Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CM(M) 1705/2019 & CM APPL.51556/2019
DR O M PARMAR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Neeraj Yadav, Adv.
Through: Ms.Samapika Biswal and Mr.Aman Kumar Yadav, Advs.
JUDGMENT
24.11.2022
1. Eviction Petition E18/2012 was instituted by the respondent Harsh Vardhan Nayyar against the petitioner Dr. O M Parmar, seeking eviction of the petitioner under Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 14(1)1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the DRC Act), in respect
14. Protection of tenant against eviction – (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of anv promises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: — (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; (b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord;
(c) that the tenant has used the premises for a purpose other than that for which they were let—
(i) if the premises have been let on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord; or (j) if the premises have been let before the said date without obtaining his consent;
(d) that the premises were let for use as a residence and neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the application for the recovery of possession thereof; (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; of the premises at No. 32, First Floor, Shankar Market, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001 (“the tenanted premises”). The eviction petition averred that the premises had been let out to the present petitioner Dr. O M Parmar by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent Dr. Sushila Nayyar, for running a clinic at a monthly rent of ₹ 1,200/- including electricity, water charges and other charges.
2. For ease of reference, allusion to the petitioner and the respondent would be made, hereinafter, as “Parmar” and “Nayyar” respectively.
3. The petition alleged that Parmar was in default of rent since 1st January 2001, despite service of legal notice on him, by Nayyar, on 30th September 2010. In the circumstances, Nayyar, invoking Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the DRC Act, [which for ease of reference, would be cited hereinafter as Section 14(1)(a)], sought that Parmar be evicted from the tenanted premises. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, "premises let for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes; (f) that the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and are required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated; (g) that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or re-building or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated; (h) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted, a residence;
(i) that the premises were let to the tenant lor use as a residence by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord, and that the tenant has ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be in such service or employment; (j) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises; (k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situate;
(l) that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in pursuance of any improvement scheme or development scheme and that such building work cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated.
4. Consequent on trial, the learned Additional Rent Controller (the learned ARC) held that a clear case for eviction of Parmar, under Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act, had been made out. Nonetheless, noting the fact that Section 14(2)2 of the DRC Act proscribed the making of any order of eviction against the tenant, unless the tenant was granted 30 days time to deposit the arrears of rent as per the order passed under Section 14(1)(a) read with Section 15(1)3 of the DRC Act, the learned ARC permitted Parmar 30 days time to deposit arrears of rent @ ₹ 1,200/- per month for the period from 1st January 2001 to 30th September 2010 with interest @ 15% per annum.
5. Aggrieved thereby, Parmar appealed to the learned Rent Control Tribunal (the learned RCT) vide RCT 40/13, which was subsequently renumbered as RCT 151/16.
6. RCT 151/16 stands partly allowed, by the learned RCT, vide the impugned judgment dated 26th September 2019. The learned RCT has held, in the impugned judgment, that the arrears of rent payable by Parmar would be liable to be computed with effect from 1st October 2007, and not with effect from 1st January 2001. The concluding para 11 of the impugned judgment dated 26th September 2019 of the (2) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by section 15: Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section, if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive months.
15. When a tenant can get the benefit of protection against eviction – (1) In every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, the Controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order directing the tenant to pay to the landlord or deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of the rent were legally recoverable from the tenant including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. learned RCT, therefore, holds thus:
7. Assailing the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The prayer clause in this petition, as originally drafted, read thus: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to:a. Call for the records of the R.C.T NO. 151 / 2016 titled as Dr. O.M Parmar vs. Harsh Vardhan Nayyar from the court of Sh. Yashwant Kumar District and Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi & E-18/2012 titled " Harsh Vardhan Nayyar vs. Dr. O.M. Parmar" from the court of Ld. Rent Controller, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi; b. Set aside the Judgment dated 26.09.2019 passed by the Court of Shri Yashwant Kumar, District and Sessions Judge/R.C.T, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in R.C.T No. 151/2016 whereby the Ld. Rent Control Tribunal has declined an opportunity to the Petitioner herein to contest the Eviction Petition on merits and despite, holding that the Ld. Rent Controller had incorrectly calculated the arrears of rent has failed to set aside the orders dated 26.07.2013, Orders dated 31.08.2013 and 20.09.2013; c. Set Aside the judgment dated 26.07.2013, Orders dated 31.08.2013 and 20.09.2013 passed in Eviction Petition bearing No. E-18/2012 by the Court of Shri Gorakh Nath Pandey, Ld. Rent Controller, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi.; d. pass any such other or further order(s) that this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
8. Subsequently, the prayer clause in the petition was amended to read as under: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to:a. Call for the records of the R.C.T NO. 151 / 2016 titled as Dr. O.M Parmar vs. Harsh Vardhan Nayyar from the court of Sh. Yashwant Kumar District and Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi & E-18/2012 titled " Harsh Vardhan Nayyar vs. Dr. O.M. Parmar" from the court of Ld. Rent Controller, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi; b. Set aside the Judgment dated 26.09.2019 passed by the Court of Shri Yashwant Kumar, District and Sessions Judge/R.C.T, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in R.C.T No. 151/2016, declining an opportunity to the Petitioner herein to contest the Eviction Petition on merits and despite, holding that the Ld. Rent Controller had incorrectly calculated the arrears of rent has failed to set aside the orders dated 26.07.2013, Orders dated 31.08.2013 and 20.09.2013; c. Set Aside the judgment dated 26.07.2013, Orders dated 31.08.2013 and 20.09.2013 passed in Eviction Petition bearing No. E-18/2012 by the Court of Shri Gorakh Nath Pandey, Ld. Rent Controller, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi.; d. Consequent thereto award the benefit under Section 14 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to the Petitioner therein. e. Pass any such other or further order(s) that this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
