Shri Satish Chand and Anr. v. Girdhar Gopal Gupta & Anr.

Delhi High Court · 10 Jan 2023 · 2023:DHC:162
Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
RC.REV. 286/2022
2023:DHC:162
civil appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court upheld eviction of tenants on landlord's bona fide need under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, holding alternative accommodation is only an incidental factor and not decisive.

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2023/DHC/000162
RC.REV. 286/2022
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
RC.REV. 286/2022 & CM APPLs. 54309/2022,54310/2022
SHRI SATISH CHAND AND ANR. ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. J.C. Mahindro and Mr. Shubham Agarwal, Advocates with Petitioner
No.2 in person.
VERSUS
GIRDHAR GOPAL GUPTA & ANR. ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. P.P. Ahuja, Advocate.
Reserved on: 19th December, 2022
Date of Decision: 10th January, 2023
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
JUDGMENT
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J:

1. The present revision petition has been filed by the Petitioners, tenants, with respect to the tenanted premises i.e., shop bearing no. 4747, Ground Floor, Main Road, Pahari Dhiraj, Delhi-110006, measuring 9’ - 0 x 38’- 0 equivalent to 342 sq. ft. (‘tenanted premises’), assailing the eviction order dated 16.02.2022, passed by the Commercial Civil Judge acting as the Rent Controller, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (‘Trial Court’).

2. In this matter, leave to defend application was allowed vide order dated 21.12.2018 and the matter was set down for trial after completion of pleadings.

3. The eviction petition was instituted by the Respondent, owner and landlord, who sought recovery of the tenanted premises on the ground of his bona fide need. The Trial Court after perusing the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties, held that the Respondent, landlord, has been able to prove all the ingredients necessary of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (‘DRC Act’) and accordingly, vide its order dated 16.02.2022, allowed the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC Act.

4. The Petitioners, tenants, thereafter filed an application under Section 25B(9) of the DRC Act for review of the order dated 16.02.2022. The said application has been dismissed by the Trial Court vide a separate order dated 03.12.2022 and the said order is also assailed in the present proceedings.

5. The facts in brief are, that landlord and his younger son Sh. Sachin Gupta are carrying on their independent businesses as sole proprietors from Property No. 4753A, Ahata Kidara, Pahari Dhiraj, Delhi.

5.1. It is stated that the landlord’s elder son Sh. Amit Gupta is carrying on his independent business being a sole proprietor from a godown bearing NO. 4785, Ground Floor, Ahata Kidara, Pahari Dhiraj, Delhi. The said property belongs to the Slum Authority and use/occupation charges are paid to the said authority by the Respondent, landlord. It is stated that Sh. Amit Gupta is dependent upon the landlord for the purpose of accommodation.

5.2. It is stated by the landlord that there is a common wall between the shop currently being used by the landlord i.e., 4753A and the tenanted premises i.e., 4747, both of which are situated on the ground floor portion of the building. It is stated that the age of the landlord was 71 years (at the time of the filing of the petition in 2018) and he wishes to settle his two sons in properties owned by him, for doing their respective independent businesses so that there are no disputes between him and his two sons. It is stated that it is for this bona fide need, the petition was filed.

5.3. The landlord filed on Trial Court’s record the exhibit PW 1/7 i.e., site plan as of the entire property, situated at Pahari Dhiraj, including the portion in occupation of the tenants and various portions at mark A to L. He also filed on record the exhibit PW 1/22 i.e., site plan of the Slum Authority property bearing No. 4785, Ahata Kidara, Delhi, being used by his elder son Sh. Amit Gupta.

5.4. It was stated that the landlord does not have any suitable alternative accommodation to satisfy the bona fide need, except the tenanted premises.

5.5. In the eviction petition, the landlord disclosed details of properties owned and possessed by himself, his wife, his sons and his daughters-in-law. Explanation was offered with respect to the unsuitability of each of the said premises and the same has been noted and dealt in detail in the impugned orders.

6. The Petitioners, tenants, admit that the Respondent is the landlord and the owner of the tenanted premises and to this extent there is no controversy in the present proceedings.

6.1. However, while controverting the claim of the landlord that the tenanted premises is required bona fide and that he has no other alternative accommodation suitable for his need, the tenants have relied upon the list of properties as disclosed by the landlord in the eviction petition to contend that the said properties are available to Sh. Amit Gupta, the elder son of the landlord, and are suitable for running his business. There is also no dispute that the elder son Sh. Amit Gupta for whose need eviction petition has been filed, does carry on business in a nearby location, which has been taken on license from the Slum Authority.

