Fauzia Sultana v. State & Anr.

Delhi High Court · 26 Oct 2017 · 2022:DHC:4543
V. Kameswar Rao
TEST.CAS. 57/2019
2022:DHC:4543
civil petition_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that interim relief seeking removal of lock from property during probate proceedings is not maintainable under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and dismissed the petition accordingly.

Full Text
Translation output
Neutral Citation Number:2022/DHC/004543
TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 1
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 31st October, 2022
TEST.CAS. 57/2019 & I.A. 7884/2021
FAUZIA SULTANA..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. R. K. Khanna, Sr. Adv. with Mr. M.A. Inayati and Mr. Khalid Ali, Advs.
VERSUS
STATE & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Mukul Gupta, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Tushar Gupta, Mr. Sumit Kr.
Mishra and Ms. Radhika Sachdeva, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO V. KAMESWAR RAO, J. (ORAL)
I.A. 7884/2021
JUDGMENT

1. This application has been filed by the petitioner under Section 151 of CPC, 1908, inter alia seeking direction of this Court to remove the lock from the property bearing No.C-46, First Floor, Neeti Bagh, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “said property”), which is alleged to be bequeathed in favour of the petitioner by Late Sh. S. K. Zaman (who was the husband of the petitioner). The present application has been specifically filed with the following prayers:- TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 2 “In view of the abovementioned facts and circumstances, it is graciously prayed to this Hon'ble Court may kindly please to;a. Allow the present application and directed respondent no.2 to unlock the said property i.e. property bearing no.C-46, first floor, Niti Bagh, New Delhi in the interest of justice. Pass any other such order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the present facts and circumstances in the favour of the petitioner and against the respondents herein.”

2. It is the case of the petitioner and so contended by Mr. R.K. Khanna, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that late Sh. S. K. Zaman was the Chief Architect and Town Planner in the Ministry of Housing, U.P. State Government, who was the owner of the said property and the petitioner and her husband had lived in the said property, since the day, the same was bought.

3. It is stated that the respondent No.2 is their only son and is currently living separately with his wife at Gurugram, Haryana for the last seven years, since the solemnization of his marriage.

4. It is stated that the respondent No.2 is harassing the petitioner by one way or another and specifically, soon after the demise of his father, he locked up the said property in the absence of the petitioner and is also forcing her to stay in a hotel.

5. So, the petitioner through this instant application is urging before this Court to direct the respondent No.2 to unlock the said property and allow the petitioner to live there peacefully. TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 3

6. It is stated that around 2011-2012, the respondent No.2 met with one Ms. Sahanaz Parveen, on Facebook and after developing certain level of friendship, brought her to the said property and introduced her as his wife to the petitioner and her husband. It is stated that the marriage of the respondent No.2 was contracted without the permission of his parents and his wife‟s behavior was also not cordial with the parents of the respondent No.2. It is further stated that since the behavior of the wife of the respondent no.2 was not cordial towards her parents-in-law, they did not permit them to stay for even a single day in the said property.

7. It is stated that the respondent No.2 always remained influenced and controlled by his wife as she had her ill eyes over the said property of the petitioner. It is also stated that the respondent No.2 used to contact his parents only when he used to be in dire need of money and not otherwise. It is further stated that the respondent No.2 also started to develop his association with some unruly persons who did not have good terms with his parents. That one amongst them was Subhash Arora from whom the parents of the respondent No.2 had bought lower ground floor, ground floor and second floor of the property bearing No.B-100, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi. It is stated that Subhash Arora runs a proprietorship business under the name and style of M/s Arora Developers and he has been alleged to have forged the signatures of the erstwhile owner of the aforementioned property and the erstwhile owner has also filed a criminal case against Subhash Arora, one Ankur Arora and B. P. Singh architect and civil TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 4 engineer of MCD under section 465/471/506 IPC for committing the acts of forgery.

