Central Provident Fund Commissioner v. Sh Ali Roshan & Anr.

1. Allowed to subject, in all just exceptions. W.P.(C) 18968/2025 & CM APPL. 78974/2025

2. This petition has been filed challenging the order dated 21.05.2025 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’), in O.A. No. 1423/2021 titled Sh. Ali Roshan v. Union of India & Anr., allowing the O.A. filed by the respondent herein, with the following directions:

3. The brief facts which gave rise to the above O.A. have been summarised by the learned Tribunal in Paragraphs 3.[1] to 3.[5] of the interim order. To further summarise the same, the respondent, who was working at the post of Enforcement Officer since 26.08.1993, was promoted on an ad hoc basis to the post of Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner on 03.11.2010. He was promoted on a regular basis to the said post on 12.11.2012. Claiming that for the Senior Time Scale, his ad hoc service should also be counted in terms of the Judgment of this Court in Employees Provident Fund Organization & Anr. v. Rajkumar 2019:DHC:6366-DB, the respondent filed the above O.A.

4. The learned Tribunal, placing reliance on Rajkumar (supra), has allowed the O.A. with the above quoted directions. The learned Tribunal in its Impugned Order has observed as under: “11.[1] Same is the situation in the present cases as well. Further the applicants of OA No.1899/2018 have completed requisite 5 years of service in the post of APFC in 2004 to be eligible for promotion to the post of RPFC- II as is evident from the chart prepared above but due to dispute regarding seniority was agitated by certain aggrieved employees as noted above and due to admission of delay in holding the DPCs, the applicants of the said OA 1899/2018 also did not get their legitimate promotion at the time when they were in service, had the DPCs been convened at the relevant point of time, they would have got the promotion to the post of RPFC-11.

9. Keeping in view the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the admitted fact that the cases of the applicants in all these cases are squarely covered by the order of this Tribunal in Rajkumar's case (supra) upheld by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court (supra) as also implemented by the respondents and this attained finality. At this stage, it is apt to mention that respondent being a model employer, although knew that the cases · of the applicants in these cases are squarely covered but they have not taken any action to grant the benefit of the said order of this Tribunal in Rajkumar's case (supra) to other similarly situated employees like the applicants herein. It is also pertinent to mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of cases included in the case of Arvind Kumar Srivastava (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the respondents' counsel, the Supreme Court has in paragraph 22.[3] has stated -that the ·delay and laches shall not be applicable in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the High Court was in rem, with an intention to give the benefit to all similarly placed persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to extend the benefit thereof to all similarly placed persons, as the applicants in all these OAs are retired employees and have been denied their legitimate right to get the STS as admittedly due to delay on the part of the respondents in convening the DPCs in this regard. We are of the considered view that the instant OAs deserve to be allowed in terms of decision of this Tribunal in Rajkumar (supra).”

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Tribunal has erred in placing reliance on the Judgment of this Court in Rajkumar (supra) inasmuch as this Court had specifically clarified that the said Judgment is on the peculiar facts of the said case. He submits that, therefore, the Judgment of this Court was not a binding precedent for other cases.

6. He further submits that in Rajkumar (supra), the respondent therein, was in the panel of 2008-09 or 2009-10 and had been appointed on an ad hoc basis much prior to the respondent herein. He submits that, therefore, the facts of the case were also entirely different and could not have been mechanically applied for the case of the respondent.

7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents, who appears on advance notice of this petition, submits that having been appointed as an Enforcement Officer in the year 1993, the respondent was entitled for his promotion to the post of APFC somewhere in