7. During the course of the arguments before this Court, learned counsel for the Petitioners stated that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the government has formulated a policy to promote shifting of paper and cardboard businesses from walled city i.e., Chawri Bazar to Ghazipur. He states that the business carried out by Sh. Amit Gupta is covered by the said policy. He states that in this regard, the Delhi Development Authority (‘DDA’) had in fact allotted a plot to both Sh. Amit Gupta and the landlord respectively at Integrated Freight Corridor (‘IFC’) at Ghazipur for carrying on the said business.

7.1. He states that Sh. Amit Gupta was allotted Plot No.944, Block C at IFC Ghazipur, Delhi, which has been sold by Sh. Amit Gupta. He states similarly, the DDA has also allotted a Plot No. 912 to the landlord himself at IFC Ghazipur and in the said plot, the landlord after completing construction, has let out the said plot to a tenant. He states the said facts bely the claim of bona fide need of Sh. Amit Gupta.

7.2. He further stated that Sh. Amit Gupta has obtained a GST registration from premises bearing No. 4785, Ahata Kidara, Delhi and in the said GST registration the said property has been described as a commercial premises and therefore, the contention of the landlord that it is a godown is contrary to the declaration on statutory record. He stated that the said property is sufficient for the need of Sh. Amit Gupta.

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7.3. No other plea was raised by the Petitioners during the oral arguments.

8. In reply, learned counsel for the Respondent, who appeared on caveat, states that Plot No.944 at IFC Ghazipur was sold by Sh. Amit Gupta much prior to the filing of the eviction petition and this has not been disputed by the tenants.

9. He states that with respect to the Plot No. 912 at IFC Ghazipur the said allotment by DDA has been made for construction of warehouse, which is a purpose different from an office space where the trader meets his customers and receives orders/bookings. He states that the tenanted premises are required for said trading purpose by the elder son of the Respondent, landlord. He further states that the Court may take judicial notice that the paper market at IFC Ghazipur is at a nascent stage. He states that Ghazipur area has not been developed and there is lack of basic amenities. He states that further, the scale of business being carried out at Chawri Bazaar cannot be compared with IFC Ghazipur.

9.1. He states that with respect to the property No. 4785, Ahata Kidara, Delhi, the landlord has placed on record the site plan exhibit PW 1/22 which shows that it is a godown and the fact that it is a property owned by Slum Authority and therefore, the landlord is entitled to seek recovery of his own premises, to settle his son. He states that there is no dispute that this property is owned by Slum Authority.

10. This Court has heard the counsel for the parties and perused the paper book.

11. As noted above the relationship of landlord and tenant is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that Sh. Amit Gupta, son of the landlord, carries on business of paper and cardboard at a nearby location, which has been taken on license from the Slum Authority and the use and occupation charges for the same are being paid by the landlord. In these circumstances the need of the landlord to provide his elder son with landlord’s self-owned premises for carrying on business has been correctly held by Trial Court to be bona fide.

12. Petitioners, tenants, have laid great emphasis on the existence of suitable alternate premises and have assailed the impugned order primarily on the said issue. The controversy in the present petition is therefore only with respect to the suitability of the alternate premises available with the landlord and with specific reference to the Plot No. 912 at IFC Ghazipur, Delhi.

13. Petitioners, tenants, with their review application have placed reliance upon a sample allotment letter issued with respect to a plot at IFC Ghazipur in the name of a third-party M/s Kwality Sales Corporation and particularly clause 5.[1] therein. It is stated that as per the said allotment letter, both Petitioner and his son are obliged to relocate the paper trade from the walled city i.e., Chawri Bazar to IFC Ghazipur, failing which the allotment shall be cancelled and the land resumed by the land-owning agency. He states that since admittedly Sh. Amit Gupta carries on paper trade and was allotted a plot at IFC Ghazipur, he cannot continue his business in the Chawri Bazar, where the tenanted premises are located.

