Paras Chauhan v. The State of NCT of Delhi

1. For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is allowed.

2. The matter is taken up for hearing and the date already fixed, that is, 15.01.2026, stands cancelled.

3. The present petition is filed seeking quashing of FIR NO. 599/2025 dated 26.08.2025, registered at Police Station I.G.I. Airport for the offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959.

4. It is averred that on 26.08.2025, when the petitioner was travelling from Delhi to Bangkok, the baggage of the petitioner was referred for physical check on the suspicion that the same contained ammunition. During the physical search of the baggage belonging to the petitioner, 3 live ammunitions and 1 empty case was recovered. It is alleged that the petitioner failed to produce valid documents for the recovered ammunition. This led to the registration of the subject FIR.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has a valid Arms License bearing NO. 33016/0038492/2022, which is valid till 31.10.2027. He submits that the petitioner was completely unaware and unconscious of the presence of the ammunition in the handbag. He further submits that the petitioner had no criminal intention to carry the ammunition which was seized.

6. He submits that the offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 is not made out on the basis of mere possession when the suspect is not conscious of the possession of live ammunition.

7. Status Report has been filed and it is verified that the petitioner has a valid arms license.

8. In the present case, the petitioner has categorically asserted that he was not in conscious possession of the ammunition and the same was inadvertently left in his baggage.

9. It is settled law that mere custody, without being aware of such possession does not constitute an offence under the Arms Act, 1959. The question that falls for consideration of this Court is whether the petitioner was in ‘conscious possession’ of the ammunition allegedly recovered from him or not.

10. The term ‘conscious possession’ has been elaborately dealt with by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gunwantlal v. State of M.P.: (1972) 2 SCC 194. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under: “5. …….The possession of a firearm under the Arms Act in our view must have, firstly the element of consciousness or knowledge of that possession in the person charged with such offence and secondly where he has not the actual physical possession, he has nonetheless a power or control over that weapon so that his possession thereon continues despite physical possession being in someone else. If this were not so, then an owner of a house who leaves an unlicensed gun in that house but is not present when it was recovered by the police can plead that he was not in possession of it even though he had himself consciously kept it there when he went out. Similary, if he goes out of the house during the day and in the meantime some one conceals a pistol in his house and during his absence, the police arrives and discovers the pistol, he cannot be charged with the offence unless it can be shown that he had knowledge of the weapon being placed in his house. And yet again if a gun or firearm is given to his servant in the house to clean it, though the physical possession is with him nonetheless possession of it will be that of the owner. The concept of possession is not easy to comprehend as writers of Jurisprudence have had occasions to point out. In some cases under Section 19(1)(f) of the Arms Act, 1878 it has been held that the word “possession” means exclusive possession and the word “control” means effective control but this does not solve the problem. As we said earlier, the first precondition for an offence under Section 25(1)(a) is the element of intention, consciousness or knowledge with which a person possessed the firearm before it can be said to constitute an offence and secondly that possession need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the gun, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power and control. ………….”

11. In the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, Bombay (II): (1994) 5 SCC 410, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court, while discussing what entails conscious possession, observed as under: “19. The meaning of the first ingredient of ‘possession’ of any such arms etc. is not disputed. Even though the word ‘possession’ is not preceded by any adjective like ‘knowingly’, yet it is common ground that in the context the word ‘possession’ must mean possession with the requisite mental element, that is, conscious possession and not mere custody without the awareness of the nature of such possession. There is a mental element in the concept of possession. Accordingly, the ingredient of ‘possession’ in Section 5 of the TADA Act means conscious possession. This is how the ingredient of possession in similar context of a statutory offence importing strict liability on account of mere possession of an unauthorised substance has been understood.”

12. It is the case of the petitioner that he was not conscious of the fact that the bag carried by him contained 3 live ammunition and 1 empty case. It is to be kept in mind that the arms which are alleged to be carried by the petitioner is not a gun. It is relevant to note that the petitioner made no attempt to conceal the ammunition in the bag and handed it for screening. In such circumstances, the version of the petitioner is a plausible one.

13. The State has not alleged that the possession was conscious or there was some mens rea behind carrying the ammunition. The present case seems to be a case where the petitioner inadvertently carried the ammunition in his baggage.

14. In similar circumstances, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Adhiraj Singh Yadav Vs. State: W.P.(CRL) 754/2020, held as under: