Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of order : 15th November 2022
BALJEET SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. N.S. Dalal, Mr. Devesh Pratap Singh, Mr. Alok Kumar and Ms. Rachana Dalal, Advocates
Through: Ms. Jyoti Tyagi and Ms. Manisha, Advocates
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J (Oral)
ORDER
1. The instant petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking inter alia the following reliefs: “(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction thereby quashing the order dated 06.02.2013 passed by the respondent, vide which the application of the father of the Petitioner was ordered to be rejected;
(ii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the Respondent to decide the representation sent by the Petitioner to the Respondent for seeking decision on merits in the light of documents submitted with the representation;
(iii) award costs of the present writ petition in favour of the
2. The land of the father of the petitioner (hereinafter “predecessor-ininterest/applicant”) in revenue estate of Village Kakrola was notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and was acquired vide Award No. 1/1993-94 dated 2nd April 1993. Compensation in lieu of acquisition was also paid to the predecessor-in-interest on 14th May 1993.
3. The predecessor-in-interest, thereafter, applied for allotment of alternative plot in lieu of acquisition of his land under the Scheme dated 2nd May 1961 of Large Scale Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land in Delhi (hereinafter “Scheme of 1961”) vide application dated 31st January
1994. The said application of the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest came to be rejected vide order dated 6th February 2013 on the ground that his entire land was not acquired.
4. Aggrieved by the rejection order, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking the aforesaid prayers.
5. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the finding of the respondent that the land of the applicant was not entirely acquired is wrong, unfounded, unsubstantiated and therefore, erroneous. There is not even a single inch of agricultural land was left after acquisition of the applicant’s land.
6. It is submitted that the application under the Scheme of 1961 for allotment of alternative plot was filed by the applicant well within time. Thereafter, subsequent to his death, and relinquishment of interest in favour of the petitioner by the other legal heirs, the petitioner got the file No. F.31(50)/129/94/L&B/Alt transferred in his name and pursued the application for allotment of alternative plot.
7. It is further submitted that after the rejection letter was received, since the petitioner was not keeping well and was admitted in the hospital, it was only in February 2016 that he was able to obtain the status of the land in question from the Revenue Department of Village Kakrola. As per a status report dated 10th March 2016, remaining land, i.e., Khasra no. 195/56 was in the village abadi and the entire agricultural land was acquired. It is submitted that as per the policy, the applicant seeking allotment of alternative plot should not be the owner of land outside village abadi and in the case of the applicant, the land in Khasra no. 195/56 was a part of the extended Lal Dora and hence, the part of abadi. Therefore, it is submitted that the petitioner is entitled for allotment of alternative plot.
8. A representation alongwith the status report dated 10th March 2016 was submitted by the brother of the petitioner on 27th April 2016 for reconsideration of the case of allotment of alternative plot but no action was taken by the concerned authorities on the said representation. The petitioner again made representations and approached the concerned authorities on 1st September 2018 and 12th February 2019 alongwith documents to show that the entire land of the applicant had been acquired and therefore, the rejected case for allotment of alternative plot should be reopened. However, no action was taken on the said representations as well.
9. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that if the stand of the Respondent is to be adopted then the policy of allotment becomes meaningless and it renders the policy otiose for allotment of alternative plot.
10. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned order rejecting the application of the father of the petitioner is liable to be set aside, since the petitioner is entitled for allotment of alternative plot.
11. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the instant petition has been filed after six years of passing of the rejection order, therefore, is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay itself.
12. It is submitted that the application for allotment of alternative plot was rightly rejected upon finding that the entire land of the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest had not been acquired. It is submitted that the Scheme of 1961 is meant for those whose entire land stand acquired and they are rendered roofless and are left with no shelter or residence, however, the petitioner does not fall under this category of persons.
13. It is submitted that therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed for being devoid of merit.
14. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. This Court has perused the rejection order dated 6th February 2013.
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, High Courts have the power to adjudicate upon an impugned order along with the power to entertain writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. While adjudicating upon an impugned order, the scope of writ jurisdiction is narrowed to examining the contents of the order which is before the Court. Any consideration beyond assessment of the impugned order, including investigation into evidence and question of facts would amount to exceeding the jurisdiction. While examining the challenge to an impugned order, the Court has to limit itself to the consideration whether there is any illegality, irregularity, impropriety or error apparent on record. The law, as has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is clear that a High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction shall not appreciate evidence and must not interfere in the order impugned unless there is a gross illegality or error apparent on the face of record. Hence, this Court will also limit itself to the question of law and the contents of impugned order dated 6th February 2013.