8. It is stated that Subhash Arora and his son Ankur Arora, who now runs a limited liability partnership firm under the name of „Jai Raj Developers‟ contacted the respondent No.2‟s father during his lifetime to resale the aforesaid property to him in order to settle their dispute with the erstwhile owner of the afore-said property. However, the respondent No.2‟s father refused to purchase the same. Thereafter, Subhash Arora and his son approached the respondent No.2 directly and entered into an agreement to sell in respect of the lower ground floor and ground floor of the aforesaid property and they also forged an agreement to sell in respect of the second floor of that property which was already sold in the name of the respondent‟s father. It is stated when the respondent No.2‟s father came to know about this forgery, he threatened the accused persons involved in the acts of forgery of filing a criminal complaint against them, however, the accused persons impeded him to file complaint. After all this, the respondent No.2‟s father‟s health got deteriorated and he ultimately succumbed to the cardiac arrest on March 30, 2018.

9. It is stated that immediately after the demise of respondent No.2‟s father, the petitioner started residing alone in the said property, however, the respondent No.2 and his wife pressurized her to transfer all the immovable and movable properties of the petitioner, in the name and custody of the respondent No.2 and his wife. The petitioner was also physically assaulted by her son and TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 5 his wife and as a result of which she filed the police complaint against them on July 04, 2018.

10. It is stated that after this incident and also since the petitioner was alone in this city and also since the police failed to take any action against the respondent No.2 and his wife, the petitioner locked the said property and went to her matrimonial home in Bhubaneswar, Orissa in July, 2018.

11. It is stated that after a lapse of eight months from the day the petitioner had gone to her matrimonial home, the respondent No.2 wrote and sent an unsigned letter to the petitioner, wherein, the respondent No.2 had asked the petitioner to provide him with the property papers related to the said property.

12. It is stated that immediately after receiving the aforesaid letter, the petitioner contacted the security guard of the said property and from him, she came to know that the respondent No.2 has sold out the two luxury cars i.e., (BMW 5 series and Mercedez Benz CLA) for ₹80 lakhs only. It is stated that the Mercedez Benz car was parked in the parking lot of the said property and even the key of the said vehicle was locked by the petitioner in the almirah lying inside the said property, however, the respondent No.2, somehow, in the petitioner‟s absence managed to sell the vehicle without informing the petitioner. It is further stated that the petitioner did not lodge any police complaint against the respondent No.2, out of her love and affection towards her child. It is stated that the petitioner, on the asking of respondent No.2, had also assured the respondent No.2, that all the property papers were TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 6 safely present in her custody. The petitioner had also asked him about the expenditures he had incurred, since he had received ₹2.[5] crores from a builder. It is stated that the respondent No.2 is under the complete control of his wife who has her ill eyes over the properties alleged to be bequeathed in favour of the petitioner and it is for this reason that the respondent No.2 constantly seeks the property papers from the petitioner which as per the petitioner, are kept locked inside the almirah lying in the said property. It is further stated that the keys of that almirah are still with the petitioner and the respondent No.2 has multiple times asked for the photographs of the keys and the petitioner has time and again provided the same to him.

13. It is stated that the petitioner seeing and observing the inimical behavior of her son, filed a probate petition in July, 2019 before this Court. It is stated that the husband of the petitioner executed a Will in her favour because she used to help him buying multiple properties by providing financial aid, as she herself used to run a transport business of her own.

14. It is stated that the petitioner‟s husband had bought the lower ground floor and the ground floor of the property bearing No.B-100, Gulmohar Park after taking a loan from one Dushyant Chikara who happened to be the business partner of the petitioner‟s husband. The petitioner‟s husband had handed over the possession of the said floors to him, however, when Mr. Dushyant Chikara came to know about the illegal activities of the respondent No.2, he approached the petitioner and asked her to return the loan amount TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 7 advanced by him. It is stated that the petitioner assured Dushyant Chikara to return his money once the petitioner settles the dispute with her son. However, the respondent No.2 has tried multiple times to dispossess Dushyant Chikara from the aforesaid property and as a result of which Dushyant Chikara has filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before this Court.

15. It is stated and as submitted by Mr. Khanna, that the notice of the probate petition which has been filed by the petitioner against the respondent No.2 before this Court, has been duly served to the respondent No.2 and till date no reply has been filed by him. It is further stated that after the lapse of 18 months since the filing of the probate petition, the respondent No.2 in collusion with Subhash Arora has now filed two suits for specific performance against the petitioner. It is stated that till December 08, 2020, the respondent No.2 had neither filed the police complaint against the petitioner and nor filed the reply to the probate petition. However, on January 11, 2021 the respondent No.2‟s counsel appeared for Subhash Arora with an I.A. No.365/2020 in a suit for a specific performance and this Court had issued a notice in the said application.

