not justified in either case, there exists a difference in judicial approach between the two – whereas in the case of a confirmed employee, the scope of judicial interference would be more expansive given the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, but the same is not true in the case of probationers who are deprived of such protection while working on a trial basis.

27. Another factor to be noted is that the judgments of this Court in Sudesh Kumar (supra) as well as Suresh Ram (supra), both deal with circulars/guidelines/orders which were issued in respect of promotion, and not direct recruitment. Moreover, both the cases involve grievances of personnel who had been working with the concerned Para-Military Force for a substantial period of time, been evaluated as „fit for service‟ in each annual medical examination and only detected with defective vision or color blindness thereafter. Per contra, the present case deals with persons who were directly recruited, provisionally selected and had merely spent six months under training at their respective centers. In light of this slight yet significant distinction, the Petitioners‟ reliance of the judgments of this Court in Sudesh Kumar (supra)andSuresh Ram (supra) is wholly misplaced.

28. This Court also does not see any shred of mala fide attributable to the concerned authorities with respect to any of the medical examinations or to the team of medical professionals conducting the medical examination. In the opinion of this Court, it is the medical practitioners of the CISF, who have themselves undergone the requisite trainings and are discharging the functions of the organization, who are best suited to form an opinion as to the medical fitness of the candidates to be recruited and once they have so formed their opinion, there can be no interference therewith, at the mere asking of a rejected candidate, more so who is a probationer.

29. For the reasons stated above, coupled with the finding that the 2013 Guidelines are not unconstitutional, the Petitioners‟ challenge to the termination orders also fails.

30. Lastly, even though the contention was not urged by the Petitioners in so many words, this Court still deems it fit to delve into whether the Petitioners ought to have been considered for all posts other than that of Ct/GD, as reliance has been heavily placed on the judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Sudesh Kumar (supra).

31. This Court notes that the advertisement in response to which the Petitioners applied, deals only with the post of Ct/GD. This being the case, there are no two ways with the law well-settled by the Apex Court, that recruitment to a public post must be held strictly in accordance with the advertisement and the relevant recruitment rules. Would the Petitioners have been automatically considered for the non-technical posts, for example, for the post of a cook, law officer, etc., that would have resulted in impinging the Respondents/CISF having gone beyond what was prescribed in the 2015 Advertisement, which is impermissible.

32. Be that as it may, this Court, in the interests of justice, deems it appropriate to leave it open to the Petitioners to file separate representation(s) with the Respondents/CISF, requesting their candidatures to be considered for posts that do not consider color blindness as a disability.

33. Upon receipt of such representations by the Petitioners, if any, the Respondents/CISF are directed to render their decision within a period of ten weeks from today.

34. With the above observations, all the writ petitions are disposed of.

35. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.

36. No order as to costs.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J NOVEMBER 28, 2025