16. This Court has perused the impugned order bearing No. F.31(50)/129/ 94/L&B/ALT/16890 dated 6th February 2013 and finds it apposite to look at the contents of the same for proper adjudication of the matter. The relevant portion of the impugned Order is reproduced hereunder:- “With reference to the above-mentioned subject, it is to inform you that your case for alternative plot in lieu of acquired land has been placed before the Recommendation Committee held on 19/12/2012, the Committee observed that the entire land of the applicant has not been acquired and is therefore in view of the decision in the case titled “Jai Singh Kanwar V/s. Delhi Administration in Civil Appeal. No.8290 of 2010by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Hence, the Committee rejected the case.”
17. A bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that the only ground taken by the respondents while rejecting the application of the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest is that his entire land was not acquired and therefore, he, or even the petitioner herein, were not rendered landless subsequent the acquisition of land in question.
18. The instant petition stems from the Scheme of 1961. The Scheme for Large Scale Acquisition Development & Disposal of Land in Delhi which came into force on 2nd May 1961 and has been modified from time to time, not only provided for measures for controlling value in urban areas but also largely regulated the conditions stipulated for acquisition, development and disposal of land. The Scheme provides for eligibility criteria as well as conditions and procedures one needs to follow while applying for allotment of alternative plot. The Scheme provides for such conditions under paragraph 10, which were updated and modified with time and as per requirements. These conditions act as eligibility criteria for the land owners whose lands were acquired and who became entitled to be considered for allotment of alternate plot, subject to the conditions laid.
19. These conditions which stood under paragraph 10 of the Scheme are reproduced hereunder:-
20. The Division Bench of this Court in Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Veerwati, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 1444, and its connected LPAs, held that there are four requisite conditions for consideration while filing and adjudicating the application for allotment of alternative plot. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:-
21. The conditions stipulated in this matter have stemmed from the Scheme of 1961 and its subsequent amendments and hence, have to be given foremost importance while making an application for allotment of alternative plot and while its consideration by the concerned authority.
22. Admittedly, the condition of holding a plot/residential accommodation being a bar for consideration of application of allotment of alternative plot is bar which finds mention in the first as well as the subsequently modified versions of the Scheme of 1961. This bar is also applicable in cases where the entire land of the applicant has not been acquired or where certain portion of the applicant’s land remains in Lal Dora.
23. It is also pertinent to see that the aim and intention of the Scheme of 1961 also highlights the said bar since the ultimate aim of the Scheme is to accommodate those who are rendered roofless. The objective of the Scheme of 1961 suggests as under: “The scheme of providing developed residential plots to farmers whose lands are acquired for planned development of Delhi is a rehabilitation measure”
24. This objective has also been reiterated by this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases. In Surender Singh Mann vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, W.P.(C) 12306/2015, decided on 25th August 2017, a Coordinate Bench of this Court observed as under:-
25. In State of M.P. vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639, the Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborated on the general principle and provisions for rehabilitation and observed as under:- “Land acquisition and rehabilitation: Article 21
26. It is desirable for the authority concerned to ensure that as far as practicable persons who had been living and carrying on business or other activity on the land acquired, if they so desire, and are willing to purchase and comply with any requirement of the authority or the local body, be given a piece of land on the terms settled with due regard to the price at which the land has been acquired from them. However, the State Government cannot be compelled to provide alternate accommodation to the oustees and it is for the authority concerned to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing alternative land considering the facts and circumstances of each case.
27. In certain cases, the oustees are entitled to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is meant only for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of a loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition. The authorities must explore the avenues of rehabilitation by way of employment, housing, investment opportunities, and identification of alternative lands. “10. … A blinkered vision of development, complete apathy towards those who are highly adversely affected by the development process and a cynical unconcern for the enforcement ofthe laws lead to a situation where the rights and benefits promised and guaranteed under the Constitution hardly ever reach the most marginalised citizens.” (Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. case [Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Oram, (2010) 11 SCC 269: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 450: JT (2010) 7 SC 352], SCC p. 273, para 10) For people whose lives and livelihoods are intrinsically connected to the land, the economic and cultural shift to a market economy can be traumatic. (Vide State of U.P. v. Pista Devi [(1986) 4 SCC 251: AIR 1986 SC 2025], Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority [(2002) 4 SCC 666: AIR 2002 SC 2036], Land Acquisition Officer v. Mahaboob [(2009) 14 SCC 54: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 297], Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Oram [Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Oram, (2010) 11 SCC 269: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 450: JT (2010) 7 SC 352] and Brij Mohan v. HUDA [(2011) 2 SCC 29: (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 336].) The fundamental right of the farmer to cultivation is a part of right to livelihood. “Agricultural land is the foundation for a sense of security and freedom from fear. Assured possession is a lasting source for peace and prosperity.” India being a predominantly agricultural society, there is a “strong linkage between the land and the person's status in [the] social system”.