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16. It is stated that on March 09, 2021 the respondent No.2 in collusion with Subhash Arora got successful in lodging an FIR against the petitioner. Since the lodging of the FIR, the respondent No.2 has been continuously pressurizing the petitioner to withdraw the probate petition and also to transfer all the properties in his TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 8 name. The respondent No.2 is also threatening the petitioner that if the said properties are not transferred in the name of the petitioner and also if the probate petition is not withdrawn by the petitioner then the police will be constrained to put the petitioner behind the bars.

17. It is stated that the Investigation Officer, who got appointed pursuant to the lodging of the FIR, has visited the matrimonial home of the petitioner multiple times and has also threatened her to settle the dispute with the respondent No.2.

18. It is stated that after all these incidents, the petitioner reached Delhi, on June 16, 2021 and joined the investigation. The petitioner on arriving Delhi, when visited the said property, found that the lock of the outer entrance gate of the said property was changed. So, she immediately called the respondent No.2, however, his phone was untraceable and thus, the petitioner had to book a hotel for her stay.

19. It is stated that the very next day, the petitioner visited the said property and again tried to call the respondent No.2, however, his phone was again not reachable and thus, the petitioner had to call the police. The police after reaching the said property, asked the petitioner to show the documents of the said property for the purpose of determining the ownership of the said property and she informed the police that all the property related papers were lying inside the said property and showed them her Aadhar Card. It has been submitted that the police officer then took her to the Hauz TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 9 Khas Police Station, where they directed the petitioner to go back and asked her to come again after two days.

20. It is stated that the police did not take any action and moreover directed the petitioner to maintain the status quo qua the said property.

21. It is stated that the respondent No.2 is currently residing separately and the said property was in exclusive possession of the petitioner. So, it is urged before this Court that the respondent No.2, cannot be permitted to illegally take over the possession of the said property by locking the same.

22. It is stated that the petitioner has been residing in a hotel, since the respondent No.2 has put the lock over the said property. Therefore, she has filed the present application seeking removal of the lock from the said property.

23. On the other hand, Mr. Mukul Gupta, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2, has contested the very maintainability of the present application and has mostly denied each and every averments of the petitioner.

24. It is the case of the respondent and so contended by Mr. Gupta that the petitioner has approached this Court with unclean hands and has only filed the probate petition on the strength of a forged Will, dated February 09, 2018.

25. He submitted that vide order dated May 12, 2021, this Court had sent the said Will to the FSL and according to the FSL report the said Will was found to be forged and fabricated. It is submitted that on this account, P.S. Crime Branch has already TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 10 registered an FIR bearing No. 75/2021 against the petitioner and her associate and the chargesheet has also been filed against the petitioner and her associate.

26. He submitted that the said Will is not executed in accordance with Shariyat Islami and Personal Law, therefore, the said Will is not valid in the eyes of law.

27. He submitted that the present application has been filed out of petitioner‟s enmity against the respondent No.2‟s wife and also for bringing down her reputation.

28. He submitted that the petitioner never had any cordial relations with the respondent No.2 and his father and the petitioner‟s relationship towards her husband and the respondent No.2‟s remained strained throughout his life time and she had even abandoned, both her husband as well as her son (respondent No.2), when the respondent No.2 was only 16 years old.

29. He submitted that the respondent No.2 moved to his Gurgaon home along with his wife, only on account of his father‟s advice and in fact, the respondent No.2‟s father was very much unhappy with the fact that the respondent No.2 and his wife had to move out of the said property.

30. He submitted that the present application is also not maintainable on the ground that the petitioner has attempted to convert a probate petition into a suit for possession. He further submitted that it is a settled law that any interim order can only be granted in relation to the final relief sought by the petitioner. However, in the present case, there is no final relief which has TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 11 been sought by the petitioner. So, it is urged before this Court that no interim order can be granted and thus the present application deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable.

31. He also submitted that the maintenance of the said property is currently being undertaken by the respondent No.2, who is also paying the utility bills for the same. It is submitted that even the voter I.D. card of the respondent No.2 is of the said property, which manifests that the respondent No.2 has been continuously using the said property. Plus, it also shows that the said property was not exclusively occupied by the petitioner, as it has been made out in the present application.