14. This Court has perused the impugned order dated 03.12.2022 passed by the Trial Court in the review application, wherein after perusing the terms of the sample allotment Trial Court has held that the plot allotted at IFC Ghazipur is for warehousing purpose and it is not meant to be used as a shop, whereas the bona fide need pleaded by the landlord in the eviction petition is for operating a shop at the tenanted premises. Further, the Trial Court observed that IFC Ghazipur is located at place which is 25 kms from the Chawri Bazar market and held that no evidence has been led by the tenant that paper market has infact shifted from Chawri Bazar market to IFC Ghazipur. The Petitioners have not disputed the aforesaid findings of fact of the Trial Court. The relevant finding of the Trial Court reads as under:

“11. However, even if for the sake of arguments, the allotment letter dated 31.03.2006 is taken into consideration, a bare perusal of the same shows that it pertains to allotment of warehousing plot. Perpetual lease was granted by DDA with certain terms and conditions, violation of which entail cancellation of allotment/lease. Thus, the premises at Ghazipur are only for warehousing purpose and not meant as a shop which has been the case of the non-applicant/landlord since beginning. Even if it were to be held that the non-applicant/landlord was required to shift his retail shop at Ghazipur or that the non-applicant/landlord has breached the terms and conditions of allotment, he is not stopped from retailing paper from the subject shop and he cannot be deprived of his right to utilize the suit property owned by him for his stated need and force him to carry on his intended business from a far-away place at Ghazipur. The applicant/tenant has never agitated or proved that that all the paper merchants have shifted to Ghazipur. It is also never claimed by the applicant/tenant that paper market is no longer continuing in the locality where the petitioner and his sons are carrying on their business or where the subject shop is situated.”

15. The landlord has duly disclosed the existence of the Plot No. 912 at IFC Ghazipur in the eviction petition. The landlord stated that despite Government’s policy to shift the paper and cardboard business from Chawri Bazar to IFC Ghazipur, Chawri Bazar still continues to be the trading hub for paper and cardboard business. He states that due to lack of business activities and infrastructure, the plot at IFC Ghazipur can be used only for warehouse purposes and it is not suitable for carrying out trading activities as customers still visit Chawri Bazar for placing orders and all related activity happens at Chawri Bazar. The tenant has not disputed the material fact that Chawri Bazaar continues to be a hub for paper market. Further, Sh. Amit Gupta is presently carrying on his business from Chawri Bazar and therefore his need to relocate in the same market to the tenanted premises, as opposed to IFC Ghazipur, which is located 25 kms away, stands to reason. In these facts, the finding of the Trial Court holding that the Plot No. 912 at IFC Ghazipur is not a suitable alternate accommodation does not suffer from any error of law.

16. The landlord has stated since he, himself, is carrying on business in the area of Ahata Kidara, Pahari Dhiraj, Delhi and the tenanted premises are adjoining. Similarly, Sh. Amit Gupta is also carrying on business in the same area from the licensed premises from Slum Authority.

17. The Petitioners, tenants, in the revision petition have set out a list of alternative accommodations available with the Respondent, landlord, which are as under; however, the landlord has duly disclosed the same in the eviction petition and has explained the unsuitability of the said accommodation:

17.1. Property No. 4747 to 4749, Ahata Kidhara, Pahari Dhiraj, New Delhi – It is stated by the Respondent that the Property No. 4747 are the tenanted premises being used by the tenant herein. The property No. 4748 was vacated by the previous tenant Sh. Kishan Kumar Dua during the pendency of subject eviction petition, however, admittedly the said property is now being used by Sh. Sachin Gupta the younger son of the Respondent, landlord. The property no. 4749 is number given to the staircase and it is not a shop premises.

17.2. Property No. 4785, Gali Ahata Kidara, Pahari Dhiraj, New Delhi – The Property No. 4785 is a godown and is already in use by the elder son of the Respondent as disclosed in the eviction petition. It is a property owned by the Slum Authority.

17.3. Premises at Khasra Nos. 563 and 565, Village Siraspur, Delhi and at Khasra No. 639/5 at, Libaspur Delhi – It is stated that the said premises are godowns and are being used for godown purposes by the Respondent, landlord and his sons.

17.4. Property No. 947-949, Chhota Chipiwara, Chawri Bazar, Delhi – It is stated by the Respondent that the said property is owned by Sh. Amit Gupta and the same is lying vacant as it is situated in a narrow by-lane. The said premises is situated 8 kms away from Ahata Kidara, Pahari Dhiraj, Delhi and the same is not suitable to the Respondent or his sons.

