Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Decision delivered on: 22.11.2022
HANS STUDY CENTER ..... Appellant
Through: Mr Manish Kumar Mishra, Ms Akansha Singh and Mr Srinivas
Venkat, Adv.
Through: Mr Dev. P. Bhardwaj and Ms Anubha Bhardwaj, Advs.
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU [Physical Hearing/Hybrid Hearing (as per request)]
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J. (ORAL):
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 19.09.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) 3747/2015. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant had assailed the order dated 13.03.2015 passed by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India [hereafter referred to as “GOI”].
2. Via the aforementioned order, GOI has, in effect, refused grant-in-aid to the appellant.
3. The record shows that GOI in 2007-2008 had advertised the “Scheme of Coaching for Scheduled Tribes” [hereafter referred to as “the Scheme”]. The Scheme sought to support coaching given to disadvantaged Scheduled Tribe (ST) students who were looking to seek admittance to quality coaching institutions; the object being that they would get a leg-up in appearing and qualifying for competitive examinations held for jobs available in the public and private sector.
3.1. As per the Scheme, financial assistance is to be provided to coaching institutes, such as the appellant, to enable them to coach eligible ST candidates for competitive examinations.
4. The manner in which financial assistance had to be provided to the successful coaching institutions is detailed out in the Scheme.
4.1. We need not detain ourselves with this aspect of the matter, as the issue raised in the appeal and before the learned Single Judge relates to reimbursement of grant-in-aid.
5. The aforesaid Scheme was, admittedly, advertised and applications, in that behalf, were invited. The appellant, concededly, was one of the successful coaching institutions.
6. The appellant had approached the learned Single Judge with the grievance that grant-in-aid had not been provided to it for the following periods: “2010-2011 (second instalment); 2011-2012; 2012-2013 and 2013- 2014” [hereafter referred to as the “subject period”].
7. The rationale provided by the learned Single Judge in rejecting the plea advanced on behalf of the appellant was that it had failed to place on record audited accounts for the subject period.
7.1. The counsel for the appellant argues that since grant-in-aid was not paid in advance, the aspects concerning expenditure incurred was not reflected in the audited balance sheets.
7.2. This aspect of the matter emerges upon a perusal of the impugned order. For the sake of convenience, the relevant extracts are extracted hereafter: “….8. The principal reason indicated in the impugned order for denial of grant-in-aid, is that the petitioner had not submitted duly audited account for reimbursement of expenditure. It is the petitioner’s case that no such audited accounts could be submitted as the petitioner had not received any aid. It was earnestly argued on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner is required to provide utilisation certificate and the same would be done once the grant was disbursed. xxx xxx xxx
10. Plainly, the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner are not persuasive. The petitioner had admittedly not produced the audited accounts indicating that any expenditure had, in fact, been incurred. As held in the impugned order, the petitioner's claim was not for receipt of advance, for which utilisation certificates could be issued subsequently but was a case of reimbursement of expenditure already incurred.
11. On a pointed question as to what would be the position if the grant in aid was not disbursed, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in that case the teaching staff and other persons who had provided services would seek recovery from the petitioner. Thus, concededly, the petitioner had incurred the expenditure although not effected payments. Thus, the accounts of the petitioner would necessarily have to reflect such liability; but concededly, no such accounts were produced before Joint Secretary.
12. It is also difficult to accept that the teaching staff would continue to teach for more than three and a half years and service providers would provide boarding and lodging to the students without receipt of any payment. It is also noteworthy that the petitioner's institute not only coaches ST candidates but also other candidates from general category and the teaching faculty would also be common to both category and students. However, the grant-in-aid is only available in respect of ST candidates and, therefore, notwithstanding that the petitioner had not received the grant-in-aid, the petitioner would nonetheless be maintaining accounts for other income and expenditure necessary to run the coaching institute. Plainly, no such material had been provided to the Joint Secretary. In absence of such audited accounts establishing that the petitioner had incurred the expenditure, no reimbursement could be granted…”
8. On the other hand, a perusal of the order assailed before the learned Single Judge i.e., the order dated 13.03.2015 passed by GOI, discloses that, although audited accounts had been furnished by the appellant institute, it did not contain components of expenditure for which the claim was made, that is, expenditure incurred vis-a-vis stipend, boarding & lodging, advertisement and coaching fees [including charges of faculty] for the subject period. This facet of the matter emerges on a perusal of paragraph 3 of the GOI’s order dated 13.03.2015. For the sake of convenience, the said paragraph is extracted below:
3. On reconsideration of the claim of the petitioner after going through all available records and oral and written submissions made by the petitioner, it is seen that the period for which grants are requested pertains to previous years i.e. 2010-11 (2nd Installment), 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 and as such it is a reimbursement proposal to this Ministry, as the activities have been claimed to be already undertaken by the grantee organization. Note 1 below Rule 211(1) of General Financial Rules (GFRs) stipulates 'Utilization certificates ' need not be furnished in cases where the grants-in-aid are being made as reimbursement of expenditure already incurred on the basis of duly audited accounts'. As such, the duly audited accounts for the reimbursement of expenditure of previous years are statutory prerequisites. In the instant case, the audited accounts furnished by the guarantee institution does not contain the components of expenditure for which claim is being made viz., stipend, boarding &lodging, advertisement and coaching fees (including charges of faculty) for the years 2010-11 (2nd Installment), 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14. Moreover, the institution, by their own admission, had not incurred the expenditure for the years 2010-11 (2nd Installment) and 2011-12, 2012-13& 2013-14 towards the items admissible under the scheme i.e., coaching fees (including the charges of faculty), advertisement charges, stipend to candidates, assistance for boarding/ lodging to outstation students. Hence the claim is not substantiated as per requirement under the provisions of GFR, 2005. [Emphasis is ours]
9. From the above extract, it is evident that the appellant’s plea for reimbursement for grant-in-aid was rejected on the ground that it did not fulfil the requirements of General Financial Rules, 2005 [in short, “GFR”], which did away with the submission of utilization certificate where reimbursement of expenditure was sought on the basis of audited accounts.