32. He has further submitted that the respondent No.2‟s father was aware of the petitioner‟s temperament and her nature and he also knew that the petitioner could go to any extent to destroy the life of the respondent No.2 and his wife and it was for this reason that the respondent No.2 was told by his father to live separately from the petitioner. He submitted that the father of the respondent No.2 used to continuously visit the respondent No.2‟s place and even used to live with his son and daughter- in-law.

33. He further submitted that the respondent No.2 never parted his way with his father even when his father was hospitalized. Even on the day of his father‟s demise, the respondent No.2 and his uncle viz., Nures Sayeed took him to the hospital. He submitted that it was the petitioner who never used to visit her husband and in fact in January, 2018 when her husband had the scheduled surgery TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 12 for stent in his heart, the petitioner flew to her matrimonial home and chose to stay there during the entire process of operation.

34. He submitted that it was the respondent No.2 only, who used to take care of his father and even his wife used to visit the hospital to meet her father-in-law and they both used to stay with the respondent No.2‟s father even for the period of post-surgery in order to take good care of him

35. He further submitted that right after the demise of the petitioner‟s husband, the petitioner‟s entire family came to the said property and stayed with the petitioner until the petitioner left the city unannounced along with all the property related papers. He submitted that the petitioner in the present application has concocted the entire case and thus is liable to be prosecuted for perjury apart from dismissal of the present application and the testamentary suit. He further submitted that the averment of the petitioner to the extent that the respondent No.2 has sold the Mercedes Benz which was parked in the parking lot of the said property in the absence of the petitioner is completely concocted and it was specifically submitted that the respondent No.2 never received an amount of ₹2.[5] crore from a builder as averred in the present application.

36. He further submitted that the respondent No.2 was never served with the notice of the probate petition and it was the petitioner who tried her level best in order to not to effect the service of the notice upon the respondent No.2. He submitted that upon the respondent entering the appearance, the petitioner had TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 13 even sought to settle the matter with the respondent No.2 as she was aware that the Will on the basis of which the probate petition has been filed is fake and a fabricated document. He submitted that the respondent No.2 never pressurized the petitioner to withdraw the probate case and also to transfer all the properties in his name. He further submitted that the petitioner never stayed in a hotel as the said property was never locked by the respondent No.2. He submitted that the petitioner has averred in the present application that all the property related papers are lying inside the said property; however, it is the petitioner‟s own admitted case that she had taken all the property related documents to her matrimonial home, therefore, this manifest that the entire facts of the present application has been concocted and fabricated. He submitted that it is correct that when the petitioner came to Delhi, she attempted to change the lock of the said property and he also submitted that the petitioner was never forced by the Police to handover the key of the entrance gate of the said property to the respondent No.2. He submitted that no police officer has ever pressurized the petitioner to do the aforesaid act.

37. It is further the case of the respondent as contended by Mr. Gupta, that the present interim application being filed in the probate case is not maintainable in the eyes of law. To contend this, he has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande alias Handege vs. Vithalrao Hande and others (2011) SCC Online Bom 440. TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 14

38. It is his submission that the probate court can only determine the genuineness and due execution of the Will, nothing more and nothing less. He submitted that the issues of title are alien to the probate proceedings.

39. He further submitted that the meaningful engagement with Sections 266, 268 and 269 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, manifests that the probate court can only be concerned with the question as to whether the Will of the deceased is genuine and that it has been made voluntarily. The probate court, under no circumstances, can grant interlocutory relief in respect of the property which forms part of the estate of the deceased prior to the grant of probate.

40. While on the other hand Mr. Khanna, in order to counter the aforesaid submission of Mr. Gupta has relied upon the judgment of the coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Shri Kulbir Singh vs. State and others, MANU/DE/0590/1993, and submitted that the probate court has got all the powers of a Civil Court, which is abundantly clear from a plain reading of Section 266 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, therefore, an application filed under Section 151 of CPC,1908, seeking an ad interim injunction is duly maintainable and valid in the eyes of law.

41. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, the first issue that needs to be decided is, whether the present application filed by the petitioner seeking a direction that the respondent No.2 to unlock the property i.e. C-46, First Floor, Neeti Bagh, New Delhi, is maintainable. TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 15

42. Before I come to this issue, it must be stated that the Will for which probate is sought was sent to the CFSL upon the directions passed by this Court and the CFSL, in its report has concluded that the Will is forged and fabricated. Pursuant thereto, an FIR No.75/2021 has been registered against the petitioner and her associate and a charge sheet has also been filed against them.

43. Mr. Khanna states that the filing of the FIR is not conclusive that the Will is forged and fabricated. In any case, this aspect needs to be decided in the probate petition at a later stage. It is stated that during the pendency of the probate petition, this application has been filed by the petitioner. In support of his submission, on the maintainability of the application, Mr. Khanna has relied upon the judgment in the case of Shri Kulbir Singh (supra), wherein, the facts are “that the petitioner had filed a probate petition No. 45/89, through which he sought the probate in respect of the registered Will dated February 19, 1973 made by the deceased Smt. Dhan Kaur i.e. his mother in favor of the petitioner. The deceased had left behind a plot bearing No. A-2/121, Safdarjang Development Residential Scheme, New Delhi. The deceased breathed her last on January 13, 1977. The deceased through that said Will bequeathed to the petitioner the said plot of land. The petitioner therein was not a resident of India and was continuously residing abroad. The petitioner received an information from the DDA, respondent No.5, addressed to the testatrix Smt. Dhan Kaur that the lease in respect of the said plot of land would be cancelled if the constructions were not raised on the TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 16 said plot of land as the lease in respect of the said plot was granted for the purpose of raising construction for residential purposes. In the above said circumstances, the petitioner, therein, requested his sister i.e. respondent No.2, therein, to approach the DDA for the property being mutated in favor of the heirs of the testatrix i.e. the petitioner and respondent Nos.[2] and 3, as the petitioner at that time was not in possession of the original Will nor a copy thereof. In view of the above, the said property got mutated in the joint names of the petitioner and respondent Nos.[2] and 3, in order to preclude the DDA from cancelling the lease deed in favor of the deceased. Later on, certain constructions were raised on the said plot of land. A completion certificate was also issued. When the petitioner came to India, he inspected the disputed property and found that the whole of the structure raised thereon was demolished and the entire disputed property had been dug up. On enquiries, it was revealed that respondent No.2 was purporting to induct certain strangers into the said property known as Harmeet Singh Ghai, Pankaj Chaudhary and A.K. Jain. The petitioner in this connection tried to contact respondent No.2 who refused to meet him. He informed the MCD with regard to the proposed unauthorised construction being carried on. The petitioner therein had suffered irreparable loss and injury as some strangers were inducted into the property and also rights were created in favor of third parties. Therefore, he filed an application under Section 151 CPC, 1908 seeking an ad-interim injunction, restraining the respondent No.2, TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 17 therein, or any other person from making any construction over the disputed property till the disposal of the probate petition.

44. That the respondent No.2 therein had filed her reply to the said application. She stated that she sold and disposed of, only her share in the disputed property in favor of one Harmeet Singh Ghai, for a total consideration of ₹12,50,000/-. It was further averred by her that she had neither raised any construction nor demolished anything qua the disputed property. So she pleaded that, if the petitioner has got any cause of action, it is only against one Harmeet Singh Ghai and not against her.

45. Respondent No.3 therein (i.e., the sister of the petitioner therein), had supported the case of the petitioner. She submitted that the respondent No.2, her servants, agents and representatives should be restrained from raising any construction over the disputed property.

46. That application had been opposed on behalf of the objector therein i.e., the Business Associates. It was urged for and on behalf of the objector that the disputed property had already been sold to the objector. In fact, they had purchased it from the respondent No.2 therein, who had then joined hands with the petitioner and respondent No.3, therein. The objector submitted that in order to bring pressure on the objector and to extract further money from them, the Application was filed by the petitioner. It was also stated that the Court whilst dealing with the probate petition was not competent to grant any injunction. Hence, it was TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 18 sought that the application filed therein, be dismissed on these grounds”.