17.5. Two allotted alternative plot sites at 912 and 944, Block C at IFC Ghazipur – Plot No. 912 has been dealt with above and held to be unsuitable. It is stated that the Plot no. 944 was sold by Sh. Amit Gupta on 05.04.2011 much prior to the filing of the eviction petiton, which fact is not disputed.

18. The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 has held that in a petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the Court is concerned only with the requirement of a bona fide purpose. The contention regarding availability of alternative accommodation can at best be only an ‘incidental one’.

19. The Trial Court has examined the pleas of the tenant with respect to the existence of alternate accommodation threadbare in the impugned orders dated 16.02.2022 and 03.12.2022 and after perusing the evidence on record held that the tenants’ plea that the said alternate accommodations are suitable for the Respondent, has no merit.

20. The Supreme Court in Anil Bajaj and Anr. V. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 15 SCC 610, has held as under: -

“6. …. What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several other shop houses from which he is carrying on different businesses and further that landlord has other premises from where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be effectively carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose of his business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business.” (Emphasis Supplied)

21. In the present petition there is no plea challenging the finding of the Trial Court with respect to the bona fide need of the landlord and his son addressed during the arguments. It is not disputed that Sh. Amit Gupta, son of the landlord is carrying on business and therefore the contention of the landlord that he needs the tenanted premises for his son’s business stands sufficiently established on record.

22. As per Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the landlord/landlady, is required to prove his/her bona fide need for the tenanted premises as well as that he/she has no other reasonably suitable accommodation, to satisfy their requirement. However, recently the Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam (Supra) has held that in an eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the Court is concerned only with the requirement of a bona fide need and that the plea of alternative accommodation is ‘incidental one’ at best. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment read as under:

“29. Section 14(1)(e) deals with only the requirement of a bona fide purpose. The contention regarding alternative accommodation can at best be only an incidental one. Such a requirement has not been found to be incorrect by the High Court, though it is not even open to it to do so, in view of the limited jurisdiction which it was supposed to exercise. Therefore, the very basis upon which the revision was allowed is obviously wrong being contrary to the very provision contained in Section 14(1)(e) and Section 25B(8).”

The word ‘incidental’ as defined in the Oxford dictionary, sixth edition, refers to ‘occurring as something casual or of secondary importance’. This would mean that availability of alternate accommodation should not become the decisive or pivotal factor in eviction proceedings. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, once a landlord/landlady has sufficiently established his/her plea of bona fide need, the mere availability of alternate accommodation at the disposal of the landlord/landlady is but a secondary factor and not a primary one and therefore the same cannot become the sole basis for permitting the tenant to retain the tenanted accommodation to the peril of the landlord/landlady, particularly once the other factors entitling him/her to recovery the premises have been established. The landlord/landlady having duly disclosed the alternate available accommodation and having reasonably explained that the same are not adequately suitable for his/her requirement, the fact that tenant contends that the said alternate accommodation is suitable cannot detain the Court from passing the eviction order. The Court will reject the explanation offered by the landlord/landlady with respect to the unsuitability of the alternate accommodation only if it is perverse, however the Court need not substitute the preference for tenanted premises shown by landlord/landlady with the dictates of the tenant. The preference shown by landlord/landlady for the possession of the tenanted premises vis-à-vis another alternative accommodation available to him/her cannot be rejected on the say-so of the tenant so as to set at naught the salutary purpose of Section 25B of the DRC Act. [The Technological Institute of Textiles and Sciences v. M/s Shree Nath Ji Developers, RC. REV. 174/2020]

23. In the facts of the present case, the landlord has established the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, namely (i) relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties; in fact the landlord is also the owner of the tenanted premises, (ii) the premises have been let out for commercial purposes, (iii) the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for his elder son, who is dependent on him for his accommodation and wants to carry on his business from the tenanted premises and the landlord has no other reasonable suitable accommodation for his need.

24. The preference expressed by the landlord in the facts of the present case to seek eviction of tenant from the tenanted premises, which are adjoining with the shop used by him cannot be held to be unreasonable. The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222, has held as under: - “14………While considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come.”

25. In revision, the powers of this Court are merely supervisory and one of superintendence and this aspect has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua (supra) and more specifically in paragraph 23 therein as under: “23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

26. Therefore, in all overall conspectus of this case, this Court does not find any merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed.

27. All pending applications also stand disposed of.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J JANUARY 10, 2023/msh/aa