9. Mr. Yadav, learned Counsel for the petitioner advanced two contentions.
10. The first was that the arrears payable by his client under Section 15(1) of the DRC Act would be liable to be computed not from 1st October 2007 but from 21st November 2009. For this purpose, Mr. Yadav emphasises the words “legally recoverable”, employed by the legislature in Section 14(1)(a) and Section 15(1) of the DRC Act. He seeks to submit that Section 14(1)(a) envisaged non-payment, by the tenant, of arrears of rent “legally recoverable” from him, and Section 15 empowered the learned Rent Controller to make an order directing the tenant to pay the arrears of rent thus “legally recoverable”. Mr. Yadav presses into service Article 52 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to contend that the expression “legally recoverable” would have to be understood with reference to the date when the eviction petition/suit was filed. Article 52 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read thus: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
52. For arrears of rent. Three years. When the arrears become due.
11. A suit for recovery of money could only claim arrears up to a period of three years prior to the institution of the suit. Mr. Yadav submits that Article 52 of the Limitation Act, if examined vis-à-vis the date when the eviction petition was instituted, would permit recovery of arrears only up to a period of three years prior to the institution of the eviction petition. The date of service of the legal notice, he submits, would, therefore, be completely irrelevant and, therefore, the learned RCT was also in error in computing the terminus a quo, from which the arrears of rent would be payable, as three years prior to the date when the legal notice was served by Nayyar on Parmar. Mr. Yadav presses into service, for this purpose, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamala Bakshi v. Khairati Lal[4].
12. As against this, Ms. Samapika Biswal, learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the learned RCT has correctly computed the period of three years backwards from the date of service of the legal notice by Nayyar on Parmar. She refutes the contention of Mr. Yadav that the period of three years would be reckonable backwards from the date when the eviction petition was instituted.
13. Having considered the submissions of both sides on this matter in the backdrop of the statutory and precedential position, I am inclined to agree with Ms. Biswal’s submission.
14. If one is to read Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act holistically, it envisages non-payment, by the tenant, of “the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable, from him” within two months of the date on which a notice of demand “for the arrears of rent” has been served on him by the landlord. It is obvious that the words “arrears of rent”, having been used twice in this provision, has to be accorded the same meaning at both points[5]. The clause envisages the legal recoverability of the arrears of rent of computed vis-à-vis the service of a notice for demand of such arrears by the landlord on the tenant. The period of
For the proposition that a word, used more than once in a statutory provision has to be accorded the same meaning at all places where it is used, one may refer to Bhogilal Chunnilal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 356; K. N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592; Raghubans Narain Singh v. Uttar Pradesh Government, AIR 1967 SC 465; Mohd. Shafi v. VII Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1977 SC 836; Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti, AIR 1990 SC 897. three years, therefore, has necessarily to be computed backwards from the date of the service of the notice of the arrears of rent, and not backwards from the date on which an eviction petition, at some indeterminate future point of time, may come to be instituted. Such an interpretation would require the person invoking Section 14(1)(a) to be clairvoyant which, quite obviously, the statute could not have envisaged.
15. On a plain reading, therefore, the “legal recoverability” of the arrears of rent is, even as per Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act envisaged vis-à-vis the date of service of the notice of demand for the said arrears.
16. The expression “legally recoverable” in Section 15(1), being directly relatable to Section 14(1)(a) has also, therefore, accorded the same meaning.
17. On a conjoint reading of Section 14(1)(a) and Section 15(1), therefore, it is ex facie apparent that the arrears of rent payable would be for a period of three years prior to the date of service of the notice of demand of such arrears. Section 52 of the Limitation Act cannot come to the aid of Mr. Yadav or militate against the aforesaid interpretation, as it merely identifies the terminus a quo and not the terminus ad quem of the period for which the arrears would be claimed. It merely states that the period of the limitation for claiming arrears of rent is three years from when the arrears became due. The question that arises is the date from which the period of three years would have to be worked backwards. That question is not answered by Article 52 of the Limitation Act. As I have already opined, a plain reading of Section 14(1)(a) and Section 15(1) of the DRC Act would indicate that the period has to be reckoned backwards from the date of service of the notice of demand of arrears.