47. On the aspect of maintainability of the application, this Court in the afore-said discussed case, has in paragraphs 11 to 14, held as under:- (11) It is fully manifest from the relevant provisions extracted above, that a High Court has got the concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge in the matter of grant of probate and the District Judge under Section 266 while acting as a Probate Court has got all the powers of a Civil Court as is abundantly clear from Section 266 of the Indian Succession Act. A close scrutiny of Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act reveals that the object behind the enactment of the said section is to preserve the disputed property from being destroyed, dissipated and frittered away. (12) I am tempted over here to cite a few authorities in support of my above view. It was observed in Air (38) 1951Cal.561 (Atula Bala Dasi and others V. Nirupama Devi and another). "It is open to the Probate Court not only to appoint an administrator pendente lite but also to issue an order of injunction, temporary in character, pending the appointment of an administrator pendente lite. If such powers are exercised in probate cases by a probate court, there is no reasonable chance of any property being dissipated, pending the actual grant of a probate or the appointment of an administrator". (13) To the same effect are the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as (Manohar Lal Chopra

V. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal).... "Section

151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the fact of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 19 limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has but been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code". (14) In view of the above, I conclude that the present application is maintainable and this Court can grant injunction while exercising its inherent powers even in a probate case.”

48. It is the submission of Mr. Khanna, that the said judgment still holds the field.

49. Insofar as the judgment in the case of Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande alias Handege (supra) relied upon by Mr. Mukul Gupta is concerned, there in the said case, the issue which arose for consideration before the Bombay High Court was the appellant who was the named executor under the Will, filed a Testamentary Petition seeking probate of the Will. The appellant initiated the interlocutory proceeding in the form of a Notice of Motion seeking injunction against the Fourth and Fifth respondents therein, from entering upon, coming to or interfering with the immovable property of the testatrix. The said motion was opposed by the Fourth and Fifth respondents therein, on the ground that in view of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Rupali Mehta vs. Tina Narinder Sain Mehta (2006)(6) Maharashtra Law Journal 786, the motion is not maintainable. In that judgment, it was held that in a petition for probate, an order of injunction cannot be granted in relation to the property of the TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 20 deceased, since the Court in such a petition, is not concerned with the Will and the sole question which concerns the probate court is whether or not the Will is genuine. When the Notice of Motion came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge, it was dismissed as being not maintainable in view of the judgment in Rupali Mehta (supra).

50. Then in the appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay, on analyzing the position of law on this context, has in paragraphs 14 and 15, held as under:-