10. In this context, Mr Manish Kumar Mishra, who appears on behalf of the appellant, has brought to our notice two orders passed by the learned Single Judge when the writ petition [i.e., WP(C) No.3747/2015] was pending adjudication. These orders are dated 25.02.2016 and 23.05.2016. For ease of reference, the said orders, being brief, are extracted hereafter: Order dated 25.02.2016 “Petitioner is directed to place on record affidavits of its teachers and students for the relevant period stating that they are still waiting for the salaries and stipends for the claimed period. Let the said affidavits be filed within eight weeks. List on 23rd May, 2016.” Order dated 23.05.2016 “Learned counsel for respondent-UOI prays for and is permitted to file an application for perjury within a period of six weeks. List the matter on 25th November, 2016.”
10.1. A perusal of the aforementioned orders would show that via the first order, i.e., order dated 25.02.2016, leave was granted to the appellant to place on record affidavits of teachers and students to show that expenses had been incurred.
10.2. Likewise, a perusal of the second order, i.e., order dated 23.05.2016, would show that perhaps, because the respondents doubted the identity of the affiants, they were granted leave to file an application for perjury.
11. The record shows that the respondents did file an application for perjury, i.e., CM No.13297/2016.
11.1. Concededly, this application and the reply filed on behalf of the appellant to the said application, has escaped the attention of the learned Single Judge.
11.2. We may note that, broadly, in the reply to the application, the appellant has stood by its assertion that the affidavits of teachers, students and advertisers are genuine.
12. Therefore, what we are faced with is the following. 12.[1] Although, the order of GOI dated 13.03.2015 adverts to the fact, as noticed above, that audited accounts were filed without alluding to the various heads under which reimbursement was claimed, the affidavits filed, based on the leave given by the court, exemplifying the expenses incurred, went unnoticed in the impugned order. The reference to this aspect that the appellant had admitted to the fact that it had not incurred expenditure qua components which were reimbursable under the Scheme does not find mention in the learned Single Judge’s order and appears to be completely contrary to the stand taken in the affidavits filed in the writ court.
13. Therefore, what was required to be done, according to us, was to have an exercise be carried out, perhaps by the District Collector of the concerned area, to reach a conclusion one way or the other, as to whether expenses had been incurred by the appellant.
14. In this regard, we may note that the contention advanced by Mr Mishra that because grant-in-aid was not paid in advance, therefore, the reimbursable components could not be reflected in the audited accounts, is a submission which is completely untenable.
14.1. If audited accounts were prepared, the liability ought to have been reflected on accrual basis. It is not Mr Mishra’s contention that accounts were not prepared on an mercantile basis.
15. That said, the entire purpose of the Scheme is to provide assistance to the disadvantaged ST candidates through teachers who undertake the duties of coaching such candidates.
16. Given this position, we are of the view that the best way forward would be to have the material placed on the court’s record [i.e., the affidavits] examined by the District Collector of the area or any other officer who is able to discharge such duty. These affidavits are appended on record at pdf pages 38 to 235 (Volume-II) of the case file.
17. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside, as also the order dated 13.03.2015 passed by the GOI, with a direction that the affidavits placed on this court’s record will be scrutinized by the District Collector of the concerned area or any other officer who is in a position to examine the veracity of the assertions made therein.
18. A report in that behalf will be prepared and submitted to the concerned authority in the GOI for considering the claim for reimbursement of expenses for the subject period.
19. The above exercise will be conducted at the earliest, though, not later than twelve (12) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order passed today.
20. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
21. At this stage, Mr Dev P. Bhardwaj, who appears on behalf of the respondents, says that notice was issued by this court via order dated 23.07.2018, only in respect of the second instalment.
21.1. In this regard, our attention has also been drawn to the subsequent order passed by the coordinate bench dated 30.07.2019.
21.2. While in the first order, the figure concerning the second instalment was indicated as Rs.10,95,000/-, this was corrected by the subsequent order wherein the figure was scaled down to Rs.2,45,000/-.
22. Mr Bhardwaj, it appears, is perhaps unaware of the order passed by the Supreme Court on 05.01.2022 in Special Leave Petition (SLP) No.38000/2019. The Supreme Court in the SLP preferred by the appellant against the aforementioned orders dated 23.07.2018 and 30.07.2019 passed in the instant appeal, gave liberty to the appellant to challenge the said orders passed by the coordinate bench whereby notice has been limited albeit, subject to the final decision in the appeal.
23. Therefore, this contention of Mr Bhardwaj cannot be sustained.
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J TARA VITASTA GANJU, J NOVEMBER 22, 2022 aj Click here to check corrigendum, if any