Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 12th December, 2025
NARESH KUMAR & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Kamal Singh, Adv. All the petitioners in person.
Through: Mr. Hitesh Vali, APP for the State
Singh, PS Karawal Nagar.
R-3 & 4 in person.
R-2, 5 & 6 (through VC)
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition is filed seeking quashing of FIR NO. 309/2014 dated 20.04.2014, registered at Police Station Karawal Nagar, for offence under Sections 341/323/325/379/356/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), including all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
2. The said FIR was registered pursuant to a complaint made by Respondent No. 2 alleging that on 20.04.2014, at around 4 pm, when Respondent No. 2 was passing though the lane of Harijan Basti, Petitioner No. 5 called him to his house. Allegedly, even though Respondent No. 2 refused to go there, Petitioner NO. 5 took him inside, where the other petitioners were present. The accused persons allegedly locked Respondent No. 2 inside and gave beatings to him with an iron pipe, due to which, his leg bone got broken. When Respondent No. 2 started calling Police, the accused persons snatched his two mobile phones, his wallet which contained some documents and around ₹5,000/-. In the meantime, on being informed, Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 (who are the family members of Respondent No. 2) went to save him, who were also beaten badly by the accused persons. Hence, the present FIR.
3. Charges have been framed against the petitioners on 26.11.2022 for offences under Sections 392/325/342 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners states the parties are known to each other and are residing in the same area, and an altercation was a result of a petty misunderstanding. He states that the petitioners are apologetic for their conduct. He submits that the petitioners will voluntarily pay a total sum of ₹10,000/to each of the victims as compensation as well.
5. The present petition is filed on the ground that the matter is amicably settled between the parties by way of Deed of Settlement dated 16.01.2025, on their own free will, without any pressure, force or threat.
6. All the petitioners and Respondent Nos. 3 & 4 are present in person in Court today whereas Respondent Nos. 2, 5 & 6 have joined the proceedings through video conferencing. The parties have been duly identified by the Investigating Officer.
7. The victims, on being asked, state that they have since forgiven the accused persons and are satisfied with the apology and the compensation amount.
8. They further state that they do not wish to pursue any proceedings arising out of the present FIR and they have no objection if the same are quashed.
9. Offence under Section 392 of the IPC is noncompoundable in nature whereas offences under Sections 325/342 of the IPC are compoundable in nature.
10. It is well settled that the High Court while exercising its powers under under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) (erstwhile Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) can quash offences which are non-compoundable on the ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the complainant. The Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down parameters and guidelines for High Court while accepting settlement and quashing the proceedings. In the case of Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.: (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed as under:-
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.” (emphasis supplied)
11. Similarly, in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.: (2017) 9 SCC 641, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed as under:-
under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” (emphasis supplied)
12. It is stated that the parties are well acquainted. Once the victims have settled with the petitioners, the chances of conviction are also reduced. In such circumstances, continuation of proceedings would only cause heartburn to the victims and would amount to abuse of the process of Court.
13. Keeping in view the nature of the dispute and that the parties have amicably entered into a settlement, this Court feels that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the dispute alive. I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.
14. However, keeping in mind the fact that the State machinery has been put to motion, ends of justice would be served if the petitioners are put to cost.
15. In view of the above, FIR No. 309/2014 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed, including the charge dated 26.11.2022, subject to payment of total cost of ₹50,000/- by the petitioners, to be deposited with the Delhi Police Martyrs’ Fund, within a period of eight weeks from today.
16. Let the compensation of ₹10,000/- be given by the petitioners to each of the victims (Respondent Nos. 2 to 6) within a period of eight weeks from today as well.
17. Let the proof of deposit of cost and payment of compensation to the victims be submitted with the concerned SHO.
18. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application also stands disposed of. AMIT MAHAJAN, J DECEMBER 12, 2025/‘KDK’