“14. xxx xxx xxx Now, it has been emphasized on behalf of the Appellant that the words "all matters connected therewith" in Section 266, have a broad connotation and that Section 268 emphasizes that the proceedings before the District Judge in relation to the grant of probate and Letters of Administration will be regulated so far as the circumstances of the case permit by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is contended that the power to grant interim orders is a necessary adjunct of the power of a civil court. The ambit of the words "all matters connected therewith" has to be construed in relation to the grant of probate and letters of administration. Such a proceeding does not concern itself with title or even the existence of the property but only determines whether the will was executed by the testator of his own free will. That being the ambit of the proceeding, the words “connected therewith" cannot transform the probate proceeding into one in which issues alien to the grant of probate are to be decided. That would be impermissible. The contents of the broad general language in Sections 266 and 268 must be read in the context of the specific provisions which are made in Section 269. The Legislature in sub-section (1) of Section 269 made a specific provision to the effect that until probate of the will of a deceased person is granted or
TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 21 an administrator of his estate is constituted, the District Judge (i) is authorised and required to interfere for the protection of such property at the instance of any person claiming to be interested therein; and (ii) in all other cases where the Judge considers that the property incurs any risk of loss or damage to do so. For that purpose, the District Judge is empowered to appoint an officer to take and keep possession of the property. While recognising and conferring such a power expressly on the District Judge, the Legislature nonetheless mandated in sub-section (2) that this section shall not apply when the deceased is a Hindu, Mohammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person, nor shall it apply to any part of the property of an Indian Christian, who has died intestate. When Section 268 emphasizes that "save as hereinafter otherwise provided", the proceedings before the District Judge shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, so far as the circumstances of the case permit, it is not open to the District Judge to exercise a power contrary to the legislative intent and mandate of Section
269. Until probate of the Will is granted of a deceased person or an administrator is constituted, the statute has recognized the power of the District Judge for the protection of the property (at the behest of a person claiming to be interested) and in all other cases (where the Judge considers that the property incurs a risk of loss or damage). But, just as this power is specifically conferred upon the District Judge, sub-section (2) precludes the exercise of the power when the deceased belongs to one of the categories specified in sub-section (2). If the provisions of Sections 266 and 268 were broad enough to bring within their purview, powers of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 269, there was no necessity to incorporate a provision in the nature of sub-section (1) of Section 269. As a rule of interpretation, the Court will not ascribe or attribute the use of a surplusage to the Legislature. But, even if an alternate construction is possible - one that recognizes that sub-section (1) of Section 269 only makes TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 22 implicit a power which is exercisable under Sections 266 and 268 - the effect of sub-section (2) is to preclude the exercise of that power in the case of one of the excepted categories. It would not be permissible, in the face of the specific provision of sub-section (2) of Section 269 to read into the provisions of Sections 266 and 268 a general power to grant interlocutory relief even prior to the grant of probate in respect of the property which is alleged to form part of the estate of the deceased. This construction is fortified by the principle that the testamentary Court in proceedings for probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the Will of the deceased is genuine and that it has been made voluntarily. The probate Court is not concerned with questions relating to the property itself. Though an assiduous attempt was made on behalf of the Appellant to rely upon the provisions of the Act, to which a reference has been made earlier, the Court in this case is essentially concerned with the powers of the testamentary Court when it exercises its jurisdiction in a petition for the grant of probate. In view of the express provision which is contained in Section 269(2), there can be no recourse to the exercise of the inherent powers of the Civil Court. This, however, would not preclude recourse to a civil suit for obtaining relief necessary for the protection of the property.
15. In Atula Bala Dasi vs. Nirupama Devi, AIR 1951 Calcutta 561, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court inter alia considered the question as to whether the probate Court has any jurisdiction to issue an order for stay of proceedings pending in another Court. The Division Bench noted that the powers of the probate Court for the protection of the property which is a subject matter of testamentary disposition are regulated by the specific provisions of the Act and Section 247 authorises the Court to appoint an administrator pendente lite. The Court adverted to Section 269, including sub-section (2) and observed that in that case it was not necessary to consider the implications of the provision. The Division Bench of the TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 23 High Court held that an order of temporary injunction could be made pending the appointment of an administrator pendente lite. In the present case, as pointed out on behalf of the Respondents, no such prayer is made for an appointment of the administration pendente lite. The Respondents have contended that they are admittedly the original heirs of the deceased and not "other persons". According to the Respondents, the only prayer sought by the executor who incidentally is not even an heir of the deceased, is an interim injunction against the Respondents, who are the heirs of the deceased. We do not find that the judgment of the Calcutta High Court would be of any assistance to the Appellant. Similarly, the judgment of the Learned Single Judge of this Court in Pandurang Shamrao Laud vs. Dwarkadas Kalliandas, 1932 (35) BLR 700 does not really deal with the issues which have arisen in the present case. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain vs. Eknath Vithal Ogale, AIR 1995 SC 1102 in support of the contention that the words "in connection with" are of the widest amplitude. These observations of the Supreme Court are sought to be relied upon to amplify the words ""all matters connected therewith" in Section 266. The words which have been used in Section 266 must receive interpretation in the context in which where they are used. In the context of the jurisdiction of the probate Court, it is a well settled principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court that the Court cannot go into questions as regards title or of the existence of a property bequeathed by the deceased. We, therefore, find merit in the contention of the Respondents that the interpretation which is sought to be placed by the Appellant would travel beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the probate Court and would be contrary to legislative intent. (emphasis supplied) TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 24