26. Hence, it is evident that the Scheme of 1961 was introduced as a means to provide for those whose land is acquired for the purposes of development and to ensure that such persons are not rendered homeless or landless in the event of such acquisition.
27. In the instant case, the case of the petitioner and his predecessor-ininterest was considered by the concerned authority, i.e., the Recommendation Committee, and to evaluate the eligibility of the petitioner for allotment of an alternative plot the necessary actions were carried out. It was found that the entire land of the applicant had not been acquired. Therefore, evidently, the petitioner was not landless after the land of his predecessor-in-interest was acquired.
28. An examination of the objective of the Scheme read with the observations made in the abovementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, definitively and unambiguously indicate that the Scheme of 1961 is targeted to those individuals, villagers, farmers etc. who may be rendered homeless or landless upon their land being acquired by the Government, or any Authority under it, for the purposes of development. The very structure of the Scheme suggests that it is a welfare and rehabilitative measure for those affected by the actions taken in the process of development of the State of NCT of Delhi. Being considered for compensation, whether monetary or in the form of alternate plot, is an entitlement which is available to individuals who fulfil the criteria provided for under the Scheme. Those who lose their homes or their agricultural lands, that are the only source of their livelihood, are the beneficiaries of schemes like these and rightly so need to be facilitated as soon as possible. Such individuals, owners, villagers, farmers and their families cannot and should not be left remediless after their land is acquired. However, it should also be borne in mind that in garb of such welfare schemes, those who have alternative and effective means of sustaining a life do not take unfair advantage of the schemes and welfare provisions of the Government and its Authorities. Keeping in mind the objective of the Scheme, it is found that enforcing an eligibility criterion for consideration of application of allotment of alternate land is not unreasonable or unfair and is in fact required for ensuring that the active and effective measures reach those who are in need.
29. Moreover, the Division Bench of this Court in Ranjeet Singh vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10794, observed as under:-
57. The Court notices that the appellants’ argument that ownership of land or residential property in the village or extended abadi is not to be construed as a bar is, no doubt, justified. Yet, the fact that a dispossessed land owner has ownership or possession of a residence in the village, ipso facto, cannot entitle him or her to make an enforceable claim for allotment of alternative plot. Particularly when the left over lands with appellants are urbanized ones.”
30. The aforesaid observations by the Division Bench also clarify the position that dispossession itself does not entitle an applicant for allotment of alternative plot. The important condition which has to be considered is whether the applicant is left without any land/residence whatsoever after acquisition.
31. Since, the very purpose of the scheme for allotment of alternative plot is to provide for those who do not have any land left, residential or agricultural, subsequent to their land being acquired, and even the conditions laid under the Scheme provide for the ineligibility on account of ownership of a land, it is found that the case of the petitioner does not fulfil the eligibility criteria and hence, he was rightly found not entitled to the alternative accommodation under the Scheme.
32. Furthermore, in the instant case, as is evident from the record that the petitioner after passing of the rejection order on 6th February 2013, went into deep slumber for years and only got agitated after a considerable passage of time of more than six years and as per the petitioner’s version. It is a wellknown principle that delay defeats equity - “Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit” which means that equity assists the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights. Unreasonable delay in bringing forth a claim or laches are a major hurdle in granting relief to the claimant, especially when the delay is substantial. There is also no case made out for violation of the principles of natural justice.
33. Keeping in view the observations and discussions in the foregoing paragraphs and the facts and circumstances, it is found that there is no error apparent on the face of record or any gross illegality in the impugned order dated 6th February 2013 bearing No. F.31(50)/129/94/L&B/ALT/16890 passed by the concerned authority while deciding the application for allotment of alternative plot. The petitioner was not rendered landless after the land of the father of the petitioner was acquired.
34. Therefore, this Court does not find any merit in the instant petition since the petitioner cannot claim a benefit that does not accrue to him. Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed.
35. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.
JUDGE NOVEMBER 15, 2022 gs/ms