18. This interpretation is fortified by the judgment in Kamala Bakshi[1] on which Mr. Yadav himself places reliance. In that case, the decision of the learned Additional Rent Controller, holding that three years would be computable backwards from the date of service of the notice of demand, and as upheld by this Court, was found, by the Supreme Court, to be correct. One may reproduce, for ready reference, paras 3, 8 and 10 of the report in the said case, thus:
19. For the aforesaid reasons, the first issue that arises has to be answered in favour of the respondent. The learned RCT has, therefore, correctly held the arrears of rent to be liable to be computed from 1st October 2007.
20. As a result, the challenge to the impugned order dated 26th September 2019 has necessarily to fail. The order is accordingly, upheld.
21. There is no necessity, therefore, for this Court to proceed to the orders dated 26th July 2013, 31st August 2013 and 20th September 2013, as the said orders stood set aside by the order dated 26th September 2019, which stands upheld.
22. Mr. Yadav has then sought to contend that, even if it were to be assumed that the learned RCT had correctly computed the arrears of rent as payable with effect from 1st October 2007, the petitioner was required to be extended the benefit of Section 14(2) of the DRC Act. The amended petition, too, incorporates a prayer for grant, to the petitioner, of the benefit of Section 14(2) of the DRC Act.
23. Mr. Yadav faults the learned RCT for not having extended, to the petitioner, the benefit of Section 14(2).
24. In the facts of the present case, this prayer cannot be granted. The simple reason is an order dated 29th November 2019, which was passed by this Court, prior to issuance of notice in this petition: “The original order by the Rent Controller dated 26th July, 2013 by which the occupation charges were directed to be paid by the Petitioner to the Respondent, was modified by the RCT vide the impugned order dated 26th September, 2019, and directions were issued by the RCT for making payments from H' October,
2007. Vide order dated 26th July, 2013, while allowing the petition of the Respondent under Section 14 (1) (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the RC directed the Petitioner to pay arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 1200/- per month from P' January 2001 till 30'^ September 2010. The Petitioner was further directed to tender rent at the rate of Rs. 1200/- per month from the date of filing of the eviction petition till 26th July, 2013 within 30 days. However, the Petitioner did not pay the said amounts. An application under section 14(1) of the Act was filed by the Petitioner, which was dismissed vide order dated 31st October, 2013. On 20th September, 2013, the RC, while noting that the Petitioner had failed to pay any rent as had been directed by the previous orders, held that the Respondent was entitled to recover possession of the premises and accordingly passed an eviction order. The Petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 38, which vide the impugned order, was disposed of by the RCT. The order of the RC was modified by the RCT to the extent that Rs. 1200/- per month was directed to paid w.e.f from October, 2007 till 25th September, 2012, and thereafter Rs. 1500/- per month was to be paid. On 20th November, 2019, the RC directed warrants of possession of the suit property to be issued. No amount has been paid by the Petitioner which is a clear default. Various reasons are given for non-payment. The benefit under Rent control statutes being strict in nature, the same ought to be enforced strictly as held in Balwanti Devi v. Mahesh Kumar Chopra, 191 (2012) DLT36. Under these circumstances, considering the location of the property, which is located in Shankar Market, Connaught Place, it is directed that the Petitioner, who is running a clinic in the tenanted premises, shall pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- per month with effect from 26th July, 2013 till date. The arrears for the previous years shall be cleared within a period of three months, however, the future payments from the month of November, 2019 shall be paid on or before the 10* of every month to the landlord. Any default in payment shall immediately result in execution of the warrants of possession. The above payments shall be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of either of the parties in the final decision of this petition. Subject to compliance with the above directions, and payments being made, the warrants of possession shall remain stayed. List on 23rd April, 2020.”
25. On account of failure, on the part of the petitioner, to comply with the aforesaid order, the petitioner was not entitled to any interlocutory relief against the warrants of possession which had been issued consequent to the impugned order passed by the learned RCT.
26. Mr. Yadav sought to submit that, prior to the order dated 29th November 2019, the petitioner had sought to tender a cheque dated 16th October 2019 in terms of the order of the learned RCT for ₹ 1,86,032/-, which the respondent did not accept.
27. The order dated 29th November 2019 was passed by this Court thereafter. It is a matter of record that there is no compliance with the said order till date and that, in fact, the petitioner has been in the tenanted premises, which is prime commercial estate in Connaught Place since 26th July 2013. Even if one were to reckon the period from 29th November 2013, the petitioner is continuing in the premises, rent free, for over three years as on date.
28. Clearly, a case such as this cannot invite any interference from this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Miscellaneous application stands disposed of.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J NOVEMBER 24, 2022