51. From the reading of the afore-mentioned judgment, it is clear that an application, as has been filed by the petitioner in the present case, which is not a prayer as contemplated under Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, shall not be maintainable.
52. In fact, I find that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ajay Malhotra v. State, Test Cas. 37/2018 decided on May 15, 2019, while considering an application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC,1908, filed in a probate petition seeking probate of Will dated October 26, 2017, wherein the petitioner had sought an interim injunction against respondent Nos.[2] and 3 therein, restraining them from selling, alienating, transferring or creating any third party rights or interest in respect of any of the immovable properties bequeathed in favour of the petitioner therein, under a document dated October 26, 2017, purporting to be the Will and testament of the deceased testator, had dismissed the same. While interpreting the provisions of Section 269(2) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, this Court, held that the said sub-section, specifically restricts the application of Section 269(1), if the probate is sought of the Will of the deceased person who was Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina. This Court while holding that such an Application, as not maintainable, has held, as under:
“14. The court would also like to record that notwithstanding the fact that the question of title is not involved in testamentary proceedings, the Court is not wholly incompetent to grant a temporary injunction in extreme cases. Such order of injunction is issued in aid of
TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 25 and in furtherance of the purpose for which a grant is made by a probate Court. Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act, gives the Court such power. The said provision reads as under:
"247. Administration pendente lite.-Pending any suit touching the validity of the will of a deceased person or for obtaining or revoking any probate or any grant of letters of administration, the Court may appoint an administrator of the estate of such deceased person, who shall have all the rights and powers of a general administrator, other than the right of distributing such estate, and every such administrator shall be subject to the immediate control of the Court and shall act under its direction."
The reading of the aforesaid provision clearly shows that it is therefore open for the probate Court not only to appoint an administrator pendent lite, but also to issue an order of temporary injunction, pending the appointment of an administrator pendent lite. However, such orders are passed, when an application is made for the appointment of administrator pendent lite. The probate court will not grant injunction as a matter of course. The Court would have to examine whether there is a necessity for appointment of an administrator pendent lite. Such is not the case before the Court in the present case.
15. It is also to be noticed that section 269 of the Act reads as under:
"269. When and how District Judge to interfere for protection of property.- (1) Until probate is granted of the will of a deceased person, or an administrator of his estate is constituted, the District Judge, within whose jurisdiction any part of the property of the deceased
TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 26 person is situate, is authorised and required to interfere for the protection of such property at the instance of any person claiming to be interested therein, and in all other cases where the Judge considers that the property incurs any risk of loss or damage; and for that purpose, if he thinks fit, to appoint an officer to take and keep possession of the property. (2) This section shall not apply when the deceased is a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person, nor shall it apply to any part of the property of an Indian Christian who has died intestate." The said provision also empowers the Court to pass orders for the protection of the property of the deceased person. Sub-section (2) of section 269 specifically restricts the application of the said provision where the deceased is a Hindu, Mohammedan, Sikh or Jaina. Admittedly, the deceased here is a Hindu and therefore, not entitled to invoke section 269. The fact that the legislature has restricted the application of section 269, to certain category of persons, clearly indicates by implication that the legislature never intended to confer such power on the testamentary court to give interim directions in relation to the persons covered under section 269(2) of the Act.
16. No doubt this Court in Kulbir Singh v State (1993) 52 DLT 57 has held that the Court has the power to grant injunction exercising its inherent powers, however, the facts of the said case are distinguishable and in that case, section 269(2) was not brought to the notice of the Court in the said judgment. As discussed above, the Court in exceptional circumstances can pass interim orders in order to preserve the disputed property from being destroyed, dissipated and fettered away. However, the facts and circumstances of the present case are not such that would entitle the petitioner to seek such a relief. For the TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 27 afore-going reasons, the application is completely devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.
53. In fact, I find that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court clearly held that the effect of Sub-Section (2) of Section 269 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, is to preclude exercise of power in case of one of the excepted categories. It went on to hold that it would not be permissible, in the face of the specific provision of sub-section (2) of Section 269, to read into the provisions of Sections 266 and 268 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, a general power to grant interlocutory relief, even prior to the grant of probate in respect of the property which is alleged to form part of the estate of the deceased. In the case in hand, the deceased being a Muhammadan, the bar under Section 269(2) shall come into play.
54. Suffice to state that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ajay Malhotra (supra), has clearly held by referring to the judgment of Shri Kulbir Singh (supra), that the latter judgment is distinguishable, as Section 269(2) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, was not brought to the notice of this Court in the said judgment.
55. I agree with the above conclusion of the Coordinate Bench of this Court and the law having been settled in terms of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, this Court is of the view that the present application filed by the petitioner for the prayers, as already noted above, shall not be TEST.CAS. 57/2019 Page 28 maintainable in these proceedings and as such, the same is dismissed.
56. It is made clear that the above conclusion is on the maintainability of the application and has no bearing on the petition for probate.
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J.